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BOOK
1987

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Contents

Moving the Peace Process Forward 18
At 40: The Search for Peace Continues - **Shimon Peres** 24
On the Peace Process - **Dr. Yossi Beilin** 29
Peacemaking - Appearances and Realities - **Gideon Refael** 34
An Occasion for Peace - **Shimon Peres** 40
The Peace Process - **Aharon Levran** 47
Is the De Facto Peace with Jordan a Better Model Than the De Jure Peace with Egypt? - **Joseph Alpher** 57
A Just and Lasting Peace - Illusion or Reality? - **Yaakov Hisdai** 65
Unnatural Government - **Arie Naor** 71
The Second Republic - **Meron Benvenisti** 74
The Formula for a Strong Economy - **Moshe Nissim** 79
Bank Hapoalim 85
Stabilizing the Economy - **Prof. Michael Bruno** 86
Recovery of the Banking Industry - **Dr. Asher Halperin** 87
Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development in Israel - **Dr. Ran Marom** 91
Moving from Emergency to Stabilization and Growth: A New Kind of Struggle - **Yaakov Pridan** 97
The Economics of Peace - **Elmer L. Winter** 103
The Arab States' Military Buildup and its Impact on the Military Balance with Israel - **Aharon Levran** 105
Arms for the Ayatollahs - **Joseph Alpher** 124
The Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit 130
The Jewish Agency: Fantasy and Reality - **Abba Eban** 132
Israel Faces 40: Renewing Zionist Commitment - **Arye L. Dulzin** 136
Israel and the Administered Territories - **IDF Spokesman** 139
Free Speech and National Security - **Ephraim Lapid** 145
The Role of the Attorney General in Times of Crisis: The Shin Bet Affair - **Itzhak Zamir** 148
Israel - a Durable Democracy - **Chaim Herzog** 159
Israel Must be a Liberal Democracy - **Prof. Sir Isaiah Berlin** 161
The Israel–Diaspora Institute 170

A Time for Radical Educational Restructuring - **Dr. Saul B. Cohen** 171
ORT Around the World 176
High Technology and Jewish Values - **Prof. Ephraim Katzir** 180
Science and Society - **Chaim Herzog** 182
Amal Celebrates its 60th Anniversary 186
Christian Support for Israel - **Jan Willem van der Hoeven** 191
Israel's Leaders comment on the ICEJ 194
Will there be enough Jews for all of Judea and Samaria? - **Jan Willem van der Hoeven** 196
Middle East Survey Anti Semitism or Anti–Zionism. Is there a Difference? - **Jan Willem van der Hoeven** 199
Particularization not Ghettoization - **Dr. David Hartman** 202
The Balfour Declaration Paves the Way - **Chaim Herzog** 205
Israel: Reconcilling the Opposing Dreams - **David Harman** 211
A Democratic Heritage - **Chaim Herzog** 216
Power and Responsibility: Reflections on the Ethics of Jewish Statehood - **David Hartman** 222
Ethics within the Reality of War - **Tzvi Marx** 228
Strengthening the Jewish Spirit - **Chaim Herzog** 232
Jerusalem and Pluralism - a Public Discussion - **Teddy Kollek, Paul van Burren, David Hartman** 237
Renewing our Dedication to the Jewish World - **Chaim Herzog** 253
German-Israel Relations - **Chaim Herzog** 257
An Historic visit to Berlin - **Chaim Herzog** 262
Extradition of John Demjanjuk 269
Reflections on the Trail of John Demjanjuk - **Ernie Meyer** 277
Israel's Territorial Predicament - **Yael Yishai** 280
The Lavi Decision: A Self–Inflicted Wound - **Moshe Arens** 291
Tourism - Israel's Leading Export - **Abraham Sharir** 296
Operatrion Independence Update 299
Advertisement 302
Pursuing Justice - a Tribute to Louis Dembitz Brandeis - **Chaim Herzog** 311
A Letter to Elie Weisel - **Jan Willem van der Hoeven** 316

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What Made the Headlines in Israel during 1987?

Calendar of Events:

January

- Lavi jet makes its maiden flight; flight a success, but funding in doubt
- Sakharov meets Ida Nudel
- New York's Cardinal O'Connor pays controversial visit to Israel. The Vatican's contradictory attitude confuses and embarrasses Cardinal
- Shas Minister Yitzhak Peretz quits government over convert ID card controversy. Insists on having some way of marking a convert's halachic status in civilian identification papers
- Bank Leumi ex-director Ernst Japhet keeps his severance pay — $4.5 million, despite public outrage and calls for investigation of WZO
- Irangate continues to boil — Israel is implicated by US documents
- Shamir pledges assistance to assailed SLA
- Murphy continues Mideast swing in Jerusalem
- Coalition averts renewed debate on 'Who is a Jew' bill
- Peres and Nissim seek 'mini' economic reform
- IDF gets its first Ethiopian officer
- Economic cabinet approves $320 million cut in state budget
- 15% more road accidents in 1986
- Israel planes raid terrorists in Beka'a
- 1986 inflation 19.7% after December index
- Hospital workers' strike paralyzes Israel's health system
- Shamir 'could trade land for peace'
- Dr. Meir Heth to be named Leumi chief
- Bob Hawke arrives to warm welcome
- IDF move to improve liaison with UNIFIL
- Economic package signed

February

- Irangate continues — at Senate, further testimony does little to clear Israel
- US 6th Fleet sails to Lebanon — reprisals promised should harm come to American hostages
- Soviets release 42 dissidents from prisons and camps
- US hostages in Lebanon reprieved
- International conference threatens to split coalition. Peres and Shamir go to their corners and prepare for the expected fight
- 9 hurt, one seriously, in Egged bus blast
- Shomron is 13th Chief of General Staff
- Israel to get a say on VOA broadcasts
- Chernobyl polluted herbs were sold here
- TV blocked out as technicians strike over chief's suspension
- Shamir pledges to aid Bedouin
- Transplant man (Dr. Michael Shirman) leaves hospital
- IAF hits targets near Sidon
- Yosef Begun is released from Soviet prison
- Meir Ya'ari, Mapam founder, dies at 90
- UNIFIL's chief sapper killed by katyusha
- John (Ivan) Demjanjuk trial begins in Jerusalem (16/2). American lawyer Mark O'Connor is joined by Israeli advocate Yoram Sheftel in defending accused Nazi war criminal, before justices Tal etc
- Syrian troops enter Beirut
- International conference supported by EEC
- Hospital strikes on-off throughout month
- Tower Report finds that Israel actively encouraged US in Iran arms deal
- Shamir 'satisfied' with New York meetings
- Horrors of Treblinka dominate testimony trial
- 12 Border Police hurt in attack outside Old City
- Kahane loses postal privileges
- Peres off to Cairo

March

- IDF Chiefs want to scrap Lavi for F-16
- Danny Kaye dies at 74
- Col. Aviem Sela indicted in US for his part in Pollard case (4/3). Sela recruited Pollard while studying in New York
- Jonathan Pollard gets life sentence, his wife, Anne, gets 5 years in prison. Both are placed in maximum security prisons, under extremely harsh conditions. Anne Pollard suffers from severe stomach disease

- Israel probe into Pollard case investigates Israel's role. Hazorea Commission to investigate Rafi Eitan's intelligence unit and brief
- Hospital strike ends
- Leftists who met PLO go on trial
- Shazar Prize to Abba Eban
- Funds pour in for Pollards
- IDF officer killed, soldier wounded in security zone
- Win over Czechoslovakia takes Israel to Davis Cup quarter final
- Begun's son arrested
- Soviets free 10 more dissidents
- Government decides on limited sanctions against South Africa
- Low-key South African reaction to Israeli sanctions
- China announces talk with Israel
- Rabbinate ready to do battle with High Court on converts
- Egypt invites Waldheim
- Entire Western Wall now uncovered
- U.S. welcomes Sella's decision to quit Tel Nof air base
- Knesset sets fixed minimum wage
- U.S. tried to plant spies in Israel
- Israel could get China's coal instead of Pretoria
- Leftists who met PLO go on trial
- Soviets to permit flights through Romania for Jews
- Herut convention closes peacefully after Levy and Sharon threaten Shamir's position
- State budget passes

April

- Shamir shown new Merkava
- Jerusalem Electric Co. told it is losing its concession in Jewish neighborhoods
- Herzog visit to Bonn ends era of restraints. Herzog visits Bergen-Belsen
- 1,000 publishers show their wares at Israel Book Fair
- Economy booms, statistics show
- Peres meets with Soviet officials at Socialist Convention held in Rome
- Petrol bomber kills settler
- Appeal is likely to be heard in new Shin Bet affair
- Foreign currency rules relaxed
- Peres-Shamir face off on international conference again
- West Bank unrest — students arrested in Bir Zeit University
- Stormy Palestinian National Council ends in Algiers rejects UN Resolution 242, pledges continued armed struggle

- US resigned to fall of unity government over international peace conference
- Court admits Trawniki ID card into evidence at Demjanjuk trial
- Holocaust memorial dedicated at Wall
- Planning approved for Eilat railway
- Yuli Edelshtein to be freed
- Restoration completed of Jewish Quarter
- Entire Demjanjuk bench to Germany
- $150,000 raised for Pollard defense fund
- Rabin pledges campaign against terror in areas
- Settling Soviet Jews will cost IS 350,000

May

- Political crisis in Israel halts US sponsorship for Arab-Israel peace process
- Klaus Barbie faces accusers in French court
- 8 year old boy slain in Alon Moreh
- Circassian Issat Nafsu released, cleared of treason and espionage
- Israeli gunned down in Gaza
- 60,000 teachers strike
- IAF hits PLO bases near Sidon
- Egged strike averted at last minute
- El Al may break through Iron Curtain
- Students up in arms over discriminatory tuition fees
- Sport triumphs as India agrees to host Israelis
- Jerusalem awaits 'definitive statement' from King Hussein
- Likud lashes out against international conference
- Key Israeli role in arming Contras
- Shamir visits Poland
- Kalkilya violence escalates
- Former refusenik dies on way to Israel
- Soldiers eject settlers from Patriarchs' Cave
- McFarlane denies Israel 'conspiracy'
- Foreign currency reserve burgeons
- Pollard probes in Israel find that ministers should have known
- PLO coordinating attacks on Israel with Hizbullah

June

- GSS probe named by Supreme Court President Meir Shamgar. Moshe Landau, Yaacov Malz, Yitzhak Hofi
- Rashid Karame Killed

- Settlers rampage in Dehaishe
- 'Scrap Lavi' mood growing among cabinet ministers
- Israeli boy, 14, stabbed in Hebron
- Rare welcome for Shamir on arrival in Togo
- Siniora to stand for Jerusalem elections
- Ethiopia holds 37 Jewish activists
- U.S. move to close PLO office in capitol
- Public stranded as Egged bus drivers strike
- Kahane ousted from Knesset for not taking standard oath of allegiance
- Petrol to rise up 20% by August 1
- Rabin goes to U.S. to discuss Lavi options
- Treasury and Histadrut stand firm in wage war
- Nazi past mentioned briefly as Waldheim meets with Pope
- Hizbullah in concerted Lebanon raid
- Peled warns IDF won't be limited
- Judges dominate Shin Bet probe commission
- Leftists who met PLO in Budapest to be prosecuted
- U.S. Jews meet Arafat
- TV and Radio strike for 6% pay increase
- Shamir, Peres reopen dispute on international talks
- Chinese invite Communists from Israel on 10-day visit
- Soviet consular delegation arrives to deal with Soviet property problems
- Israel to supply more Irangate information
- Waldheim visits Jordan

July

- Refusenik made to wait dies of cancer in Moscow
- Rabin okays West Bank water drilling project
- NBC film on areas causes storm
- Barbie gets life
- 6 year-old Tal Moses dies of bomb injuries
- 450,000 workers strike against government refusal for wage increases
- Comptroller report criticizes Lavi
- Attempts made for Lavi recovery plan
- Druse uprising in Beit Jann
- Oliver North begins testimony — "assumed Reagan knew"
- US warships to Gulf
- 2 bills for conversion voted down
- Worst heat wave in 30 years
- Yuli Edelshtein here

- Newspapers out on strike
- Israeli tourists barred from entering India
- Moscow may let Jews visit Israel as tourists
- Tourists return to Egypt as terror fear recedes
- Davis Cup squad unfazed by tight security in Delhi, Israeli national tennis team in India
- Washington said planning $1 billion arms sale to Saudis
- Schweppes said bowing to Arab boycott
- IAF planes sink terrorist boat
- Pickering reaffirms U.S. interest in peace parley
- 5,000 Israeli women mass for peace
- Thatcher to press Reagan on backing for peace parley
- Interest rates fall
- Soviets warn: Jericho rocket threat to USSR

August

- Gaza sealed after IDF officer slain
- Peres, Rabin reject U.S. deal on Taba
- Amman, Moscow near deal on Mig-29s
- Thousands in march against Sabbath film showings
- Hess takes his secret to the grave
- Israel, Hungary close to renewal of ties
- Roadside protests staged by farmers in northern Israel
- UN soldier dies, six IDF men hurt in Lebanon
- Beer Sheva man stable after heart transplant
- Inner Cabinet authorizes large water drilling near Herodian
- Single vote dooms the Lavi
- Vanunu goes on trial
- West Bankers among Mecca dead
- Arafat gets warm welcome in Delhi
- Murphy says Syria may talk directly to Israel
- Health Ministry to issue pamphlet on heat
- Violent demo in East Jerusalem
- Shamir in Romania wants to boost East bloc ties
- Terrorist 'suicide' gang arrested

September

- Likud wants revote on Lavi
- Arens resigns post
- 20,000 Israel Aircraft Industries workers for Jerusalem rally

- Yosef Begun gets exit visa
- Rabin pays homage to Dachau victims
- Summer time saved $6.2 million
- Daliya Brailovsky, 15-year refusenik arrives
- Shultz coming to promote conference
- Most Arabs strike on back-to-school day
- Syria, Jordan to build dam on Yarmuk
- IAF hits camps near Sidon
- Fatah seen behind slaying of Arab cartoonist
- Peres to raise peace parley at UN
- U.S. envoy warns of Jew hatred in Austria
- U.S. Defense Secretary offers Rabin military contracts
- Pope lets Jews down on Israel ties
- Israel, Hungary agree to resume formal relations
- West Bank civil chief quits over policy
- AJC to take sides on peace parley
- More reports of talks on freeing Iranian Jews
- Assad: parity with Israel a must
- Israel likely to win $200 million U.S. contract
- Welcome to Soviet mission extended 'several months'

October

- Peres in historic talks with China's foreign minister
- Dollar and stock markets slump around the world
- First state visit to U.S. for Israeli president
- Israel, Egypt set up panel on Taba strip
- Ida Nudel, arrives to tumultuous welcome
- Slepak to get visa at last
- Golan wine wins gold at world contest
- Armand Hammer foresees Moscow-Jerusalem ties
- Local capital caught up in (Wall Street) panic
- Shultz in Jerusalem
- Eight prominent Palestinians boycott Shultz
- Just 1.5 million Jews left in USSR
- Israeli lauds Egyptians for rescue from Sinai flood
- New fund urges Jews to have more children
- Shamir denies shift on parley formula
- Israel anxiously monitoring possible U.S. cuts
- Student wounded in violent protest at Bethlehem University
- Wounded UN soldier shot dead by SLA

- U.S. to begin building VOA relay station
- Troops fire at rioters as Gaza violence continues
- Israel selling arms 'secretly to China'
- Bank shares have lost NIS 700 million
- No victory in Gulf War seen as best for Israel

November

- "GSS lied for 16 years" reports Landau Committee
- Chirac arrives
- Stevedores' go-slow at ports costing loss of millions
- Herzog leaves on U.S. visit
- Terrorists on gliders strike army camp in North, 6 soldiers killed
- Treasury tough against devaluation despite dollar fall
- Seven more hospitals hit by sanctions
- Israel gets thumbs down on new F-16 participation
- Big Beer Sheva plant may be shut down because of pollution
- No change in policy after Weinberger, Israel told
- Jews in areas nearing 58,000
- Plunging dollar hits record low levels
- Abu Nidal group 'seajacks' 8 Belgians off Israeli coast
- Amman summit opens
- Hussein pleas to stop Iran-Iraq war and to confront Israel
- Hussein urges Arab unity against Israel
- Settlers held after Gaza girl shot dead
- Devaluation possibility recedes with low index
- Arab nations renew ties with Egypt
- Top Egyptian arrives to mark Sadat visit
- Fatah men seized at sea
- Sharon moves to apartment in Jerusalem Old City
- Israel tells Congress that North instigated Iran deal
- State Department urges Israel not to expel Awad
- Austrian politician quits over anti-Semitic remark
- Israel upset by UK veto of European Council accord
- Curfew clamped on Balata after violent protests
- UN opens up war crimes archive
- US-USSR reach full accord on middle range missiles
- Judge rules Jerusalem ban on Sabbath films is out of bounds
- Unrest in West Bank and Gaza — Settlers vs Palestinians and the Army in the middle

December

- Greek foreign minister here; Peres expects better ties
- Subsidies on food and transport to be cut
- Dinitz new World Zionist Organization Chairman
- 200,000 mass in U.S. capitol on behalf of Soviet Jews
- Jewish areas across Green Line linked to national power grid
- Areas violence flares
- Rioting gets extensive coverage in Western media
- Authorities split on moves to deport activists
- Soldier wounded on border with Egypt
- Israel denies it is selling arms to Iran
- Peres confirms meeting Hussein in London
- Kremlin behind East Bloc thaw with Israel
- Israeli knifed to death in busy Gaza square
- Interest rate falls after central bank recants
- IDF officer, four terrorists killed in Lebanon sea clash
- Israel defends army's behavior in areas
- Gaza workers urged to stay home to use boycott as protest
- Israel launches effort to save image hurt by policy in areas
- White House raps Israel's 'harsh measures'
- Israel rejects UN censure on areas
- Shamir to Israel Arabs: Spurn PLO
- Infiltrators captured, crossed from Jordan
- Authorities split on moves to deport activists

Prime Minister Y. Shamir in peace conference with Secretary of State G. Shultz in Jerusalem

Moving the Peace Process Forward

When discussing Israel's foreign policy vis-a-vis the Middle East conflict, it is important to note the changes that have taken place in this region in recent years. Peace between Israel and Egypt is, of course, the most important development — one which gained further momentum when the issue of Taba was submitted to arbitration in 1986, followed by the summit meeting in September 1986 between then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Alexandria, and a subsequent meeting in February 1987 (Peres was then Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister), which dealt mainly with the idea of an international conference. It is crucial for President Mubarak to continue his efforts to expand the peace process in this area.

Jordan has undergone changes as well. Between 1967 and 1974, Jordan was ready to have peaceful relations with Israel based on conditions Israel could not accept then. In 1974, the Rabat resolution created a new situation in the area, in which the PLO was accepted as the sole representative of the Palestinians. And then, for ten years, King Hussein made no effort toward any kind of indirect negotiations with Israel. In 1984, Hussein shifted his position — he was now ready to participate in negotiations with Israel provided that two main conditions were accepted: the convening of an international conference; and the participation of the PLO in this process. The February 1985 agreement between the PLO and King Hussein lasted only one year. The King's policy towards the West Bank and the Gaza Strip shifted as well, and he began assisting the population in the administered territories, in order to strengthen his own position there. Hussein's readiness to take part in the process is the most significant factor involved in this new approach.

The war between Iran and Iraq also has had its impact on our area. The fundamentalism in Iran is creating — or already has created — something new in our area: a coalition of moderate Arab states, like Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who would like to see peace initiatives and who perceive the threat of Iran as much more frightening than the threat represented by Israel.

Syria has been seriously weakened economically in recent years and, lately, militarily as well. The veto power of Syria against Jordan has also diminished. From Israel's point of view, this is a positive development. The oil crisis is an additional factor to be considered. The veto power — the blackmailing power — of the oil producers has been weakened.

Israel's Response: Two Options

The main question with which Israel must contend, then, is how to react to all these developments in the region. There are two possibilities dividing Israeli public opinion: One is to support the status quo, as a failure at the negotiating table may lead to a deterioration of the situation; accordingly, it may be better not to launch this campaign than to launch it and fail. In addition, negotiation always ends in compromise, which might ultimately weaken Israel. So, preserving the present situation is preferable.

The other option, of course, is to advance the political process. First, it is impossible to preserve a status quo. Recall the traumatic experience of 1973, when much of the nation felt Israel had achieved its strategic targets, and yet it was still surprised by a war in which it paid a very high price. Further, there is the demographic problem. Presently under Israel's control, including the territories, are about 2 million non-Jews, mainly Arabs, and approximately 3.5 million Jews — a clear Jewish majority — but, in terms of Israel's future, it may become a problem. Finally, nobody knows whether the situation in the Arab world will remain as it is, whether the moderate regimes in Jordan and Egypt and in other states will prevail. And we may lose an opportunity, a very good point in time to move the peace process forward.

Peace is very important to all of us — for Israel and for our Arab neighbors. It will transfer our resources from security to economic growth and welfare.

Historical Lessons

In the twenty years prior to the establishment of the state, between 1929 when the Jewish Agency was formed until 1948, Israel was engaged primarily in the difficult task of establishing its independent national identity. During the following twenty years, between 1948 and 1967, our efforts were turned to proving that our independence is not a passing phenomenon. And from 1967 until now, most of our time has been spent in preventive measures — repelling attacks, such as the Six Day War, and dealing with their results. Too many chances have been lost along the way by all of us. I believe, for example, that Israel missed a very interesting chance in 1971 to participate in talks with Jordan and Egypt to find a way to peace. The Arabs made mistakes as well; as in 1947 when they rejected the idea of a separate state, which had been proposed by the United Nations. And ten years ago, they made another mistake by bluntly rejecting the idea of Camp David. Had they taken advantage of this opportunity, they might now have autonomy.

The lesson we must learn from history is that Israelis and Arabs, Palestinians and the Arab states, must not repeat these mistakes. It is folly to think that time is working in our favor. Every moment that passes without peace is a precious moment lost. The Arab states are spending huge sums of money for the purchase of arms to be used in wars against each other, against Israel. But the standard of living declines and poverty increases. As for Israel, every moment without peace is a moment of less education, less prosperity and, what is more important, less immigration.

International Framework for Direct Talks

The best way to solve the Palestinian problem and resolve the conflict with the Arab states would be direct negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. I believe that the Palestinian issue is the heart of the problem. There is no chance for any agreement between Israel and the Arab states without solving the Palestinian problem.

We understand that it is impossible to conduct direct negotiations with the Jordanians and the Palestinians at this moment. Syria's veto power is Jordan's main deterrent. Therefore, there is a need for an international conference.

Then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres appeared in the UN General Assembly in October 1985 and said openly that if the Jordanian condition for launching the peace process is the idea of an international conference, he accepts it.

But there are some initial requirements for such a conference. Israel's major condition is that the conference not become a substitute for direct negotiations; the parties themselves must determine their own future. The conference would be prelude to or an umbrella for direct negotiations between the parties.

The other condition, based on Jordan's request for the participation of the five permanent members, is that all five members must have diplomatic ties with the parties in the conference. Here, Israel is mainly concerned with the Soviet Union: It should resume relations with Israel and change its policy towards Soviet Jewish emigration.

Palestinian representation is a further problem. Some years ago, the Arab world might have been united about the participation of the PLO in the peace process. This is not necessarily the case now. Syria will not support the participation in such a conference of the PLO led by Arafat, and neither will King Hussein, after having broken relations with the PLO in February 1986. Furthermore, relations between Egypt and the PLO have been similarly disrupted following the April 1987 meeting of the Palestinian National Council in Algiers.

Israel's position — and this is the view of both major political parties in Israel — is that the PLO, which is still engaged in terror, and which has not changed its stand regarding the existence of Israel, will not participate in this conference. The alternative is that the Jordanian delegation will include a Palestinian delegation, and every Palestinian who resides in the administered territories will be permitted to take part, as will others, as mutually agreed.

Negotiations without Prior Conditions

If these problems are solved, and if Israel finds itself participating in an international conference, the question of an eventual permanent solution still remains. The suggestions of the different parties to the conflict are well known. There is the Palestinians' request to have a separate Palestinian state in the Israel-administered territories. The Jordanians want a federation; and it still is unclear whether they are speaking about two independent states. In Israel, there are views about the annexation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as well as about territorial compromise. The question is whether we should enter an international conference with the solutions already in mind. This seems to be a mistake.

The dynamics of an international conference may lead to a solution, perhaps different from those mentioned above. Perhaps the best solution would be one that will enable every side to say, "Well, my dreams are still there, I hope to achieve them, maybe not this year, maybe next year or next generation"; perhaps it will be something along the lines of the European communities, in which some economic and cultural ties will be maintained in order to ensure the security of all parties involved.

The Israeli-Palestinian problem is not an ancient one; it goes back only some decades. The hatred is not such that no solution can be found. On this tiny piece of land, two peoples may become good neighbors in the future.

International Political Involvement

Every side uses the other side's problems in order to say that nothing can be done. For example, it is said that the United States is busy with the Iran affair, so they can't do anything now; there is a presidential crisis, so let us wait until after the elections in 1988 when there will be another administration and maybe then something will happen. Or, people claim that the Soviet Union is molding new policies towards many parts of the world and it is therefore too early now to try and launch the peace process; let us wait and see if Mr. Gorbachev consolidates his power to know exactly what he intends to do. There is opposition in Egypt and problems in Jordan, so let us hold off. There are many excuses to avoid finding a solution.

The participation of the PLO in an international conference is impossible. Palestinian involvement without the formal participation of the PLO, could facilitate the way to such a conference.

It would be difficult for President Assad to participate in this international conference. It seems it is easier for Syria to use the conflict as a tool toward some end rather than to resolve the conflict. Of course, Syria is welcome to participate.

Of course there are some difficulties in Israel too. We will continue our efforts to find the modalities for this international conference and the moment the conditions are accepted, the idea will be brought to the Israeli Cabinet for a decision.

Soviet Recognition of Israel

The Soviets understand that they made a mistake in 1967 by severing relations with Israel. They did not gain anything from it, and they lost the possibility of having any kind of access to the country's leadership. This does not mean that acknowledging this mistake will lead them to change their policy tomorrow. But if there is to be an international conference, the Soviets will have to resume their relations with us, and open the gates for Jews who want to leave the Soviet Union.

The Iran-Iraq War

Irangate is now more an American story than an Israeli one since quantitative input was very marginal. About $450 billion was spent between Iran and Iraq, and Israel sold about 10 or 15 million dollars of ammunition only. This is not going to change the balance of power. The continuation of this war is not in Israel's national interest. It is to Israel's benefit that there be no winning parties in this war.

Arab Moderation and Peace

The notion of moderate Arab states is interesting: To what extent are we dealing with image and to what extent are we dealing with reality? Sharp differences surely exist between Syria on the one hand and Egypt on the other. But in terms of the peace process, it seems that one must think about what goes on within the Arab countries. There is no indication that in the so-called moderate Arab states the public has been seriously prepared to accept the kind of process that is being discussed.

People often say everything is public relations. For instance, Gorbachev is all public relations, and he is actually more conservative than the others, but he understood that being moderate is the best game in town now so he became moderate. Or, they say that they are all extremists is Israel and it is just a question of playing roles, so Peres became the moderate one while Shamir is the extremist and they simply arrange everything between them. Israel sometimes says the same thing about the Arab world: Mubarak or the late Sadat were extreme like the others, but when they saw an opportunity they played another role for a while till they went back to their real — extreme — interests.

However, Egypt's moderation is legitimate. The view of the people cannot be changed in a year or two — there are anti-Semitic cartoons in some of the papers and criticism against Israel in the opposition press. But Israel's experience with the Egyptians is proving that it is possible to have peace in our area, despite the mutual mistrust, the problems we face and the normalization, which is far from perfect. Normalization is not a 100 percent bilateral concern; for example, there are many Israeli tourists traveling to Egypt although there are very few Egyptian tourists in Israel. Yet the progress is enormous, when you consider the change between 1977 and 1987. This is a very good precedent for continuing the process.

Israel-Lebanon Relations

Lebanon will not participate in such an international conference, although it is welcome. The question is, of course, who will represent Lebanon now? For the time being there is no solution to the internal Lebanese problem. Israel left Lebanon, and has no wish to be involved in its internal problems. Israel does not see the presence of its soldiers in the security belt as permanent, but rather as a stop-gap measure, until the moment that Israel is sure that its northern front is secure. I hope that it won't take long before we leave Lebanon altogether. As for the prospect of a peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, it won't be possible in the near future.

Israeli Public Opinion

It should be recalled that a short while before Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977, Israelis were asked about the importance of the Sinai Peninsula to them and about 70 percent said that they would prefer to have Sharm el-Sheik and the Sinai Peninsula rather than peace. Some weeks after the visit, the same question was asked and 70 percent were in favor of conceding on this point. It is very difficult to ask people about vague ideas, like the international conference, or if they believe the Arabs will make peace with Israel. The question should be asked during negotiations, when the atmosphere is completely changed. If public opinion is divided now, I believe that when peace is felt to be around the corner, it will be much less so.

At 40: The Search for Peace Continues

Shimon Peres

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

In a world grown cynical of the superpowers' increased arms competition, and fearful of the technologies it has unleashed, the people of Israel appreciate the readiness of the United States and the Soviet Union to begin a process of nuclear disarmament. This is not just a technical accord. It is a political dictum: no longer can we find military answers to political problems — what is necessary are political answers to the military menace.

The world remains divided. While on the global level the parties seem to edge slowly toward accommodation, on the regional level passions still endure.

Today, threatening mines in international waterways are symbols not of the modernity of warfare but of its persistence. In our region, mines of extremism lurk just beneath the surface. They may explode when least expected. Thus we support the attempt to introduce a durable cease-fire in the Persian Gulf.

In the vicinity of the world's most significant source of oil, two flames send dark clouds that obscure the horizon: the flame of fundamentalism launched to overpower moderation; and the flame of belligerency — residue of the Arab-Israeli dispute — seemingly calm; it is hardly extinguished. Each flame may reinforce the other.

Never before was the menace of extremism so perilous, never before were the moderate forces of the Middle East — on both sides — closer to an understanding than today. Both Arabs and Israelis can be at peace with themselves only if they reach peace with each other. Fundamentalism threatens moderation. Belligerency consumes resources that can help contain extremism.

Arabs are troubled by the thrust of fundamentalism as they struggle with an impossibly expensive arms race and the need to address the deserved expectations of a rapidly growing population. Israelis are troubled by a demography wrought by war and the need to sustain a defense posture of "the few" against "the many".

This is the heavy toll of the region's flames. They can be further fuelled or extinguished. Our actions today can either unleash forces of yet untold destruction or launch us on a course of a new promise.

Israel is celebrating its 40th anniversary. Four decades studded by hostility and war. From the memories of the Holocaust we have had to build a new life, as tragic biographies merged into a history of hope. We have returned to the birthplace of our faith, to the cradle of our biblical values. The language of the prophets now echoes with the joy of children in the mountains and valleys where it began. Deserts were turned into gardens, human talent into industries. No emergency has delayed the growth of the democratic spirit; no war has prevented the construction of a just society and a modern economy.

The historical analogy is inspiring: for 40 years our people wandered in the desert before Moses brought them to the Promised Land. Today, after 40 years in the wilderness of belligerency, we stand at the gates of a new promise to our children — and to those of our neighbors — to live in understanding despite the differences; to determine their own fate without interference by armed forces triggered by hate. Can we offer them a Middle East where the intellectual challenge is man's conquest over nature, free of man's conquest over man? In brief — to bring peace.

We remember the last words of Moses before parting with his people at the gates of the Promised Land. He admitted his inability to provide them with adequate clothing and fresh bread and he offered them the right of choice:

"I have set before you life and death; blessing and cursing. Therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." (*Deuteronomy 30:19*)

The coming few months may be crucial. During this brief period we may begin negotiations on one of the most important issues of our day — or miss the Ark of Hope. This brief period may produce the long sought after breakthrough or be absorbed by political paralysis. Confidence, that was built carefully — almost tacitly — among several parties in the area may evaporate. A coalition for peace, held together by fragile links, may fall apart with uncertain likelihood of revival.

Present crises — in the Persian Gulf or Lebanon — may take unexpected turns; disillusionment with the absence of progress may produce new coalitions of hostility. Thus, in the absence of a vibrant peace process, the political skies may become capricious again, bringing drought to a thirsty region. Against these prospects of uncertainty stands the unprecedented — if vulnerable — reality whereby relevant parties to the conflict see a way to begin negotiations. Indeed, two years ago, both Arabs and Israelis pledged support for the current initiative for peace from the podium of the United Nations. Moreover, since then, further progress has been made.

We have rekindled our peace with Egypt and intensified the dialogue with its leaders and people. We found President Mubarak to be a builder of a better life for his people and of bridges for a comprehensive peace in the region. At the cedar groves of the mountain of Ifrane, we met courageous leadership: King Hassan of Morocco calling for peace, loud and clear. Across the Jordan River, rich in history and poor in water we hear the echo of the voice of King Hussein. An experienced leader who wishes, like us, to bring our peoples out of the darkness of old hostility into the new greenhouses of peace, security and development.

In the West Bank and Gaza we notice an unannounced change. Many Palestinians seem to have concluded that violence leads nowhere; that dialogue should not be postponed. There is a readiness to negotiate in a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to solve a problem which all of us need and would like to solve — the Palestinian problem.

We have all matured politically with the repeated failure at attempts to produce peace plans for our region; we have realized that none can be acceptable as a precondition for negotiation. For it is the object of negotiation to produce solutions otherwise unattainable. Hence, over the past three years, efforts have focused on the most promising plan: begin negotiations without pre-planning their outcome.

Five months ago these efforts crystallized and found expression in a document worked out with the support of American emissaries, whose tireless and creative efforts should be credited with much of what has been accomplished. It reflected a meeting of minds based on eight principles:

1. The goal is peace. Direct negotiations are the way to get there.
2. An international conference is the door to direct negotiations. Once convened it should lead immediately to face-to-face, bilateral negotiations.
3. The conference will not impose a settlement or veto agreements reached bilaterally.
4. Those who attend the conference must accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and renounce terrorism and violence.
5. Negotiations are to solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. This is to be done in negotiations between the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the Israeli delegation.
6. Negotiations will be conducted independently in three bilateral-geographic committees:

A Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and an Israeli delegation in one.

A Syrian and an Israeli delegation in another.

A Lebanese and an Israeli delegation in the third.

All delegations, as well as an Egyptian one, will be invited to participate in a fourth, multilateral committee.

7. Whereas the bilateral committees will be engaged in solving the conflicts of the past, the multilateral committee will deal with charting opportunities for the region's future.

8. The five permanent members are to serve as the match-makers; entrusted with bringing the parties together, and legitimizing the process whereby the parties negotiate freely and directly, without uninvited — and occasionally divided — external involvement. This is not a ceremonial task, but an essential role for facilitating negotiations.

Israel is united in its search for peace; in its desire to negotiate directly with its neighbors. We differ over how best to move the process forward. An international conference raises opposition in some Israeli quarters, while others see it as an opening.

The Israeli Cabinet is divided on the issue and is yet to make a decision. Much depends on the nature of the conference. Unless the permanent members of the Security Council respect the current consensus — rather than insist on their old preferences — the international conference will remain just a slogan.

We call upon the Soviet Union to credit us with the same good faith in our efforts for peace as we credit it in its readiness to make *Glasnost* a way of life. The Soviet Union is not our enemy. It must be aware of our historical and family attachment to our brethren living on its land. We appeal to the new leadership in Moscow to allow the Jewish people to express their identity freely and to allow them to reunite with their destiny in the land of their ancestors.

We call upon the People's Republic of China, the great country that we respect, not to be timid or one-sided in its support for free negotiation.

To both Moscow and Beijing we say candidly, diplomatic relations are not the prize for peace but a channel for communication. Those wishing to participate in bringing peace cannot confine their relations to one side of the rivalry alone.

And to the Palestinian people: the time for recrimination and blame is past. These have brought only violence and terror. Now is the time to turn from violence to dialogue, and travel jointly towards a different destiny. There, your children like ours, will live in self-respect, exercise self-expression and enjoy freedom and peace. We, who have experienced others' domination, do not wish to dominate others. We, who sought justice and security, do not wish to deny them to others.

For the past forty years, this ancient region has become — not by choice — a testing ground for the technology of war. Thousands of human lives have been lost tragically and billions of dollars were spent to no avail.

Unable to change the past, we can design a future where our region can develop into a testing ground for mobilizing science and technology to offer a new source of growth. A future where peace attracts economic investment; a future where resources spared by restraining arms races are invested in basic and higher education.

It is this vision of an alternative future that has given birth to the suggestion that in the wake of the opening of political negotiations, an economic conference — without political strings attached — will take place. Composed of those who have a stake in regional stability, and the capacity to contribute to it, it can offer a most imaginative plan for regional development.

To those who preach indecision; to those who take shelter in the illusion of a tranquil status quo, we say: this is our moment of choice. Decisions of today will determine the fate of our people for decades to come.

Our choice is between hatred and dialogue; suspicion and hope.

Our choice is between investment in an endless arms race and between investment in the well-being of our people.

Our choice is between extremism and moderation; between fundamentalism and reason. It is our choice to prevent the next war.

It is up to us to make the months to come a time for reason.

I am convinced there are no conflicts without hope for solution, only people who have lost hope in their search for solutions. I am convinced that the real conflict today in the Middle East is not between Jew and Moslem; Arab and Israeli; Palestinian and Zionist. The conflict is between "past oriented" leadership and "future oriented" ones; between those resigned to the fatalism of belligerency and those determined to alter this fate. For the future of our children, for a better tomorrow, we must all stand up to the preachers of war. To the advocates of destruction, united we say: there are no holy wars, only holy human lives.

Already on the first day of our Independence I learned from my mentor, David Ben-Gurion, that peace is the highest degree of security; and the moral call is the highest degree of wisdom. I shall remember it forever.

Address to the 42nd Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York.

On the Peace Process



Dr. Yossi Beilin

Foreign Ministry Director-General for Political Affairs

Exactly 20 years ago, Israel found itself extended throughout the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Golan Heights and the Gaza Strip. For the first time in our history, Israel, a National Unity government, as well as the entire political spectrum, were in a state of shock at the victory.

Immediately upon the conclusion of the war, Israel put forward the most far-reaching proposal yet advanced for a peace agreement with its neighbors. The decision, adopted on June 19, 1967, called for peace negotiations with Egypt and Syria based on the international borders; no specific proposal was made regarding Jordan.

The unequivocal Arab reply was issued at the Arab summit meeting in Khartoum on September 1, 1967: No peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with Israel.

On November 22, 1967, Security Council Resolution 242 was adopted. This resolution, whose great advantage lies in its vagueness, coupled withdrawal from territories occupied in 1967 with peace in the region. The advantage to

Israel was that it was not required to withdraw immediately from all the territories. The advantage for the Arabs was the acceptance of the principle of withdrawal. Resolution 242 established the procedure that an emissary of the UN Secretary General — Gunnar Jarring in this case — would be sent to the region to encourage a peace agreement.

In the critical years between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, several parallel efforts were made to advance the peace process, all of which failed:

□ Gunnar Jarring's mission, involving numerous visits to the region and specific proposals;

□ The Rogers proposals, based on implementation of Resolution 242 through minor border corrections and, at a certain stage, a unilateral Israeli withdrawal;

□ Talks among the four powers, initiated by the Soviet Union, with the aim of imposing a solution of the states of the region.

In the course of the six years between the wars, both sides — Arab and Israeli — made errors and missed opportunities. Had the Arab states accepted the original Israeli proposal, they could have regained all or most of the territories occupied by Israel; while Israel, which rejected the proposals raised in early 1971 by Jarring, had to fight the Yom Kippur War, and ultimately surrendered what it had previously refused to yield. The Arabs thought that international pressure would restore the territories to them; while Israelis believed that they had nothing to lose by not arriving at a settlement with the Arab states, and that time would work in their favor. Reality proved different. Israel began to establish settlements in the territories and retracted its 1967 proposal; while the Arabs, who never renounced their belligerent intentions, once again went to war with Israel.

The 1973 Geneva Conference, which was the direct result of the Yom Kippur War, gave rise to interim agreements with Egypt and Syria and, indirectly, to the 1978 Camp David accords, which constituted the most important breakthrough to peace in the Middle East since 1948. The Rabat decision of 1974, declaring the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, seriously impaired Jordan's chances of entering into negotiations with Israel.

The hopes of Egypt and Israel that other Arab states would follow the example of the Camp David accords failed to materialize. In Baghdad, the Arab world decided to sever relations with Egypt. The peace treaty signed with Lebanon in 1983 following a controversial war there was, in short, hopeless.

The first significant change began in 1984. A new government was established in Israel, according priority to ending the war in Lebanon, the ironing out of differences with Egypt, and the opening of negotiations with Jordan. In September, Jordan renewed its diplomatic ties with Egypt; and in November, with the convening of the Palestine National Council in Amman, King Hussein, addressing the Council, spoke of an international conference and of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

Ten years after Rabat, there were signs of a real change in King Hussein's position. He was now ready to take part in negotiations with Israel, with the international conference and Palestinian participation providing the necessary backing and protecting him against efforts to torpedo his initiative. His efforts to reach an agreement with the PLO ultimately ended in failure, when the PLO rejected his conditions for participation in the negotiations — acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and a halt to terrorism.

Israel could have said "no" to the new option. Indeed, it was hard to be enthusiastic about the idea of an international conference. The United States didn't want it. Israel preferred direct talks, although it had in the past agreed to an international conference. Even Egypt preferred not to have to seek recourse in such a conference. Nevertheless, all saw King Hussein as a desirable and authentic partner to negotiations.

There was a serious American effort to examine the possibility of reaching an agreement by other means, with the conclusion that the King of Jordan saw no other procedure as feasible. This led to a change in Egypt, which came to support the idea of an international conference. In Israel, then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres, supported by the decisions of the governments of Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin and Menachem Begin, presented a position which envisioned the international conference as an opening that would accord legitimacy to direct negotiations between Israel and each of its neighbors. In October 1985, in his address to the United Nations General Assembly, Peres expressed his consent to the holding of such a conference; and on his return to Israel, the government coalition defeated a vote of no confidence on this issue, thus expressing its support.

On the new basis thus created, the United States undertook efforts in the Middle East to establish the broadest possible common denominator for direct negotiations, which would be opened within the framework of an international conference. These talks, which like all such talks experienced ups and downs, reached their conclusion in April this year.

The proposal taking shape today is for a conference which will include the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict which will not be able to impose or prevent a solution, and which will call on the parties to open bilateral negotiations in order to achieve peace in the Middle East and a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Several questions remain open: Most importantly, the readiness of the Soviet Union to normalize its relationship with Israel, i.e., the opening of its gates to Soviet Jewry and the renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel, as well as the question of Palestinian representation as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. It is nevertheless clear that the greatest obstacle on the regional level has been overcome.

The Israeli government discussed the possibility of entering into direct negotiations following an international opening, but did not reach the decision-making stage. Indeed, today, this issue is the focus of debate and controversy within the Israeli political system.

What are the arguments against Israeli agreement to an international conference?

□ The entire matter is not operative, and it is unlikely that such a conference will be convened even if Israel should agree to it.

□ The conference is liable to impose a solution on Israel that would pose a threat to its security.

□ The conference negates the Camp David accords.

□ Should an international conference be convened and fail, the resulting frustration would lead to a deterioration in the relations between Israel and its neighbors.

Of course, other arguments could be added, however:

□ If the conference fails to convene for reasons not dependent on Israel, the United States could again turn to Jordan and suggest a different procedure. This would be a true test of whether Jordan really wants a solution, or is merely seeking an excuse.

□ No conference will be able to impose a decision on Israel, a fact which can be guaranteed by means of a memorandum of understanding with the United States, as well as with France and Great Britain. Pressure can be exerted on Israel even in the absence of a political process (October 1977) or in a three-sided process such as Camp David.

□ An international conference does not contradict the Camp David accords, and they even indirectly alluded to it (acceptance of Resolution 338). Anyone who argues that there is a contradiction between the procedure of an international conference and the Camp David procedure could argue as well that direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan also contradict the Camp David accords: These state that Jordan will join the negotiations on a permanent solution for the region only two years after the establishment of the autonomous authority — but such an authority has never been established.

□ Frustration resulting from failure is an argument put forward by those who support the status quo. No one can guarantee success, and the conference may indeed fail. However, the dynamics of sitting together may well give rise to interesting solutions, whether permanent or temporary, while the deterioration of the situation in the region can result not only from change and the beginning of a political process, but also from doing nothing.

If the critics of the international conference had a different proposal with any chance for success; if they said: we have a partner to implement the second part of the Camp David accords; if they said: someone is prepared to hold direct talks with us — then there could be a real discussion of what is the best way. But the situation today is not one of a debate between two different approaches, but rather a debate between one operative proposal, between a real breakthrough after 20 years of paralysis on Israel's eastern border, and the continuation of the existing situation with the hope that we will be offered more agreeable proposals some time in the future.

The status quo is our greatest enemy. Israel is faced with a complex demographic problem, with important social questions, and with the fact that for 40 years it has been forced to fight and defend itself against terrorism. The Arab states, which have invested vast sums in military arms and equipment, are today experiencing economic difficulties liable to undermine the stability of their regimes. Time is not working in favor of either side to the conflict. Too many young people have lost their lives in the Middle East, on both sides of the border. It is our duty to take advantage of the opportunity which has been created, even if it is not entirely free of risks, and to embark on a course of peace.

Address delivered to the European Parliament.

Peacemaking — Appearances and Realities



Gideon Rafael

Former Director General of the Foreign Ministry

If theology were the art of disputation and politics the craft of argumentation, our dispensers of religion and practitioners of politics could pride themselves on being uncontested champions in the field. To smooth the flow of their wisdom, they firmly refuse to be confused by facts or to allow their prejudices to be ruffled by knowledge.

To make their debates more lively, they prefer to raise secondary problems at the wrong times and in oblique terms, in order to obscure the real issues. To keep their audiences alert, they evince the soundness of their arguments with stridency laced with acrimony.

The latest debating fad arousing the tempers of the politicians centers on the international Arab-Israel peace conference.

This appeared on the world stage under a variety of appellations. For King

Hussein it is meant to be an umbrella to protect him from the downpour of Arab rejectionism. For Shimon Peres, it is a forum where Arab and Jew are going to walk hand in hand towards new horizons. For Shamir it is the annunciation of Israel's doom. For President Mubarek it is the only practical means to extend the separate peace into a comprehensive Arab-Israel settlement.

In Israel, however, both camps — those who labor to promote the conference and those who are dead opposed to it — are certainly aware that they are fighting a sham battle. The real issue is not the mechanics of the peace process, but the substance of the peacemaking.

On this, both disputants are extremely reluctant to reveal their true positions. Of course, everybody who has been dealing earnestly with the problem of Arab-Israel peace knows that whatever occurred in this field took place within an international context.

This has been the rule from the day in 1947 when the UN General Assembly recognized the right of the Jewish people to sovereign independence. It was applied in the armistice negotiations in Rhodes in 1949, conducted by the UN mediator, Dr. Ralph Bunche. It proved itself valid 30 years later, in the peace negotiations with Egypt directed by President Jimmy Carter at Camp David.

Never have direct Arab-Israel negotiations unassisted by third parties produced a single formal agreement. The talks with King Abdullah from 1947 on, and the frequent intimate exchanges with his grandson Hussein to this day, confirm this regrettable fact of international life.

Cliches have always adorned the diplomatic dictionaries of the parties to the conflict. Negotiations without preconditions is one of Israel's favorites. But how does this tally with our acceptance of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and our recognition of the "legitimate rights of the Palestine people" as prerequisites for negotiations?

The principal Arab slogan is "the right of the Palestinians to self-determination." For Jordan, this means the confederation of a semi-autonomous West Bank and Gaza with the Hashemite kingdom. For the PLO, it signifies the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as the first stage in the liberation of the whole country: that is, the liquidation of Israel, as Arafat's more outspoken colleagues openly admit.

The flight into debates on negotiation frameworks, venues and techniques is nothing but an escape from the discussion of the real issues of substance. In the absence of a preliminary but not necessarily binding, clarification of the concessions the parties are willing to make, any international negotiation is doomed to failure. In this regard, it is immaterial whether the negotiations take place under the auspices of the five permanent members of the Security Council (the least promising option of all); or the joint chairmanship of the United States and the Soviet Union as in the Geneva peace conference in 1973; or, in the best cases, at present nonexistent, under the active direction of the U.S.

Without an advance understanding between the parties on the negotiable parameters of their positions, any international conference, whether designed as a shelter for reluctant Arab participants, as a straitjacket to be used by the big powers to condition the recalcitrants, or as an Israeli public relations device, will be nothing more than an arena for diplomatic figure-skating.

The armistice agreements would have never been concluded, had the Arab negotiation partners not been aware *a priori* of Israel's refusal to withdraw to the truce lines, or had Israel insisted at that stage on the transformation of Arab belligerency into permanent peace.

Egypt would have never entered into peace negotiations unless President Sadat felt assured by preliminary contacts with Israel that he would regain Egypt's territories lost in the Six Day War for the equivalent of a full-fledged peace treaty supported by the U.S.

If the peace process is meant to lead to peacemaking the contending parties must first reach domestic clarity on their peace aims; then try to gain support for their position from their allies; and last but not least, test with their adversaries whether there is sufficient ground for mutual accommodation. Neither Israel nor its still unreconciled Arab neighbors have yet surmounted any of these three hurdles.

On the last point, the longest and utterly frustrating probing has taken place over a period of 20 years between the leaders of Israel and Jordan. The extent of the concessions offered by Israel was matched by King Hussein's evasiveness.

Apparently he felt not too insecure in his fence-sitting. Subsidized by the Gulf states, courted by the West, flattered by the East, supported by Egypt, dealing with Arafat and dismissing him, reassuring President Assad of Jordan's unflinching fidelity to the Arab cause, and keeping his lines of communications with Israel open, is indeed a remarkable feat of diplomatic tightrope walking.

Meanwhile, the agile king is leading friend and foe down a circuitous garden path. He entangles Washington in procedural discussions; humors Moscow by sponsoring its participation in the peace conference; dangles before the West Bankers the carrot of material amelioration; and goads Israel to wield the big stick against his Palestinian adversaries.

While arguing with growing vehemence about the mechanics of the peace process, the two principal parties forming Israel's present government are sharply divided on the substance of peace. In their actual state of mutual distrust, the Likud prime minister feels justified in tripping up his Labor foreign minister, whom he suspects of entrapping the government in peace negotiations.

The positions of the two parties are widely known in their semantic wrappings, but rarely divulged in their true meaning. The Labor Party pronounces its repugnance of Israeli rule over a large, disfranchised Arab community, whose steady growth of population and discontent jeopardizes the Jewish character and the democratic system of Israel. While the leader of the party promises the Palestinians an improvement of the "quality of life", whatever this may mean, his colleague the minister of defense stresses, in response to accusations of leniency, that he is taking sterner measures of repression than any of his Likud predecessors ever did.

On the territorial issue, the Labor Party by and large supports the Allon plan, but has never adopted it as its official policy. With the passing of the years and of Yigal Allon, the Labor program replaced the specifics of contemplated territorial concessions with general formulas, such as the readiness to cede densely Arab-inhabited areas. Still, it can be safely assumed that Labor continues to adhere to the general principle of "territories for peace", while avoiding any commitment to the definition of Israel's eventual eastern border.

It is not excluded that those who presently support the idea of the five-power international conference expect its dynamics to produce a territorial settlement which the Israeli political process is unable to initiate on its own.

It is precisely this suspicion that arouses the vehement opposition of the Likud to the convocation of an international peace conference in any form except the renewal of the talks on Palestinian autonomy. The fact that these long-drawn-out negotiations foundered because both sides tried to pre-empt, in disregard of the Camp David accord, the final disposition of the West Bank and Gaza, is conveniently overlooked by Prime Minister Shamir and those of his colleagues who at the time opposed Camp David and tried to obstruct its implementation.

Obviously, it is not the format of the international peace conference that prompts the Likud's fervent objection. It is its total negation of compromise, which is the essence of all negotiation. The ideology of Likud commits it to the retention of all territories presently under Israeli control, and their eventual incorporation into the state.

Admittedly, this will never be sanctified by a negotiated Arab-Israel agreement. The leaders of Herut, however, believe that it can be realized by a combination of extended Jewish settlement in Judea, Samaria and Gaza; the maintenance of a repressive regime eliminating Palestinian opposition; the continuation of American indifference; and in circumstances of widespread upheaval, by the application of force, spurring a mass exodus of the dispirited Palestinians.

The Likud reckons that the government of National Unity, with its built-in deadlock and its timid Labor partner, is a safer vehicle for advancing its goals than an electoral consultation of the nation. The Likud's belief in the eventual success of its concept is founded on the continuation of Israeli apathy, American lethargy and Arab enmity.

American lassitude is indeed the key factor for the preservation of the stalemate. It seems that in its waning years, the Reagan administration shies away from new peace initiatives, unilateral or multilateral, for a variety of reasons, some connected with its global priorities, others caused by its Middle Eastern disappointments.

The U.S. position on the substance of a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict has not changed essentially since President Johnson pronounced his five points in June 1967. They are reflected in the Rogers plan of 1969, embodied in the Camp David agreement of 1978 and reformulated in the Reagan proposals of 1982. All of them advocate an Arab-Israel compromise; none of them endorses the territorial status quo created as the result of the fighting of 1967.

If the Israeli leaders and foremost among them Shimon Peres, were truly convinced that the time is ripe for a renewed all out peace effort, they should try to reach an agreement with Washington on the substance of the settlement before seeking an understanding on the methods of the negotiations. Only the harmonization of the U.S. and Israel positions on the terms of the peace, its nature, implications and American undertakings in its behalf can ensure the protection of Israel's vital needs in any peace negotiation whether handled by the U.S. alone or conducted jointly under American-Soviet auspices, as provided for in resolution 338, which the Likud now recognizes as the sole valid instrument for the achievement of peace.

The Reagan plan is nothing but the latest detailed, and most amenable specification of U.S. policy, unchanged for the last 20 years. If the government would stand by the commitment of its then Prime Minister, Shimon Peres, at the Alexandria summit conference in September last year, to make 1987 the year of peace negotiations, it should enter without delay into confidential talks with the U.S. on a coordinated peace policy.

The Reagan plan, adjusted and possibly improved, could form the basis for a joint U.S.-Israel peace strategy. It is by no means inconceivable that the two countries, which were able to generate the necessary interest and intimacy to cooperate on strategic matters, should manage to muster sufficient trust to coordinate their political concerns. Such an endeavor would, in the long run, provide Israel with no less security and the U.S. with enhanced regional stability, than the cryptic understandings on strategic cooperation.

However, in the absence of any prospect of agreement by the present government on the substance of a peace settlement, there is not much sense in discussions between Jerusalem and Washington on the elaboration of a joint peace policy. It is perhaps the most distressing aspect of our present national dilemma to watch the government of national unity performing like two orchestras, one playing martial music and the other siren songs, both being conducted by a trio of band-leaders, none of them knowing the score.

Whether peace with our neighbors is within reach is an open question. To promote it is an inescapable national duty. To attain it, all parties have to make fateful decisions. The Arabs will have to accept Israel as an integral part of the region. The Soviet Union must redress the imbalance of its relationships in the area. The U.S. must decide on a new forceful, persistent and substantive initiative.

Israel must regain its decision-making capability; restore confidence at home and credibility abroad; and, above all, put its house in order to be administered by a government of internal cohesion and unity of purpose, with a leadership which would subscribe to Jefferson's maxim: "The essence of government is the art of being honest."

An Occasion for Peace



Shimon Peres

Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

We are now celebrating the 39th year of the State of Israel. We've had five wars during those four decades. Not a single decade without a war. In 1948, we actually had a war before we had a state. 1956, we fought for free navigation in the Red Sea. 1967, we were attacked by the Egyptians, the Jordanians and the Syrians. 1973 — the Yom Kippur War, again an attack from two fronts. And then in 1982, we went into Lebanon and left in the early part of 1985.

It's a long period of time, and there have been many wars. We must be serious in trying to see if we can extricate our people — the Jewish people; our country, the Jewish state; our region, the Middle East — from the state of war.

Israel-United States Friendship

Since the formation of the National Unity government, we have been working on a strategy for peace. Now I didn't come to mobilize anybody in Washington to support me in Israel. I remember a very heated argument that once took place between then-Prime Minister Golda Meir and then-American Ambassador Walworth Barbour. Golda asked, "Mr. Ambassador, what do you think, is Israel an independent country? Are we a satellite of the United States?" Barbour, who had a wonderful sense of humor, answered, "Madame Prime Minister, as a matter of fact, the United States has recognized the independence of Israel, and we know that you are not a satellite of the United States. But may I ask you, has Israel recognized the independence of the United States of America? And we are not one of Israel's satellites? So, both of us are independent and we recognize the independence on both sides of the ocean."

Independent in that we are a family. It is not a friendship in contradiction. It is a friendship in complement and accomplishment. An then again, in the Israeli government itself we have two voices. Yet, I prefer one democracy with two views than a system where you have one view but no democracy.

So it's normal that we argue among ourselves. And though there are some good Jewish people who would like to see democracy without elections... I hope after the Messiah will arrive we might be able to introduce this sort of system. For the time being, it doesn't work. We have to decide.

A Strategy for Peace

Since the establishment of the National Unity government, we have developed a policy and a strategy for peace. The first step we had to take was to get the Israeli troops out of Lebanon. It was a controversial issue. Actually, the Cabinet at that time was also divided, five against five, and it took time before we had mobilized the majority. Today, I believe, the people and the government are happy that we are out of Lebanon.

Then we took a second step — we changed the policy on the West Bank, to improve the quality of life there. We have changed the settlement policy: all mayors are Arabs; economic doors were opened; a Jordanian-Egyptian bank was opened in Nablus; and an air of confidence began to flow across the Jordan River, preparing the ground for a better future.

And then we went farther and we settled the outstanding issue with Egypt — Taba. I think here there has been a slight misunderstanding: Perhaps our relations with Egypt didn't improve immediately, but they were encouraged to go a different way — namely, to invest their energy and resources in the development of their country.

Maybe the peace between Egypt and Israel is not a perfect peace. But still, all of us prefer an imperfect peace to a perfect war. And instead of competing with bullets, we are competing with oranges today, to the benefit of our peoples. And even now agricultural cooperation has begun very seriously between the two countries.

Now we have to move on. Where is the real problem? What is the most complex issue that keeps belligerency an ongoing policy in the Middle East? Undoubtedly, it has to do with the territories; with the people living there; with our relations with Jordan; with the solution of the Palestinian problem. Before I refer to the solution, may I express something which doesn't belong to day-to-day politics. I believe that we Jewish people need a homeland and the homeland can only be Israel. There is no doubt about this.

Yet, now that we have a homeland, we can't ignore the demographic issue — because land is stable, demography is changing. And we must be careful so that what we have achieved geographically we don't lose demographically; that is, to keep the Jewish people a clear majority so as to ensure the nature of the State of Israel in the future.

Moral Principles

But, then, every nation has land and every nation has demographic considerations. What makes us Jewish, in my judgment, is that Jewish history was conducted on moral lines.

There are three basic principles in the lessons of our history: First, the Jewish people has never once agreed to become slaves of another nation. We fought the largest of empires, whether it be Egypt or Rome, so as not to surrender to their whims.

On the other hand, and this is the second point, throughout history we have never been tempted to become masters of other people. We have never tried to run the affairs of other people. And, we have good reason for this: Jewish life is so difficult that we don't have the energy to do anything else, anyway. But, it's a moral call, not just a matter of experience.

And the third point, morally speaking, is that when we become a majority, we have been told by Moses himself not to forget the fact that we were once a minority. When you are a majority, remember how to treat minorities.

These are the three principles in the annals of Jewish life that go together with homeland, demographic considerations and moral values. Maybe this isn't an easy combination; nor does it suggest a simple solution. Very far from it. But we know that we have to solve the conflict with the Jordanians. We have to find a solution to the Palestinian problem.

Direct Talks with Jordan

The Jordanians — who attacked us twice, and now regret it — tried time and time again to tell Israel and the United States that they are ready to enter into negotiations with Israel, provided that either Israel or the United States promises before the negotiations start what they are going to get as a result of the talks. The United States couldn't make promises on behalf of Israel, and Israel wouldn't go into negotiations losing everything before the negotiations even started. So the Middle East became quite enriched with files of solutions that led nowhere — and with no negotiations. As a matter of fact, at least three people got the Nobel prize for peace in the Middle East without us achieving peace....

And I, along with others, came to the conclusion that if we really want to find a solution, we cannot speak about the nature of the solution but how to achieve it. That is, negotiate directly and have the solution result from free and open talks.

In addition to that, it was clear that the argument is not only between Israel and the Arabs, but within the Arab camp itself — basically, between the PLO and King Hussein. The PLO is running one way and the king in the other. The PLO wants the solution to be a Palestinian state with a Palestinian army a few yards from our Parliament; and the Jordanians say, "Well, we want a Jordanian-Palestinian solution," which may permit, for example, demilitarization or functional arrangements.

I think all of us have decided that between the two, between Hussein and Arafat — given a king who as shown talent and a chaotic organization that has shown violence — we prefer the king, for a solution to the Palestinian problem, as well.

International Opening to Direct Talks

For many good years, it simply didn't work: Hussein wouldn't enter into direct negotiations; and when he did talk, about negotiations, he wanted the Americans to offer guarantees and the Palestinians to participate. Now, for the first time, the Jordanians are ready to enter into direct negotiations providing there's an international framework. They also insist on a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

If you have two separate delegations, you may have two separate solutions: a Jordanian and a Palestinian state. If you have a joint delegation you can also decide on the nature of the solution from the outset. The Jordanians are now saying that they would like to start with an international conference. Why? They say first of all, "You don't promise us a thing. And, we have to at least say that we are going in a direction and in a way which will be accepted by the Arab world." The task of the conference, in my judgment, is not just to serve as an opening event or ceremony, but to suggest something that apparently some of the Arabs are in need of in order to open direct negotiations — legitimacy.

Then they say that if the PLO will accept UN Resolutions 242 and 338 and the renunciation of violence and terror, they shall be asked to join the Jordanian delegation. If not, they will be left out.

From what we know, the PLO will not accept any of these conditions. In addition to 242, they want self-determination. In addition to the Jordanian delegation, they want a separate Palestinian one; and not only aren't they ready to renounce terror, but they declare terror as their strategy.

As Secretary of State George Shultz once said, the name of the game is direct negotiation.

Conference Participants

Who will participate in the conference? Jordan wants the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. We agreed; actually, we have told the United States and the United States supports us, that the Russians will be able to participate only if and when they establish diplomatic relations with Israel and change their policies on Jewish life in the Soviet Union.

We are telling the Russians to make peace with Israel before trying to peacemake between us and the Arabs. It doesn't matter how large the Soviet Union is and how small Israel is, size is only measured in miles — when it comes to justice, all of us are equals. And this no matter whether you're a superpower or a small country.

We are saying the same thing to the Chinese, but the Chinese are shy on the issue for the time being. And our ability to comprehend the Chinese language is still of limited capacity, so we don't know how we stand with them.

On the other hand, though it's so hard for me to admit because we have historically been suspicious of Great Britain, that here comes a lady, Margaret Thatcher, with character and guts. She shows a friendship toward Israel like nobody before her, expressed in two ways. She was the first British prime minister to visit Israel while still in office. And the compliments we got from her were unbelievable, even to the ears of the most modest Israelis.

For example, she said that Jerusalem is cleaner than London. That's one of the occasions when we didn't issue an official denial — but I'm not sure that all the Londoners were really satisfied with it. And then she went to Moscow and, with great courage and admiration, she invited Yosef Begun and some other refuseniks to breakfast.

This was followed by Secretary of State George Shultz, who conducted a kosher seder, right down to the proper wine and proper blessings. So, I don't feel that we're alone.

The Role of the Soviet Union

We have another argument with the Russians and we are talking with them.

I personally talked with Eduard Shevardnadze for an hour-and-a-half. They sent some Russians to Rome and we spoke with them as well. You know, *glasnost* is really a revolution. Because the real honest difference between the United States and Soviet Union is that in the one, you ask questions; in the other, they provide answers.

But to us, the Russians are beginning to ask questions... And, then, the Russians are being asked, "Well, you have invested $20 billion in Egypt — you took money away from your citizens, from your children — and what did you achieve? You gave them arms and they lost the war. You built them the Aswan Dam and they disbanded the Communist party. You supported them politically and they expelled you."

One can even dare ask about Cuba. It's the same story. They have been supporting Fidel Castro with four or five billion dollars a year for the last 25 years. It's quite an investment. I think it comes to over a hundred billion dollars. Did the United States become weaker because of it? Were the Cubans becoming happier because of it? Really, the only results one can see are the flaming speeches of Fidel Castro.

There are real questions and I don't think the Soviet Union has the answers. Anyway, we have already had a conference of this nature, though shortlived, in 1973 in Geneva. The Russians entered without any prior conditions; they left when they were supposed to; and Henry Kissinger conducted negotiations in the wake of that conference without really causing any harm to anybody. It was also an international opening. But the Russians agree that the conference should not have the right to impose a solution and that the basic negotiations should be conducted in bilateral groups. Fine.

But then the Soviet Union says that it would like to have a more dynamic role. And we ask, what does this mean? Israel shall not accept this, not from anybody. It is our issue, our future and we shall decide.

I don't know if we already have the Russians participating in the conference. We agree with the Americans on the conditions and basis upon which the Russians can partake in such a conference. But in the meantime, the Jordanians actually have agreed that in the wake of the conference, we may arrive at the point where we can negotiate directly for peace.

No Prior Concessions

The newspapers claim I was involved in negotiations with Jordan. If this is true, may I make at least one more true statement: The Jordanians did not ask and I did not make any promises of concessions of any sort. We are going into the negotiations with clean hands and mind, and with American participation, to look for a solution that will be different from all the non-solutions till today, and that may really bring peace.

I would also like to add that we are not a charity organization. We are not doing favors for the Jordanians and neither do they do favors for us. They need peace. We need peace. We have children. They have children. They paid a heavy price for their wars and defeats. And we have paid a heavy price for our wars and victories. And the greatest victory will be once we shall offer peace to our children. Peace for the future. Peace for the region.

Challenge of Peace

I can't think of anything more important today that stands before us. All of us are facing the same dilemma. You cannot maintain the high cost of military technology and ignore the broad expectations of your own people, for a fair life and a fair chance. Syria discovered that its economic shoulders are simply too narrow to support massive rearmament.

And I believe the Soviet Union itself reached the conclusion that even if the United States is flying into space, their own budget hardly permits them to answer their needs for food, education, health and so on.

We are living in a changing world where economy is becoming more important than politics. Actually, diplomacy today is national and narrow-based. Economics is international and dynamic.

Even for the United States, the economic challenge of Japan may be even more immediate than the Soviet military threat. We are a people who have waited two thousand years to live in our homeland and to make our living with our own minds. We are a people who have suffered so much and yet our hope still remains to contribute to the Arab nations.

Maybe the moment has come. Maybe most of us are living with old conventions. And maybe our eyes are not sharp enough to see a new occasion. No, we should not make unnecessary concessions. No, we should not blunder because of pressure from the Soviet Union. We must take our fate in our hands and courageously and honestly see if there is an opportunity for peace. Let us face the new reality.

Delivered at the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) Conference.

The Peace Process

Aharon Levran

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University

During the course of 1986 the Israel-Arab peace process made no appreciable advance; in effect, the situation created by the IDF withdrawal from Sinai in April 1982 continued to prevail. Nevertheless, developments during the year held a potential to influence the advancement of the process in the near future. In this regard, a modest improvement in Israeli-Egyptian relations following the signing of an arbitration compromise over Taba, and the sharp deterioration in Jordan-PLO relations following a period of joint political activity based on their February 1985 agreement, were of particular note.

In early December 1986 the preliminary arbitration discussions over Taba commenced in Geneva. Egypt and Israel agreed to present their arguments by May 13, 1987. This initial step was made possible when the government of Israel formally approved the compromise in early November, although the two sides had formalized the conditions in principle in August. Agreement was reached following concessions by both parties, although Israel appeared to have backed down over more issues than Egypt, as it sought to facilitate the summit between Prime Minister Peres and President Mubarak in September in Alexandria, and to repair some of the damage done to its relations with Egypt in the aftermath of the Lebanon War.

As against this Israeli view of the role of concessions over the Taba dispute as paving the way for increased "normalization" of bilateral ties with Egypt, the latter was guided by a different viewpoint. Despite its minuscule dimensions Taba is seen by the Egyptians as a national symbol; the Egyptian government position on the issue reflects the principle that every inch of Egyptian land is sacred and non-negotiable. Thus from the beginning Cairo insisted on binding arbitration rather than mediation — the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty allowed for either possibility — and rejected the notion of economic or other collaboration between the two states in the disputed area.

During the course of the extended negotiations, Egypt sought to ensure that the text of the compromise ensure a favorable outcome from its point of view (Mubarak on October 10: "the arbitration matter is one-hundred percent in our favor") by recognizing the legal status that prevailed prior to the Israeli conquest of 1967. Egypt also insisted that upon the commencement of arbitration the Sinai Multinational Force (MFO) be stationed at Taba; in practice a small MFO unit was deployed there, while Israel continued to exercise its own police authority. Egypt viewed this move as constituting, in effect, the annulment of Israel's possession. The Taba question is expected to reach its final resolution, at Geneva, around mid-1988.

Taba is not the only source of disagreement between Egypt and Israel. Egypt continued to criticize Israeli policies in Lebanon and the administered territories of Judea, Samaria (the West Bank) and the Gaza District. These issues, however, were not assigned high priority by the Egyptians, particularly as they could register their satisfaction over both the IDF withdrawal of nearly all its forces from Lebanon, and Israel's efforts toward improving the "quality of life" of the Palestinian Arabs in the territories. This, along with the Taba settlement and Israel's readiness to accept a new organizational framework — the international conference — for advancing the political process and the Palestinian question (in ways that contradicted the provisions of the Camp David accords), facilitated the Peres-Mubarak meeting in September in Alexandria.

Here again the Israelis read the situation somewhat differently. While Prime Minister Peres himself attached a degree of urgency to his efforts to advance the political process for fear lest a stalemate eventually produce deterioration and even war, the Israeli government displayed a greater degree of unity over the fundamental need to improve relations with Egypt, and was therefore more forthcoming on the Taba issue. More specifically, the Israeli leadership was united in recognizing as a vital Israeli interest that Egypt remain out of any Arab war coalition, thus reducing the Arab capacity to mount a unified military threat against Israel. While this approach may imply that the actual content of Israel-Egypt relations was of secondary interest, it was nonetheless important to the Israelis. In particular Jerusalem attached high significance to the mutuality of the relationship, and the fulfilment of obligations and agreements, which were seen as essential to the ultimate guarantee of essential Israeli interests.

This then was the probable set of primary considerations that guided Israel in making significant concessions to Egypt over the Taba arbitration issue and in attempting to advance the two countries' bilateral relationship. The Egyptians reciprocated, too. After a four year hiatus a "new" Egyptian ambassador to Israel was appointed (actually the veteran charge d'affaires was promoted), and Egyptian and Israeli ministers exchanged visits. Still, in some of the more substantive areas of collaboration, such as advancement of Egyptian tourism to Israel and expansion of commercial and cultural ties, there was no significant progress.

While there was thus no major breakthrough in relations, the Peres-Mubarak meeting of September in Alexandria played a major role in efforts in that direction. The Egyptians emphasized that the summit focused almost entirely on the Palestinian problem. Mubarak told the press on September 29, "Ninety-nine percent of the talks were devoted to the Palestine problem and the international conference, and not to bilateral issues." Egypt emphasized that agreement had been reached on the need for a comprehensive solution by means of an international conference to which Peres had explicitly agreed; the Egyptian foreign minister stated that the conference would involve "all the parties and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; we may ignore the contradictory declarations of Israeli officials, which are for domestic consumption." This presentation is probably too one-sided. It is difficult to believe that the Israeli side did not bring up both the need to advance the two countries' bilateral relations — despite Mubarak's public protests against Israel's harping over the concept of normalization — and the question of Egyptian compensation to the families of the victims of the Ras Burka incident in the autumn of 1985. Still, the summit apparently produced agreement over the concept of an international conference as a framework for negotiations to advance the peace process, as well as the establishment of a preparatory committee for the conference, to be formed during 1987 — which the two leaders declared "the year of peace negotiations." But it evidently did not resolve the most salient issue of contention: PLO participation in such a conference.

The advent of rotation in the premiership of the Israeli government presaged increased disagreement over Peres' advocacy of the international conference idea. Prime Minister Shamir, who took office in late October, rejected the conference as an instrument for advancing the peace process. In early December he stated that he could accept such an "international forum" only "to give its blessings to arrangements achieved through direct negotiations" between Israel and the Arabs. This position appeared to contradict the understandings reached in the Peres-Mubarak summit, as well as the policy enunciated by Prime Minister Peres in October 1985, and approved by the Knesset, regarding the status of an international conference as a framework of sorts for the opening of negotiations. This internal Israeli dispute was liable to affect Israel-Egypt relations in the future.

While those relations advanced in the course of 1986 despite numerous difficulties, thereby improving overall chances for the peace process as a whole, the process was not expanded to include additional participants such as Jordan. Here King Hussein's dramatic speech of February 19, 1986 must be seen as an important landmark. Beyond the authoritative report on Jordan's efforts to collaborate with the PLO that the address provided, its importance lay in four key areas of emphasis: the behavior of the PLO leadership throughout Hussein's efforts to advance the international conference idea — and the need for PLO participation therein; developments in the American position regarding these two issues; Jordan's inability to continue pursuing the political process alone; and the break in Jordan's relations with the PLO leadership.

According to Hussein, despite his willingness, during the course of the year following the Hussein-Arafat agreement of February 11, 1985, to invest exhaustive efforts toward integrating the PLO into the peace process; despite his coordination of all his moves with Arafat; and despite the two parties' considerable achievements — in the end, the PLO leadership dealt the king a devastating rejection. Indeed, while the PLO's rejectionist position was decided upon at a meeting of the organization's leadership in Baghdad on November 24, 1985, it was withheld from the king's knowledge, so that his continued efforts produced nothing. Little wonder, then, that Hussein concluded by announcing that, "We are unable to continue to coordinate politically with the PLO leadership until such time as their word becomes their bond, characterized by commitment, credibility and constancy. On our part, we know of no other way of fostering confidence than by truthfulness or of strengthening it than by clarity. For confidence is paramount in constructive cooperation." In other words, Hussein accused the PLO leadership of unreliability and even mendacity, as well as indecisiveness.

No less significant was the changed American position to the peace process as a whole, and to its two most central controversies in particular — the international conference, and PLO participation. The initial US position held that Israel and a joint delegation of Jordanians and moderate Palestinians would enter direct negotiations under American auspices. They then agreed to initiate a dialogue with the PLO, on condition that it accept Resolution 242. Ultimately the American position was formulated as agreeing to invite the PLO to the international conference if it would declare its recognition of 242, express a readiness to enter into peace negotiations with Israel, and condemn terrorism. Nowhere did there remain an American requirement that the PLO explicitly recognize Israel's right to exist, as the US had undertaken within the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding with Israel in 1975.

As for the international conference itself, while Washington's initial position had supported direct talks under their auspices along the Camp David model, and had sought to exclude the USSR from the Middle East peace process, Washington ultimately agreed to consider a conference that would comprise all five permanent Security Council members. It also agreed that the conference be convened on the basis of 242 and the necessity to ensure the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. True, the US, like Israel, continued to insist on Soviet renewal of diplomatic relations with Israel, while Hussein was unsuccessful in reaching an agreed definition with the US of the conference's authority (Hussein wanted a forum with "teeth", rather than a formal framework). But these remaining issues of controversy could hardly dispel the impression that Washington had come a long way in its efforts to maintain the peace momentum.

The administration, while insisting on certain conditions, had nevertheless made considerable concessions over issues of principle: allowing Soviet and PLO participation in the conference; agreeing to negotiate on the basis of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; and agreeing to negotiate with the PLO. These changes in the American position reflected not only Jordanian and Egyptian pressures, but also the changes in Israel's own stand, as expressed by Prime Minister Peres. The latter's acceptance of the international conference idea, in contradiction to the positions of earlier Israeli and American governments, left the US little choice but to go along with some sort of conference. It remained questionable, however, whether Soviet participation in the peace process was in the American or Israeli interest, and whether an international conference was a better instrument for advancing that process than Camp David-style direct negotiations.

A number of considerations evidently prompted Peres to accept the international conference formula. First, he recognized that the conference was a *sine qua non* for King Hussein to join the peace process. Secondly, he continued to insist that the conference would serve as no more than a general framework for direct negotiations, and not an alternative to them. Lastly, Israel's acceptance of the formula would enhance its image in Egyptian and European eyes, and vis-a-vis the Soviet Union as well, if only the latter accepted Israel's conditions, i.e. renewal of diplomatic relations and allowing mass Jewish emigration.

But Peres may have been underestimating the significance of his acceptance of the conference formula with all its drawbacks: the very Israeli act of agreement would be a precedent for the future. Nor was it clear why Israel should deliberately constrain either the freedom of action of its sole ally, the United States, which was not interested in integrating the Soviets into the peace process, or for that matter its own freedom of action — it would undoubtedly be quite isolated politically in such a conference. But since the chances of such a conference taking place looked slim indeed at the close of 1986, the Israeli position may have been primarily tactical and temporary.

Indeed, as Hussein himself noted in his February 1986 speech, Jordan's accomplishments did not satisfy the PLO requirements for participating, and the PLO rejected Washington's quite significant concessions by arguing that its recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people did not satisfy its demand for prior recognition of the right to self-determination. The PLO rejection was undoubtedly also influenced by additional considerations, including such internal problems as the challenge posed by the pro-Syrian "Salvation Front". Following the PLO rejection and withdrawal from prior understandings with King Hussein, the latter, as we have seen, announced his severance of political coordination efforts with the PLO leadership. This meant, in practice, a freeze on the Jordan-PLO agreement of February 11, 1985; as President Mubarak put it to *Al-Watan al-Arbi* in October 1986, "Even if we want to talk to Israel within the framework of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement, they'll tell us, and rightly so, that the agreement is in abeyance."

It is an entirely different issue whether ultimately Israel would be prepared to negotiate along the lines agreed upon by Hussein and Arafat — which are a far cry from satisfying Jerusalem's interests. The five main principles of this agreement were: territory for peace; the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people, to be exercised within a national confederative framework with Jordan; a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with UN decisions; solving all aspects of the Palestinian problem; and peace negotiations within the framework of an international conference attended by all permanent members of the UN Security Council together with all parties to the conflict, including the PLO in a joint delegation with Jordan. In any event, this was not the first time the PLO had let Hussein down. An earlier instance occurred in the aftermath of the PLO withdrawal from Beirut, the advent of the Reagan Plan and the Fez summit decisions of September 1982. Then too, following a period of political collaboration between the PLO and Jordan, the PLO Executive Committee decided in April 1983 against a joint initiative.

Another element that stands out in the Hussein speech of February 1986 is the absence of a "Jordanian option" as that notion is accepted in Israel. In effect, Hussein rejected the concept of a territorial compromise with Israel over the West Bank. Clearly he also rejects the Camp David autonomy plan. Ostensibly, then, having unmasked the PLO's duplicity, and in view of his own assessment regarding the need to advance the political process ("the heartache that derives from a situation of neither war nor peace ultimately becomes suicide, and generates a situation that leads to a conceding of our rights"), the king might seek alternative ways to advance the process, even alone. But the king evidently would not attempt to move forward without the PLO or, for that matter, Syria, whose presence at the international conference he had also begun to demand. Obviously, Pan-Arab constraints, together with Jordan's strategic weaknesses, were too imposing to enable Jordan to take initiatives without an Arab partner.

Jordan's refusal to go it alone did not, however, tie its hands completely with regard to the West Bank. There its independent activity took three directions. Most prominently, it acted to reduce the PLO leadership's access to the territories by closing, during April-July 1986, most of the 25 PLO offices in Jordan, including all Fatah offices and all those opened by the PLO in Amman after the Palestine National Council meeting there of November 1984, which ushered in a Jordan-PLO thaw in relations. Officially, 12 PLO offices in Amman remained open, but in practice only the PLO "embassy" and the PNC Chairman's bureau continued to function. PLO headquarters, including the "Western Sector" and the Force 17 offices, were all closed. Their removal, along with expulsion of Arafat's deputy for operations, Abu Jihad, were expected to reduce the wave of terrorist activity that began on the West Bank in 1985, and which threatened to damage relations between Israel and Jordan. Jordan also encouraged one of the Fatah and PLO leaders in Jordan, Abu al-Zaim, to abandon the ranks and set up a rival, pro-Jordanian group. This new split in the ranks, coming on top of the Syrian-encouraged "Salvation Front" schism, also constituted a clear Jordanian provocation against Arafat's leadership. Small wonder, then, that Arafat and his followers accused Jordan of attempting to create an alternative PLO leadership.

A second direction of Jordanian activity was an effort to win over the support of West Bank Palestinians. The king himself issued an appeal for their backing in his February 1986 speech, and followed up by invoking a new policy designed to broaden Jordanian influence in the territories while increasing the population's dependency on Amman. This effort took two primary forms: the announcement of a Five Year Plan for the development of the territories, and an increase in Jordanian involvement in political and bureaucratic aspects of the Palestinians' lives.

As for the Five Year Plan, by late 1986 details were not yet clear, as the sums involved appeared to be a function of the financial aid that Jordan could recruit from external actors in the Arab world and the West. Even the modest figures mentioned in the actual plan, such as $150 million (for all five years? for the first year?) remained doubtful. Jordan itself was experiencing financial difficulties, and in any case it had already begun transferring some $35 million (12 million dinars) to the West Bank annually to pay salaries of bureaucrats and support the Waqf. Still, Jordan's initial efforts in 1986 produced $14.5 million (about 5 million dinars), with another $29 million budgeted for 1987, in addition to the fixed annual transfer. Even these small sums might succeed in expressing Jordan's new resolute approach to confronting PLO influence and restoring its influence in the West Bank and Gaza.

As for outside aid to the Jordanian effort, the United States budgeted about $11.5 million in 1987 for "enhancing the quality of life of residents of the West Bank and Gaza," although it was not clear whether this contribution would be administered within the framework of the Jordanian Five Year Plan. Britain, too, agreed to allot about $7 million over five years, with half this sum administered via Jordan and the other half applied directly. Additional European countries, such as West Germany and France, were known to be considering contributions. Meanwhile, the Saudi Arabians were thought to be hesitating as to how to participate in the Jordanian development effort lest they anger the PLO, which came out resolutely against the Jordanian Five Year Plan. In any event, while the total sum garnered by Jordan by early 1987 did not exceed a modest $55 million, this was not negligible, given the PLO's own limited financial capacity.

A second Jordanian effort to win over the Palestinians in the administered territories involved an enhanced effort at political involvement. Thus, Jordan was involved in the appointment of new mayors for Hebron, Ramallah and al-Bireh, and it exercised pressure on senior PLO supporters to moderate their views — by preventing their entry into Jordan, pressuring for their replacement, withholding funds, etc. It also reopened the Cairo-Amman Bank in Nablus, sponsored a pro-Hashemite weekly, and initiated proceedings to open an office of the Jordanian national airlines on the West Bank. Most of these steps, and especially the sponsorship of new mayors and the opening of a bank, could not have taken place without the acquiescence and cooperation of the Israeli authorities, who were no less interested than King Hussein in strengthening his influence, and weakening that of the PLO, in the territories.

By early 1987 it was still premature to assess the success of this new, more aggressive Jordanian policy. It was doubtful whether Jordan, following years of yielding to PLO predominance, even aspired to achieve a short term, extreme reversal of the political proclivities of the West Bank residents. At most, Hussein appeared to hope to create an alternative to PLO influence and to begin to erode its impact on the Palestinians, while sowing the seeds for future developments — particularly if the PLO begins to show signs of disintegration. As for the PLO, it clearly recognized the dangers of the new Jordanian policy, and attacked the Five Year Plan vehemently. But it could hardly be perceived to oppose efforts to improve living conditions in the West Bank, particularly as it was hard put to compete with the Jordanian financial contribution. Still, the new direction of events was liable to cause the PLO to heighten terrorist activity and generally incite the West Bank and Gazan Palestinians in an effort to prevent erosion of its own status in the region.

A third direction of Jordanian activity in the aftermath of the break with the PLO took the form of a rapprochement with Syria. This reflected a confluence of interests between the two countries, in which Syria's primary objectives were to torpedo any political agreement toward peace — particularly one made without its participation — and to enhance its strategic standing vis-a-vis Israel. Damascus, had condemned the February 1985 Jordan-PLO agreement and the Jordan-US talks that followed. Thus the shelving of both the agreement and the talks facilitated a Syrian initiative to repair its ties with Jordan. The latter was interested in improving relations with Syria due to its own fundamental strategic weakness and its constant and historic fear of its northern neighbor, nourished recently by Syria's massive military buildup. Beyond these considerations, Jordan traditionally seeks to balance its Pan-Arab relations, and it was thus anticipated that, following Jordan's renewal of formal relations with Egypt in September 1984, it would take a step in the opposite direction. As early as April 1985 Hussein had appointed the pro-Syrian Zaid al-Rifai to the office of prime minister, and the actual rapprochement with Syria was just a matter of time, with the crisis in Jordan-PLO relations accelerating the process of mending ties that had deteriorated since 1980. In late 1985 Hussein visited Damascus, and in the first half of 1986 Hussein and President Assad exchanged visits. Hard and fast benefits came immediately: reciprocal sabotage and infiltration activities ceased, Jordanian electricity was again routed to southern Syria, various delegations held visits, and Hussein attempted to mediate between Syria and Jordan's ally, Iraq.

This process did not, however, produce signs of a significant warming of military relations between the two countries in any way similar to the situation in the mid-'70s. Moreover, a number of issues remained unresolved, such as support for opposing sides in the Iran-Iraq War and Syria's extreme opposition to the peace process. King Hussein did not hide these problems when he stated, in April 1986, that the rapprochement "was not simply a question of security, it is a recognition of a mutual benefit which can be derived from better relations between us. We will not compromise our beliefs...merely to court favor with Syria."

One last event that merits consideration in a survey of the peace process during 1986 is the surprising summit between Prime Minister Peres of Israel and Morocco's King Hassan, on July 22-23, in Ifran, Morocco. The meeting itself was portrayed by the Israeli side as a dramatic effort to revitalize the peace process. If so, it was not successful; according to Hassan's version, the talks were a failure. Indeed, it seems unlikely that Hassan himself believed that by agreeing to meet with Peres he could persuade the Israeli leader to accept the "Arab Peace Plan" as it was formulated at Fez in September 1982 (it calls for Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, and Israeli recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination). Rather, the meeting's importance was in its very existence: the first public, direct meeting since 1981 between an Israeli and an Arab leader, however distant Morocco is from the Arab-Israel arena.

The Arab reaction to the meeting was of particular significance. President Mubarak of Egypt expressed his satisfaction; indeed, the Ifran meeting served him well to prepare the Arab public for his own summit with Peres in September. Syria reacted angrily, and alone among the Arab states severed relations with Morocco. Libya, which had signed a unity agreement with Morocco in August 1984, reacted somewhat incoherently, with Qadhafi proposing that the "problem" be presented to the Moroccan and Libyan peoples for a decision. In late August Morocco canceled the two states unification pact. Jordan, overcoming initial discomfort, sent Prince Hassan, the king's brother, to a conference in Morocco in late August, and screened his warm reception there on Jordan TV.

More worrisome from the Israeli standpoint was a statement by Morocco's King Hassan on August 7, following his meeting with Peres, that "if a new war breaks out between the Arabs and Israel, Morocco will take its place in the front ranks of the Arab combatants, and this is our ultimate obligation." True, the statement was made to improve Hassan's somewhat tarnished Pan-Arab image, but this fact could not fully mitigate its extreme tone.

Thus, while 1986 witnessed both positive and negative developments in the regional peace process, for a relatively moderate Arab leader like King Hassan to resort to such provocative declarations would seem to reflect the long road still ahead to achieving a full and real peace in the Middle East.

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Is the *De Facto* Peace with Jordan a Better Model than the *De Jure* Peace with Egypt?



Joseph Alpher

Deputy Head, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University

In terms of strict international jurisprudence, Israel lives at peace with only one of its neighbors. Her only recognized peace treaty is with Egypt.

But recent Israeli-Arab relations are surprisingly rich in arrangements that fit a more homespun definition of peace — *de facto* rather than *de jure* peace perhaps, but nevertheless peace.

This suggests that the notion of Israeli-Arab peace need not be considered in absolutist terms. There are many pragmatic versions of coexistence with the Arabs that might satisfy Israel's strategic needs as well as a formal peace treaty, and without demanding of Israel sacrifices it cannot make. Perhaps we can develop innovative models for a *de facto* peace that can be used in future negotiations, especially between Israel and Jordan.

In the course of its 40-year history, Israel has actually signed peace treaties with two Arab countries, Egypt and Lebanon. The treaty with Egypt is the better known because it followed a dramatic peace process spearheaded by the dynamic leadership of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and American President Jimmy Carter. Signed in 1979, that treaty fulfilled Israel's decades-old dream of *de jure*, formal peace with an Arab neighbor — a peace replete with embassies and ambassadors, provisions for free trade and movement of peoples, and, of course, a formal end to the state of war.

The treaty with Egypt has worked fitfully, primarily due to Egyptian reticence — an attitude often explained by the Egyptians as a reaction to Israeli provocations. Tourism, for example, goes one way only — from Israel to Egypt. With rare exceptions, the Egyptians discourage their citizens from visiting Israel. Commerce too has been sporadic at best; the Egyptians have managed to create considerable obstacles to the development of trade. By 1986 Egyptian-Israeli commerce accounted for less than $100 million a year (aside from Israel's large purchases of oil from Egypt). Much of this meager trade goes via intermediate ports in Cyprus and Italy where the Israeli origin of goods is disguised. Cultural exchanges between Egypt and Israel are rare, approaching zero.

But the elements of the treaty designed to maintain the military peace — disengagement, demilitarization and international inspection arrangements in Sinai — are carried out by both sides nearly to the letter.

After its invasion of Lebanon in mid-1982, Israel signed a peace treaty with that country in May 1983. This followed extensive negotiations, again with American participation. The treaty provided for a step-by-step peace process. Initially the only embassy was to be Israel's in Lebanon; negotiations on commerce and movement of peoples were postponed to a later date, and Israel retained certain military patrol and intervention rights inside Lebanon.

This peace treaty, of course, reflected the unique circumstances in which it was concluded. Lebanon, then as now, had no functioning government or army to speak of; Israel had occupied parts of the country to fend off terrorist attacks, and its first interest was in ensuring its right to continue to defend itself against terrorists. Israel refused to consider evacuating Lebanese territory unless and until the Lebanese parliament agreed to a peace treaty. The Israel government, under heavy internal pressure to justify the costly invasion, also sought a formal treaty as proof that its military operation had paid off. The Lebanese, prodded by the United States and in many ways negotiating at gunpoint, made a half-hearted effort to draw up a peace document that would satisfy Israel.

The treaty that was the product of these efforts became a dead letter even before the ink had dried. Lebanese president Amin Gemayel, prodded by Syria, immediately denounced it, and the Lebanese parliament refused to ratify it (although it was not formally cancelled by Lebanon until May 1987). Within a few months Israel, now divested of its last illusions about Lebanon, abandoned all pretense of achieving peace there and commenced a unilateral withdrawal process from that tortured country.

In addition to these formal peace treaties, Israel has developed surprisingly fertile informal, or *de facto*, relationships of coexistence with two Arab countries. The more significant is Jordan. Since September 1970, when Jordan's King Hussein wiped out the Palestine Liberation Organization's military and terrorist infrastructure in his country, he and a succession of Israeli leaders have built a fairly stable structure of cooperation and collaboration. True, they never meet in public. But over the years Hussein's clandestine meetings in London or the Negev desert with Israeli leaders like Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Abba Eban and Shimon Peres have provided grist for the mills of numerous political gossip columns.

Together the leaders of Jordan and Israel have found ways to coordinate anti-terrorist measures at least as effectively as do Egypt and Israel. In addition, Jordan maintains liberal quotas for agricultural and manufactured goods exported to it (and, through it, to the entire Arab East), from Gaza and the West Bank (with a generous portion of relabeled Israeli goods included). As with Egypt, tourism and travel are one-way only, but this time the other way round — the Arabs, rather than the Jews, do the traveling. Arabs from all over the Middle East, including Arabs from the West Bank and Gaza, go back and forth freely.

Recently, Israel and Jordan agreed to encourage increased Jordanian investment and activism in the West Bank and Gaza. By opening a branch of a Jordanian bank in Nablus, paying the salaries of West Bank teachers and civil servants, vetting candidates for mayoralty appointments by the Israeli military government, and offering Jordanian passports to stateless residents of Gaza, Jordan is seeking, with Israeli collaboration, to enhance its influence over this key Arab population and to counter that of the PLO.

None of these arrangements is enshrined in a formal peace treaty like the one that binds Israel and Egypt. All of the agreements between Jordan and Israel have simply evolved since the Israeli conquests of 1967, particularly after 1970. Yet in terms of its contribution to the overall Arab-Israeli peace process the Israeli-Jordanian *de facto* relationship is probably more fruitful than the Israeli-Egyptian *de jure* peace. Millions of Arabs moving in and out of Israel and Israeli-occupied land since 1967 have been able to relay to the Arab world a portrait of Israel vastly different from that described by official Arab propaganda. Arab-Jewish business relationships have developed; Israeli medical institutions have treated rich sheikhs from Bahrain and poor bedouin from Jordan; Israeli books and newspapers have been crossing the Jordan River daily for two decades. Of course, it is difficult to measure the impact of these developments upon the Arab world; but it may have been as great as that of a formal peace treaty like the one with Egypt.

Morocco is the second Arab country with whom Israel has developed a modicum of peaceful relations over the years. Like Jordan's King Hussein, Morocco's King Hassan has never signed a peace document with Israel. Unlike Hussein, however, Hassan did agree, after years of secret relations and clandestine visits by Israeli leaders, to meet publicly with Israel's Prime Minister Peres in August 1986. And Hassan played a leading role in "chaperoning" the Israeli-Egyptian peace breakthrough in 1977, by allowing Israel's Moshe Dayan to meet the representatives of Egypt's Sadat on Moroccan soil. Today Hassan even welcomes Israeli visitors to Morocco, although visa arrangements are complicated. Lately a few Morocco agricultural officials have openly visited Israel.

While Jordan and Morocco offer the most tangible instances of fruitful *de facto* Arab relationships with Israel, a number of additional Arab countries have, in recent years, reconciled themselves to a certain small degree of gradual evolution toward coexistence. Thus Israeli journalists (usually using European passports) have quite openly been permitted to visit Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia to report for Israeli papers. At international professional conferences most Arab participants no longer seek to ostracize their Israeli colleagues. And in late 1986, the entire Arab world barely yawned when confronted with the news that a Saudi billionaire, Adnan Khashoggi, had openly collaborated with Israeli arms dealers to sell American weapons to Iran. None of these manifestations of coexistence was conceivable ten years ago.

Of all of Israel's close Arab neighbors and interlocutors, only Syria continues to maintain an extreme "rejectionist" pose concerning any and all fraternization. This appears to derive less from the continued Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights — after all, Egypt and Jordan were not prevented by Israeli occupation of land they claim, from talking with her — than from the ideological positions of the Syrian leadership. Syria is ruled largely by members of the Alawite clan, which represents only ten percent of the population. To strengthen their grip on power, the Alawites, led by President Hafez al Assad, have allied themselves with the Soviet Union and with extremist Iran, and foster claims by Syria upon all the territory of the states surrounding it: Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that Syria won't relax its attitude toward Israel; after all, it won't even talk to Yasir Arafat of the PLO, and it actively plots the downfall of the government of another neighbor, Iraq. Nevertheless, as long as Syria does not judge the opportunity ripe for hostilities with Israel, it conscientiously upholds its end of the two countries' disengagement of forces agreement, which has successfully kept peace in the Golan since April 1974.

Arabic has two different words for peace. *Sulh* implies reconciliation; it describes the kind of traditional ceremony in which bitter enemies gather and "bury the hatchet" or "smoke a peace pipe" (actually they eat a meal together, the *sulha. Salaam*, like its Hebrew cognate *shalom*, refers to a deeper and more lasting peace. When *salaam/shalom* is impossible, *sulh* may be a practical alternative.

Israelis themselves remain relatively unaware that they have developed two different models for peace with the Arab world — a formal and an informal version. The informal one may hold more hope for the near future of Arab-Israeli relations than the kind of legalistic treaties Israel would ideally like. As former Israel Defense Forces chief of intelligence Shlomo Gazit has observed, it is entirely possible that no additional Arab countries will be willing in the foreseeable future to sign a formal peace treaty with Israel, and that the informal alternative — *de facto* peace — may be the only game in town.

Formal, contractual peace has been a primary Israeli demand since the first Israeli-Arab war in 1948. As much as it embodied the notion of non-belligerency or an end to the state of war that enveloped the besieged Jewish State, the idea of a formal peace treaty also reflected Israel's yearning for recognition as a nation — a nation like all other nations, in its own state. That, after all, is what Zionism has always implied. In the 1950s and 1960s, that demand fell on the deaf ears of a radical, militant nationalist Arab alliance led by the likes of Egypt's former president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. In those days, Arab leaders and the Arab media could not bring themselves even to mouth the word "Israel," preferring instead such code words as "the Zionist entity." In addition to this intransigent Arab nationalism, the more fundamentalist-oriented Moslems like the Saudis invoked Islamic doctrine that denied the Jews the status of nationhood.

As time passed, however, and the Arab-Israeli wars took their toll in the Arab world as well as in Israel, parts of the Arab world began to develop more moderate viewpoints, eventually coming to terms with Israel as a permanent political entity.

Yet formal peace with Israel remains a difficult notion for many Arab leaders and movements to deal with. Hence their mixed reactions to the Egyptian treaty. When Egypt signed its peace agreement with Israel, it was ostracized by the rest of the Arab world. It was suspended from the Arab League, and most of its diplomatic relations with other Arab nations were downgraded or broken off entirely. (But it is incorrect to conclude that Sadat was murdered because he signed a treaty with Israel. His Moslem fundamentalist assassins compiled a long list of complaints against him which they presented at their trial in Cairo. The treaty with Israel was number 18. Higher on the list were Sadat's ties to the United States, his flamboyant lifestyle and his westernized wife.)

Significantly, every Arab state except Libya, Syria and South Yemen welcomed the ill-fated Israel-Lebanese pact when it was signed in 1983. Even Egyptians who had vehemently opposed their own country's peace treaty with Israel gave their blessing to the Lebanese peace, no doubt because it ended Egypt's isolation as the only country to have signed a peace treaty with Israel. But it would be foolish to read this special situation as necessarily representing Arab desire for a formal peace treaty.

Moderate Arab leaders fear extremist Arab reaction to their peace efforts. And just as clearly, formal, open peace moves generate far more radical antagonism than informal, clandestine maneuvers. King Hussein and King Hassan have shown that a *de facto* peace with Israel can enjoy wide acceptance, or at least tolerance, among broad sectors of the Arab world that would have great difficulty dealing with *de jure* peace.

It may be time to explore more explicitly what an informal, *de facto* peace can offer both sides, especially in view of Israel's disappointment in the formal peace treaty with Egypt, as well as the failure of the Lebanon peace pact.

From the Arab side, a *de facto* peace imposes limited obligations, avoidance of conflict with Moslem fundamentalists and hardliners and, hence, reduced exposure to pressure. From Israel's perspective, the *de facto* peace model in many ways elaborates on a long Israeli tradition of secret diplomacy and clandestine contacts that developed during Israel's lean years of total isolation in the Middle East prior to 1977.

In a *de facto* peace Israel might be required to offer fewer concessions. And the Arab side might be willing to accept less. After all, in Israel's ongoing relationship with Jordan, Israel has been required to return none of the occupied territories in exchange for the benefits of its coexistence relationship with the Hashemite Kingdom. Perhaps an additional understanding can be developed in which, in exchange for Jordanian concessions, Israel would return some but not all of the West Bank. Alternatively, an informal arrangement might be worked out that leaves Israel with certain rights in the occupied territories, but allows local autonomy in other areas of government. Both possibilities would contrast sharply with King Hussein's frequent public demands for complete return of all occupied territories including East Jerusalem, in exchange for a formal treaty. Yet Hussein himself might prefer such informal arrangements in view of the dangers to him that are involved in a formal peace treaty. So too might a friendlier, more representative future regime in Syria, especially since no Israeli government would think of returning all of the Golan Heights to Syria for a piece of paper called a peace treaty.

A *de facto* peace treaty denies Israel the formalistic aspect of a peace treaty — the rituals, the trimmings of diplomatic relations. More importantly, it also denies Israel the core of the peace treaty with Egypt: non-belligerency, formalized in terms of demilitarization arrangements guaranteed by a host of friendly countries that, in the case of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, patrol the Sinai Peninsula in order to maintain the peace.

For either Egypt or Israel to break this aspect of the peace treaty by going to war against the other would mean undertaking a blatantly illegal act under international law; it would call forth the opprobrium of much of the world and perhaps involve military clashes with American, Norwegian and Senegalese troops in Sinai.

Obviously, *de facto* arrangements involving non-belligerency are easier, hence more tempting, to break. The present coexistence arrangement between Israel and Jordan offers little in the way of mutual deterrence. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that Jordan, without a contractual peace agreement, does at least as well as Egypt in preventing low level warfare or terrorism across its borders. Maintaining a quiet border, after all, requires first and foremost a sense of rational self-interest. Hussein, and even Assad, have proven over the years to be highly rational leaders in this respect, whatever the extremist predilections of the latter. But the deterrent ingredients embodied in the formal Egyptian-Israeli treaty are clearly superior in terms of war prevention. Hence Israel, in considering new *de facto* arrangements with Jordan, should seek to incorporate as many of these ingredients as possible. There is precedent for this. The Camp David provisions for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip envisioned a multinational presence in these territories to provide early warning of aggression, during at least the first stages of autonomy.

Demilitarized zones are another obvious possibility. Indeed, the non-belligerency aspect of a formal peace might even be enshrined in some sort of document, even if the other ingredients of such a peace were absent.

In effect, then, it appears that years of fruitful but informal coexistence with Jordan provide a very appropriate and positive backdrop for Israel to attempt to negotiate a more permanent settlement with King Hussein. Yet these negotiations, whether held within the framework of an international conference or on a strictly bilateral basis, whether reported to the world or, like Jordanian-Israeli negotiations to date, held clandestinely, must take into account lessons learned from the peace with Egypt, as well as the realities of King Hussein's domestic and inter-Arab position. Thus, many of the "fruits" of peace may have to remain informal, despite Israel's understandable desire to enshrine them in a public document. In return, Israel would be justified in making less than total concessions regarding territories it controls, or in refusing to relinquish certain sovereign aspects of that control.

On the issue of military arrangements, however, both sides would presumably prefer a more formal status. Demilitarization of the territories evacuated, international patrols, and electronic early warning stations are all methods that have proven successful in the Sinai under the Camp David peace regime; with modifications, they could be adapted to an Israeli-Jordanian scenario. Certainly in the West Bank they must take into account that distances are shorter, and that Israel's legitimate fears of attack from the east — if not by Jordan, then by Iraq, or even Iran, at some future time — would remain considerable. While such a formal undertaking by the two sides would constitute a departure from the *de facto* model, it is precisely over mutual military matters that even the most intransigent Arab state bordering on Israel — Syria — has always been prepared to sign legalistic documents along with Israel that regulate the status of cease fire lines and international inspectors.

Thus, in view of the political and military constraints on Israel and its Arab neighbors for the next few years or even decades, expanding the *de facto*, informal peace with Jordan, and developing a similar model with additional Arab countries, may be the best, perhaps the only, possibility for peace.

A Just and Lasting Peace — Illusion or Reality?

Dr. Yaakov Hisdai (Colonel Res.)

In June 1919, a just peace treaty was signed in Versailles. The peace conference proclaimed freedom to the enslaved peoples of Eastern Europe. The Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Serbs established independent countries, and everyone expected that the justice which had been done for the oppressed nations would ensure an enduring peace.

The death of this illusion is well-known. The newly independent states became a focus of instability and quarrels stemming from internal problems and relations with their neighbors. Eventually, the enlightened agreement of Versailles led to the Second World War.

Since then, Europe has learned an important lesson: justice and peace do not necessarily go hand in hand. In fact, the principles of justice and freedom sometimes make peace remote and create the causes of war, while repression and slavery may well ensure lasting peace. Thus, perhaps, the countries of Central Europe are enjoying a relatively long period of peace thanks to the presence of the Soviet fist.

Europe learned something else from that just but tragic contract; each of the new states established at Versailles aroused long dormant territorial dreams. This created "disputed territories" which became a source of tensions that disturbed the peace of Europe until the outbreak of the Second World War. The moral is that newly freed countries do not easily compromise on their rights, and independence does not satisfy them; it even intensifies their appetite.

The final lesson learned from Versailles is perhaps the most important — national-historical quarrels are not easily resolved by the good will of diplomats.

Does Justice Insure Peace?

In the State of Israel, the expression "a just and enduring peace treaty" is familiar and widely accepted. Were it merely another flowery phrase reserved for eternal use — it might be considered fairly innocuous. The problem is, both extremes of the political spectrum use it in all seriousness. The disagreement between the two is naturally on the definition of 'justice'. The right-wing insists that true justice means Jewish rule over the entire biblical Land of Israel (i.e., including the West Bank), and that this will ensure a lasting peace. The left-wing argues that the need for justice applies chiefly to the Palestinians, and that peace will be guaranteed to us and future generations if it is granted them.

It is fine for each side to maintain its own opinion of justice, but delusions are dangerous. History teaches that justice may be attainable, but that there is no direct relationship between its achievement and peace.

The Arab world that surrounds us is in the process of awakening, and the Palestinians are the yeast in the dough. Our dispute with this world is very sharp, and it is not the sort of conflict that can be resolved by the goodwill of statesmen. Perhaps we will have to wait a few generations until proper conditions are created for its true resolution.

If the responsible majority of the State of Israel does not want to be swept up by extremists who offer illusory solutions and unjustified internal divisiveness, it must decide that the goal at this stage is not to find a solution to the problem, but rather to learn how to live with it. How can we create conditions that will permit us a lasting existence in the heart of a hostile world? This question can and must be debated, but if the discussion is to be beneficial rather than destructive, a prior framework of facts and evaluations must be agreed upon.

Partial Solutions

The first fact to be considered is that our national policy must reflect a complex set of factors in the areas of politics, security, economics, demography and culture. Each of these areas may include goals and necessities which at times contradict each other. Thus, for example, there is a clear contradiction between security needs, which may well dictate holding certain borders, and demographic considerations, which warn of the loss of a Jewish majority within the expanded boundaries. Moreover, a solution that seems advantageous according to a certain viewpoint risks causing a problem, nonexistent today, in another area. Say, for instance, that we were to favor a complete withdrawal from the disputed territories in order to solve the political and demographic problems. This "solution" would catalyze the establishment of a Palestinian state or "confederacy", to which refugees could return from other Arab countries. Overnight, we might discover a poor, fanatic and overcrowded country that lacks real sources of subsistence on our border. What sort of neighborly relations could exist between us? What are the implications of another Lebanon at our side?

Let us remember that most plausible solutions can solve no more than part of the problem. Assume that we partially withdraw from the disputed territories and limit ourselves to maintaining security control only. Would the Israel Defense Forces be freed from the ugly business of searches, arrests and barricades? Would the problem of Arab labor in Israel be solved in this way?

There are no pat solutions to these problems, yet the conclusions to which they lead are of importance to any consensus on national policy. First of all, it is clear that in the near future no extremist solution stands a chance of success, including both annexation and complete withdrawal. Approaches of this nature may indeed resolve a certain aspect of the problem or guarantee us important advantages, but they would also augment the dangers we face to an intolerable degree. Secondly, even a compromise solution could only alleviate some of the issues of the Arab-Israel conflict, but not eliminate them completely. Therefore we can only arrive at partial settlements regarding specific elements of the conflict.

These settlements would be limited by the fact that they may never be permanent. The situation in the Middle East is chronically unstable, and the Arab world is deep in the grip of powerful social and cultural processes. Those processes will determine the nature of our relationship to the Arab world far more than our own deeds and aspirations. It is also difficult at the present moment to know the direction to which the Palestinians will turn — towards dialogue or increased violence. Under these conditions, what may appear today as an efficacious arrangement of a certain problem risks revealing itself tomorrow as dangerous and destructive. Thus the conclusion must be drawn that in the conditions in which we live today any arrangements can only be temporary.

The Issue is Survival

We must remember that the conflict between us and the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab world is a particularly grave one. The battle is not over a relatively small area of land such as Alsace-Lorraine, the subject of dispute between France and Germany for generations. Our struggle is for a small country, whose every inch is dear to the peoples fighting over it. It is a land difficult to divide physically, economically and militarily, and impossible to unite demographically. The struggle is also fought under conditions in which losses and defeat are measured not in terms of damage but in terms of existence or annihilation.

These circumstances lead to the following conclusion, for which national agreement is vital: under such difficult conditions, one must distinguish between short-term national policy, which is the critical problem, and long-term aims. It seems evident that the priority in the short run must not be the realization of ultimate national goals, but rather the assurance of physical survival. The purpose of national policy at this juncture must be to search for interim and temporary arrangements that will ease the points of friction and enable us to live with the problems until the time comes when we will be able to think of an extensive and conclusive arrangement.

Who Rules?

Within the framework of the basic national consensus of Israel, there is room in which to discuss the question of what exactly is the most burning problem at this stage, and how it should be dealt with. However, first of all, we must reach basic agreement on the question of government authority.

Government authority in the formulation of national policy cannot be a subject of national contention. Israel's special situation requires that her government distinguish itself by its flexibility and tactical maneuverability. Therefore, the government must maintain the right to decide to go to war, just as it has the right to order a withdrawal. Such decisions cannot be made in "the street". The public cannot tie the hands of government on these issues. Sometimes it is imperative to take a step backward today in order to go forward tomorrow. In more difficult circumstances, he who is unwilling to retreat today will be forced to run for his life tomorrow.

Whoever supports a government with adequate authority must ensure that it is composed of intelligent people and that its decision-making system is dynamic and efficient. How we might ensure this is the subject of a separate discussion, but let no one delude himself that the public can manage policy in the place of a faltering government.

A strong government and the efficient management of national policy is not compatible with the phenomenon of groups of citizens who take the law into their own hands. We must be reminded of this principle once again, now of all times. The inhabitants of the (West Bank) settlements are justifiably furious and bitter about the government's feebleness in maintaining security on the roads of Judea and Samaria. As long as Israel controls the disputed territories, it has the responsibility to enforce law and order there. But is the concept of "strong government" divisible? Could a government possibly be strong toward Arabs and weak toward Jews? No, the authority and the obligation of the government cannot be divided. Whoever tied the government's hands at Sebastia and at Kadum [two illegal Gush Emunim settlements that were granted government recognition after a protracted struggle] should have known that the same hands would be weakened when it came to dealing with the Arabs.

In searching for the reasons underlying the riots and disturbances in Judea and Samaria, one need not look so far as the P.L.O. and the international conference. Israel, both as a nation and as a people, does not radiate authority and strength, neither inwardly nor outwardly, and the Palestinians, our closest neighbors, are the first to notice.

Looking Westward

The political principle that must serve as framework for the national agreement is this: we cannot solve the problem, so let us learn to live with it. But on the long road of our battle for survival, we need a compass to point us in the direction of our destination, and this is found in the deepest and most important level of all — that of culture.

History reveals that a reality in which one people rules over another is rarely the final outcome of the meeting between the two. When the military battle ends, the cultural struggle begins; in the long run, it is the cultural dialogue that determines the final relationship between conqueror and conquered. In the course of world history, many subdued nations swallowed up their conquerors, bequeathed them their culture, and in the end made them a part of themselves.

We cannot absorb the Arab world culturally, but it could swallow us up and consume us completely. How can we succeed in preserving our singularity and our culture in the long term? This is the most important question for our future.

In the history of our people, alongside the chapter that explains how Israel preserved its singularity and faith, there is another which describes its integration in human history. From its pages we can draw some important conclusions with which to address this question.

One of the prominent characteristics of the Jewish people is its refusal to be provincial. We have always been drawn to centers of creativity and human accomplishment from which we could be enriched and to which were able to make our own contribution. Thus Eastern European Jews of the modern era turned to the cultural centers of Western Europe and the United States, and when the appropriate conditions materialized, they began to emigrate in masses to those destinations. North African Jews acted in exactly the same way when they adopted French culture. Thus the Jews of Algeria emigrated to

France in the wake of the creation of the state based on Moslem culture and Eastern orientation.

The *halutzim* (pioneers) who emigrated from Europe to Israel brought Western culture with them. Some of them brought, in addition, a romantic dream of integration into the East. Although this dream was often connected to visions of peace and dialogue with the Arabs, it contradicted historical reality. The destiny of Zionism and of the State of Israel was determined not by integration with the East but rather through preservation of the link to the West. This was a historical decision for Zionism, which was both justified and suited to the nature and aspirations of the Jewish people.

If the connection between the Jewish people and the Land is to be preserved, *Eretz Yisrael* must be a center of culture, science and technology; its activities and creativity must be connected to other international cultural centers. Today, the majority of the centers are in the West, and we are close to them in our political culture, our legal and judicial concepts, and our appreciation of human rights and the sanctity of life. We do not know when the nations surrounding us will adopt these views and values, but until they do, we will not be able to integrate with the East. That is one of the fundamental problems in our relations with the Arab world. It is unwilling to accept us as a foreign body; and we are both unwilling and unable to give up our attachment to the Western world.

Under these circumstances, the arrangements and agreements that we can reach with the Arab world can only have the nature of settling the conflict rather than making a fast friendship. For now, Israel must be a fortress that stands alone, neither overly interfering with its neighbors nor asking for their love. Illusions are very easy to sell— they are pretty and colorful. It is more difficult to confront the truth — the hard, grey truth. But only by living with the truth can a nation like ours hope to exist.

When the Jewish nation chose to return to its land and build its state there, it chose to live with the conflict with the Arabs. Three generations of Jews confronted this problem in *Eretz Israel* and were not defeated by it, for they did not become entangled in illusions. Our generation will be able to live with it as well — if we follow the same path.

Unnatural Government



Arye Naor

How many governments does the State of Israel have?

This is not just a matter of sophistry. It is the government's prerogative to determine goals and decide on priorities. No other body is allowed to represent a country before the international community and to act on the state's behalf. That is why, since antiquity, it has been regarded as self-evident that it is as impossible to have more than one foreign policy at the same time as it is to have concurrently point and counterpoint. It is a law of nature.

But it now appears, in the case of Israeli foreign policy, that either natural law has been repealed or we have more than one government. One of our "governments" decides that an international peace conference has the potential of leading to a breakthrough in the peace process and therefore accepts it, while the other is convinced that said conference is really dangerous to our future and rejects the idea. And, so that nobody would fail to clearly understand Israel's foreign policy objectives, Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres in his capacity as the foreign minister officially negotiates the conditions for convening that international forum, while Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir firmly explains why such a conference is unconditionally unacceptable to the same State of Israel — not as a matter of diplomatic tactics but in principle.

And so, how many governments do we have here?

None, I'm afraid. The executive powers of the state are embodied in the government. Acting on behalf of the state, the government has certain exclusive spheres of action, including foreign policy. No one is allowed to interfere with the use of those exclusive powers. Therefore, it is impossible that more than one government may act at the same time, internationally or domestically. To say that there is more than one government in power at the same time is a contradiction in terms. It means that there is no government at all.

Upon its establishment some observers described the cabinet of national unity as a camel with two humps. They were wrong. The camel, unfortunately, has two heads: one leads to the right and the other to the left. The unavoidable consequence is either a total stalemate or a fractured hump. In any case the poor animal can't move.

Quite soon, the Likud and Labor will have to reconsider their political partnership. Having early elections can harm the economy, but we also can expect little from our wounded camel.

Apart from domestic ramifications, Israel's international position needs clarification. Do we have a foreign policy at all? If so, what are its objectives? What do we want to achieve? Is peace the aim or just the means to promote other goals?

These are essential questions. It is the duty of the government to answer them before using its diplomatic power; otherwise, national strategy would be determined by tactical considerations — a mistake for which a high price could be paid.

But this government could not survive a political debate on the conditions and procedures for establishing peace. Such a debate in the Cabinet would probably lead to a political crisis resulting in early elections.

Apparently such a development may really help Shamir and his followers in Herut. It was not by accident that he told his American hosts that he was ready for elections on the basis of rejecting the very idea of an international conference. In that way, he has proven to his party that he is a courageous leader and has improved his ability to refute the criticism by his party rivals, David Levy and Ariel Sharon.

If Labor does not take up the challenge he emerges as almost undisputed leader. If it does, he will win his party's nomination without a real fight, and then have a good chance of winning the election campaign and serving as prime minister for four more years. Either way, his absolute negation of the international parley pays off in terms of domestic politics.

The international meaning of the two foreign policies of Israel is quite another matter. It damages the prospects of peace and questions our determination to achieve it. Even our best friends will find it difficult to explain and justify our running away from peacemaking on procedural grounds — especially after a clear recommendation from the Reagan administration to consider an international conference as a mechanism to ensure the participation of Jordan in the peace process.

More than that, it is a misconception to say that a U.S. decision on whether or not to discuss Middle Eastern affairs with the Soviet Union fully depends on us. We probably have an opportunity to receive a certain payment from the Soviets in return for our approval of their participation in the peace process. But this option is not permanent. It is possible that in the course of East-West dialogue, a superpower understanding on our region may be reached. It happened before and it took a great deal of effort, in which much reason and courage were invested, until a way to avoid that threat could be found.

Why should we, by rejecting the American position, push our only allies into the arms of the Soviets? Is there someone who really believes that Israeli national interests can be furthered in that way?

Even without going into the dialectics of talking peace in order to prevent an unnecessary war, it is clear that by unconditionally rejecting the idea of an international conference, we gain less and risk more then by discussing it seriously with the U.S., as well as with Egypt and Jordan.

Nevertheless, from his point of view, Prime Minister Shamir's arms have not been twisted, and standing with Secretary of State George Shultz in the State Department's crowded lobby, he firmly and unequivocally explained to the media that the policy advised by Shultz could have endangered Israel. "I am strongly opposed to that invention," declared our prime minister, referring to the idea of an international peace conference that had been recommended by Shultz a moment earlier.

By doing so, Shamir again proved his courage. It is not easy to say "no" to the U.S. It is unpleasant to say to none other than the best friend of a country that his approach represented a major threat to that state and it is embarrassing to say so inside Washington, standing beside the secretary.

There is no doubt that Shamir's personal record is full of brave deeds. He successfully escaped twice from British prisons, one of them in Africa. He never hesitated, neither in the Lehi underground nor in the Mossad, where he later served. He always was ready to do what he thought was necessary at a given moment, regardless of personal risks involved. Very few people could have accomplished what he did.

But leading a nation, making and conducting foreign policy, requires more than that. History is full of disasters caused by brave leaders who misconceived reality. Sitting with folded hands will not promote peace, But peace, as Menachem Begin said shortly after he had assumed power, is inevitable. In the end there will be peace and the real question is, do we gain more by a delay in that process?

The answer is no. Therefore, a sense of political realism should lead the whole government to adopt a more positive approach. But what can one expect from a camel with two heads and a broken hump?

The Second Republic

Meron Benvenisti

In every discussion of subjects related to the West Bank and Gaza Strip — riots, settlements, demography, political initiatives — the mechanisms of suppression go into immediate action. Facts, data, processes, tools of analysis and control, scientific disciplines, sober situation assessments — all these undergo a process of smelting and refining. The impurities — i.e. unpleasant facts — are thrown on to the garbage heap of prophecies of doom, while the refined material is placed in the mold of the prevailing "conception," and emerges in processed form: familiar, soothing and non-threatening.

Perceptions shape reality, not the reverse. Conceptual frameworks filter facts and data: cozy answers seeking facile questions.

Time has apparently stood still. Issues raised twenty years ago are perceived as perennially relevant, and are "solved" in the same way as they were "solved" in the past (Resolution 242, the Allon Plan, the iron fist policy). Dilemmas defined a generation ago never seem to turn into problems requiring immediate decisions; all dangers are projected on to the distant future; all options remain open; all processes are reversible; time is on our side; we are still right, good, sane and wise.

Someone else is to blame: the PLO, the left, the Likud, Gush Emunim. Compared to what the future could bring, the present is not so terrible.

The status quo is preferable to all alternatives; subjective will (so teaches our Zionist heritage) can always overcome objective reality. Others maintain the opposite: objective reality, in the form of external pressure, war, demographic threat, will unravel the net in which we have become ensnared, without our having to do anything about it. What "must" happen (mass immigration from the Soviet Union; Arab acquiescence in our existence; American pressure for withdrawal; the victory of the "sane camp"; the credo of "The strength of Israel will not lie") will indeed come to pass.

We, the strong, sane and pragmatic center, must shut out reality, steer clear of cognitive dissonance, and insoluble conflict between the image we like to present to the world, and reality. If we become paralyzed by fear we shall not go about our business as usual.

We must therefore ignore the phantoms whispering that the future has already arrived, that we have passed the point of no return, that we have crossed the red line.

If not, we will have to act: change our image of ourselves, confront a disaster which has already taken place.

We shall no longer be able to rely on the "peace process," "the Jordanian option," "authentic Palestinian leaders." We shall no longer be able to believe that "the PLO is masterminding the riots"; believe in "the death throes of the PLO," in "functional partition," "unilateral autonomy," "benign occupation," "improving the quality of life," "purity of arms," "acting according to procedures," "law and order," and in "investigations commissioned by the IDF spokesman."

We must define the problem in clinical terms of security and politics, ignoring messy economic, social and psychological processes. And, at all costs, we must ignore the passage of time. We dare not look in the mirror; we must either cover it or smash it.

"I can offer them no consolation," wrote Sigmund Freud, "for at bottom that is what they are all demanding, the wildest revolutionaries no less passionately than the most virtuous believers." Naked reality can offer us no consolation.

On the seventh day of the Six Day War the Second Israeli Republic was established in the Land of Israel. Its political, societal, economic and administrative systems took form gradually, and are now consolidated, twenty years later.

Its government rules over all mandatory Palestine, and has the monopoly on governmental coercive power in the entire area under its dominion. The distinction between Israel's sovereign territory and the area in which it rules by military government has long since lost its meaning, as it acts as sovereign, for all intents and purposes, in the whole of the area west of the Jordan River, changing the law as it wishes, and creating permanent facts.

The key to all legislation in the territories is the formulation: "anyone empowered to act in Israel according to Israeli law may so act in the territories." The Defense Ministry, through the Civil Administration, is, in effect, military governor of the "local" population, its jurisdiction being defined not as territorial, but ethnic. The Ministry of Housing decides how many flats will be built in Ariel and Kiryat Arba, in the same way as it decides how many apartments will be built in Petah Tikva.

All Israeli objectives have been attained in the territories and Jewish interests have been assured. The process of economic integration has long since been accomplished; infrastructure grids have been linked (roads, electricity, water, communications), administrative systems have been unified; social stratification has become institutionalized and political relationships have settled into well-established patterns.

The Second Israeli Republic is a bi-national entity with a rigid, hierarchical social structure based on ethnicity. Three-and-a-half million Jewish Israelis hold total monopoly over governmental resources, control the economy, form the upper social stratum and determine the educational and national values and objectives of the republic.

The two million Palestinians divide into Israeli Palestinians and the Palestinians in the territories. Though the former are citizens of the republic, their citizenship does not assure them equality in law as one crucial test of citizenship is military service and Israeli Palestinians who are exempt from service are, as a result, second-class citizens.

The remaining one-and-a-half million Palestinians are citizens of a foreign state (in the West Bank) or stateless altogether (in Gaza). They are deprived of all political rights, ostensibly because they are under military occupation, though even their rights under international conventions governing military occupation are not assured, since the government of the republic does not recognize the application of these conventions to the territories.

The ethnic groups maintain economic interaction defined in professional literature as "internal colonialism," that is, the inferior ethnic group serves both as cheap labor and a market for finished consumer goods.

The Second Republic is, by any objective standard, a dual society and a political system whose technical term, again, in professional literature, is "Herrenvolk Democracy." The only reason this has not been universally acknowledged is that the territories have not been formally annexed.

At the same time, everyone senses that chances of resolving the situation, which is intolerable (from a moral and liberal point of view) by ceding territory, is no longer feasible, and all other "solutions," such as autonomy, merely legitimize the status quo.

Communal strife wages in the Second Israeli Republic. There is a perpetual conflict, not necessarily violent, between the Jewish majority group that seeks to maintain its superiority, and the Arab minority group that seeks to free itself from majority tyranny.

The majority community perceives the struggle as one of "law and order." The minority community, which does not regard the regime as legitimate, seeks to destroy it.

Both communities deny each other's standing as a legitimate collective. Hence, the Arabs define Zionism (the expression of the collective aspirations of the Jewish people) as racism — ergo illegitimate. The Israelis, in their turn, define Palestinian nationalism as PLO terrorism — ergo illegitimate. This delegitimization is vital for both sides, for it enables both to believe in the exclusivity of their claim and in the absolute justice of their position.

Both communities, though internally divided, outwardly present a monolithic facade. The Israeli consensus comprising the vast majority of the Jewish group is united in its aspiration to preserve the Jewish character of the Second Republic, i.e. its superior status, even at the cost of democratic values.

While the differences between the main Jewish political factions are those of emphasis, style and abstract moral scruples, even these vanish utterly on the daily, tactical level.

The vast majority of the Arab group is united in the desire to destroy Jewish hegemony, and is divided only over the most effective method of achieving their objective: armed struggle or "sumud," steadfastness. Just as all Israelis are Zionists, so too, are all Arabs PLO.

The dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian communal strife is similar to that of intercommunal conflicts everywhere — from Beirut to Belfast. It is waged in an endless cycle of violence, enforcement, domination, containment — fights over every piece of land, every tree.

It is accompanied by the development of stereotypes, a lowering of the threshold of moral sensitivity, the loss of humanistic values and despair leading ultimately to psychological withdrawal, to anarchy or fundamentalism.

The "carrot-and-stick" method which, in the absence of long-term policy, is the inevitable means of control — only exacerbates the conflict. The rise in the standard of living of the subject population sharpens its feelings of frustration and outrage. Exposure to the open society hasten the modernization process of the minority and the sophistication of its political struggle.

The conflict erupts periodically, usually following an unplanned provocation, and quickly dies down. But violence simmers just below the surface. It is an endemic condition, lacking a durable solution.

The actual existence of the Second Israeli Republic is not in danger. The conflict between Israel and the Arab states has effectively come to an end. Even if it flares up on the Syrian front, it will bring no geo-political changes in its train. Neither are grim forecasts of disintegration of the republic from within, as a result of communal strife, plausible.

The balance of power between the Jewish and Arab communities is decisively in favor of the Jews, and the gap is widening. The resources at the disposal of the government and the sophistication of its system of enforcement, ensure that any attempt to threaten the system will be crushed.

The strength of the system is based on the cohesiveness of the Jewish consensus and its readiness to support the regime. Such support is guaranteed because the political center perceives the conflict in terms of survival. Terrorist activity and extreme demonstration of political protest by the minority sharpen the feeling that there is no real alternative and act to strengthen belief in the justice of the cause.

Suppression of the unpleasant aspects of reality is a central element in the solidity of the Jewish national consensus. Ignoring the dual system upon which the republic is based: the ethnic stratification of superiors and inferiors, serves as a barrier against unresolvable ideological and cognitive contradictions.

The continuing theoretical discussion of long-range dilemmas and the dangers of a bi-national political entity serve as safety valves for release of pressures on the conscience. The status quo is perceived as tolerable, because an unflinching analysis of its implications would only raise unanswerable questions and spell dangers for national consensus.

Hence, even after all these years people still carry on agonizing over theoretical dilemmas, though these have long since been transformed into practical problems which have, in effect, already been solved through force of inertia.

Self-delusion, therefore, plays a vital role in maintaining sanity and a sense of tribal affiliation. It could be maintained indefinitely if Israelis lived on a desert island, and did not lay claim to universal values of equality and human dignity.

When the character of the Second Israeli Republic becomes clear to the objective observer, when the outside world manages to overcome its reticence about preaching morals to the Jews, when feelings of shame overcome the defense mechanisms of "a nation apart," which Jews have developed over two thousand years of dispersion, then our self-serving delusions will finally be shattered.

But then it might be too late. Self-delusion will then have deteriorated to the point of loss of all contact with reality, and the Second Israeli Republic, which, from its birth, manifested worrisome signs of emotional instability, will then become a "crazy state."

The Formula for a Strong Economy



Moshe Nissim

Minister of Finance

Since 1973, the Israeli economy has been in a deep crisis, the main sign of which has been absence of growth. Prior to 1973, growth rates were high and stability was retained. The drastic change in the rate of growth and productivity formed a turning point in the economy that resulted from a series of shocks, such as the rise in defense costs, the worsening of trade conditions and, mainly, the large rise in oil costs and interest payments.

This turning point led to extensive inflation, a large deficit in the budget that had to be funded by a high tax burden, a nationalized capital market, growth of the national debt, a decline in investments, balance of payments difficulties, and a growing government sector. Growth was replaced by financial manipulations.

The economic program that was introduced in July 1985 was designed to work simultaneously on two planes: reduction of inflation rates, and improvement of the balance of payments.

The program included fiscal and monetary restraint, erosion of wages, stabilization of the exchange rate, and price controls, with an adjustment of all the various components.

The successful results were expressed in three main areas: the state budget was balanced, monthly inflation rates dropped from an average of 15 percent to 1.5 percent, and the foreign currency situation was improved. On the other hand, unemployment increased by 2 percent, reaching 8 percent in the first quarter after introduction of the program.

A number of external factors contributed to the improvement: special emergency aid from the U.S., in the amount of $1.5 billion, a declining dollar and a decrease in the prices of fuel, commodities, and interest rates.

The great progress made in the past two years in halting inflation, balancing the state budget and improving our external financial situation has enabled us to change our policy emphasis in the direction of economic growth. The July 1985 economic program was a transitional stage, but a necessary and prior one for recovery of the economy.

In practice, there can be no growth without economic stability in general, and price stability in particular, since the meaning of stability is focusing on efforts to increase exports and marketing, that is, a growth in output in the economy, an increase in production investments the calculation of whose viability is not affected by high and unanticipated inflation rates.

The real test that the Israeli economy faces today is its ability to go over to the stage of growth. Growth, with retention of a stable price level, and with no worsening in the balance of payments, is the aspiration of many countries. Our task is sevenfold more difficult, since we wish to create the conditions and climate for growth, while, at the same time, reducing the rate of price rises, from an average of some 20 percent a year to the level in the countries with which we trade.

The contribution and role of economic policy is to create the conditions and climate for this process, mainly by removing those factors that blocked growth for over 10 years, including decreasing involvement in the economy, an involvement that has distorted and prejudiced the allocations of resources in the economy, both by administrative involvement in many spheres, licenses, control, and by a high tax burden and excessive involvement in the capital market.

In order to create the climate and conditions for growth, we have adopted a comprehensive program this year that includes tax reform, capital market reform, budgetary policy, and other means of economic policy.

The gross tax burden which had been one of the highest in the world damaged economic efficiency with a reduction in productivity, and primarily, by reducing the incentive to work and to invest. Additionally, a tax system that is based on high tax rates results in selectivity and differential tax rates that discriminate between sectors, harm the economic allocation, and lead to administrative and bureaucratic red tape, that divert manufacturers' attention to enforcement and application of the tax laws.

From a fiscal point of view, reduction of the tax burden is not possible without a parallel reduction in budgeted expenditures. As I have noted, a balanced budget and a reduction of the need to finance government expenditures have enabled us to introduce income tax reform this year. The effect of the tax system on economic activity can be examined at two levels. First, marginal tax rates applying to individuals, that is wage earners and the self-employed. The marginal tax rate is known to be an important, central and determining factor in work and incentives to progress and the taking of initiative.

A significant step in the direction of encouraging work and initiatives was taken with the reduction of the maximum marginal tax rate, from 60 to 48 percent.

The second level is that of tax rates for companies. A firm's own resources are most effective for investment and initiative in comparison to other expensive alternatives the firm might have had to use, such as credit and raising capital. There has thus been a significant reduction in tax rates for companies, from 61 to 45 percent for all types of companies.

Special encouragement has been given to foreign investments. We feel that the success in slowing down inflation and achieving economic stability make for good conditions for foreign investments, and so the tax on those firms with foreign investors has been fixed at a low rate of between 10 and 25 percent, according to the weight of the foreign investment.

Reducing labor costs means encouraging demand for workers, utilization of unemployed workers, and improvement of competitive ability. To achieve these aims, we have acted for a reduction in National Insurance contributions, payable by employers and the self-employed, and have reduced Employers' Tax from 7 to 4 percent. These measures, apart from providing incentives, also contribute to the maintenance of price stability.

A committee of experts I appointed to extend the reform are examining distortions, discrimination, expansion of the tax base, and cancellation of preferences and exemptions.

Increasing the genuine competitiveness of Israeli manufacturers in international markets will result in utilization of relative advantages in trade, greater efficiency of the economy, and an increase in the overall welfare. A further stage was recently implemented in the agreement with the United States regarding a free trade area.

In the past, the capital market in Israel was characterized by massive government involvement in raising capital, administrative rulings, and tax rates that discriminated in favor of the government. This involvement hurt the effectiveness of capital allocation and consequently, the rate of growth of the economy. We have thus done away with tax discrimination in favor of government bonds, as well as the requirement that administrative permission be obtained from the finance minister in order to issue bonds and shares.

The considerable reduction in the budgetary deficit means a decline in the government's financing requirements, that is, a bigger slice of private savings can be referred to investment in the business sector, and long-term interest rates have come down.

According to the framework of the budget for this year, the government will be vacating a considerable segment of the capital market. In an open economy in which imports and exports have great weight in economic activity, foreign currency controls cannot be effective.

The respite in the sphere of inflation and exchange rates has made possible rectifications in the foreign currency control regulations including a reduction of restrictions on activity in foreign currency by the business sector and by individuals.

In order to make progress in the privatization process, I decided to appoint the First Boston Corporation as consultant to the government, in preparation of an overall program in this sphere.

The aim of the program is to put into effect government policy for a reduction of its involvement in government corporations — as part of its policy to reduce its involvement in the economy as a whole. Apart from a reduction of involvement per se by selling government corporations, the internal and external debt can be reduced. Sale of government corporations and share issues in Israel and overseas will attract further investment funds from within the country and abroad for development of plants, creation of marketing channels, increased employment, and greater efficiency of companies.

The program will encompass some 30 government corporations and their subsidiaries, and this is the first time that we are preparing a professional, long-term comprehensive program, including operative procedures for sales, with negotiations with potential purchasers and share issues.

The Consumer Price Index, which rose in July by 0.2 percent, marks a further cooling down in the rate of price rises, and we hope that the inflation level in the 1987-88 budgetary year will be lower than that of the previous year. Our foreign currency reserves come to over $4.5 b., our short-term debt situation has stabilized somewhat, with an improvement in the debt structure, with the proportion of the short-term debt declining.

Our financial standing in world financial markets is growing stronger, and Israel's place among the countries that receive credit has risen considerably. In discussions about Israel's economy held by the board of directors of the International Monetary Fund, words of praise were heard for our economic policy, and representatives of all countries unanimously felt that Israel was the greatest success story of recent years among countries that have improved their economic situation.

A structural change has taken place in the economy recently, and in the last two years the business product has risen by nearly 4 percent a year.

The level of exports in the first seven months of 1987 was 16 percent higher than for the same period last year, but part of the rise can be attributed to an increase in export prices.

One of the reasons for the success of the economic program has been the confidence the public placed in it. An indicator of this confidence on the part of the public can be seen in the flow of private capital to the Israeli economy.

On the other hand, we are not ignoring negative signs and are following up on them with concern and caution. The level of imports this year is high, in comparison with the average level in 1986, and the growth in exports is not keeping up with that of imports. Without doubt, this is one of the central problems that we shall have to cope with.

Private per capita consumption rose by 12 percent in 1986, after a drop in the previous two years. There are signs that the growth rate is becoming more moderate and savings rates, which declined last year, will increase somewhat this year.

Signs pointing to a possible growth in the gross domestic product, particularly the business product, can be found in the considerable increase in the import of inputs for production and investment assets, apparently showing a rise in the level of investments in fixed assets in the first quarter of the year. We can find support for this trend in the industrial production figures that show an increase in output.

The recovery of economic activity is also reflected in the drop in unemployment rates to an average of 5.5 percent.

In order to reinforce the stability, action has to be taken in a number of areas.

Meticulous preservation of the framework of the agreed budget is vital, in the face of heavy pressures to increase it. The surplus that we managed to achieve in 1986 is one of the greatest achievements in the budgetary sphere of the last two decades, and its implications for the economy serve as a model for our continued efforts.

That is the reason why I voted against continuation of the Lavi project. Continuation of the development and production of the Lavi, alongside other requirements of the military that are no less important for our security, would have meant an additional budgetary expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars a year. With all the sorrow it entails, there was no choice but to make the painful and important decision for the sake of economic recovery in Israel.

A wage policy that responds to wage demands that are unsupported by a rise in productivity could put us back in a period of instability and harm profitability.

The trend of the economic policy outlined is to gradually create a new climate for the Israeli economy, turning it into a flourishing economy in which, in the long term, it will be possible to achieve a higher level of welfare, price stability and political stability. The alternative is economic deterioration and continuous inflation.

As we stand at this crossroad, the choice would appear to be simple. Its practical application, however, requires both economic and political efforts to put the economy on the runway prior to taking off into renewed growth, lest we revert to a period of inflation and stagnation.

I should like to think that we will make it.

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Stabilizing the Economy

Prof. Michael Bruno

Excerpts from the address delivered by Prof. Michael Bruno, Governor of the Bank of Israel, at the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Inter-American Development Bank.

"...Israel's stabilization stage, which started in July 1985, is still in process. It established nominal anchors for wages, the exchange rate and bank credit, in a set of synchronized measures, taken all at once, with a sharp fiscal cut and monetary restraint supporting them throughout the whole period. But a crucial contribution to the success of this program came from the formal agreement between the Histadrut Labor Federation, the employers and the government, which suspended wage indexation in exchange for a price freeze and a stable exchange rate. This suspension caused a 25-30 percent decline in real wages for nearly six months, which helped to bring the rate of inflation down from 20 percent a month to 20 percent a year. As a result, linkage payments in our financial system, including savings, were checked. Tax collection soared, and all this with practically no suppressed inflation, a stable exchange rate and the virtual elimination of unofficial exchange markets. Even if we take into account the unanticipated drop in oil prices and the emergency assistance from the United States, the results still surpassed our own expectations."

"...Israel's adjustment process is now entering the stage of structural reforms. A comprehensive capital market reform is expected to limit the government's role to neutral dimensions and provide efficient tools for private intermediation. A credit market reform, which is now being considered, should bring closer together the considerably divergent interest rates, in a much segmented credit market. A tax reform, which is also planned, should lower taxes on corporations and individuals, hopefully broadening the tax base. Various aspects of these reforms are still being debated, with a resulting delay in their adoption. The condition for their success, however, remains the balanced — or nearly balanced — budget, as much as wage restraint which continues to be a prerequisite for stability. These two conditions should continue to serve as a test, as well as a support, for the success of the present stage."

Recovery of the Banking Industry

Dr. Asher Halperin

Executive Director, Association of Banks in Israel

Israel's banks lost 220 million dollars during the 1983 banking crisis. In 1984 the commercial banks registered a profit of 110 million dollars. In 1985 the profits of the commercial banks rose to 150 million dollars. In 1986, profits dropped to 36 million dollars and if one deducts the 17 million dollars lost by one medium-sized bank the net profit after tax in 1986 amounted to 19 million dollars. Estimates for 1987 profits of the commercial banks range between 270 to 300 million dollars. What brought this revolutionary change in the profitability of Israel's commercial banks? One cannot point to one specific reason. As usual with economic phenomena, a large number of causes were responsible for this change. Initially, there was a structural reorganization in the banks. Then customers changed their banking habits. There was a change in the bank business policy and income tax reform. Finally measures to improve efficiency in the bank system bore fruit in 1987.

These steps led to structural changes in the banking situation. If in the pre-1983 crisis, banks enjoyed rapid and substantial expansion in their activities, in recent years banks suffered from overstaffing, unused equipment and buildings. Getting rid of these surpluses contributed substantially to the improvement of the banking business in 1987.

The Board of Directors at the commercial banks was streamlined and the number of directors was limited to fifteen. No more than one-quarter of the directors could be employees of the bank or "interested parties" in the bank. Board members responsibility was substantially increased as was the authority and the power of the Internal Auditor. The most important change was the dichotomy between the function of the Chairman of the Board and the General Manager of the bank. The latter is the chief Executive Officer and for all practical purposes runs the bank while the former is responsible for setting the policy and supervising the operation of the bank.

Curbing inflation, which meant less need to visit the bank daily to safeguard the value of one's deposits and savings, changed the consumer's banking habits. With the contraction of operations in the security market and the foreign exchange market, the need for employees in the banks was drastically reduced. As a result, the staff at financial institutions (the Bank of Israel, commercial banks, mortgage banks, finance companies and others) dropped from 49,000 to 38,000. It is estimated that the personnel reduction in commercial banks was some 12,000 over four years, with all its repercussions on the cost, efficiency and the profitability of banks. A change in the business strategy of banks was also registered. During the past four decades the banks in Israel traditionally looked for depositors and sources of money since any funds they mobilized could easily be lent — there was always demand for money in excess of the available funds. In the last year, the banks were running after borrowers and started granting various concessions to them including lowering interest rates. Furthermore, the size of the balance sheet of the banks underwent a change in business strategy. No more chasing after items that inflated the balance sheet since importance was no longer attached to it. The emphasis and overall efforts of management and employees were concentrated on bank profits and profitability.

The revolution in bank profitability

What caused the sharp rise in profits from 36 million dollars in 1986 to net profits after tax of 270 million dollars in 1987?

The banks' financial margins increased, that is, a larger gap between the rate of interest banks pay on deposits and the interest rates they charge borrowers (including the interest rate they receive from the Central Bank on their liquid assets). The margins which virtually vanished in the first nine months of 1986 were reopened in the last quarter of 1986 and substantially rose in the first eight months of 1987. Bank commissions which had been frozen for a number of years were deregulated and partially adjusted to the increase in the general price level and operational costs. Nevertheless, bank commissions are still far below what they should be and in some cases do not cover the cost of the services that the banks render. Allocations for bad bank debts amounting to 260 million dollars in 1985 and 355 million dollars in 1986 are expected to be smaller in 1987 and substantially lower in 1988. This is due to the economy's overall recovery which stimulated economic activity and lead to greater profitability in business enterprises, thus reducing the number of business failures. In addition the majority of the problematic business loans were eliminated from their books resulting in less need for such allocations. Improvement in the net profits of the bank was also a result of the decline in taxes on banks. Corporate and income taxes on banks were reduced from 66% to 52%; while corporate and income tax on other businesses were reduced from 61% to 45%. Furthermore, employers tax was reduced from 7% to 4%; social security taxes were also decreased by about one-quarter.

The increased economic activity had a direct impact on bank business and profitmaking. Bank credit in Israeli currency grew, commercial credit in shekels just about doubled in the last two years whereas foreign currency credit only dropped slightly. Banks doubled credit, due to renewed growth in demand and as an outcome of its efforts to expand credit. More foreign trade, especially in imports contributed to larger bank commissions for servicing and financing Israel's foreign trade. Banks also benefited from the turnover in the Stock Exchange which was much more active in 1987 than in previous years. Underwriting, brokerage and other commissions in the securities business were substantially higher than in previous years. Gain was also registered in Israel's banks foreign exchange dealings during the year.

Efficiency measures were probably the most significant factor in the bank system's new profitability in 1987. Doubling bank credit, servicing and financing of larger foreign trade, handling of more securities and foreign exchange business — all with fewer employees paid less — resulted in higher efficiency which brought in more profits to the banks. True, in 1984 and 1985, bank employees salaries suffered a reduction in real terms; in 1986, they were slightly higher; and it is feared that in 1987 salaries will be higher in real terms than they were in 1986. Nevertheless, the cut in personnel and the resignation of a number of top banking executives who earned large salaries, all contributed to a moderate increase in salaries; as did limiting overtime hours, the transfer to a five-day work week and other efficiency measures.

The banks have closed more than 100 branches which were losing money thus enabling them to sell off buildings including plots on which bank branches were planned to be erected. Selling of properties increased the banks' financial assets, enabling them to earn more from loans. Last, reducing staff meant banks could sell equipment and refrain from purchasing new office furnishings. The introduction of automatic equipment (ATM) at banks resulted in substantial savings. Banks in Israel are virtually "on line", "real time". The setting of 500 ATMs from which every bank customer can withdraw money can also be considered as progress. The banking system's recovery, ability to introduce more efficient systems and profitability, the reorganization of top management including the Board of Directors, all contributed to improving the image of commercial banks which had deteriorated over recent years. Further progress should be shown in this area in 1988.

Uses of Nuclear Energy for Economic and Social Development in Israel

Dr. Ran Marom
Director, External Relations
Israel Atomic Energy Commission

Israel belongs to that group of countries which, though meagerly endowed by nature, have, through hard work and the application of science and technology, made promising achievements in certain fields. It has gained a wide range of experience, and knowhow in the medical, industrial and agricultural applications of nuclear and radiation techniques and technologies for securing economic and social benefits.

These activities are carried out at the two research centers of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, the various universities, and other research institutions (such as the Weizmann Institute, the Volcani Center, etc.). In certain research areas, there is a close cooperation between them.

The knowledge and expertise gained in these endeavors strengthened the Israeli scientific and industrial infrastructure. Within this context, it is believed that the interaction between the research centers and industry is mutually beneficial.

Applications in Industry

Technologies based on radioisotopes and radiation for industrial modernization are aimed at saving raw materials and energy, improving product quality and the operational safety of factories.

In Israel, nuclear and radiation technologies are utilized in industry principally in the field of quality control and industrial monitoring. By using radioactive tracer elements one is able to control, modify and optimize industrial material mixing, material flow and disturbances. Radioactive industrial systems based on radioactive sources and radiation detectors have been designed and are applied to quality monitoring on production lines.

X-ray and Gamma-ray radiography have expanded as a principal technique for nondestructive testing to produce better quality products.

The joint utilization of radiation detection techniques and modern computer systems have made real time radiography systems a widely applied tool for imaging internal structures of objects both as a quality control tool in industry and security check tool in commercial aviation.

Gaseous radioactive and chemical tracers are used for ventilation and air exchange measurements in buildings, laboratories, green houses and large scale air pollution studies.

There are a variety of industrial applications of tracers including mercury inventories in electrochemical plants, residence time distribution measurements in mineral processing plants, paper mills and food and chemical industry. In addition to these full-scale industrial applications, tracers are used in laboratory scale investigations for the benefit of the chemical industry and public utilities, such as water treatment, reclamation and supply.

Applications in Hydrology

The use of radioisotope tracers began in hydrology in the mid-1950s. Stable isotope and radioisotope techniques for dating and tracing of water sources are the major contribution of nuclear science to the hydrological research and water sources development in Israel. In the arid and semi-arid zones, such as Israel and the Negev, the rate of replenishment and movement of groundwaters in very slow, so that one has to resort to naturally occurring long-lived radioisotopes for dating the residence times of waters in the underground reservoirs. Natural variations in the abundance of oxygen and hydrogen isotopes are exploited for determining the origin of the groundwater sources and their recharge pathways.

Using such methods the major groundwater systems of Israel, and, in particular, the arid parts, have been studied to assess their potential as water supply systems. The information obtained greatly contributed towards the optimal exploitation of Israel's underground water resources. Later, radioisotope tracers were used for the investigation of concentration dynamics in water supply systems, thereby contributing to the water quality control.

Artificial short-lived radioisotopes, which can be injected into water streams, have been used in the study of surface waters, both for assessing flow rates in surface streams and in order to study the mixing regime in reservoirs along the Israel National Water Carrier scheme.

Applications in Environmental Studies

Tracer applications are extensively used in Israel for environmental studies as well.

Various large-scale environmental investigations make use of radioisotope tracer techniques. Examples include study of sewage dispersion in the sea, disappearance rate of coliform bacteria in the sea, thermal pollution due to discharge of cooling water from power plants, residence time distribution in sewage treatment oxidation ponds, etc. The sand movement on the sea bed was measured with radioisotope tracers, the results being used for the calibration of physical-reduced scale hydraulic models of harbors and cooling water basins.

Applications in Medicine

Beneficial uses of radiation and radionuclides can also be found in health and medicine.

Nuclear medicine had its beginning in Israel in the late fifties and early sixties. Its infrastructure was the establishment and progressive development of its three main pillars — radiopharmaceuticals, instrumentation, specialized manpower.

Development of radiopharmaceuticals was the outcome of a project begun by the Israel Atomic Energy Commission in its laboratories, which today provide the 28 departments of nuclear medicine throughout the country with 32 Tc^{99m} generators weekly (activities up to 1.2 Curie), for a total of 1200 Curies per year.

They also provide 36,000 kits annually for various medical procedures. Through the years this activity has generated a number of research projects, the most recent of which is the development of an Os^{191} — Ir^{191m} (Osmium-Iridium) generator which is particularly useful in cardiology.

In addition, activities are carried out on a routine industrial basis: In development of new surgical products such as sutures and needle packs, radiosterilized pharmaceuticals, tissue cultures, petri dishes.

The specialized instrumentation necessary for the nuclear medicine departments in Israel was developed by a group originating at the Haifa Technion-Israel's Institute of Technology. Forty gamma-cameras with data processing facilities constitute the core instrument in all these departments.

The medical manpower consists of 40 M.D. specialists in nuclear medicine. This specialty is recognized by the Israel Medical Association. There is a period of residency of four-and-a-half years at the end of which residents must pass an examination to receive the status of specialist in nuclear medicine. Nuclear medicine also has academic standing and as such is an integral part of the curriculum of our medical schools and postgraduate schools of medicine. The need for technical training in this field has been recognized by the Ministry of Health but this has yet to be organized.

This infrastructure has transformed nuclear medicine in Israel into an active part of both clinical medicine and research. All hospitals of more than 250 beds have adequate facilities or are on the way to developing them. Performed annually are approximately 100,000 diagnostic imaging procedures (of which 20̈ are cardiologic tests) and more than 500,000 in vitro radioimmunoassays. Every year some 500 patients (20% with thyroid carcinoma) receive treatment in nuclear medicine departments.

Research activity is carried out at various levels and very often at the highest level of specialization, with publication of results in international scientific journals.

Applications in Food and Agriculture

In the field of food supplies, many countries face the problem of food losses for human and animal nutrition due to infestation, contamination, deterioration, diseases. These losses are especially high in warm countries, which frequently lack the infrastructure needed for rapid transport and adequate storage, as well as other necessary facilities. In the light of today's rapidly increasing world population, food losses have to be brought under control. One way of food processing is the use of ionizing radiation for food preservation and decontamination.

The application of ionizing radiation to food, industrial products and surgical disposables has been developed in Israel over a period of more than twenty years. It has reached commercialization in the latter field within an industrial gamma radiation sterilization facility as well as within several industries which are manufacturing a number of radiation sterilizable disposable products. Several products have been developed in the field of plastic products (flame-resistant materials, special films, etc.). Food irradiation processing has reached commercial status with spices (200 tons treated in the first year — 1986) and approaches semi-commercial status with several others.

Clearances have been obtained for fruit and vegetables, grains, cereals, pulses and nuts, mushrooms and strawberries, poultry, spices, condiments, herbs, dried vegetables and poultry feed. Commercialization is expected in a number of cases by 1988 or 1989.

The contribution of these activities to the economic and social development of Israel is significant in establishing a basis for the creation of new industries, thus improving the wholesomeness of different foods, and bettering the quality and efficiency of medical and diagnostic products.

Mineral Prospecting

Another field of endeavor concerns mineral prospecting and recovery. Novel processes were developed for the recovery of uranium from phosphates, as a by-product of the production of phosphoric acid. These processes can provide uranium at a price which is competitive with the present low price of uranium on the international market.

Additional R&D

The sustained effort in R&D and the systematic application of nuclear science and technology have brought results in other fields of endeavor. An increasing fraction of the activities of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission Research Laboratories have gradually become non-nuclear in nature.

The underlying philosophy is that any effort leading to an economically viable contribution to improved quality of life is desirable. Thus, much of solid state and materials science R&D have shifted towards semiconductors and optical products and the nuclear medicine groups have become increasingly involved with NMR (Nuclear Magnetic Resonance) diagnostics. Yet another noteworthy feature is the development of a series of new sophisticated instruments, mainly in the field of radiation protection intended as commercial prototypes for worldwide markets.

A substantial portion of these activities is carried out in conjunction with newly established industrial parks and is accompanied by extensive market development efforts. The role of the parks is to promote the growth of new high-tech industries and to serve as outlets for R&D products ready for commercial exploitation.

Rotem Industries Ltd. and Isorad Ltd. are the business arms of the Nuclear Research Center — Negev and Soreq Nuclear Research Center respectively. They are in charge of transferring products and processes developed by these research centers to science-based industries.

Nuclear Power

Israel is also looking into various relevant aspects related to the introduction of nuclear power.

Power plants

For Israel to use nuclear energy for power production in the near future, the cost of nuclear electricity will have to favorably compare with electricity produced in fossil-fuel fired plants. However, the prospects for the introduction of Light Water Reactors for power generation have been narrowed. Israel considers what may be termed a shift towards more emphasis on R&D and conceptual design of the coming generation of nuclear power reactors.

Within this context, the suitability to the Israeli conditions, of so called "passively-safe" reactors is examined. Among the issues being investigated are safety, resistance to acts of sabotage, compatibility with the Israeli electrical grid, possibility of inland siting and potential for non-electrical applications, such as sea-water desalination.

Fusion as a future alternative

There can be little doubt that looking beyond fission energy, mankind will have to try and bend fusion to the task of providing energy to its ever-growing needs. The research into the as yet unsolved problems of fusion is an essential ingredient in any discussion of nuclear power. Israel cannot lose sight of it. General research is carried out as a contribution to the international effort to advance the current search for a practical and safe way to marshall fusion as a major source for the ever-increasing needs of the next century.

Safety

Nuclear safety is essential for enhancing the capability to cope with emergencies and to minimize the consequences of a nuclear incident. The activities in this field are carried out by the Licensing Division of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission which is responsible for the regulation and licensing of all existing and planned nuclear installations as well as related activities in Israel. This division has issued a number of technical regulation and policy documents concerning various issues related to site selection, and to the design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants in Israel.

This paper is based primarily on excerpts from a presentation prepared for and distributed by the Israel delegation to the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, held in Geneva, March-April 1987. The author was a member of the delegation.

Moving from Emergency to Stabilization and Growth: A New Kind of Struggle

Yaacov Pridan

1. The July 1985 Emergency Economic Plan: The First Phase

Following two unsuccessful attempts, toward the end of 1984 and again at the beginning of 1985, to curb the hyper-inflation that almost brought Israel to the brink of economic disaster, a new plan was introduced in July 1985. This program was backed by a determined National Unity government, led by then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres and supported by the Labor Federation and the nation's employers.

The 1985 plan had four prongs or main objectives:

□ The budget deficit was to be cut from 15 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) to 8 percent.

□ The shekel was devalued on 1 July 1985 by 19 percent and then linked to the dollar at the value of 1.5 new shekels.

□ Prices and wages were frozen for three months, and the automatic indexation of wages to prices was temporarily suspended. This resulted in an immediate 20 percent drop in real wages, giving breathing space to the employers and thereby preventing a sharp rise in unemployment.

The freeze was gradually thawed, as wages were allowed to catch up from December 1985 to February 1986 at a rate of 4 percent monthly. In February 1986, a gradual deregulation of the prices of goods and services was begun, and by the end of 1986 about 60 percent of the price controls were lifted.

□ Tight credit control through high interest rates was applied.

The policy implemented did indeed achieve its goals — beyond expectations.

Inflation has declined from 445 percent in 1984 to 185 percent in 1985 and 19.7 percent in 1986. The rate of unemployment remained relatively stable (at 7.1 percent at the end of 1986) and inflation seems to have been beaten without creating a recession. The budget deficit was reduced to about 4 percent of the GNP as the government slashed subsidies on food and transport and imposed new taxes on foreign travel, cars and property. The balance of payments improved, and the Bank of Israel's net reserves shot up from $2.6 billion at the end of 1984 to $4.2 billion at the end of 1986, a 60 percent increase.

The success of the 1985 stabilization plan, however, cannot be attributed to the new-found political will only. Israel was helped as well by three windfalls: (a) lower oil prices, which chopped Israel's oil bill from $1,510 million in 1985 to roughly $920 million in 1986; (b) the dollar's fall against the currencies of Europe (the destination of 40 percent of Israel's exports), to which the shekel is linked, and which helped Israel postpone a 10 percent devaluation until January 1987; (c) extra American aid of $1.5 billion, spread over the last two fiscal years.

2. Risks on the Road to Economic Recovery

The 1985 emergency plan may be considered an initial success, as it succeeded in reducing the inflationary pressures on prices and on the balance of payments. However, we are still only half-way down the road to the solution of our economic problems and to creating suitable conditions for the resumption of economic growth in the coming year; and the government is well aware of the dangers of relaxing at this stage. Israel's inflation rate is still well above the average of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a "club" of the 24 industrialized nations of Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania) area. The particular danger of declining competitiveness through rising labor costs is real. After falling sharply during the second half of 1985, real wages began rising again by the middle of 1986. If labor costs continue to increase, competitiveness will decline and it will be even more difficult for the government to resist inflationary devaluations of the shekel.

3. A Fragile Construction

The economic stability obtained is indeed fragile. Since July 1985 and until January 1987, the exchange rate of the new shekel has remained fixed at approximately 1.5 shekel to the dollar, while market prices have continued to inch up. Between August 1985 and January 1987, the consumer price index rose at the cumulative rate of 36 percent, while real wages in 1986 increased by some 7 percent over 1985.

This resulted in a significant reduction in export profitability, especially in dollar exports (real exports increased in 1986 by 7 percent, slower than in 1985) and in a rate of increase of 60 percent in imports of general consumer goods and another 90 percent in imports of durable consumer goods. The trade deficit rose in 1986 by 20 percent. Concomitantly, private consumption rose by 12 percent in 1986, contrasted with a 7 percent decline in 1984 and no increase in 1985.

A considerable slowdown in economic growth had already taken place in the previous years as a result of the oil crisis and the Yom Kippur War. From 1973 to 1984, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew at an average annual rate of 3 percent only. In the same period, investment in fixed assets declined at an average of 1 percent per year.

The restrictive economic policy, implemented in the second half of 1983 and intensified since the launching of the stabilization program, caused a further slowdown in economic activity. The GDP declined in the second half of 1985 by about 5 percent, an increase of 2.8 percent for the whole year. In 1986 a slight rise of 1.1 percent was registered.

It was, therefore, essential for the Israeli government to move to the second stage of its economic recovery program: On 13 January 1987, it adopted a series of comprehensive measures which extended the July 1985 emergency program.

4. Policy Goals

In order to succeed, the new stabilization program had to tackle the following objectives simultaneously:

(a) to bring down the annual rate of inflation to a one-digit figure;

(b) to ensure continued improvement in the balance of payments and increase export profitability;

(c) to create conditions for the resumption of growth in the business sector, while reducing the role of government in the economy, without undermining the economic stability achieved;

(d) to restructure the economy so as to reduce the weight of the public sector and, more specifically, to cut the budget further;

(e) to strengthen confidence in the Israeli economy and currency, both internally and internationally.

5. The January 1987 Stabilization Program: The Second Phase

After a long public debate, the following decisions were taken by the government on 13 January 1987:

(a) The value of the shekel was lowered by 10 percent, to 1.65 to the dollar. The new rate is likely to remain in force for an extended period, with relative wage stability.

(b) Price increases on some subsidized goods: 20 percent on regular bread, 15 percent on white bread, 15 percent on milk and milk products, 5 percent on frozen chicken.

(c) A temporary 2.7 percent moratorium on cost-of-living increases.

(d) Reduction of employer social security payments extended.

(e) Price controls were extended to 31 March 1988. Decontrolled products and services will not be affected unless their prices rise precipitously, in which case controls will be reimposed.

(f) Recognizing that income tax rates for individuals and companies are too high, discouraging initiative, growth and investment, the government submitted a tax-reform bill to the Knesset, which went into effect 1 April 1987, to reduce the top rate for individuals from 60 percent to 48 percent, and for companies, depending on their nature, from 67 percent to 55 percent, or from 40.5 percent to 36.25 percent. (Individuals earning above 7,400 shekels per month will pay a total high of 52.8 percent.)

(g) Cancellation of fees on vehicles, contracts, documents, airplane tickets. The tax on flights abroad will be raised to 250 shekels, but will no longer be index-linked.

(h) In order to decrease the large interest differentials in various forms of credit, a levy of 3 percent will be laid on all credit in foreign currency received by Israeli residents.

The Knesset recently approved the 1987 budget. Its main components follow:

— Total: 37.6 billion shekels.

— Composition of the budget:

Ordinary budget	IS 11.7 billion
Development budget	IS 1.7 billion
Debt service	IS 16.0 billion (Excluding debt repayments to the Bank of Israel of 1.6 billion shekels)
Defense budget	IS 8.2 billion

The budget includes cuts of around 400 million shekels from various ministries: Labor — 35 million; Education — 30 million; Health — 28 million; Construction — 28 million. 110 million are to be shaved from subsidies and 80 million from the budget reserve.

6. Prospects for the Future

Will the second plan be as successful as the first? At this stage it seems more problematic, as the government has failed to obtain as yet the broad public support it achieved with the first program. The approval of the proposed budget for 1987 met with a lot of difficulties, following conflicting demands from different sectors. Moreover, the government had to abandon in the meantime its attempt to cancel a number of tax discounts and benefits now in effect as part of the tax reform.

The future evaluation of the plan, however, is still unclear, and even a stabilized rate of inflation of 20 percent is still very much above that of the OECD countries and of the United States average 3 percent yearly inflation rate. A few months hence, exporters may exert renewed devaluation pressures, as they have done now, which could trigger a higher, more permanent inflation. In fact, for many years, economic planners have been trying in vain to seek a devaluation that would not quickly raise prices and wages, but thus far with little success. When 1987's national and sectoral work agreements are negotiated in April, price rises will have absorbed the January devaluation and wage earners will inevitably ask to be compensated through wage rises, with the underlying risk of a renewed inflationary spiral.

The government will probably seek to erode real wages (as during the first plan), aware as it is of its growing difficulties in proceeding to reduce its spending. Proposed cuts in education, health and other budget items have encountered heavy criticism from the respective ministries. This might in itself jeopardize the achievements of one of the basic goals of the economic policy — diverting resources for growth from the public to the business sector — a disincentive for the private sector to spend less and invest more.

Despite all the hurdles and difficulties, the second stage of the economic stabilization plan stands a fair chance of success, thanks to the fact that it is more comprehensive than its predecessor. It tackles inflation, the balance of payments, the budget, tax and capital market reform and growth.

Forecasts prepared for 1987 by the Bank of Israel and the relevant ministries indicate there will be faster average growth in 1987; exports will continue to rise satisfactorily and consumption will slow, while fixed-asset investment should increase — after 1986's seven-percent fall; and unemployment will decline marginally.

1987 Forecasts for Major Economic Variables Increase (%)

	1986 (estimate)	1987 (forecasts)
Gross Domestic Product	1.1	3.2
Exports of goods and Services	5.7	5.3
Unemployment	7.1	6.8
Private Consuption per capita	10.2	2.8
Fixed-Asset Investment	-6.8	+ 3.4

The main problem will continue to be inflation, which may rise by more than 20 percent during 1987. This will place the government in an awkward position, where it must decide whether to maintain the declared policy of keeping the present exchange rate constant or devaluate again, with all the expected consequences.

7. Summing Up — With a Look to the Future

In the land of prophets it is difficult — and even hazardous — to prophesy. Yet, many people remain optimistic, believing that the public has become used to lower inflation and will attempt to maintain it by restraining wage demands and prices. This may forestall eventual pressures for redevaluation.

In its struggle for economic recovery, Israel's ultimate weapon in its economic arsenal is the brainpower and entrepreneurial zeal of its work force. Israel may well have more MIT graduates per capita than any country except the United States. IBM, Digital Equipment, Intel, National Semiconductor and Motorola have all established computer design centres in the new industrial parks mushrooming around the academic centers of the country. These and many other investors have been attracted, *inter alia,* by the ability of Israeli engineers and technicians to come up with innovative technical solutions as well as by their creative character. Israel is also producing entrepreneurs who are creating ingenious new products: for instance, Luz Industries — the world's only producer of large-scale solar energy systems; Laser Industries — an innovative and leading producer of surgical lasers; Scitex — a sophisticated enterprise in computer graphics, among others.

Israel will continue to develop original, sophisticated products and will try hard to boost its exports and attract new investments. In this context, Israel finds itself well positioned between the European Communities (EC) and the United States, since it has Free Trade Agreements with both. Import duties from the EC decreased by 60 percent on 1 January 1987 and will reach zero by 1 January 1989. Industrial exports to the EC are not taxed, as of July 1977. The Free Trade Agreement signed with the United States in 1985 will phase out duties on U.S.-Israeli trade over a ten-year period.

These factors, together with Israel's other assets, should help the country realize its economic goals, despite the difficulties it faces.

The government sees this economic stabilization plan, like the emergency plan implemented after July 1985, as an inclusive program whose success is capable of paving the way for renewed economic growth in the years ahead.

The Economics of Peace

Elmer L. Winter

Chairman of the Committee for Economic Growth of Israel
Past President of the American Jewish Committee

Despite widespread differences between Prime Minister Shamir and Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Peres, serious discussions are taking place in Israel and in many world capitals relating to a Middle East international peace conference. The talks revolve around security concerns, return of land, autonomy, etc., yet seldom is the question asked — "What are the economic advantages of signing a peace treaty?"

Without discussing the pros and cons of an international conference as the setting for peace negotiations, it is clear that substantial economic gains will flow from a peaceful solution of Arab-Israeli differences. Indeed, the economic benefits resulting from peace could be the very cement to hold the treaty together.

After the signing of a peace agreement, Israel could substantially reduce the huge defense budget that has inhibited economic growth. Much of this crushing burden could eventually — but not immediately — be eliminated. Funds used for defense could be used to meet the social and educational needs of Israel's citizens.

A peace treaty would provide political stability in Israel, resulting in increased foreign investment — particularly in the high-tech area where Israel has won international recognition. This in turn will help put a stop to Israel's serious brain-drain.

Through subcontracts agreed upon with Arab manufacturers, Israeli manufacturers could expand their exports to the United States and Europe. These exports could be sold duty-free to American and European buyers under FTA and EEC agreements.

There are 150 million Arabs living in the Middle East. Following a peace agreement, Israel could find expanded markets for a broad range of Israeli products in many Arab countries.

Through the elimination of the Arab boycott, a peace agreement will open new world markets for Israel. Good examples would be expansion of trade between Israel and Japan, Israel and China, and other countries that have surrendered to the boycott. American companies that now bypass Israel out of fear of the Arab boycott will also become buyers of Israeli products.

The elimination of the Arab boycott could also revive trade relations between Israel and many African countries. Twenty-nine African countries broke ties with Israel in 1973. Recently, Togo, Zaire, Liberia, Ivory Coast and Cameroon started to redevelop business relationships with Israel. Others will inevitably follow.

Trade between Israel and Egypt is likely to increase if some other Arab states make peace with Israel. While the original expectations for expanded trade between Israel and Egypt have not materialized, a broader Mideast peace should stimulate economic relations between Israel and the largest Arab country.

Positive economic benefits will also flow to Arab countries who become part of the peace process. Many Arab countries need goods and services that Israel produces, such as fertilizers, agricultural equipment, medical services and equipment, computers, and textiles, as well as new technology.

Factories could be opened in Arab countries under subcontracts with Israeli companies to provide much-needed employment for Arab workers.

A peace treaty in the Middle East would encourage tourism to the Arab states as well as to Israel. Israeli universities will be open to more Arab students. The facilities of Israel's hospitals will offer increased medical services to Israel's Arab neighbors.

Looking farther down the road, it can be anticipated that a Mideast Common Market might well develop to speed the free flow of products and services among the countries of the area. They will help to raise the standard-of-living of all citizens of the region.

Finally, the United States would be a major beneficiary of an Israeli-Arab peace treaty. This would be a result of not only the political stability a treaty would bring to the region, but also the reduction of U.S. financial commitments to Israel and Egypt as they move towards greater economic independence.

The Arab States' Military Buildup and its Impact on the Military Balance with Israel

Aharon Levran

The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University

The Arab states' military buildup is a striking phenomenon, especially in view of the economic crisis they have been facing since oil revenues began to diminish in 1981.

The Arab states have persisted in their overall military buildup for various reasons. For one, they have not abandoned their concept of military struggle against Israel as a viable option. The rejectionists consider it the major strategic option; the moderates view it as a possible alternative. Secondly, due to sociological factors the military still constitutes the backbone of most Arab regimes. Thus the fairly normal ambition of most armed forces to enhance their capabilities, especially with new weapons systems, meets with little bureaucratic opposition, and defense is the last area to be affected by budgettary cutbacks. In addition, the lessons drawn from the last two wars with Israel (1973 and 1982), and the latter's own military buildup in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, have spurred Arab military growth. Finally, the Arab military buildup is related to inter-Arab and regional disputes. This is best illustrated by the war between Iraq and Iran, which thus far has more than tripled the Iraqi order-of-battle.

Main Characteristics of Arab Buildup

The Arab military buildup from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s was characterized by quantitative growth, but particularly by qualitative enhancement. On the quantitative scale, the number of divisions in the three Arab countries bordering Israel (Egypt, Syria and Jordan) was 25 percent greater in 1986 than during the Yom Kippur War (25 divisions, compared with 20 in 1973). During the same period the number of armored and mechanized divisions in these armies more than doubled: 22 (out of a total of 25), compared with 10 (out of a total of 20). If the enlarged Iraqi ground order-of-battle is taken into account, the figures are even more impressive.

Quantitative growth is also evident with regard to main weapons systems. The armies of Egypt, Syria and Jordan increased their tanks by 60 percent (7,300 tanks in 1986, compared with about 4,500 in 1973). In aircraft, helicopters and APCs, the growth rate was 100 percent (about 1,400 aircraft in 1986, compared with 750 in 1973; 500 helicopters, compared with 200 in 1973; and 9,000 APCs, compared with 4,500 in 1973).

The most impressive quantitative buildup was in Iraq, where the order-of-battle of ground forces grew from 12 divisions at the beginning of the war with Iran (September 1980) to about 40 divisions and one million soldiers in 1986, far exceeding any other army in the region. True, a large number of these new divisions, particularly those formed lately, were far from attaining full operational capability; yet even a reduced order-of-battle of 15 to 20 divisions, when the Iran-Iraq war ends, could be considered highly significant.

Another Arab state engaged in specific quantitative force building was Syria. The Syrian concept of strategic parity with Israel is the ideological basis for Syria's massive military buildup. Thus the ground forces' order-of-battle increased from five divisions in the wake of the Yom Kippur War (1973) to some nine divisions in 1986. During the same period Syria also doubled the total number of its armed forces personnel to about 500,000 regulars (exceeding Egypt, whose population is four times larger than Syria's). Another striking increase in Syria's military buildup was in air defense: the number of its missile batteries increased to 150 in 1986, compared with less than 40 in 1973. Notably, however, in late 1986 — early 1987, reductions in the size of the Syrian armed forces were imposed due to economic constraints.

As for Egypt, even after signing the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, it increased the number of its divisional frameworks from 10 in 1979 to 12 by 1986.

Of even greater significance than this quantitative growth is the qualitative Arab military buildup. It threatens to close the quality gap that the Israel Defense Forces have had up to now. The Arab states' emphasis on quality stems primarily from their awareness that quantitative superiority alone will not enable them to win against Israel's qualitative military edge.

Secondly, competition among the superpowers and other interested parties wishing to recover petrodollars has opened up previously restricted weaponry markets, thus enabling Arab states — especially Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — to procure quality weaponry from the West, including the United States, with minimal limitations. Ironically, the Middle East peace process too helped remove barriers to the transfer of advanced weaponry, mainly to Egypt.

Thirdly, salient qualitative improvements in Russian-made major weapons systems such as tanks, aircraft, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, also contributed to the enhancement of qualitative weaponry in the Arab inventory. The Syrian Armed Forces benefited mostly from these improved qualitative features.

Finally, the Arab states' great efforts in the field of education and in the integration of well-educated recruits into the ranks of their armies have improved the quality of their forces.

This qualitative buildup finds expression in the three major components of military power: manpower, weaponry and operational capability.

Manpower

The improvement in the quality of manpower in the Arab armies is first of all expressed in their ability to enlist better educated conscripts. This is particularly true in the armies of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and has raised standards especially among low-ranking officers. In the last few years, however, the trend of an increase in the annual number of educated conscripts has significantly slowed down. More important, due to the basic weakness of vocational education in most Arab countries, and despite ongoing efforts to improve the situation, their armies still suffer substantially from a lack of skilled technological manpower. Simultaneously, skilled manpower is greatly needed in the civilian sector as well.

Weaponry

Improvements in weapons systems are even more salient. They have two general characteristics. First, emphasis on the actual procurement of modern weaponry has increased the ratio of advanced weaponry in the overall arsenal. Secondly, western components have been added to existing and often outmoded eastern weaponry. Specifically, these qualitative improvements are expressed in the following aspects.

First-echelon weapons systems In contrast to the past, Arab armies now possess major weapons systems that are used both in the East and the West as first-echelon armaments. This is chiefly evident in air and land weaponry. First-echelon fighter-bomber aircraft, such as F-15s and F-16s, are now deployed by the Saudi Arabian and Egyptian air forces. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are equipping their air forces with state-of-the-art European aircraft such as the Tornado and Mirage-2000. Syria has been equipped by the Soviet Union with improved MiG-25 interceptors and Sukhoy-22 strike aircraft, and in 1987 was expected to receive the brand new MiG-29, which is considered to equal major performance aspects (e.g., look/shoot down capabilities) of the American F-15 and F-16 aircraft. The Iraqi Air Force were to have received this latest type of Soviet aircraft by late 1986.

On land, the Jordanians possess advanced British Chieftain tanks, while Saudi Arabia and Egypt are equipped with first-echelon American tanks, the M-60 A3. By 1986 one quarter of Syria's 4,000 tanks were advanced Soviet T-72s, some of the improved type. These advanced tanks are not available even to all Soviet armored divisions, or in all Eastern Bloc armies.

The most striking qualitative improvement in artillery is the emphasis on procurement of self-propelled artillery pieces. At present more than half of Jordanian and Saudi artillery is self-propelled. Lately Egypt, too, has embarked in this direction by acquiring about 120 SP artillery pieces from the United States, in addition to developing and producing its own SP guns. Other Arab states that base their arsenals on the Soviet Union are less advanced in this regard due to a lack of Soviet emphasis on SP artillery. Syria has acquired some Soviet-made SP artillery while Libya and Iraq are also obtaining these systems from Italy and France.

In the area of air defense, on which the Arab states place significant stress, their forces recently armed themselves with mobile SA missiles both from the East (Improved SA-6, SA-8, and SA-13) and from the West (mobile HAWK and Crotale missiles).

We have already mentioned Syria's large arsenal of 150 SAM batteries; it equals the number of SAMS possessed by Egypt. But while Syria is dependent solely on the Soviet Union, Egypt has obtained a considerable number of American and French SA missiles. Moreover, both Syria and Egypt have emphasized the mobility of air defense missiles: about half of Syria's SAMS, and about one-third of Egypt's, were mobile by 1986. Interestingly, even Jordan has considerably strengthened its air defense by obtaining, in addition to 14 stationary US HAWK missile batteries, a range of Soviet-made tactical mobile air defense systems (the SA-8 and SA-13).

Force-multiplier weapons systems As for air weaponry, the striking items are the acquisition of command, control and early-warning aircraft such as the

US AWACS and Hawkeyes by Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and attack helicopters from both East and West. These are possessed in large quantities by Israel's immediate neighbors (about 180) as well as by the peripheral countries (about 240).

Diversification in land forces armaments ranges even further. Advanced anti-tank missiles with longer ranges and better firing systems have been acquired by all Arab armies. Most are also in the process of equipping themselves with advanced artillery munitions such as cluster and sophisticated homing shells. Another item of advanced weaponry is scatter mines — already used by the Arab states bordering Israel, as well as Iraq, Libya and Saudi Arabia.

Auxiliary weapons systems, such as improved tank and artillery fire-control systems, have helped the Arab armies to improve both their old and new arsenals. Jordanian Chieftain tanks are equipped with such computerized systems. American M-60 A3 tanks possessed by Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan are equipped with thermal sights integrated into the fire-control systems of the tanks, and will soon be equipped with laser range-finders. Another important item to be integrated into Arab armored and mechanized land forces is the improved Starlight Scope (SLS). All these auxiliary systems will enhance Arab land forces' performance in day and night operations.

Stand-off armaments To round off the discussion on weapon force-multipliers, we look at items of stand-off and long-arm weaponry, with which the Arab states have also taken an impressive step forward.

In the air, this category encompasses the entire range of sophisticated guided missiles (TV, laser, etc.) — whether from the East (a variety of air-to-surface missiles) or from the West (Maverick missiles and others). The Iraqis have already used French EXOCET and AS-30 laser-guided missiles quite extensively in the Gulf. On the ground, this category includes SS missiles such as the long-range but relatively inaccurate SCUD-B (possessed by Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Libya), the shorter range but more accurate SS-21 (possessed by Syria), and the long-range (300 km) Sepal shore-to-sea missile. Long-range SA-5 missiles might also be included in this category. All these weapons, some recently arrived, invest Arab armies with a long-arm capability that enables them to extend their striking power to the heart of Israel.

Military industry To these improvements in the quality of the Arab military arsenal one must add a growing local production of weapons. This is especially conspicuous in Egypt and is beginning to have an impact in Syria.

Egypt has embarked vigorously on a program of local production of weapons systems in addition to its veteran efforts at small arms and ammunition production. In 1986 the Egyptians were engaged in attempts to produce SP artillery guns, and were even considering producing a main battle tank. In addition, Egypt assembles western trainer aircraft, upgrades outmoded Eastern

Bloc tanks, and produces various kinds of short-range missiles. The development of this military industry, apart from prestige considerations, is bound both to improve the maintenance capability of the Egyptian Army and to enable it to spring operational surprises on its adversaries.

Syria has embarked on a similar pattern, though with a lower profile. Syria is concentrating chiefly on chemical weaponry production (including SSM chemical warheads) and on conventional auxiliary weapons systems.

Operational Capability

The qualitative improvement of the major Arab armies is also evident in battlefield operational capability – first and foremost, in structural changes undergone by the land and air forces of most of the Arab armies.

Apart from converting its main Soviet-made weapons systems into western ones, Egypt is significantly reorganizing its land and air forces to obtain operational offensive and mobile warfare capabilities that they did not possess in the past. Its army is becoming more mechanized and mobile: in the Yom Kippur War the Egyptian Army consisted of two armored, three mechanized and five infantry divisions; at present it comprises four armored, six mechanized and two infantry divisions. This development is backed by a significant increase in mobile air defense batteries — in addition to older SAM-6s acquired from the East, Egypt now possesses French Crotale and US mobile HAWK batteries; altogether about 40 batteries — and by initial steps toward acquisition from the United States of SP artillery.

The Egyptian Air Force has procured a considerable number of advanced western combat aircraft — these will total about 130 when supply is completed — as well as 65 attack helicopters and some 100 trainers. It has also abandoned Soviet air operational doctrine in favor of the western model.

Syria's massive military buildup has also increased its army's military capabilities. By 1986 it possessed the capacity to attack Israel's rear with both advanced aircraft and SS missiles. It improved its offensive capabilities by acquiring a mobile warfare ability with a land order-of-battle that is entirely armored, mechanized, and airborne. Its defensive capabilities, too, have been considerably augmented by extended and intensive fortifications in the Golan Heights and the Lebanese Biqa Valley. Increased quantities of weapons and numbers of units have improved the ability to absorb and survive battle casualties — a lesson drawn from the Yom Kippur War. Finally, Syria has also registered progress in the naval arm by significantly improving coastal defenses and procuring submarines and long-range shore-to-sea missiles. These could provide the Syrian Navy with sea capabilities never before at its disposal.

The Jordanian Army has for some time enjoyed a fairly adequate defensive posture with its small but modern, mobile and mechanized land order-of-battle: half of the four divisions are armored and the other half mechanized. By 1986 the beginnings of an offensive capability were emerging, based on improved Chieftain tanks, Soviet mobile SAM batteries, SP artillery, attack helicopters, and engineering equipment. This new offensive capability is also reflected in the offensive-oriented training exercises that the Jordanian forces conducted in 1986. However, the Jordanian Army's full-scale offensive capability is limited by its small size, and particularly by the weakness of its air force and, to some extent, its air defenses as well.

Even the Saudi Army, with its fundamental disadvantages in terms of lack of manpower and, especially, skilled personnel, has made significant progress in its air and naval arms. Both forces have procured advanced weapons systems from the United States (five AWACS, 60 F-15 aircraft and 13 missile ships) and Europe (72 Tornado aircraft from Britain and four missile frigates from France). Alongside the Iraqi Air Force, the Saudis are now a dominant factor in the skies above the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, and their navy has an enhanced capability to control traffic in the Red Sea. As such, their capability to defend the kingdom has improved remarkably, as has their offensive and retaliatory potential against neighboring states. A Saudi capability (combined with that of the other GCC countries) to contribute advanced air units to Arab forces and to take part in an air war against Israel is another specific improvement.

An additional important development is the Arab armies' capability to control and command greater numbers of ground formations at higher echelons. This was achieved by establishing corps headquarters. These were operational in the Egyptian Army as early as the Yom Kippur War; by 1980 the Iraqis were operating eight such headquarters (in comparison to one at the beginning of the war with Iran); and recently two corps headquarters were introduced in the Syrian Army.

Efforts are also being invested to develop and integrate a variety of C3I means, EW and ECW systems, etc. Some of these improvements, especially in the area of EW, have already been utilized in battle. While it is premature to fully evaluate their contribution to the improvement of command and control capabilities, the very persistence by Arab armies in these areas indicates a recognition of their potential. Indeed, Arab advances in EW could ultimately impair the IDF's command ability.

Another factor in the improvement of the major Arab armies' operational capability involves the intensity of training in general, and close-to-combat-reality exercises in particular. This includes the mobile and offensive type of training that Syria's and even Jordan's and Egypt's armies conducted in 1986. In Iraq, improvements in operational capability are undoubtedly linked to the accumulating combat experience gained in the long war with Iran. Certainly, logistical and engineering battle expertise, and the experience of officers and headquarters gained in the war with Iran, will be helpful in any circumstance.

Mitigating Factors

It is valid to assume that the massive Arab military buildup has strategic and operational implications for the Arab-Israeli military balance. Yet the primary question is whether and to what extent Israel's qualitative military edge has eroded. In this regard two important factors must be examined: the Arab ability to exploit the potential of modern and sophisticated weaponry, and the Israel Defense Force posture.

Maximalizing the Potential of Advanced Weaponry

An assessment of the Arab armies' ability to maximalize the potential of their advanced weapons systems is vital if we are to draw conclusions regarding the military quality gap between the IDF and the Arab armies. Since much of the relevant information is not available, such an evaluation must remain somewhat theoretical and incomplete. In addition, even tentative conclusions should be drawn only regarding air weapons systems where qualitative dimensions, new technology and sophisticated weaponry are most predominant.

It is generally argued that advanced aircraft are comparatively easier even for mediocre pilots to handle, both in air-to-air combat and in air-to-ground attack missions, because of the advanced armaments and modern avionics installed in them. This assumption can perhaps be illustrated by the downing of one or two Iranian F-4s by Saudi pilots in the summer of 1984 (though they were assisted by American-flown AWACS and an American-assisted Saudi air defense system). Yet the poor performance of Syrian pilots flying relatively good aircraft in the Lebanon War makes such an assumption disputable.

Additional evidence supporting a more skeptical view can be found in Egypt's difficulties in absorbing American Phantom F-4 aircraft. These planes are rather complicated to handle, but were nevertheless supplied for political reasons after the signing of the peace accord with Israel. On the other hand the Egyptian Air Force successfully absorbed the advanced but easy to handle F-16 aircraft.

A case at hand is the Iraqi Air Force's performance in the Gulf war. Despite their absolute quantitative and qualitative edge over the Iranian Air Force, the Iraqis performed poorly in the air during the years 1980-1985. They improved significantly in 1986 when, by using better equipment and employing more daring tactics, the Iraqi Air Force finally succeeded in seriously damaging the economic infrastructure of Iran. Apparently Iraqi pilots managed only in 1986 to master the 80 French Mirage F-1s that were in their possession for some years. They launched impressive long-range attacks down the Gulf and around

Teheran. More effective French-made air-to-ground laser guided missiles, such as the AS-30, contributed to these successes. Iraqi courage in conducting low altitude air attacks on well-defended Iranian targets also played a role in these achievements. While these Iraqi gains appear to prove that modern equipment indeed contributes significantly, one must take into consideration the fact that in 1986 the Iraqi Air Force was not confronting a substantial opponent.

Against this backdrop, two preliminary conclusions can be drawn. One is rather simplistic: it holds that the ability to extract the maximum from advanced aircraft depends solely on the type of aircraft used: contrast the Egyptian Air Force's successful absorption of the F-16 with its difficulties with the F-4. The second conclusion somewhat contradicts the first: it holds that high quality weapons systems cannot accommodate underqualified operators. Thus, advanced aircraft require more skillful pilots in order to extract the most from them, for such aircraft contain avionic systems that are increasingly complex and diversified, and necessitate greater and more varied handling skills. If, in turn, a better pilot can extract much more from an advanced aircraft than can a mediocre one, then there is a significant gap between good and mediocre pilots flying the same advanced aircraft. Extracting the maximum from advanced aircraft also necessitates a better air control and command system than the Arabs seemed to have in 1986.

In addition, it may be argued that Arab pilots' inferior level compared to Israeli pilots will continue to be affected by inherent constraints such as deficient selection methods of pilots and lower training levels. These problems are particularly salient in the Syrian Air Force, due to its rapid buildup in recent years. Nevertheless, Arab air forces that have adopted western air doctrines appear to have become more effective. Certainly in the long run one can expect the operation of advanced weapons systems to promote a better understanding of air warfare and improved overall performance in Arab air forces.

On land, Arab field commanders confront new problems involving complex warfare and the functioning of sophisticated and diversified weapons systems. While the issue should not be overemphasized, it may be assumed that Syrian and other Arab commanders' future ability to function effectively in time of war will decrease to some extent due to command overload generated by the magnitude and sophistication of modern combat means. In addition, command ability will be affected by the increasing need for close joint operations on the future battlefield. The complexity and burden upon low and medium-ranking commanders will grow with the transfer of battle control to them in accordance with modern warfare doctrines that prescribe delegation of combat authority. These complexities may affect IDF commanders, too, but as their quality basis is higher and they are better trained to initiate, improvise and operate flexibly, they are bound to overcome them more easily.

Thus, much depends on the personal qualities of Arab field commanders. When more complex mobile warfare is involved, Arab commanders will presumably be less effective, while in simpler and less complex combat forms, such as static defense, or in routine military activities executed in accordance with more or less regular combat doctrine, their effectiveness may be higher.

Another important point concerns the shortage of qualified technical personnel in Arab armies. This shortcoming is closely linked to the overall low quality of manpower potential in Arab countries, as well as to deficiencies in the educational infrastructure. It substantially restricts the Arabs' ability to fully exploit advanced weapons systems.

Yet another significant factor restricting Arab military growth and quality is the recent drastic reduction in financial resources. Diminishing oil revenues have adversely affected all Arab countries — oil producers as well as confrontation states — eroding their ability to maintain massive military buildups. Some, like Libya and Saudi Arabia, have significantly cut their defense budget allotments; others are struggling hard to maintain at least the nominal values of these expenditures. We have already noted that Syria, due to the heavy burden of defense expenditures on its shaky economy, decided to reduce somewhat the size of its land forces.

Thus the massive Arab military buildup of the late 1970s-early 1980s has slowed down, at least for the time being. The qualitative dimension, too, has been affected. Yet it remains the most reasonable avenue of advancement in view of financial and infrastructural constraints. It remains to be seen, however to what extent Arab armies will be able to fully exploit the quality weaponry they possess.

Israel's Defense Posture

Arab military capabilities are closely related to those of Israel. The weight of the threats and risks emanating from the Arab military buildup can only be measured after taking into account Israel's military efforts. The interplay between the capabilities of both sides determines both the military balance prevailing between them, and the degree of deterrence that the IDF enjoys vis-a-vis Arab armies.

Israel's defense forces also grew considerably in size and quality in the wake of the Yom Kippur War (1973). Quantitatively, the IDF has doubled its strength in many areas since then. While in 1973 Israel's land forces consisted of six divisions, by 1986 there were 12. Quantitative doubling also characterized the IDF's major weapons systems: some 600 aircraft in 1986, compared with about 300 in 1973, and 3,800 tanks in 1986, compared with some 2,000 tanks then. The IDF more than doubled some military items: about 8,000 APCs in 1986 compared with less than half that number in 1973; and 190 helicopters in 1986, whereas in 1973 it had only about 75. Moreover, by 1986 the IDF possessed at least small quantities of weapons systems, such as SAMs and SS missiles, that were not in its arsenal then.

Qualitatively, the majority of IDF land forces are armored and mechanized: in 1986 its APCs equalled the total number of those in the combined armies of Syria, Jordan and Egypt. Similarly offensive in character is the artillery corps, comprising primarily SP pieces. Also typical of the IDF are its offensive and qualitative dimensions. Thus, Israel does not expend financial and manpower resources on air defense or coastal defense components, in contrast to Arab armies that invest a considerable portion of their resources in defense. These characteristics stem first and foremost from Israel's strategic necessity to wage a short war and score a decisive victory. Versatile military equipment is intended to compensate for a shortage of manpower and limited financial resources.

The majority of IDF resources are channeled to the air and armor arms. In the air, emphasis is placed on high quality multi-role aircraft that are capable of executing attack as well as defense missions. Arab air forces, on the other hand, until recent years concentrated mainly on interceptor type aircraft. The number of high quality aircraft in the IDF has grown significantly in recent years to occupy a greater proportion of the total. With the addition of C/D type F-16s, the IAF will possess an impressive contingent of some 200 very high quality aircraft, in addition to its F-4s and Kfirs, as well as combat-proven quality air-to-air and air-to-surface advanced weapons systems like Python 3 and Purplefist.

This emphasis on quality and offensive types of weaponry is also found in the armor corps. Israel has been producing, though in small numbers, one of the best main battle tanks in the world, the Merkava M-1, whose performance in the Lebanon War (1982) was remarkable. An improved Merkava M-2 is already under production. In parallel, Israel has been engaged for some time in improving and upgrading its remaining tank fleet of American M-60 A3s and M-60 A1s, British Centurions, and captured Soviet F-55s and T-62s.

Israel's navy, too, has offensive and high quality imprints. It concentrates on small and speedy vessels — the MFPBs and missile-armed hydrofoils that constitute the backbone of its power — rather than on large and slow sailing or defensive types. Submarines and landing craft can also be included in this offensive category.

An additional emphasis in the IDF's structure and buildup is on force-multipliers, such as Hawkeye early warning and control aircraft,vehicles piloted by remote, sophisticated and stand-off air armaments that made their successful debut in the Lebanon War, advanced land armaments such as tanks, artillery fire control systems, and night-vision devices, and electronic warfare equipment for use on land or in the air.

Yet despite apparent increasing threats from the Arab military buildup, national economic constraints caused the IDF to undergo a drastic cutback in its defense budget during 1984-86. At a time when most Arab armies' defense budgets were increasing nominally (even though in real terms they decreased slightly), the IDF budget was cut by some $600m during these years. These budgetary constraints are behind substantial cuts in manpower and reduction of units in the regular forces. The cutbacks also entailed reductions in stocks, while reduced training hours particularly affected reserve units. Slowdowns in a number of weapons development and upgrading projects as well as drops in maintenance levels were also evident. While intensive efforts were invested to minimize the harm done to the qualitative components of IDF power, and several new items were introduced, nevertheless both weapons development and the size and training of regular units were affected.

In sum, despite current IDF difficulties and basic drawbacks such as a permanent manpower shortage, the IDF's overall high quality has not diminished, particularly in key power components like air force intelligence and mobile warfare capability. Consequently the Israeli technological and quality edge remains intact. This, alongside US support and strategic cooperation, continues to constitute a crucial factor in the IDF's deterrent posture.

Strategic and Tactical-Operational Implications

Despite the Arab armies' limitations and the mitigating factors discussed earlier, their massive military buildup of recent years and enhanced military capabilities are bound to have implications for Israel. This net assessment applies both to strategic and tactical-operational levels and, altogether, to the military balance between the Arabs and Israel.

The Strategic Level

In view of the massive Arab military buildup, some Arab states may revive the notion that they possess a military option to resolve the conflict with Israel. We recall that it was Egypt's recognition that such an option does not exist or is too costly, that brought it to the peace negotiating table with Israel. Additional Arab states may share this kind of thinking. But as the military balance has come somewhat adversely to affect Israel in recent years, the war option may again be perceived as viable not only among the Arab Rejectionists.

One factor that may fuel the revival of this Arab war option is possible attrition in the IDF deterrent posture. Israel's deterrence certainly has not grown in recent years, due both to the outcome of the 1982 Lebanon War and Israel's current economic hardships. In Lebanon, for the first time, Israel evacuated Arab territory against a backdrop of grave internal dissent regarding war aims. Disagreement was considerably intensified by Israel's deep sensitivity to human casualties, stemming from operational and moral difficulties faced by the IDF in coping with terrorist and guerrilla warfare in densely populated Arab areas. The long stay in Lebanon also illustrated Israel's weakness in conducting a protracted war effort.

Economic hardships in Israel have recently been exacerbated, forcing the IDF, as noted earlier, to cut back its regular order-of-battle and other vital elements in the power equation.

To these two fairly recent developments we must add Israel's basic shortcomings. One is a longstanding deficiency in translating battlefield successes into overall strategic and political gains. There is also a deep recognition in Israel that the conflict cannot be decided by military means, due to basic asymmetry in size, resources, international support, etc., between Israel and its Arab adversaries, as well as to additional domestic and external constraints. A second basic shortcoming is Israel's well known manpower shortages. Israel is approaching total exploitation of its manpower potential for military purposes. Basically this is not the case with the Arab countries apart from Syria — though at the moment they are unable to spend as much of their financial resources as they would like on the military, nor can they always conscript better educated recruits into the ranks of their armies. But in both areas they retain a long-term potential that is saliently expressed even now with much bigger standing armies than Israel's.

These Israeli limitations vis-a-vis the Arabs may in future generate a negative change in the military balance between Israel and its Arab adversaries, together with a deterioration in Israel's deterrent posture which could augment the Arab war option and increase risks of war.

Though a possibility, this is not yet a reality. Today, even in the wake of the Arab military buildup, the IDF is rightly considered on a one-to-one basis as stronger than any other Arab army. This advantage derives mainly from the qualitative edge that the IDF still maintains over the Arab armies, and was clearly manifested by Israel's air power in the 1982 Lebanon War. The IDF's edge could also be brought to bear in the event that Israel had to face an Arab military coalition of some kind. It is likely that when confronting such a coalition the IDF would encounter difficulties in gaining a decisive and rapid victory; but the ultimate outcome would still probably be as in the past.

Fortunately for Israel, the chances of such a coalition forming are unlikely at present. This is due mainly to two factors: first the deep rift among the Arab states over the strategy that has to be implemented in order to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict — with Egypt excluding itself from the circle of war with Israel. Egypt has essentially lost an interest in war; it does not seem to be withdrawing from its peace strategy with Israel, due largely to pragmatic considerations such as its assessment of Israel's military strength, and the possibility that in case of war, Egypt might lose both the Sinai Peninsula (again) and US financial and strategic support.

The second reason is that Iraq is pinned down in a prolonged and resources-exhausting war with Iran. The war not only prevents the forming of an eastern war coalition against Israel, it also best illustrates the deep split among Arab states, as radical Syria and Libya back Iran against Iraq. Jordan, due to its military weakness, has never been able alone to initiate a war against Israel. Thus its only option is to join another major Arab country in such a war; although this cannot be ruled out, it is arguable whether a war would best serve Jordan's interests. Moreover, the option of war is less likely to be applied in Jordan's case as an effective means for advancing the peace process.

This leaves Syria as the only serious potential candidate for war with Israel. As mentioned earlier, Syria has been building up its forces according to its strategic parity concept, in order to achieve a capability of fighting alone against Israel, both defensively and offensively. Recent reductions in the size of its ground forces may cast some doubt on Syria's ability to achieve the desired parity with Israel, and even on its intention to initiate a war with Israel in the near future. However, even if at some time in the future Syria believes that it has reached the military parity it seeks with Israel, this does not necessarily imply that it will exercise the military option and initiate a premeditated war. After all, Syria would still hesitate to fight alone against Israel. It is questionable whether Damascus would seriously count on its Arab sister states to join it in a war adventure. Moreover, Israel's close links with the United States would have a significant deterrent impact on Syria and its patron, the Soviet Union.

Further, even if Syria assumed that a surprise attack in the Golan Heights would provide it with initial gains, it is highly doubtful whether its forces would be able to maintain them against an IDF counterattack. Indeed, the Israeli reply could be expected to inflict heavy punishment on Syria. Certainly the Syrian leadership could hardly assume that a military initiative and possible initial gains on the battlefield would constitute the sum total of the battle.

True, even Arab military defeats or stand-offs, while not constituting apocalyptic events for the Arabs (in contrast to the case should Israel suffer a defeat), nonetheless may carry in their wake potential dangers to Arab rulers and to strategic and national assets. The price of war and the risk that damage to the vital national infrastructure could significantly affect the well-being and advancement of Arab countries, may constitute a valid constraint on Arab war aspirations. This applies to Syria as well. While Damascus has to consider the price it pays for acquiescing to the current status quo on the Golan Heights, on balance this price seems for the time being more acceptable to Syria's leadership. However, the main factor curbing Syria's taste for a military adventure appears to be its weakness in air power and possibly in air defense as well; these constitute a critical military constraint.

In parallel, the risks of war in the area could also increase if and when Israel concludes that the arms race or the deterioration in the military balance are no longer tolerable, i.e., that they violate a red line regarding its security. Although Israel would not hasten to exercise a pre-emptive option, one cannot completely exclude the possibility.

In sum, the Arab military buildup and additional factors appear to have narrowed the gap in the military balance with Israel and, in a way, have increased the risks of war in the area. But Israel's overall military edge on its Arab adversaries is being maintained for the present, especially as an Arab war coalition is not imminent. However, the Arab armies' constant buildup, especially their effort to narrow the qualitative gap with the IDF, has brought to the surface a number of new risks and predicaments for Israel at the strategic-operational level.

The Operational Level

The Arab military buildup during the past several years has also advanced Arab operational capabilities in areas pertinent to the future battlefield. These enhanced capabilities pose new challenges that Israel will have to cope with both on the front line and in its rear areas.

Syria and other Arab countries have armed themselves with advanced strike aircraft, improved air-to-air and air-to-surface ammunition and accurate surface-to-surface missiles; this is especially the case with Syria, armed with the SS-21 in addition to SCUD-B missiles. As a consequence, the vulnerability of rear areas of Israel has significantly increased. This was not the case basically until the end of the 1970s, despite the fact that beforehand most of the Arabs possessed SCUD-B long-range — but inaccurate — SS missiles. Today, in contrast, the Arabs, especially Syria, possess a certain capability to hit sensitive civilian as well as military targets deep within Israel with improved accuracy. Thus Israel, which was fortunate enough not to suffer such blows in past wars, may face a significant and painful test to its absorptive capacity.

Militarily, it may be legitimately argued whether SCUD-B or SS-21 missiles can inflict heavy damage to military installations. Here a lot depends on the number of launchers, the accuracy of firing and, not less, on reserve missile stocks. However, it is more certain that SSMs are better able than aircraft to penetrate Israel's airspace. It is also obvious that SSMs may serve as a terror weapon against civilian targets. In any event, the SSM capacity, especially in Syrian hands, presents a sharp challenge to Israel's own capability to strike deep inside Syria as a strategy for deciding a war or bringing about its early end.

This Arab capability can be used in two basic situations: as an integral part of the opening strike of an Arab war initiative, and/or in retaliation for Israeli attacks, in the course of a war, on the Arab rear or on sensitive targets. In the first case, it is more likely that the targets chosen for the opening strike by the Arabs will be military installations and other military objectives. In case of an Israeli response in kind — particularly one that involves painful blows, let alone heavy civilian casualties — then it is likely that the next Israeli targets selected by the Arabs would also include civilian objectives.

A well-known keystone of Israel's security doctrine prescribes waging a short and decisive war. Short — because Israel's economy and society cannot afford a long war with all its repercussions; decisive — because Israel cannot afford defeat at the hands of the Arabs, nor is a draw a desirable outcome. One of the major tenets in Israel's security doctrine for achieving these objectives has been the prompt transfer of the battle to Arab territory. This was achieved by fostering maneuverability and offensive capabilities. By 1986, however, one could discern a number of obstacles to this objective, especially with regard to Syria. First, the large quantity of forces (over six divisions) deployed in the relatively narrow Golan Heights creates a saturation of forces there. Secondly, this area is densely packed with several fortification lines and additional military obstacles, creating a deep defensive structure. Third, advanced weapons systems — attack helicopters, scatter-mines, mobile air-defense missiles, long-range and SP artillery guns with advanced ammunition, etc. — facilitate a rugged and effective defense.

These tactical realities may restrict the IDF's maneuver potential and attack momentum on the ground, while Syria's strengthened air force and air defense may present new obstacles to the IAF in its quest to assist Israel's land forces' breakthrough operations and in attacking strategic targets in Syria's rear, as in the past. These are indeed grave obstacles for the IDF unless, as in the past, it comes up with surprising solutions.

In any event, it does not look like a future war in this sector will be a short one; and human casualties and economic losses will no doubt be greater than in the past. Still, these potential predicaments apply mainly to Israel's northern front.

The Arab military buildup has brought with it a greater offensive potential. Arab armies have built up better offensive capabilities along all potential confrontation areas around Israel.

Syria's entire ground order-of-battle is armored and mechanized. Five of the divisions are armored, three are mechanized, and the ninth division is comprised of elite infantry. This order-of-battle is supported by SP air-defense missile batteries. A mobile artillery component is basically still lacking, but in the rather limited ranges of the Golan Heights (west to the Jordan River), this deficiency is not critical.

As for Egypt, 10 of the 12 divisions of the land order-of-battle have been converted into armored and mechanized formations (four armored, six mechanized); depending on procurement resources, the remaining two infantry divisions may be similarly converted. The number of mobile SAM batteries has also increased significantly. At present, the Egyptian command is able to support mobile ground offensive efforts in Sinai with effective air defenses. As has been noted, although the Egyptian Army lacks SP artillery support, steps are being taken to remedy this deficiency.

Even Jordan's land force mobility capacity is salient. Its four divisions are armored and mechanized and, in contrast to Syria and Egypt, they are supported by several hundred SP artillery pieces. However, the Jordanians still lack complete and effective air support. Nevertheless, in the short distance between the Jordan River and the mountain ridge of Samaria (inside Israeli administered territory) even the existing 14 stationary HAWK SAM batteries can provide the Jordanian Army with a relatively effective air defense. And this calculation still does not consider the 20-40 mobile SA-8 launchers that the Jordanians have received from the Soviet Union. Another supportive element are the two dozen attack helicopters Jordan has acquired from the United States.

All this does not imply that the Arab armies have acquired a fully offensive capability. They still have some way to go, whether through improved training or by adding weaponry components. But in contrast to the past, they have taken significant steps forward in the offensive direction.

New Dimension in the Threat from an Eastern Front

An "eastern front" on the eastern borders of Israel — comprising Syria, Iraq and Jordan — was and remains the greatest military threat to Israel. Such a military escalation poses a grave danger to Israel due to the latter's lack of strategic depth, and its proximity to Israel's vital infrastructure.

Recently a new dimension to this threat developed from a drastic change in the size of forces on this front. In the Yom Kippur War (1973), there were 12 or 13 Arab divisions on this front — five Syrian, five Jordanian (though the Jordanians sent only two armored brigades to help Syria), and two to three Iraqi (an expeditionary force, out of an Iraqi order-of-battle of some ten divisions). Today, Syrian and Jordanian ground forces alone amount to 13 divisions.

Here we must inquire: should the Iraq-Iran War end, how large would an Iraqi expeditionary force be, considering that by 1986 Iraq had some 40 divisions? It is valid to assume that the enormous size of Iraq's present army will shrink by about half once the war is over. Yet even in this eventuality, in case of war with Israel the Iraqis would still be able to send a ground expeditionary force of one or two corps comprising four to eight divisions (this calculation is based on the Yom Kippur War experience, when Iraq sent a near three-divisional size force out of some six existing ground divisions).

Even were such a large force to arrive at the front after several days of fighting, it could cause new and grave difficulties to the IDF. An Iraqi expeditionary force comprising two complete corps would equal the entire Syrian Army. It would be able to extend Arab war efforts to new sectors, thus dividing, dispersing and weakening the IDF. Nor should it be forgotten that the Iraqi Army has acquired battle experience and logistic capabilities in its long war in the Gulf. Given this backdrop, we must attach great significance to the question of Iraq's strategic readiness to participate in a future war with Israel by sending a sizable expeditionary force, once the Gulf war is over.

For quite some time after the war with Iran, however, Iraq will probably not hasten to send a sizable force to fight against Israel, for two reasons: lingering fear of Iran, and Iraq's capacity to sustain a new war effort and casualties. But if and when this line of reasoning does not prevail, then the Iraqis will add a new dimension to the threat from an eastern front. Nor, under certain circumstances, can an Iranian expeditionary force of some size be excluded; but a discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of our present inquiry.

Conclusions

The recent Arab military buildup is characterized by gradual but steady quantitative strengthening and, even more, by qualitative enhancement. The quantitative buildup is evident in the larger numbers of new Arab ground formations and in the abundance of weapons systems in their arsenals. The qualitative enhancement finds expression in the three major components of military power: manpower, weaponry, and operational capability. It is in weapons systems that the qualitative improvement is most salient, while Arab operational capabilities have been further augmented through intensified and close-to-combat-reality training and structural changes.

The repercussions for Israel are both strategic and tactical-operational. Strategically, the first implication is that the new Arab military dimension threatens to narrow the qualitative edge that the IDF has enjoyed hitherto in the military balance. The second is the possible revival of consideration even among Arab moderates, of the benefits of the military option in the conflict with Israel, especially when an Arab war coalition can be established. Consequently, the risks of war have somewhat increased, even without considering Israel's economic predicaments, which are seriously affecting its military. Mitigating factors, however, include the Arabs' current and projected deficiencies in financial resources and skilled military manpower, which restrict their ability to extract the most out of advanced weaponry; political fragmentation in the Arab world; and Israel's defense posture. The latter, though recently adversely affected, is still capable of deciding a future war in Israel's favor or at least of inflicting heavy punishment.

On the tactical-operational level, in looking at the future battlefield the implications for Israel of the Arab military buildup are no less evident. A new threat to the interior and rear of Israel emanates from the advanced aircraft and improved surface-to-surface missiles deployed by the Arab armies, and especially Syria. Secondly, the IDF may find additional difficulties in waging a short war of maneuver and gaining a decisive victory on certain fronts. In any event, the price of war in human and material resources for all parties, including Israel, will be substantially higher than in the past.

Finally, the gravest short-term military threat to Israel stems from Syria's enhanced capacity to launch a surprise attack, albeit possibly for limited objectives. An even greater threat could emerge if and when an eastern front, including an expanded Iraqi expeditionary force, develops.

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Arms for the Ayatollahs

Joseph Alpher

The lack of public protest in Israel over the country's role in supplying arms to Iran has perplexed Americans, particularly American Jews. They deserve a deeper explanation than mere reference to the fact that no laws were broken in Israel or that Israel must sell arms in order to maintain its own vital defense industry. Even Shimon Peres's knee-jerk reference to the imperative of unconditionally helping out the United States when asked to, however understandable (and pathetic) in the post-Pollard era, does not go far enough. When Israel's official justifications begin to touch upon the importance attributed to cultivating "moderate" elements in the Iranian leadership elite, they are getting warm — but still not really giving true expression to the approach to Iran that, over the years, has become a reflex among most Israeli decision-makers.

The deeper truth is the subconscious bias towards Iran that characterizes Israel's decision-makers, a bias that brings them to favor that country to an extent that exceeds the bounds of plain political or strategic rationality.

That is, of course, a weighty claim. Yet there is precedent for such strategic confusion: Many of these same decision-makers had personal experience with an earlier *conseptsia* (best translated as "bias" or "predisposition"), which lulled Israelis in 1973 into believing themselves so obviously invincible that there was simply no danger of attack by Egypt and Syria. While the Iran issue is not in the disaster category of 1973, the *conseptsia* involved is similarly indicative of fuzzy strategic thinking on the part of Israeli leaders who should know better.

As Israelis have come to view the Middle East, Iran belongs to its "periphery" — to a category of non-Arab and/or non-Muslim states that ring the Arab Middle East and that include Turkey, Cyprus, Ethiopia, and the African Sahel states.

Geographically speaking, Israel is indeed at the center of the Middle East; one may draw around it on the map a ring of Arab states and, beyond them, another ring of non-Arab states. A more flexible definition of the periphery also comprises an ethnic element: the non-Arab or non-Muslim minorities of the Middle East, some actually located in or near the region's heartland where Israel sits. The Kurds of Iraq, the Lebanese Maronites, the Egyptian Copts, and the Druze of Lebanon and Syria most readily come to mind. Theories about the special relationship that Israel, itself a member of the ethnic periphery, might or should develop with these states and peoples go back at least to the 1920s, when the late Ze'ev Sherf proposed a "covenant of minorities" as a basis on which the Jewish people could secure its status amidst hostile Arab nationalism in the region. (Interestingly, some early formulations of the minorities issue suggested Jewish covenants with the Alawites of Syria and the Shi'ites of Lebanon — two groups that are today thoroughly hostile to Israel.)

Torat haperipheria (the periphery doctrine) became more or less official strategy under Ben-Gurion in the early 1950s. It was predicated on the recognition that the infant State of Israel had been clearly rejected by the surrounding Arabs, and that these same Arabs espoused a radical expansionist nationalism that also threatened the periphery.

Indeed, Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi of Iran were willing, if low-profile, friends to an Israel that might help them counter the incitement of Gamal Abd al-Nasser in Egypt and Abd al-Qarim Qassem of Iraq. Newborn black African states bordering on North Africa, such as Chad, Niger and Senegal, also welcomed Israel as a counterbalance to Arab-backed Muslim influences. Closer to home, Labor Minister Yigal Allon briefly investigated the option of encouraging the establishment of a Druze buffer state in Syria's Jebel Druze in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War. Later, in the mid-1970s, the Maronites of Lebanon accepted Israeli support in their struggle against Syrian and Palestinian encroachment on their geographical and political assets. For some three decades of constant struggle against a hostile Arab world, collaboration with the periphery proved fruitful both for Israel and for its friends.

Parenthetically, it must be noted that Ben-Gurion also enunciated a second strategic policy regarding Israel's alliances: the need for the small state to ally itself with a major world power in order to ensure a source of arms and international support. Here, too, he was not the first: He himself cited the biblical precedent that in ancient times Israel usually had to maintain some degree of subservience to a nearby "power," such as Egypt or Assyria or, yes, Persia — and earlier leaders of the Zionist movement had appealed successively to Germany, the Ottoman Empire, the young Soviet Union, and Britain for paternal support before Ben-Gurion led the young state into close relationships with, first, France and then the United States.

As we shall see, the two policies came together rather fatefully in the Iran arms deals.

Torah haperipheria, then, predicated a mutuality of interests with the non-Arabs of the region, based on a mutuality of fear of hostile Arab intentions. Israeli proponents of arms sales to Iran unabashedly cite it as the strategic underpinning for their policy. Iran, they say, will return to normalcy and moderation — i.e., to a recognition of the need to maintain close ties with Israel and the West — once Khomeini has disappeared from the scene. For, so goes their argument, Khomeini and his program for Iran and the Middle East are an aberration. Within the ranks of Iranian elites are many key actors who appreciate the need for Israel and Western links, and they must be encouraged. Even the Gulf War, pitting Iran against most of the Arab world, is a manifestation of the ultimate logic of the periphery policy: By tying down Iraq's legions around the Shatt al-Arab; thereby effectively paralyzing the Arab eastern front against Israel and keeping a prime Arab-Israeli belligerent out of mischief, Iran is fulfilling its ultimate destiny as a periphery state.

The Israelis who hold to this view of Iran's continuing place in the "political periphery" are to be found all across the political spectrum, from Ariel Sharon in the Likud to Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres in the Labor Party. As Ha'aretz columnist Abraham Schweitzer put it: "Iran is important in and of itself, as it sits in the rear of our potential enemies. If and when the Gulf War ends, Iraq will always have to watch its eastern flank....It requires an imagination developed beyond any reasonable degree to conjure up the thought of Irani-Arab collaboration in a coordinated offensive against Israel."

One of the indirect benefits generated by Irangate for the development of Israeli strategic thinking, indeed for Israel's own assessment of its place and role in the Middle East, has been the opportunity to reassess this view. For while no Israeli laws were broken by Israel's arms sales to Iran, and while few in Israel permitted themselves to question the economics of selling arms or the realities of collaboration with the United States, the periphery theory has for the first time come into question.

A number of intellectuals, including scholars of Iran, a few politicians such as Ezer Weizman, and several prominent journalists, as well as members of the intelligence establishment who (as in the United States) were circumvented or ignored by those who sold weapons to Iran, have seized upon the ramifications of the arms affair to argue that both the Arab Middle East and the periphery have changed radically since the periphery theory was enunciated by Ben-Gurion three decades ago. Today, these critics point out, Israel is engaged in a gradual rapprochement with an increasingly moderate Sunni Arab mainstream in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and elsewhere. Radicalism in the Middle East is now to be found for the most part on the periphery, in Marxist Ethiopia and fundamentalist Iran. Black Africa turned its back on Israel in 1973. And as Israel's experience in Lebanon showed, the ethnic periphery, the Maronites, can be at least as treacherous from the Israeli standpoint as Muslim Arab radicals ever were. Indeed, it is in Lebanon that the ultimate Iranian treachery to Israel should be recognized, as Tehran actively manipulates and encourages extremist Shi'ite groups that are openly hostile to Israel and the West, and who preach the liberation of Jerusalem, via Lebanon, for Islam.

Nor do these observers see any genuine signs of moderation emanating from Tehran that might justify selling it arms. The "moderate" Iranian generals and politicians sometimes talked about are all either dead, exiled in Los Angeles, or...in Baghdad, trying to help Saddam Hussein bring the war to a close in the belief that this will save the lives of their fellow countrymen and perhaps hasten the demise of the Khomeini region. Moreover, as Israel Defense Force Chief of Intelligence General Amnon Shackak notes, Tehran, if victorious, plans "to export the Islamic revolution to all states in the region, and to destabilize their regions." Adds Abba Eban, currently Knesset Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee chairman. "The greatest danger to Israel is the Khomeinist threat; I wouldn't sell Iran a broken typewriter." Virtually all these critics agree that Israel's relationship with Iran only angers and discourages those moderate Arab neighbors with whom Israel must learn to live.

The government's insistence of treating Khomeini's Iran within the same "periphery" framework that provided operational guidelines to relations with Iran in the Shah's days, has inevitably produced an anti-intelligence bias. An intelligence establishment, after all, exists primarily to deal with one's enemies — particularly if, like Israel, one does indeed have numerous enemies. Since in the decision-makers' eyes the Iranians are essentially friendly peripherals — since, by the same token, the Maronites were at heart natural allies of Israel in 1982 — the intelligence people need not be consulted concerning the efficacy of policy regarding them. And if they are consulted or volunteer an opinion, it may be overruled by "operational" considerations that only a decision-maker can undertake, and policy then can be executed by trusted subordinates who, however nonprofessional, understand these operational interests.

Here is a parallel with the Reagan Administration's clumsy way of dealing with Iran through the National Security Council. It is one of relatively few parallels in the Iran arms scandal, and understandably so. For Americans who deal with the Middle East tend to view Iran not as "periphery," nor through an Israeli or Arab prism. Rather, they treat Iran strategically within the context of the southern flanks of the Soviet Union and the northern flank of the Persian Gulf oil-producing region, and these more global perceptions dictate a different set of priorities. Still, the shared U.S.-Israeli "operational" anti-intelligence bias over Iran has produced an impressive list of mutual intelligence failures, beginning with the very failure to anticipate or understand the Khomeini revolution, through the predictions of an early Iraqi victory in the west and ending in the false assumptions regarding the presence and strength of pragmatic leaders in Tehran that informed the arms fiasco. To this list may be added one exclusively American intelligence gaffe — the misapprehension of the status of the Bazargah-Yazdi government that brought about the 1979 attempt at rapprochement by Brzezinski and the subsequent hostage crisis -- and an Israeli failure to understand Iran's growing role among Lebanon's Shi'ites until it was too late to do anything about it.

Another interesting comparison between the Israel-Iran dyad and recent American political history comes to mind with reference to U.S. dealings with China. In the 1950s and '60s, the American "Old China hands" — those veterans of pre-Communist China who retained an intimate but very specific knowledge of that country — were involved in forming and developing the policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and his aspiration to reestablish pro-Western Kuomintang rule in Beijing. In maintaining U.S. support for Chiang, they effectively ruled out for decades any alternative modes of dealing with Mao Zedong and the communist regime in China.

In similar fashion, Israel's lingering support for Iran is backed and justified to a considerable extent by Israel's own "old Iran hands" — those Israelis who dealt closely with pre-Khomeini Iran, meaning, in effect, with the thin stratum of Westernized Iranians who ran that country. Nurtured by their contacts with exiles and their perceptions of a very different Iran from that unveiled to the world by Khomeini, they continue to lobby for a pro-Iranian tilt in Israeli policy. Ya'akov Nimrodi and David Kimchi, of Irangate fame, are typical members of this lobby. More surprising is the advocacy of Iran espoused by Uri Lubrani, Israel's last-but-one chief diplomatic representative in Tehran who, as current Israeli coordinator of policy in Lebanon, has to find ways to counter Iran's direct support for hizballah and the Islamic Jihad with their aggressive anti-Israeli and anti-Western pose, and their gallery of abducted Americans and Europeans. "We simply have to live with contradictions," Lubrani told a university seminar audience. "I know Iran, and I continue to have a gut feeling that in 10 or 15 years there will be a friendly regime there that will thank us for helping Iran at its time of need."

If the Israeli leadership appears to be out of touch with realities on the Iran issue, it may also be out of touch with the Israeli people on the larger issue it implies — that of Israel's ultimate place, in terms of both self-image and appearance in the eyes of others, in the Middle East. In early 1986, a university-sponsored survey found that more than 60 percent of Israelis thought that Israel could influence, by its behavior, Arab willingness to reach genuine peace. Surely Israel's support for Iran is a classic example of behavior that must be perceived by the Arabs as inimical to the peace process.

As always in the Middle East, however, the situation is more ambiguous than such a straightforward analysis implies. The damage to Israel-Arab relations wrought by Israel's role in Irangate appears to be limited. As Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, an ardent supporter of Iraq, told a visiting Israeli government minister in November 1986, he could hardly protest Israel's actions at a time when Arab states, even such relatively moderate ones as Algeria, were selling arms to Iran. The involvement of Saudi billionaire Adnan Khashoggi in the affair, and his claims to have coordinated his role with his own and other moderate Arab governments on the premise that support for Iranian moderates would hasten the end of the war, also militates in Israel's favor. So does the total lack of condemnation in the Arab world of Khashoggi's open wheeling and dealing with Israelis: It reflects the continued vitality of the Arab-Israel rapprochement, despite Irangate. Besides, most truly moderate Arabs know perfectly well that Saddam Hussein's protestations of moderation are pure posing, and that he is a dyed-in-the-wool enemy of Middle East peace whose regime deserves to be toppled. Last, this being the Middle East, one cannot resist postulating that, in Arab eyes, Israel's proven ability to collaborate on a basis of operational equality with superpower America — indeed, to provide the U.S. exclusive services in the region — and to deal, however obliquely, with the Iranian mullahs, reflects an image of vitality, acumen, and general control over Middle East events, and thereby renders it a power whose favor should be sought and cultivated.

Whatever the fate of *torat haperipheria*, one may hope that Irangate will eventually be recognized as having helped lay the groundwork for a more rational reliance on their intelligence establishments by both the United States and Israel. Perhaps it will also contribute to a more balanced Israeli regional policy in which ideally, Israel should exploit its unique location and status in the region to fill a conciliatory role between moderate Arab states and radical peripheral states such as Iran and Ethiopia. In the meantime, decision-making in Israel's dealings with the Iran-Iraq war in the near future should take into account four key parameters or facts of life: First, the thoroughly hostile attitude towards Israel of both Iran and Iraq; second, Iran's support for terrorism, and particularly its anti-Israel role in Lebanon; third, the ramifications for Israel-Arab relations of any new "flirt" with Iran; and, last but not least, the American consideration.

Joseph Alpher is a contributing editor of Moment, *and deputy head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. His most recent article in* Moment *was "South Lebanon: Back Door to Iran."*

The Histadruth Haovdim Haleumit

(The National Labour Federation in Eretz-Israel)

The Histadruth Haovdim Haleumit, or National Labour Federation (N.L.F.) is an independent, trade union organization which was founded in Jerusaelm in 1934 and celebrated this year its 50th anniversary, it deals with professional matters and protects the interests of its members.

The N.L.F. is guided by certain principles:

- It supports the rights of free professional organisation and opposes the unification of all trade unions into a single national federation;
- It supports the principle of compulsory state arbitration, a body within the framework of national vital services to settle all labour disputes;
- It opposes the establishment and ownership of economic enterprises by the labour federation while favouring, however, cooperative enterprise by workers;
- It supports the nationalisation of health insurance.

The Histadruth Haovdim Haleumit observes Labour Day on the death anniversary of the founder of Zionism, Dr. Theodor Herzl, flies only the national blue and white flag and its sole hymn is the national anthem, Hatiqva.

National institutions

The supreme organ of the N.L.F. is its quadrennial National Convention which appoints a Council, an Executive, a Supreme Control Committee and a High Court of Honour.

Delegates to the National Convention are elected on the basis of general, direct, personal and secret elections.

The Executive Committee conducts the Federation's affairs during the interval between one national convention and the next.

The 14th National Convention elected the following Executive Committee: Apelbaum Yitzhak, Abramowitz Gershon, Ashkenazi Anshel, Dr. Davidson Alexander, Ben-Yaakov Abraham, Dekel Yair, Epstein Yehuda, Fainstein Shlomo, Glazman Arye, Haus Meir, Haczek Hanoch, Hirshzon Abraham, Jutan David, Kashani Reuben, Kirstein Moshe, Melamdowitz David, Machnai Yeshayahu, Nir Moshe, Schichman Schabtai, Taub Israel, Walker Yosef, Yanovski Menachem, Youngman Shlomo. The Secretary-General of the N.L.F. is Mr. Shalom Cohen.

Social service institutions

Kupat Holim Leovdim Leumiim

(Sick Fund for National Workers – Kupat Holim Leumit)

The National Labour Federation functions in the field of health and preventive medicine through its own medical institutions, Kupat Holim Leovdim Leumiim, or Sick

Fund for National Workers, maintains 130 branches all over the country and provides medical care and services for 300,000 persons. The Sick Fund is a member of the International Social Security Association (I.S.S.A.) in Geneva.

Kupat Amal

Kupat Amal ("Toil fund") is a mutual aid fund for members of the N.L.F.

Insurance, Invalidity and Unemployment Funds

The Fund insures the workers concerned and secures their rights in respect of social conditions.

The N.L.F. also maintains an Insurance Fund and an Invalidity and Unemployment Fund.

Sela Housing Company Ltd.

The "Sela" Housing Company Ltd. has built all the housing needed for N.L.F. members.

"Sela" executes, on behalf of the Ministry of Housing, housing projects – shikunim – for immigrants, young couples, as well as various constructions such as commercial centers, publuc buildings. It has built synagogues, kindergartens and the dispensaries of the sick Fund for National Workers.

The Trade-Union Department

Deals with the specific problems of work condition and agreements with employers

Hanoar Haoved Vehalomed Haleumi

(Association of National Working and Study Youth)

Deals with specific problems of working youth; conducts numerous activities such as a vocational training school, sports, clubs, summer camps, etc. "YAAD" is the periodical published by the Youth Department.

Information, Culture and Public Relations Departments

These departments conduct widespread information activities, organize meetings and lectures, seminars and excursions, and publish bulletins on labour and economic problems.

League For National Labour – abroad

The American Committee for the National Sick Fund of Israel Inc., New-York

The Jewish Agency: Fantasy and Reality

Abba Eban

There are two kinds of tragedy; the tragedy of not reaching a goal and the tragedy of reaching it. The second kind is particularly poignant and complex. It arises when the fulfilment of a dream leaves a vacuum with no sense of future horizon.

This thought takes me back some years to a certain day in July 1948. Israel had become an independent state two full months before, but in the United Nations Security Council, when crucial issues were on the table, we still sat behind a plaque marked "Jewish Agency".

We did not have seven out of 12 votes to get the name of "Israel" in its rightful place. It was infuriating for a state glorying in its new sovereignty to lack the dignity of its name and to have no membership in any international body.

My mandate was to secure Israel's membership in its own name in all the institutions which express the sovereignty of nations and their integration, through a network of specialized agencies, into an evolving world community. This was not to be achieved until May 1949. In the meantime, we were in a sort of juridical limbo.

The appearance of our name in July 1948 was achieved by a frank manipulation. It was arranged with our closest friends in the Security Council (!) Andrei Gromyko of the USSR and Dmitri Manuilsky of the Ukraine, the incoming chairman, that on an appointed day, the new chairman would call me to the table as "the representative of Israel." The secretariat would then put a plaque marked "Israel" opposite where we sat. When the expected furor arose at the initiative of hostile members, the chairman would call a vote on the motion for cancelling his ruling.

Although we did not have seven votes for a positive ruling, our opponents did not have seven votes for a negative one. The name "Israel" stood, as it has ever since. The Palestinian Arab representative, Jamal El-Husseini, walked out, leaving the Palestine Arabs unrepresented for the next 26 years. The Jewish Agency had now receded from its international status.

By this time, all the attributes which had given the Agency its quasi-sovereign status were being taken over by the organs of the Israeli government and parliament, and by its diplomatic representatives.

It no longer had anything to do with or say about Israel's foreign policy, its legislative functions or its economic and social direction. The historic personalities who had given it a great resonance in history abandoned its roof; Weizmann to the presidency, Ben-Gurion to the premiership, Silver back to his temple in Cleveland, my colleagues and I to our embassies.

In the next few years, certain functions were to be defined for the Jewish Agency, and these were important enough to be worthy of promotion and development. But they were residual. What had been central now became marginal.

There now ensued an extraordinary process of resolute inertia that contrasted violently with the dynamism of Israel's own first decade. No effort whatever was made to adjust the new realities of power and authority in Jewish life.

The Jewish Agency still called itself, absurdly, by the very same title as that which had been held by an organism totally different from what it had now become. This was semantically exact and confusing. It set an example of imprecision which has been of no service to the Jewish Agency itself.

It is absurd to insinuate that the post-1948 Jewish Agency is seriously related to the body which had represented the Jewish interest before governments and international agencies, which had determined policies in the international field and directed the economic energies of a large community.

The gap between the name and the reality laid the Agency open to unjust charges for not fulfilling what it could no longer fulfil. It therefore deprived it of the pragmatic image out of which a new dignity could be constructed.

The failure to adapt Zionist institutions to a revolutionary change in status and functions was a gross error, of which the Zionist movement itself was to become the chief victim. But the State of Israel was also aggrieved by an implication that its sovereignty was not a particularly significant change in the direction of our national history. The State of Israel allowed itself, outra—geously, to be put on a par with a voluntary organization of modest scope and limited functions, operating mostly under the law of foreign lands.

The gap in real authority was now filled by a grotesque obsession with status. It was thought that if the department heads of this honorable but diminished institution pretended that they were equal in status with Israeli ministers, it would be possible to disguise the fact that the sovereign institutions of the Israeli state had inherited the salient areas of authority and prestige.

Not only was the Jewish Agency exposing itself to derision by a transparent misrepresentation of its stature, but the Israeli parliament and government were understated in the symbolic realm by being denied their real predominance.

At the same time, the World Zionist Organization was encouraged to continue acting as though the Herzl-Weizmann period was still in full flow.

The pretence that worthy ladies and gentlemen elected to the offices of the new Jewish Agency were the lineal descendants of Herzl and Weizmann as leaders of the Jewish people was perpetuated by a name which had outlived its own reality and subjected the bearers to undeserved jocularity.

One reason for the confusing inertia was Ben-Gurion's total refusal to take the slightest interest in the problem. His disappointment at the lack of response by Western Jewry to the concrete opportunities of state-building by personal participation drove him to an attitude of somber remoteness.

He was persuaded with difficulty to pay two brief visits to the U.S. in the 12 years of his premiership. The very word "Zionism" disappeared from his vocabulary, except for some negative references. (He was in error here, for the deficiencies of the present do not dishonor the past or foreclose the future.)

The Labor Party has now done something to atone for its own participation in the decades of illusion by taking the issue seriously for the first time. It made a logical and appropriate choice of its emissary in the form of Simcha Dinitz and refrained from pretentious rhetoric about past eras. That anyone can function in this field without the consent of the Diaspora Jews who have shared this responsibility throughout the years is wildly improbable.

The Labor Party presented four names, not one of whom deserved the patronizing and tactless text in which three of them were dismissed from consideration. This clumsiness, would justify a review of the consultative procedures for future occasions. But the reviewing process should be more fundamental and deep-rooted. The nomenclature should be changed, and functions which could be centralized under the Israeli flag should be fearlessly transferred.

The Zionist establishment would be paying a well-deserved tribute to Israel's sovereignty if it would voluntarily abrogate the absurd "status" provisions which give the impression that Israel's state institutions are not the highest expressions of Jewish nationhood.

In all conditions, there will remain a fruitful field for extra-governmental Zionist activity in an attempt, however despairing, to persuade Jews that Zionism has something to do with living in Israel and planting new generations in its soil.

Moreover, Jews will support Israel only if they continue to be Jews. This requires that a sense of heritage and a concern with preservation of Jewish identity should be a joint Israeli-Diaspora responsibility. The enrichment of Jewish content in the life of Diaspora communities is an Israeli self-interest which should replace unreal slogans of "negating the Diaspora."

The school of thought and action in which Simcha Dinitz has been nurtured has celebrated its best hours through a relentless realism that refuses to disappear from the actual world into nostalgic fantasies or illusions.

Anyone who has read the Israeli press recently knows that the Jewish Agency faces a terrifying "image" problem. Never in our recent history has a major Jewish institution been assailed with such sharp questions about the sheer necessity of its existence. This alone would justify the replacement of the past regime by a new option of change. This institution should quite simply come down to earth. It is a real chance — and may well be the last. It will encounter much good will in Israel if this chance is seized.

Israel Faces 40: Renewing Zionist Commitment

Arye L. Dulzin

Former Chairman of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish Agency for Israel

Israel's thirty-ninth year of independence and the twentieth anniversary of the reunification of Jerusalem take place at a time when Jerusalem, the eternal capital of the Jewish people, is the dramatic scene of a historic trial to bring to justice John Demanjuk, accused of being one of the most heinous perpetrators of the 'final solution' during World War II.

Everywhere in Israel, citizens of all ages and walks of life have been literally glued to their radios and television sets, as they have followed the trial's procedures and the unravelling of events at a small Polish site, known as Treblinka, where nearly a million Jews were murdered only a few years before the establishment of Israel. The trial in Jerusalem's Binyanei Ha'ooma civic center is a vivid reminder that our 39 years of independence as a free and sovereign nation in our ancient-modern homeland was achieved after much suffering and great deprivation. This makes us duty-bound to recall and remember the conditions of Jewish existence on the eve of Israel's establishment. We can never forget.

As we review the years since 1948, we can best evaluate recent political and other events in Israel and throughout the Jewish world that affect the centrality of Israel in Jewish life. Despite serious problems, the past year has brought Israel closer to peace and economic independence through the continuation of the National Unity government; a significant reduction of inflation, and Israel's growing technological capability.

Also, the peace accord with Israel's largest Arab neighbor, Egypt, provides hope for similar accords with other Arab neighbors. In terms of Israel's overall defense posture, conditions are presently better than at any time before in Israel's history before and after the Six Day War. Israel's enemies are embroiled in their own wars, and the Arab initiated energy crisis of yesteryear has been deprived of its previous influence in the Middle East. All of this has made it possible for Israel to direct more attention to solving the outstanding social and humanitarian problems that are shared with the Jewish people everywhere.

We now look forward in anticipation to a reopening of the gates of the Soviet Union to increased emigration of Jews wanting to come to Israel. Soviet Jewry is the last vestige of the great eastern European communities that existed before the Holocaust, and who, more than forty years later, continue to maintain their Jewish identity and pride because of the hope which Israel has given them. It would be sad, indeed, if the Jews of the Soviet Union, who succeeded in maintaining their national identity, were to become the victims of assimilation in other parts of the world if they do not come to Israel. Our obligation to them and to those who did not survive is to bring them back to Zion. Our experience with *Neshira,* the dropout phenomena, alerts us to the dangers to Soviet Jewish emigration that we face if we do not act responsibly. I am confident that Jewish leadership around the world will support our efforts to bring Soviet Jews to Israel.

Reports by prominent sociologists note that the Jewish people in the Diaspora are rapidly succumbing to assimilation and intermarriage. More than anything else today, the greatest danger to Jewish existence is the spiritual demise of the Jewish people outside of Israel. Our people in the free world are simply fading from sight. This is something which we must halt.

The State of Israel was established 39 years ago to guarantee the physical and spiritual continuity of the Jewish people after the Holocaust. We are rightfully proud of the fact that Israel's presence in the international arena has succeeded in preserving the physical security of Jews everywhere. We have, however, not yet accomplished the Zionist goal which is the spiritual, as well as physical, continuity of the Jewish people. No Zionist, nor other lover of Israel, can be passive when Jewish continuity outside of Israel hangs in the balance. It is, therefore, that the agenda of the World Zionist Organization and the Jewish

Agency for Israel is focused on Jewish education and its extension to even the remotest Jewish communities around the world. Together with the Government of Israel, the W.Z.O. and the Jewish Agency are providing educational and other resources not previously available. These include experienced teachers from Israel; training programs in Israel for teachers from the Diaspora; new curricula and text books, as well as the financing of local educational programs and classrooms.

I take this opportunity to call upon my fellow Jews everywhere to rededicate themselves to the ideals and vision of Zionism. I am particularly pleased that we have recently succeeded in establishing the *Magshimim* movement which incorporates the Aliyah movements that practice true Zionist realization. Aliyah remains the lifeline of Israel and the source of Jewish strength. We must encourage more of our young people to visit and study in Israel. We must practice our own realization of Zionist ideals. Our task is to enhance the role of Israel in Jewish life as the focus of our national aspirations and to guarantee the continuity of our people. Let us do so by celebrating the true significance of Israel's independence and the reunification of Jerusalem.

Israel and the Administered Territories

Security Operations

Background Factors

The security operations in the administered territories — Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip — in 1986 may be understood against the background of a number of distinctive factors:

★ Since the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon in June 1985, the defense establishment has increased its security activities. There has been a marked improvement in preventive anti-terror operations, as evidenced by the number of and speed with which terrorist cells have been discovered. Examples include the arrest of those responsible for the grenade-throwing at the Western Wall; for the stabbing murder of Eliyahu Amadi in East Jerusalem; for the planting of mines, etc.

★ The position of local pro-Jordanian elements has grown stronger, at a political price to the PLO's supporters, especially in light of the Hussein-Arafat split.

★ The grave events surrounding the battles near and within the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and the situation inside the camps in the wake of Amal's siege, have a direct bearing on the stability of the administered territories. Unrest and disturbances aimed at showing solidarity with the fighters in the camps have become commonplace among PLO supporters in the territories.

★ The Jordanians have increased operations aimed at preventing and frustrating attempts to infiltrate the territories via the Jordan Valley. They have also initiated a policy of increased economic and political involvement in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Working Principles

Israel's present policy in the territories is based on two working principles:

★ Continued prevention of terrorist activities and disturbances of all kinds;

★ Encouragement of initiatives to improve the quality of life — on the administrative, economic and social levels — including Jordanian and Western investment.

These principles are based on the assumption that most of the local population remains passive concerning terrorist activities, and active membership in hostile organizations.

Israeli Policy Objectives

All elements of security and administrative operations are directed towards three objectives:

★ Strengthening moderate elements among the local residents. "Moderates" include all those who prefer a political solution (generally, in conjunction with Jordan) and reject the terrorist option; discussions leading to negotiations are already considered acceptable among such elements.

★ Insuring reasonable public services and standard of living to the population, funded by sources other than the Israeli national budget.

★ Transferring administrative positions (in the economic, health and public service sectors) to local Arab residents without harming Israel's vital security interests. This is not a structural change in policy, but a change in personnel, intended to curtail day-to-day friction between the Israeli authorities and the Arab population.

Encouragement of International Activities

The Israeli government encourages projects initiated and carried out by foreign elements, in cooperation with the Civil Administration, provided that security needs are met and that projects suspected of being funded by the PLO are not implemented. In the framework of this policy, a branch of the Cairo-Amman Bank has been reopened; and office of UNDP has been opened in Jerusalem; agricultural produce has been marketed by Agrexco; and an American corporation has been licensed to operate. The authorities have permitted funding for upgrading services and for sanitation in Gaza Strip refugee camps, provided by European and Persian Gulf states.

The Defense Minister declared (15 February 1987) that Israel will facilitate projects initiated by foreign (including Arab) countries to be carried out with Israeli aid.

Statistics on Security Activities

★ In 1986 disturbances decreased by 30 percent, and attacks decreased by 46 percent, as compared with 1985:

* Attacks:

Incident	*1985*	*1986*
Shooting	34	18
Grenade attack	12	7
Firebombing	200	100
Knifing	0	14 (significant increase is probably due to the discovery and elimination of weapons in the area)

* The main result of the decrease in attacks has been a drop in Israeli casualties:

Casualty	*1985*	*1986*
Israelis killed	7	2
Israelis wounded	99	62
Residents of the territories killed	8	22 (7 killed by IDF fire)
Residents of the territories wounded	51	67

Civilian Administration — Activities

Background

The policy of the civilian administrations in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza District treads the fine line between those local elements who oppose terror and the minority that supports or actively participates in terrorist activities. The former receive support in many areas: The civilian administration attempts to develop services for the welfare of the population and encourages economic activity and development, based on both local and external initiative; freedom of operation is granted whenever the security and the economy of Israel are not endangered.

The budget of the civilian administration has been increased in real terms, and the scope of projects funded by international sources with the encouragement of the civilian administration has been enlarged. The growth in the budget has made possible continued development of the infrastructure of local health and electricity services as well as aid to local authorities. Services previously unavailable because of budget constraints such as improvement in telecommunications, sewage and water purification have been developed.

The Marketplace

★ Restrictions on the transfer of private money across the Jordan River have been completely eliminated. Since May 1985, approximately one million dollars a day have entered Judea and Samaria.

★ Municipal and other authorities have been encouraged to bring money from abroad for investment purposes.

★ Efforts have been invested towards the creation of an Arab banking and investment system for the residents of the territories. The original initiative was approved by the civilian authority, and the first branch of the Cairo-Amman Bank recently opened for business in Nablus. The establishment of another branch is currently under negotiation.

Industry and Trade

★ Encouragement of the development of industry to create jobs is a central element of policy.

★ Barter trade from Judea and Samaria via Egypt and Jordan has been approved; there have been no practical results as yet.

★ Local organization has been approved for the purpose of investment and development, including a manufacturers' bureau.

Agriculture

★ The direct export of citrus fruit to Egypt (not through the Council for the Marketing of Citrus Fruit in Israel) has been approved.

★ Local growers are encouraged to export fresh agricultural products through Agrexco; contracts for thousands of tons have been signed with farmers from the territories.

★ Levies on agricultural transport across the Jordan River have been reduced significantly to encourage marketing.

Electricity

★ Cities and villages in Judea and Samaria have been connected to the national electricity network, affording these areas reliable and cheap electricity.

★ This process has brought about both an increase in electricity consumption, and the development of industry and employment opportunities.

Water

★ New water plants have been created in Judea and Samaria. Many villages have been connected to the water networks.

★ Tahal (Israel Water Engineering) is conducting a wide-ranging survey of the water supply system in the Gaza District, which suffers from excess water-drawing and sea-water penetration.

Health

★ Planning has been completed and accelerated development begun on health services in Judea and Samaria, with special emphasis on improving hospitals (Hebron Hospital, Beit Jala Hospital, the Bethlehem Mental Health Institute, Ramallah Hospital, Rafidiah Hospital, and Wotney Hospital in Nablus).

★ Permission will be granted for the building of new private hospitals in Hebron, Ramallah and Tulkarm.

★ The health budget in the Gaza District has received special priority in the last few years. The effort has been mainly directed towards the Shifa Hospital, which serves the entire Gaza region.

★ Special cases continue to receive treatment in Israel, including ambulatory cases. This service is free for those with health insurance.

★ Expert counselors continue to operate in the fields of oncology, neurology, orthopedics and others.

★ Local doctors have received special training in Israel.

★ All children receive free medical care until age three.

Education

★ A large portion of the education budget has been set aside for the construction of schools, adding classes and reducing class sizes.

★ Teachers have received training and attended seminars in Israeli schools, in order to improve the level of education in the territories.

Resettlement of Refugees

★ Israel continues to be the only nation in the world which resettles refugees. To date, approximately 10,000 refugee families in Gaza have received housing.

★ Living conditions in the refugee camps near Jericho will be improved.

Local Authorities

★ Arab mayors have recently been appointed in Ramallah, El-Bireh and Hebron, with the aim of reaching the goal of all heads of the local authorities in the territories be local residents.

Conclusion

In the last two years much effort has been directed at improving the quality of life in the territories. However, problems in the areas of refugee resettlement, water distribution systems, health, education and employment cannot be fully resolved without international aid. It can be assumed that terrorism will continue in the future. Israel can only attempt to prevent it as much as possible. This can be accomplished by conducting a steadfast battle against terror and hostile elements on the one hand, while maintaining a liberal attitude towards improving the quality of life for the majority of the residents in the administered territories on the other.

Conveyed by the office of the Israel Defense Forces Spokesman.

Free Speech and National Security

Brig. Gen. Ephraim Lapid

I.D.F. Spokesman

The State of Israel is a democracy which aspires to the liberal ideals it has set for itself. In the 40 years since our independence, Israel has chronically found itself in an effective state of emergency. We have fought five wars against enemies who have sought our destruction. We also control a large population in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, which presents serious security problems. It is precisely this dynamic political and military situation that has focused the eyes of a news-hungry world on our corner of the globe.

Today, Israel receives media coverage above and beyond other countries facing similar situations, whether in Latin America or Asia. This has put to the test one of the principles our democracy cherishes most: the freedom of expression. In our complex reality, attempting to remain true to democratic ideas requires a delicate balance between security and the public's right to know. Israel is a democratic and open society, which means that journalists can gain access very quickly to a wide number of sources which are inaccessible in dictatorial regimes such as exist in most of the countries surrounding us. However, it is obvious that Israel must safeguard its tactical, operational and strategic imperatives. There is general agreement in Israel that whenever the state's security and freedom of expression collide, security considerations must prevail. Yet, our guiding principle is that while we are forced to defend ourselves day and night, we will stay, as much as possible, within the bounds of the values which we hold dear.

A free press provides us with both advantages and problems. In Israel, the local press is not the mouthpiece of the government, and therefore does not necessarily present its point of view. In fact, the Israeli press is an extremely alert watchdog, providing constant analysis, sometimes critical, of government activities. While this provides valuable checks and balances in our society, a totally unrestrained press can unintentionally cause harm as well. In the foreign press, we have often been the victims of simplistic and distorted news reporting and analysis. This was particularly notable during the 1982 war in Lebanon, and in reporting of recent events in the administered territories. It should be mentioned that in recent years, we have witnessed two major examples of leading democracies —— the United States and the United Kingdom —— which have prevented press access to their operations in Grenada and the Falklands.

The mechanism that ensures that the freedom of the press does not damage the security of the state is the military censor. In Israel, the legal basis for this censor is the British Mandatory defense regulations of 1945. While Israel is admittedly the only democracy that has a permanent censor, it is also the only democracy to be in a constant state of war with most of its neighbors. The censorship imposed on the press can be proven to have saved lives. The Israeli press understand the importance of some supervision over what they report, and have generally accepted the principle of censorship. Like every Israeli, the Israeli reporter has an army background. He is therefore sensitive to security concerns and understands well the reasons why a certain report might be prevented from publication at a certain time. In 1949 the editors' committee was founded, consisting of most Israeli newspaper editors and representatives of the Israel Broadcasting Authority. In return for the censor's agreeing to limit his powers to the sphere of military security in exchange for detailed briefings on sensitive issues from relevant officials, the committee agreed that all news on security issues would be subject to prior censorship. Political considerations play no part in the work of the censor. The foreign press is expected to submit all reports dealing with the military to the censor. It is virtually impossible for us to monitor every thing that is reported about us throughout the world.

Today, the means exist to transmit information over great distances in seconds. Texts, videos, and radio can be relayed immediately through advanced means of telecommunication. Computers have caused a tremendous proliferation of information, and have increased the speed and efficiency with which information can be processed. This presents us with an even greater challenge than we faced before. There are more than 200 foreign correspondents stationed in Israel. This is the third largest foreign press corps in the world. Only the U.S. and the USSR have more foreign journalists on their soil. These journalists display a keen interest in the internal affairs of the I.D.F., and in a host of subjects which are often confidential. These include the army's budget, its methods of operation, its weaponry, its future battlefield plans, and the operational aspects of its presence in the administered territories. The presence of this large and active foreign press corps helps highlight the delicacy of our situation. While on the one hand we must ensure that the press does not unintentionally release information that is harmful to our interests, we understand the importance of reporting the news, and we facilitate the work of the press however we can.

In times of war, journalists have been allowed access to the battlefield despite the dangers to both their lives and our security needs. Reporters are by and large allowed access to Judea, Samaria and Gaza, and are able to report on events there. The I.D.F. spokesman's office arranges fact-finding trips, visits, and interviews for journalists, publishes information, and acts as a liaison between the army and the public. The I.D.F. releases information and relevant background material through periodic or timely press briefings and updates. We strive to maintain our credibility among the press at all times. We know that we cannot afford to be seen as giving out false information or withholding information that should be in the public domain. We recognize that if the press cannot get the information it needs from us, it will seek it elsewhere. Good relations with the press are in our practical interest, as they allow us to present our point of view to the world. There are no simple solutions to the complex issues I have discussed. All of us hope that the day will come when the dangers to the security of our state will diminish. When this happens, security considerations will become less prominent and the maintenance of the principle of freedom of the press will become a less complicated issue. Until that day, we believe that we are doing our utmost to preserve both our security and our democratic values.

Address of I.D.F. Spokesman Brig. Gen. Ephraim Lapid at the Hebrew University's Conference on Free Speech and National Security, 24 December 1987.
(Communicated by the I.D.F. Spokesman)

The Role of the Attorney General in Times of Crisis: The Shin Bet Affair



Itzhak Zamir

Professor of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Former Attorney General of Israel, 1978-1986

Introduction

I shall begin with a very brief description of the main functions of the Attorney General. I shall then turn to the role of the Attorney General in times of crisis, with special reference to the General Secret Service Affair, known as the Shin Bet Affair.

The Office of the Attorney General

The Office of the Attorney General in Israel has grown from British practice. However, it has developed in its own individual way to become a very different, possibly unique office. There are two main differences between the Office of the Attorney General in Israel and comparable offices in some other common law jurisdictions. First, in Israel the Attorney General is not only the head of the Legal Service of the government, but he is also regarded as the guardian of the rule of law. And second, unlike the situation in most other countries, the Attorney General in Israel is not a politician. He is not a member of Parliament, nor a member of the Cabinet. He is a professional lawyer, and is expected to exercise his powers as head of the Legal Service and as guardian of the rule of law totally independently of the government.

As head of the Legal Service of the government, the Attorney General fulfills two main functions. First, he is the chief legal adviser to the government. As such he is responsible for a widespread machinery which consists of all the legal advisers in government service including those who are not subject to him in the administrative hierarchy, yet who accept his professional authority. He also enjoys exclusive power to advise the government on legal issues. That is to say, the government is not entitled to refer legal questions to any other lawyer, such as a private attorney, without the consent of the Attorney General. Moreover, the opinion of the Attorney General on any legal question, as far as the government is concerned, presents the law of the land, which means that it binds the government, so that the government may not pursue any course of action which in the opinion of the Attorney General is unlawful. This is a most important safeguard of the rule of law.

In his second function the Attorney General is head of the litigation branch of the government, which includes not only national prosecutions, but embraces also civil and administrative litigation. In this function, too, the Attorney General has the exclusive power to represent the State in all courts and all matters, criminal, civil and administrative. This means, that it is up to the Attorney General to decide whether to institute proceedings in court on behalf of the State in any particular case and also whether to defend the State, the government or any government organ when it is sued in the courts. If the Attorney General reaches the conclusion that a particular government act is unlawful, and he refuses to represent the government in court, as has happened not infrequently, the government remains with no legal defense whatsoever.

In the exercise of these two main functions, the Attorney General does not act as a private lawyer would act for his client. There is a big difference between a private and public lawyer. A private lawyer is only responsible for his advice when it is requested. The Attorney General too is, of course, responsible and accountable for his advice. But, much more than that, it is for him to see to it that the government observes the law. He is supposed to act, not only as the government's lawyer, but also, at the same time, as the lawyer of the people, as a watchdog over the government. As an example, he is the only civil servant, in addition to the Cabinet Secretary, who regularly attends all Cabinet meetings. He sits there not only to advise the government on how to implement its policies within the law, but also to prevent the government from taking any unlawful decisions. In this role, as guardian of the rule of law, he does not assume a passive, responsive role, giving his opinion only when he is asked to give it, but rather his role is active, sometimes aggressive and supervisory. It is a tenet of the doctrine of separation of powers that the government has power to execute the law, and the Attorney General must see to it that this power is not exceeded. The real client of the Attorney General is not the government, but the public. He owes it to the public, on trust, to see to it that the law is observed by the government.

To that end, the Attorney General must be ready, as a watchdog, not only to bark, but when necessary also to bite. And the law has equipped him with teeth for that purpose. It is not only that the government is in theory bound to abide by his legal opinion. If the government does not respect his opinion, it is up to him to decide whether to institute criminal proceedings, in case an offence has been committed, or to deny legal defense, if the governmental act is challenged in court, in which case the government would remain defenseless.

This power of the Attorney General, coupled with his prestige which reflects public appreciation and support for his role as guardian of the rule of law, has caused a practice to be developed, according to which the government and the various government organs often seek the opinion of the Attorney General in advance of any action the legality of which is in doubt. This gives the impression that the Attorney General is all too powerful and influential. Indeed, this may be the case when compared to the situation in some other countries. This also has occasionally given rise to demands and suggestions that the office of the Attorney General be restricted. Only recently the opinion has been expressed that too often the government refers questions for the decision of the Attorney General, and the implication is that this should be changed, and less questions should be referred to the Attorney General.

Respectfully, I beg to differ. In fact, only legal matters have been referred to the Attorney General by the government. The Attorney General has never been asked to express his opinion on questions of policy, for example, whether or not to agree to an international peace conference or whether or not to discontinue certain defense projects. He is only asked whether a particular course of action is lawful. And if such questions are not referred to him, the alternative is worse. Either such questions would be referred by the government for the opinion of private attorneys selected for the purpose by the government, which is less favorable than bringing such questions to the independent Attorney General; or more serious, the government will not bother to ask what is the law, and would not hesitate in taking any action the legality of which is doubtful. In practice this would necessarily mean that in many more cases the government would act unlawfully.

I think that the power of the Attorney General as it has developed over the years, even though it is broad, is very positive, especially in Israel, since it constitutes an important element in the system of checks and balances. This system is not well developed in Israel. Unlike other countries, Israel has no written constitution nor a second chamber of the legislature. And the Knesset, our legislature, is in practice dominated by the Cabinet. In such a situation the role of the Attorney General, as a check in legal matters, to prevent unlawful acts and abuse of power, has proven itself to be a vital role, and it should not be abridged.

The Role of the Attorney General in Crisis Times

The difficult role of the Attorney General as guardian of the rule of law, which quite often brings him into conflict with government, is especially difficult in times of crisis. It is also more important in such times.

Crises may occur in various fields, such as international relations, the economy and, foremost, national security. In such situations of crisis there is naturally a tendency on the part of the government to disregard the law in the face of other very important interests. There is also an increasing readiness on the part of the public, even the courts, to allow the government to pursue its course in the name of national interest, notably national security. The danger is not only that in times of crises the rule of law would not be observed, and civil liberties would be violated, but also, and more important, that in such times wrong norms would be established, which later on would be very difficult to uproot. This has happened time and again in many countries around the world. I do not want to refer to an exceptional case like the military government in Argentina, which in the name of national security and public order had crushed civil liberties. But I could bring, for instance, the case of the United States which during the Second World War detained hundreds of thousands of American citizens of Japanese origin for years, without a trial, and without even any specific accusation. And not only the public, but even the Supreme Court of the United States approved this act, which now everybody in the United States agrees was unnecessary, unjustified and did injustice to numerous American citizens. So it is a real danger. The question to ask is, what is the role of the Attorney General in such a situation of crisis?

The Shin Bet Affair

Here I will refer to the Shin Bet, the General Security Service affair, not only as an illustration, but also as a test case: a test case for the rule of law and a test case for the role of the Attorney General in Israel. But first, I shall give a very brief description of the facts of this affair.

One day in April 1984, a passenger bus was hijacked south of Tel Aviv by four Arab terrorists, to be stopped by a military unit, which then stormed the bus and killed two of the terrorists. It was later disclosed by the press — which in this case, as in some other cases, did a very great service to the rule of law in Israel — that two of the four Arab terrorists were taken out alive from the bus, to be killed later on. The public, that is to say, the press, demanded an investigation, because it seemed that a terrible crime had been committed, namely, that prisoners were murdered, not only against the law, but also against our ethical norms and traditions. A military commission of inquiry was then established. It concluded, after a very thorough investigation, that nobody had ordered the two Arab terrorists to be killed, rather that they were actually beaten to death by angry soldiers while being questioned. There was only one suspect identified, who was the Chief Paratrooper Officer. Consequently a police investigation followed, and the Chief Paratrooper Officer, a popular national hero, was prosecuted. This was a very difficult decision to take. Eventually he was acquitted. This seemed to be the end of the affair at that particular point.

However, a few months later it became known that the real story was altogether different. It was disclosed by three top Shin Bet officials, including the Deputy Head of the Service, who endangered their personal careers to defend what they considered to be the moral code of the Secret Service. The story was, that the Head of the Secret Service ordered the two Arab terrorists to be killed, an order which was carried out by his subordinates. Then, when a commission of investigation was established, he again, in cooperation with some top Shin Bet officials, ordered a cover up, which included systematic suborning of witnesses and obstruction of the course of justice. This is how the suspicion fell on the shoulders of the Chief Paratrooper Officer.

What does one do in such a case? I immediately brought the case to the attention of the Prime Minister. He, the Deputy Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet, were unanimous in their opinion, a very firm opinion, that nothing should be done, in the name of national security. The argument was that any investigation would virtually destroy the Secret Service and make the war against terror almost impossible. I was not convinced and, following a bitter controversy, I eventually ordered a police investigation. The investigation did not lead to prosecution, since the suspects were pardoned, even before the investigation started, by the President. However, the very decision to investigate the affair has brought about some positive consequences. It has been established that the Secret Service, much as other government agencies, is subject to the law, even when national security is involved; that such action as taken by the Secret Service in this affair is forbidden, and that those responsible for it, including the head of the Secret Service, must resign from the Service; and that the machinery supervising the Service should be examined and possibly reformed.

The Alleged Conflict between Law and National Security

Now I would like to convey my thoughts, during the months in which I was intensively engaged in discussion with the political echelon on the dilemma what to do in that situation, before I decided to ask for a police investigation. The main argument in that discussion concerned the relationship between the rule of law and national security. The argument was, basically, that these two interests may conflict, that they did conflict in this affair, and that, therefore, a choice had to be made between the two. If so, what was the choice to be made? Law, it may seem, is words in a book, whereas security means bombs in the street. On the one hand we seem to speak of abstract principles, whereas on the other hand we are expected to see the blood of the innocent. Security may mean physical existence, national and individual, especially in the unique circumstances of Israel, and should the rule of law count more than existence? No wonder that when the affair was first disclosed to the public, and the political echelon presented the problem to the public as one in which a choice had to be made between the requirements of the rule of law and the exigencies of national security, a public opinion poll showed that about 80% preferred security to law.

I think, however, that presenting the problem as one of a choice to be made between law and security is both simplistic and misleading. Also the very concept of a conflict between law and security, to be resolved in each particular case by the public official faced with the conflict, is dangerous and may impair even national security. Let us examine, by way of analogy, the ordinary case of a police officer investigating a crime. Is he allowed to use physical force against a suspect in order to extract from him a confession that he had committed that crime? Clearly, the law forbids it. But to the police officer such a case may present a conflict between the dry letter of the law and the real needs of internal security. The police officer may be convinced that the suspect had committed the crime, that he is a dangerous criminal, and that without a confession leading to his conviction he would remain a free person, endangering society again. By using physical force to extract a confession, the police officer may believe that he serves the public interest. Yet the police officer would be wrong to assume that a conflict exists in such a case between the law and the public interest, and that he would serve the public interest by disregarding the law. The problem, which faces the police officer in such a case, has already been considered and resolved by Parliament. Parliament, endeavoring to formulate a policy which would balance the relevant interests and serve the public in the long range, has reached the conclusion that the public interest would be best served if suspects are interrogated by police officers in the manner prescribed by law, avoiding the use of physical force. Indeed, it may be the case that without the use of physical force by police officers during interrogation, occasionally persons who had committed crimes would escape conviction and punishment. But the use of physical force against suspects is evil and dangerous in many ways and, on the whole, more damaging than beneficial to the public interest. In any case, it is the rule prescribed by Parliament, and not the opinion of the police officer in a particular case, which best serves the real interest of the public. Parliament not only represents the will of the people, but generally also has a more balanced and sound view, taking into account a variety of interests and long-range considerations. The police officer, on the other hand, has only a limited role to perform and, accordingly, a limited view. Therefore he has been given a limited power. He may not act on the assumption that he knows better than Parliament what the public interest requires. He should constantly remember that he not only enforces the law, but that he is also subject to the law. In short, he should serve security only according to law.

The same applies to all other persons in public office, elected or appointed, up to the Prime Minister. If we allow the Prime Minister or the head of the Security Service, or any other public official, to act contrary to law, or to sanction an act committed by some other official contrary to law, merely because he claims that this would better serve the public interest, it would mean that he is placed above Parliament. This may threaten to undermine the very basis of democracy and is likely, in the long run, to endanger liberty and other human rights. Especially so with regard to a security service, or any other kind of secret police, because of its immense power and clandestine character.

Nor should it be thought that authority granted to the security service to disregard the law in the name of national security may be practically confined to the security service or to national security. It is bound to spread like cancer over the whole body of the executive branch. It would naturally reach other agencies responsible for various aspects of security, such as the ordinary police and the military. Further, it would be too optimistic to assume that such a sweeping indulgence would remain confined to matters of national security. The interests of economy may be as important, sometimes even more important, than some security interests. So also foreign relations. And where is the end? From my personal experience I know that many ministers and other highly placed officials in all fields of government — industry and commerce, transportation and communication, health and education, and so on — sincerely believe that the law, as construed by the court or by the Attorney General, is sometimes a real impediment to progress and welfare. Usually they accept the rule of law only grudgingly. It is too dangerous to leave it to them to decide in specific circumstances that national security, or for that matter any other national interest, overrides the rule of law.

It is also unnecessary. The law takes ample account of the needs of national security. Various laws make special provisions to safeguard national security.

For example, considerations of national security may, under certain conditions, warrant wiretapping, or administrative detention or exclusion of evidence from legal proceedings. True, it may still appear in a specific case or subject that the law does not properly satisfy security needs. The solution in such a case or subject, however, should be provided by way of an amendment to the law. The Knesset may be relied upon to give due consideration to security needs and amend the law if, on balance, this is justified.

One of the statutory provisions which enable the government to serve the needs of national security is the provision which vests the Attorney General with discretion whether or not to prosecute. Considerations of public interest, including national security, may lead the Attorney General in a specific case to a decision to withhold investigation and prosecution. This was exactly what I was asked to do in the Shin Bet case. I had the power to do so. However, I was duty bound independently to consider whether such an exceptional course was justified in the circumstances of the case by considerations of national security.

The political echelon, as already mentioned, claimed and insisted that considerations of national security did justify and even require this course of action. But such a claim is not in itself sufficient. Arguments concerning national security, such as arguments concerning other national interests, may not be well founded in a specific case even if they are presented by the highest authority. They may be relied upon in good faith and yet be mistaken or exaggerated. Also, the possibility should not be excluded that such arguments may be knowingly used as a cover for other interests, for example, political or even personal interests. This may be effectively done especially in connection with national security. The reason is that matters of national security are generally assumed to be secret. Therefore considerations of national security may often be relied upon in general and vague terms, without further disclosure or explanation. One is expected in such cases blindly to trust those responsible for national security, first that they act in good faith, and second, that they are not wrong on the merits. But experience and wisdom suggest a different attitude. An expression in Hebrew says: respect him and yet suspect him. When you hear the argument of national interest as an excuse or explanation, do not necessarily take it at its face value, but rather examine it for yourself.

The connotation of national security is often, especially in Israel, national existence. This indeed may sometimes be the case, as in war. But this is certainly not the ordinary case. Usually, when national security is invoked to justify a certain course of action, so that it may be understood that that course of action is crucial to national security, it may in effect only mean that otherwise some damage would accrue to national security, sometimes only minor and marginal damage. Therefore, whenever national security is raised as a consideration, it should be examined, assuming it does not serve merely as a cover for other interests, to determine its relative weight. Upon such examination, it may be found out that the potential damage to national security is minor and clearly outweighed by serious damage which is bound to be caused to some other interests, such as national economy or the rule of law.

Law and Security in the Shin Bet Affair

The Shin Bet case serves as an illustration. The argument against any investigation of the suspicion that serious crimes were committed by Shin Bet people seemed, at first, overwhelming. Anything connected with the Shin Bet has traditionally been considered top secret. An investigation might, so it was claimed, disclose State secrets, concerning the structure and the operation of the Shin Bet, and for this and some other reasons might severely impair the bitter war against terror. This is why the argument gained such strong popular support at first. But a closer examination, which I endeavored to undertake, showed, in my opinion, that national security would not be seriously damaged. An investigation might, of course adversely and strongly affect some individuals, suspected of having committed the crimes, and it might also inconvenience the Service. But no more than that. To the contrary, in my opinion it would have benefited even the Shin Bet, at least in the long run, mainly in terms of internal morale and external credibility. In any case, it was clear to me that any potential damage caused to national security by an investigation would be outweighed by the damage to be caused to the rule of law if an investigation was being withheld and no steps taken against those responsible for the crimes. To withhold investigation would have meant that the Security Service is in principle, with the sanction of the political echelon and the Attorney General, above the law. It might have been taken as a general license to commit the most serious crimes, any time, in the name of national security. Such a concept and the concepts of democracy and freedom are contradictions in terms. They cannot coexist.

Later on, still in the course of the Shin Bet case, the Supreme Court had the occasion to express its opinion on the relationship between law and security. The Court was asked to decide whether the President of Israel was empowered to pardon the head of the Shin Bet, together with three other top officials of the Service, who had already admitted that they had committed the crimes, and then resigned from their positions in the Service. The Supreme Court held that the President did possess such power. However, as to the potential conflict between law and security, Justice Shamgar, President of the Court, had this to say: "The rule of law and the public interest are not contradicting concepts. They are interwoven and support each other...No orderly government can exist if it does not ensure that the rule of law is observed...National security too is based on the rule of law." Justice Barak was even more explicit on this point.

He said: "If the Attorney General is of the opinion that prima facie material exists which justifies an investigation into very serious offenses committed by anybody in the executive branch, then the rule of law demands an investigation. So with regard to any person, and so also with regard to government people. Considerations of security do not require any different result. There is no security without law. The rule of law is a component of national security." [See H.C. 428/86, Barzilie v. Government of Israel (1986) 40(3) P.D. 505, at 555, 622.]

This is then, in my opinion, the first important lesson, though not a novel lesson, of the Shin Bet affair. National security, much as other national interests, should be served according to law. The Security Service, much as any other government agency, is subject to the law. Properly seen, there is no contradiction between the rule of law and national security. The argument that national security may demand and justify unlawful action is unacceptable. Moreover, arguments of national security, because they are usually shrouded in secrecy, should be accepted with some caution. They may be misleading and even abused. Therefore, arguments of national security, even where they are a relevant and lawful consideration, should not necessarily be taken at their face value. They should be examined, to the extent possible, so that their true nature and relative weight may be determined. So it should be also when the Attorney General is requested or pressed to avoid investigation and prosecution on grounds of national security.

Final Words: The Attorney General and the Rule of Law

The role of the Attorney General in safeguarding the rule of law is another lesson made clear by the Shin Bet affair. The main guardian of the rule of law, as embracing civil liberties, is the court, and foremost the Supreme Court. In Israel, no less than in any other democracy, it has proved itself to be a highly respected and very effective check upon the government, to prevent abuse of power. But the court is only an external check. It is usually not fully informed of the inner acts and considerations of the executive branch, it cannot intervene in the acts of the executive branch on its own initiative, and only in a relatively small number of cases is it requested by aggrieved persons to interfere and examine the legality of government action. Moreover, with its limited resources and cumbersome procedure, the court could not feasibly examine the legality of government plans and acts in a general and systematic manner. This may possibly be done, if at all, only by some other agency. In Israel it is the State Comptroller, who acts as an agent for the legislature, and the Attorney General, who is considered part of the executive branch. The Attorney General acts as an internal check upon the government. He is, so to speak, present in all government departments through the network of legal advisers; he is generally well informed as to the plans and acts of the government, at least with respect to the more important and sensitive matters; and he may act, and he is expected to act, on his own initiative to prevent unlawful action on the part of any government agency. He thus serves as a first line of defense for the rule of law, which enables the court effectively to act as a second line of defense. This is an important role, particularly in Israel, where the system of checks and balances is otherwise not well developed.

This role, however, may not be effectively fulfilled unless the Attorney General is independent of the government. Such independence is of particular importance in times of crisis when matters involve national security. In such instances the danger to national security involves also a threat, often acute, to the rule of law. An English judge once said that a war cannot be carried on according to the principles of Magna Carta. Yet a war may still be carried on according to rules of law made specifically to meet the needs of war. The rule of law should not unnecessarily be sacrificed to satisfy other national interests. It is mainly the role of the Attorney General, together with the court, to stand up against such a threat, especially in times of crisis. The Shin Bet affair, I believe, is an illustration to that effect.

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Israel — A Durable Democracy

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

It is in Jerusalem that the legal tradition of our people faces the test of functioning in a sovereign Jewish state. The process began some 3,500 years ago when Moses commanded: "Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates...and they shall judge the people with just judgement." How moving it is to realize that this emphasis on institutionalized justice was enunciated in the wilderness to wandering tribes.

In the course of the ages the admonition developed into the great legal structure of Mishna and Talmud which dominated the life of Jewish individuals and communities throughout the centuries in all the regions of the world where Jews were scattered. Little wonder that, with emancipation, so much Jewish talent was diverted to the legal professions.

There is another biblical text which is highly relevant. It reads: "You shall have one ordinance both for the stranger and for him that was born in the land." This special sensitivity to the status of the alien is rooted in Israel's own experience as stranger in the land of Egypt. Sensitivity and consideration for the stranger can never be taken for granted. They must be kept alive, for, as all of us know, xenophobia is unfortunately a fact of human nature. We find ourselves contending with it here, where we are trying very hard to weld together a democratic, pluralistic society of highly diversified Jewish and other groups, with the observance of human rights as a central pillar.

Against this background and, in particular, against the more immediate background of racism's most awful manifestation, the Holocaust, the United Nations resolution labeling Zionism as racism is inexpressibly sickening and incredible. One may see it as a tragic farce. As one who fought that U.N. battle twelve years ago, I am reminded of the arguments we advanced then, which have actually been reinforced by developments in the course of time.

It was U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan who said then that the U.N. was granting "symbolic amnesty" to the Nazi murderers of six million Jews. The United Nations which began its life as an anti-Nazi alliance has virtually become a world center of anti-Semitism. For the strange perversion of the Zionism-Racism equation has entered the subconsciousness of millions of people throughout the world, and the dividing line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism has disappeared. We may trace to this influence the bombing of synagogues in European capitals or — on another, very different level — the banning of Jewish groups and spokesmen on the campuses of a number of British universities, on the ground that Zionism is a form of racism.

The emergence of a political group, with a racist ideology, in Israel, is one of the most serious developments in our 40 year-old existence as a state. But this is not purely an Israeli phenomena and it behoves not representatives of world Jewry to point an accusing finger at Israel. This movement is not of Israeli origin. It is an unhappy import from the United States. Indeed, its leader is a citizen of the United States but what is more serious — is that it could not exist without the continued financial support of members of the American Jewish community. Thus the problem is that the actions of this group reflect on the Jewish people as a whole.

In years gone by, Israel's Supreme Court recognized the principle of a militant democracy which fights to defend the principles on which it has been established. It is dangerous, in my view, to approach this problem as a purely academic super-liberal divorced from the realities of the dangers which threaten the democratic nature of one's society. History has surely taught us, with all our deep commitments to the principles of democracy, that the leaders of democracy have no right to place the weapons of democracy in the hands of those who openly proclaim that their purpose is to use these weapons to destroy the democracy in which they live. In this respect, the outbreaks of mass lawlessness, directed against innocent people and the community in general, occurring in our society in recent years, must surely sound a strident alarm to our government and our legislature.

We who have suffered more than any other nation in the world from the evil of racist ideology and from the dangers of mob violence, dare not countenance such dangerous phenomena which run counter to the basic principles of Judaism and Jewish tradition in our society. For a society such as ours, this is a matter of life and death.

Greetings by Mr. Chaim Herzog, the President of Israel, to the reception of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists.

Israel Must be a Liberal Democracy



Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin

I do not think that there is such a thing as *the* Diaspora. Different sections of our people, in different countries, feel and think differently, although there is, of course, a common thread, identifiably Jewish. The attitudes of Jews outside Israel must differ from those of Israelis but, whether the vantage point it gives the former is better or not, whether they see some things more clearly or less clearly, is not answerable in a general sense. It simply depends on particular individuals and particular circumstances. The vast majority of Diaspora Jews live as Jews; Israel is at the center of their thoughts. Some people even accuse them of making it a substitute for religion, and I think there is some truth in this.

After 1967, even the Jews who were on the margins, half or three-quarters assimilated, suddenly felt a deep twinge; they were profoundly affected; they themselves were unable to account for what happened. They felt connected with Israel in some way which they couldn't possibly deny to themselves. They felt a deep bond with Israel which they could not always analyze and, because they felt this, they began to think intensively about their relationship to Israel and about the problems this raises. They are what they are and they give the answers they give — a liberal's answer from a liberal position, a conservative's from a conservative one, and so on. There are no general answers. When you say Jews in the Diaspora have a "privileged observer" status because they are not bound up with Israel's daily existence, you are saying that they can afford to take a more detached position if they want to but, in fact, they generally don't. They believe what they believe because it is at the heart of their general outlook.

Diaspora Jewish Commitment to Israel

Some Diaspora Jews do salve their consciences by doing their best for Israel, as a substitute for aliya, but I don't think that applies to the majority of us who support Israel. The majority don't continue to ask themselves whether they ought to settle in Israel or not. They think about it, but it doesn't trouble them too deeply. They simply feel a devotion to the Jewish state because they are Jews and that is where the center of their collective consciousness is. Some end by immigrating to Israel, some do not; some spend a portion of every year there. Those who remain outside mostly regard their devotion to Israel as perfectly compatible with loyalty to their own country. In a liberal democracy one can have many loyalties: One can be loyal to one's political party, to one's university, trade union, church, and other kinds of organizations to which one belongs.

With regard to the famous question of dual allegiance, I think that Jews in the Diaspora, by and large, feel Israel to be at the center of their Jewish existence and, at the same time, feel untroubled loyalty to their countries of birth or residence. If these loyalties collide, people probably at first try not to face this (the natural reaction of people who don't want to face a cruel dilemma) but, if they do have to face it, then they decide, sometimes easily, at other times with some agony, which way to go. In times of real collision, people choose according to their consciences — there is often no clear solution. In Eastern Europe or Moslem lands, Jews have been and are faced with such dilemmas. People behind the Iron Curtain, especially the Soviet Union, are persecuted if they are suspected of sympathies for Israel — and this creates terrible difficulties. A great many remain loyal to Israel and long to immigrate; and, if they can, they do. Others do not.

Loyalty to Israel from Abroad

Pride and happiness in Israel's achievements are diminished if Israel acts in ways which people think to be morally unacceptable; or when Israelis — not necessarily the government, but individuals, parties or groups — act in a way which shocks Jews in the Diaspora. There is no doubt that this does disturb their sense of pride, which is very strong, in the achievements of Israel. It may not diminish their loyalty because some of them tend to feel 'my country right or wrong', at least to some extent. Nevertheless, Israel's actions do have an effect. Jews deeply hope that Israel will not do things they disapprove of morally. Many Diaspora Jews centered in English-speaking countries were ashamed of Israel's war in Lebanon. But they would not have felt the shame if they did not, to a large degree, identify with the life of Israel. British, French, American non-Jews didn't feel ashamed — opposed but not ashamed.

We are only ashamed of what people close to us do, the actions of our brothers or our friends, not what strangers do. If we feel ashamed of Israel that is because Israel is a society not only of Israelis, but of people for whose benefit the State of Israel was created; and that is the entire Jewish people. If there are Jews whose sympathies for Israel are genuinely diminished by the acts of the Israeli state, their original sympathy cannot have been deep, nor are their Jewish feelings those of the majority of our people.

To Whom Does Israel Belong

There is a loyalty problem in Israel because there are citizens who are not Jews and there are plenty of Jews who are not citizens. That is a problem because the State of Israel did not begin with a settled citizen population. The Yishuv yearned to be a state but was not one in the proper sense. The question arises, will the moment arrive when Israel can declare itself an independent, sovereign state and make its own rules as to whom to admit and whom not to admit? Such a moment hasn't arrived yet because Israel still wants immigration and its potential immigrants are Jews.

Citizens of other countries cannot normally be Israeli citizens — though, of course, there are cases of dual nationality. But there is no denying that the State of Israel was created as a state for Jews — for any Jew who chooses to come. The question arises, does the State still exist solely — and for all time — for the benefit of the Jews who choose to come? In the first place, it belongs to its own citizens who have interests which might one day — distant as it surely seems — conflict with, let us say, excessive mass immigration from the Diaspora. This is not probable at present, and for the foreseeable future, the more that settle here the better. But it could occur; in which case, as a sovereign state, Israel would have the right to limit immigration. Israel, rightly, does not today begin to think of the possibility of refusing the return of Jews. Israel certainly cannot morally at present abrogate the Law of Return because the Return is what the State was created to implement — it is its *raison d'etre*.

But a situation may yet arise in which the actions of the State of Israel will simply be determined by the needs and interests of its inhabitants and these may demand the limitation or even cessation of Jewish immigration. But there is neither need nor right to do this as things are and are likely to be for the foreseeable future. Nor do I think that Israelis are in a mood to say: 'This is our state. We are not interested in what you, in the Diaspora, consider to be right'. That moment, if it ever comes, seems to be remote. Today the ties are close. But, in the end, every sovereign state has the right to decide its own fate, without any political obligation to meet the needs of those outside its borders.

There may be certain laws and arrangements which are designed to attract Jews and to make the life of Jews in that country as satisfactory as possible. But it is not justified to do that at the expense of other citizens of that country. If the Jews are a privileged group in the State of Israel, so privileged that when there is a choice of benefiting the Jew or benefiting non-Jews, the benefits are given automatically to the Jews, I think that is an illiberal principle which creates discrimination and hostility and, on those grounds alone, should be avoided wherever possible. I should be entirely in favor of equality of treatment. The only thing which would deter me, which would make me hesitate, is whether this would deter immigration. Would this, in fact, create a situation in which the Jewish character of the State would inevitably suffer?

All human beings want to be equal. Privileges for the Jews do not have to be embodied in state law. If such measures are needed they should be provided through a *de facto* arrangement to meet specific needs, but the idea of embodying in the basic law of Israel that certain privileges are extended to Jews alone and cannot be extended to other citizens seems to me to be unjust — to perpetuate inequality. In other words, one must not reduce non-Jews who live in Israel to the status of resident foreigners, which is what that would mean. I think this would not only be unjust but also extremely unwise.

Minorities in the Jewish State: Rights and Resources

Israel is a Jewish state with a national minority. We know that minorities, if they are citizens, have to have full citizens' rights and, if they are minorities, they should be allowed to have their own cultural development. The Arabs obviously have their own language and their own religions and culture and these should be fully respected and maintained. The State was not created for them but they are there; they have a right to be there and to enjoy full citizens' rights, so long as they do not seek to subvert the Jewish State. In a sense the PLO does work to subvert it, in which case the Jewish State, like any other, has a right to take some kind of defensive measures. How far these should go is a matter for discussion. We must remember that, in the case of Israel, we are talking about a state created for the Jewish people and not for the inhabitants of a certain piece of territory called Palestine. That is what the Arabs object to and one can understand their objection.

I have no doubt they think that from their point of view it is a highly undesirable development and one can understand their reasons for resistance to it. We — I — take the position that our needs are greater than theirs; and there is a conflict here. There is no clean, clear-cut solution. As Chaim Weizmann once said, one wants to achieve the smallest degree of injustice. If I were an Arab living in Palestine, I think that I should feel exactly what they feel. I don't think it's unreasonable of them not to want the Jews to stay. I am afraid that they can't be allowed to fulfill their wishes, but the reality of their frustrations seems to me to be perfectly intelligible. One can sympathize with their wishes although one has, for the sake of the survival of the Jewish State, to deny them.

Allocation of resources should be governed by the examined needs, indifferently as between Jews and Arabs. That would be the ideal situation. The situation *de facto,* of course, is very different, given the present conditions in Israel. There is an injustice in diverting resources to the Jews because that may be taken to imply that Israeli Arabs are not accepted as being there by right, only on sufferance. And that, I think, is an intolerable state for any minority, one which indeed the Jews have suffered in their history in other countries, and it leads to conflict and to an undermining of institutions — a policy that is both unjust and unwise. Where there is a conflict of interests because scarce resources have to be distributed between two different groups, one tries to arrive at the least degree of injustice. One has to judge the situation in some empirical fashion.

What one cannot do is mechanically say that resources must be distributed in a rigid way, in accordance with some kind of rule or law, because that will always produce undesirable consequences. It is the same in England. Do we give money to the North which is supposed to be economically in far greater need than the South? Or do we give it to the South because we think productivity is likely to be greater there? Well, one decides as one decides. It is always a compromise — a balance — an imperfect solution.

However there is the need to preserve the Jewish State as a Jewish state. And that is an extra factor. Something which is indispensable to the preservation of the State as a Jewish state sometimes has to be done at the expense of the needs of non-Jews. When this is the case, I think it must be done so as to produce the very minimum degree of inequality and it must never be done automatically.

State and Religion

There is a tendency in Israel to satisfy some of the more intolerant demands of the Orthodox, and that seems to me to interfere with the basic freedoms of the citizen in a liberal democracy. Obviously, in a Jewish state, those who wish to practice the Jewish religion in its more orthodox forms would have far greater opportunities for doing so in total freedom than anywhere else, and that is wholly desirable. The history of the Jews is inextricably bound up with religious practice and the Jews would not have survived if it had not been for this. But, to establish a state religion in the present atmosphere would, it seems to me, lead to a serious degree of interference with the life of people who are not prepared to accept certain forms of religious life — freedom to which citizens of a liberal state are fully entitled.

In a liberal democracy there ought to be a legal right to civil divorce, civil marriage and civil burial, as in other liberal states. There seems to be a welcome tendency in the West towards emancipation from religious authority as part of the constitution.

It might be constructive to draw up an Israeli constitution or Bill of Rights and see what public reaction is. If opposition would stem from a conflict with the Halacha, I am on the side of secular constitutional law. All I can say is that I don't think that the incorporation of the Halacha into Israeli constitutional law is friendly to basic freedoms. The founding fathers of Zionism — Herzl, Ussishkin, Nordau, Sokolov, Weizmann, and to some extent even Buber — were not Orthodox Jews or faithful followers of the Halacha. The fierce opposition to Zionism from rabbinical circles to a large extent stemmed from that. There were rabbis and observant Jews among the Zionists, of course, but the vast majority of rabbis loathed Zionism no less than the assimilationists, partly because they believed that it was a desecration to permit a Jewish state before the arrival of the Messiah, and partly because they rightly suspected the founders of Zionism of not sympathizing with religious orthodoxy.

Most of the original Zionist thinkers were steeped in Jewish tradition and had been brought up in religious homes. They did not have any antipathy or hatred for Jewish tradition and religion like some of the militant socialists, atheists or anti-clericals but, nevertheless, they were not, as it were, natural disciples of the rabbinical establishment. So, the Jewish establishment, both rabbinic and secular, opposed Zionism and regarded it as a piece of unwanted secular nationalism. Only a very small minority of rabbis, like Raines or Mohilever, sympathized with the desire to return to Palestine. I myself am descended from a Hassidic family and my grandparents and all my family's friends and relations of that generation looked on Zionism with considerable horror. The fact that the State was created by people who did not accept the strict orthodox rabbinical disciplines seems to me not only historically true, but politically justified. They wanted to create a modern, liberal democracy, neither anti-religious nor a clerical theocracy.

Perhaps because those people were brought up by orthodox parents, and because tradition is tradition, the founders did not create a secular state. What it meant (and still means) to be a Jew is to be part of a community held together by strong religious ties for three-thousand years, and that cannot be ignored or cancelled. That sense of tradition, of historical-spiritual continuity, is part of the essence of what it is to be a Jew. The founders, precisely because they opposed assimilation, felt these sympathies, some more intensely than others. Weizmann happened to be deeply steeped in Jewish traditional values. He did not want clerical control and would have denied that the conception of what it is to be a Jew is indissolubly bound to the practice of Jewish orthodoxy. I believe in the idea of a free church in a free country. People should be entirely free to worship as they choose, without interference from those who say that Israel is either an orthodox religious state or it is nothing. That is real despotism.

Israel, the Jewish State

We are a people. Peoples are made by memories, by language, by custom, by descent, by religion, by everything which creates group solidarity. To be a member of a people — whether it is a nation-state or not — is to live among those who understand what each of them means, however much they may differ. Elsewhere you have to explain yourself. A Jew in Israel is at home, he does not have to explain himself. The Jew in Peru does. That is the meaning of the biblical phrase: "I live within my nation". Of course there is a religious component, historically ineluctable.

Who is a Jew

A Jew, in the first place, is anybody whom others normally take to be a Jew. However, the degree of consciousness is not irrelevant. Self-image is intrinsic to being what you are. Willingness is another matter. You may not be willing to be Jewish but then you know in some sense that you do belong to the Jewish community which you seek to leave. There are cases of half-Jews, quarter-Jews and wholly assimilated, marginal Jews. I remember an eminent Italian Jew who correctly described himself as a very marginal Jew. I knew what he meant — it meant that his children would almost certainly cease to be Jewish, that he was already somewhere else, remote from Judaism. Such Jews should be allowed to leave, there should be no effort to restrain them. I'm not in favor of missionary activity to try and save such emigrants for the Jewish people. I can well imagine who would criticize me severely for saying this, but I believe that individuals are entitled to choose their ways of life. Some leave, with varying degrees of a sense of guilt. So be it. The vast majority want to stay.

Those who wish to be converted to Judaism from another religion should and, once they are, they are Jews, Liberal Jews or Reform Jews. I regard their faith as a somewhat thin or attenuated form of Judaism but, of course, they are Jews in the fullest sense. I regard all this business of not recognizing the validity of non-Orthodox conversion and marriage as a very undesirable, reprehensible intolerance — zealotry. Even though the Jewish nation was created by orthodoxy, things change. Variety is a good thing in itself and unless it is socially deleterious, it is monstrous to persecute it. Conformity can be stifling to the spirit.

Israeli Pluralism and the Rejectionists

The question of how much Israel can tolerate depends on whether one thinks that it is in peril. It is one of the important paradoxes — what has been called the central paradox - of liberal democracies; that they should tolerate those who wish to destroy them unless, of course, it endangers the security or the central principles or policies of the state. In other words, can we Jews carry such people without peril to the social texture? This resembles such problems as those of pacifists or conscientious objectors in time of war. In liberal democracies, it is thought wrong to use sanctions against non-violent groups. Pacifism can be an obstacle to a state's decision in times of war but the question is, how great an obstacle? Where the nation is not positively endangered by that degree of heterodoxy, it should not be proceeded against, although steps to check its effect may have to be taken. The ultra-Orthodox Neturei Karta, and other zealots in Israel, are rather like Jehovah's Witnesses in Christian lands. It doesn't seem to me that their fanaticism makes enough difference to law and order or security to require action or to treat them as less than full citizens of the state which they reject. Fanaticism, as Macmillan said, is a kind of disease. It is a pathological condition. It should be treated humanely — although steps have to be taken to prevent the violence to which it sometimes leads.

I do not believe in inflexible positions or absolute solutions to social problems. The imposition of absolute solutions too often leads to bloodshed. I am not prepared to lay down rules. If you ask for a perfect answer, a code of public behavior that is morally impeccable, you risk driving principles to their limits and this tends to create deep and unnecessary suffering. I am in favor of decent compromise, of trade-offs. If there are two acceptable principles which collide, to reject one entirely and accept the other usually leads to bad consequences; so try and preserve both as far as possible. If you can't, then you have to choose. How can you know what is morally decent? You have to consider, analyze, reflect, explain, produce examples. Things cannot become clearer without providing concrete cases.

Israel as a Liberal Democracy

Denmark is a liberal democracy and so are Holland, Sweden and New Zealand. England, France and Israel are not authoritarian states — they are parliamentary democracies with liberal, nineteenth-century traditions. Israel was cast in this particular pattern. That is what the fathers of Zionism believed in and created and I don't ask for more than that — some kind of untidy liberal, social democracy. Untidy because once you begin tidying it up you will find that oppression will begin. Somebody is going to be unjustly squeezed. Tidiness — discouragement of individual self-expression — is not a proper ideal for any country, particularly not for Israel, a new, heterogeneous society encircled by variety.

Ad hoc solutions are best and yet widely accepted general principles must be kept in mind and not abandoned, even if they sometimes need specific interpretation. There is such a thing as liberal democracy; there is such a thing as "each man (or woman) shall count for one and only one"; there are such things as free and open voting systems, as parliament, as an independent judiciary, or civil liberties, or the right to property. These are basic principles along with freedom of speech, freedom of conducting one's private life according to one's wishes, provided one does not break the law. All that must never be abandoned by Israel. I cannot see how such institutions and rules could endanger the Jewish character of the State. But, of course, Israel does have to preserve a Jewish majority; it must, above all, be a Jewish state, the only land in which Jews feel totally at home, free from that social uneasiness which, in some degree, affects them everywhere else, no matter how free the societies to which they belong.

This article is based on an interview with Professor Sir Isaiah Berlin conducted by Yael Tamir-Rafaeli on behalf of the Israel-Diaspora Institute. Prof. Berlin was the recipient of the 1979 Jerusalem Prize for his writings on the freedom of the individual in society.

The Israel-Diaspora Institute

The Israel-Diaspora Institute (IDI) is an action-oriented think tank which analyzes problems, evaluates policy options and develops long–– and short-range strategies as well as models for changing Israel-Diaspora relations and Israeli democracy.

For the past two years, the Institute has concentrated all of its efforts in one direction: enhancing the democratic foundations of the Jewish State. IDI is the only existing forum for Israeli, North American and European Jewish academics to collaborate and exchange views on such diverse subjects as social institutions, constitutional legislation and educational frameworks — thus synthesizing experiences of Diaspora Jewry in modern, democratic societies of the western world.

The Institute is currently involved in three main projects:

★ The quarterly bulletin, "Israeli Democracy", analyzes political trends, measuring the strength of democracy in Israel.

★ "Judaic Sources of Human Rights" aims to show that a flexible Halacha is possible; to demonstrate that it is consistent with life in a modern democratic state, and to develop a Bill of Rights for Israel based on Jewish sources. A committee of distinguished Judaic scholars and judges in Jerusalem has been meeting on this issue.

★ "The Intellectual Process", the brainchild of Sir Isaiah Berlin, is designed to provide the intellectual basis for present and future projects of IDI. Groups of academics are meeting throughout the western world to arrive at some legitimate and workable alternatives to growing extremism around the world. Discussions focus on the belief that opposition to fundamentalism, racism and authoritarianism must assess not what one is against, but what one can support.

Israel is at a critical point in her history. The IDI is working to ensure that her future is that of a modern, democratic, Jewish state. We are proud of our past achievements, but are also aware of how much more needs doing. The Institute hopes to expand its activities to concentrate more on policy-oriented projects. The first of these, on religious pluralism, will aim at developing concrete recommendations for Israeli decision-makers as to how sound relations between religion and society can be based on legal, cultural and social foundations in a diversified, modern society.

A Time for Radical Educational Restructuring

Dr. Saul B. Cohen

President Emeritus of Queens College and
Co-Chairman, New York State School and Business Alliance

A nation whose educational system is at risk is a nation at risk. The growing concerns for educational reform in countries with such disparate approaches to education as the United States, the Soviet Union, China and France, revolve around a common theme — that nations experiencing major economic change cannot hope to make radical economic and social advances without basic educational improvement.

For Israel, education holds no less a national priority than in other modern states. Israel, too, is in the throes of fundamental economic restructuring, shifting from a manufacturing and agricultural, to a post-industrial status. But, while its leadership acknowledge the educational and scientific manpower-training needs of a high technology, service-oriented economy, the reality is that educational problems are being addressed only on the margins. Education remains among the most vulnerable objects of the Treasury's budget cutting.

When financial priorities are addressed, it is the Ministry of Education that is the first to experience reductions, and the turmoil within the universities owing to budget uncertainties is shrugged off as a problem without solution.

This article is not an apologia for maintaining the status quo in Israeli education by restoring budget cuts. It would be grossly misleading to claim that if educational budgets were to be held harmless or modestly increased, all would be well. On the contrary, the problem will not be resolved by finding financial ways of restoring the status quo ante. Rather, the challenge is to use the financial crisis as the occasion to rescue the foundering educational ship through a basic rebuilding process.

Let us first turn to higher education, not because it deserves priority of attention over public schooling, but because its values and structures are the engines that drive education as a whole in Israel. The public discussions about higher education focus on the fiscal crisis — large, seemingly ever-increasing and unexpected deficits, bitter arguments over wages and tuitions, threats of work stoppages and strikes, and low morale. Higher education, once the pride of Zionism and the Jewish nation reborn, has become its stepchild.

Today's problems are the result of years of policy neglect that permitted universities to avoid making hard decisions as to whether they could afford both excellence and access; that promoted the proliferation of institutions, programs and courses; that overly emphasized professionalization in undergraduate education, thus limiting students in their exposure to broad intellectual insights and the variety of analytic tools that are the building blocks needed to pursue career options; and that closed its eyes to the deterioration of library and laboratory equipment needed to maintain world-class university research.

Compounding these difficulties are the lack of faculty openings in a system which, for a quarter of a century, was able to provide posts for young faculty because of the explosion in student numbers to 65,000. The near leveling off of student growth to about one percent increase per annum in the last five years, together with budget reductions, mean that the system must depend upon attrition through retirements of a still relatively middle-aged faculty. This brain drain, already a major factor in the country's life, will intensify as despairing students, who want an academic career, are likely to pursue graduate studies abroad in increasing numbers and then remain there.

That Israel is falling behind in higher education is clear. Some of the statistics often quoted are not as significant as they appear. Examples of popular comparative figures are: That 5% of the American population is enrolled in higher education, compared to 1.6% of Israel's population; that there are more Palestinian university students from the territories (19.6/1,000) than Israeli students (16/1,000), or that Ph.D.'s in Arab universities are increasing at the rate of 10% per annum. Forty percent of American students are enrolled in community colleges, many of which operate at a secondary school level; many of the Palestinian students from the territories are being absorbed in the countries of their diaspora; and the quality of education at Arab mega-universities is far from admirable.

No, the problem for Israeli universities lies not in comparative international statistics, but in the quality of education offered. The plethora of courses that a university student must take, many taught by rote; the lack of an adequate faculty-student advisory system; and the grossly underpaid faculty member who has little time for teaching preparation and student counselling because of being caught up with second jobs -- teaching or consulting — or whose presence on campus is sometimes no more than an interruption from a sabbatical or other leaves taken abroad because of the lure of overseas financial and intellectual incentives. These are all symptomatic of the basic weakness.

Graduate and professional training are equally at risk. Paucity of graduate assistantships, weakness of library and laboratory resources and inadequate training systems are examples of some of the problems in post-baccalaureate studies.

Calls for reform of Israel's higher education system are hardly new and the necessary, basic, structural changes become harder to effect as the old ways become even more entrenched. The overriding requirement is for a truly public system embracing all of the higher education institutions, or those that desire to join it. Such a system's governing board should be an independent body, appointed by a responsible ministry — preferably a new Ministry for Higher Education — and accountable to the Ministry for developing, lobbying for and overseeing the budgets of the various institutions. Currently, the Council for Higher Education consists of faculty representatives of the different institutions. These representatives cannot be expected to impose and oversee budgetary controls upon themselves. Only an outside body can perform such a task, allocating scarce resources according to a rational plan that identifies priorities, reduces duplication, exchanges resources and sets policies on opening of new departments, centers and other academic units, tuition rates, salary scales, student-faculty ratios and admissions criteria. Faculty bodies should deal with what they do best — with curricula, scholastic standards, research strategies, faculty appointments and the like, not with administrative and budgetary policy.

Those universities that choose not to enter the public system should certainly have the option to remain independent. They would then have the right to set their own tuition fees and student numbers, and would cast their fiscal lot with independent Boards of Governors responsible for securing operating and endowment support. Government aid to such universities should be in the form of grants and loans to students — either based on merit or economic need — not to the institutions themselves. Private institutions would have to compete with the public institutions on the basis of offering students a quality education or some specialized concentration.

The public system would, of course, encourage the raising of supplementary funds for research, fellowships, endowed chairs, capital enhancements and the like. But, the budget of each university would be strictly controlled and privately secured funds could not be used to support permanent staff, or to purchase equipment, or construct buildings for which maintenance funds are not also assured. Above all, the private supporters of public universities would not be permitted to undertake debt obligation on behalf of the institution. The current crisis is the result of a situation in which the private sector undertakes ever increasing responsibility for gaps between university desires and needs, and governmental support, and then finds itself incapable of fully shouldering the burden. The end result is an engine out of control. All the goodwill in the world of overseas patrons and supporters cannot bring matters under control — only a government-sanctioned and —supported public system can do so.

The problems of public school education are legion — from overcrowded classrooms to inadequate books and equipment. Reform of the matriculation exams depends upon basic change at the university level. The current practice of making applications to universities directly in the major fields, if replaced by a liberal educational system, would mean that standardized tests could be used to examine students for analytical reasoning and general comprehension, rather than for particular bodies of content. This would, in turn, address the overemphasis on rote-learning that undermines much of the efficacy of learning in the public schools.

Another major problem has to do with the current division between general academic and vocational education. In the post-industrial world, the world of information science, the structural dichotomy between the two streams is becoming obsolescent. All students need to have fundamental literary, computational and analytic skills, as well as some exposure to the world of work while still in school, not simply to prepare for work in a skills sense, but to develop a work ethic for whatever career they wish to pursue. Because of rapid economic and social change, most people are likely to follow a number of different career paths in a lifetime. This puts into serious question the current practice of rigid vocational training in Israeli schools, as well as elsewhere in the world.

More than anything else, however, the improvement of public schooling in Israel depends upon the professional development of teachers and school administrators. Universities have paid little attention to their Schools of Education, which largely view themselves as research, not teacher-training institutions. And independent teacher-training institutions, of which there are forty, do not provide teachers with sufficient academic breadth or with professional credentials to attract broad public esteem and salary recognition.

It is time to unify teacher preparation in a structural sense — either basing it in the universities which would agree to absorb the teacher-training institutions and cease to treat pedagogy as a stepchild, or upgrading the status of teacher-training institutions to include research and evaluation. In either event, a four— to five-year program, including one year of rigidly-supervised field training, is called for. For all of this, a strong ministerial hand on standards of training and staff development support is needed, as well as new ways of involving parents, community, industry and labor in practical support of public education.

Learning and The Book have always played a central role in Jewish culture. It is difficult for Israelis to admit that the erosion of their educational system may undermine the foundations of this culture. Even more dangerous than the impact upon economics and defense, the weakening of Israeli education means a lowering of social and cultural aims and aspirations. Educational priorities are the quintessence of national priorities; and the need for a radical educational restructuring is at hand.

ORT Around the World

The Organization for Rehabilitation through Training (ORT) was founded in Czarist Russia in 1880 to train the poverty-stricken Jews of Eastern Europe in the basic skills of industry and agriculture. From those beginnings ORT has grown to a global network of 800 schools and training centers providing technological, academic and Jewish education to more than 100,000 men, women and youth in 26 countries. In over a century, ORT training has enabled two million Jews to take their places in the world with dignity and self-respect.

Planning and coordination of programs is centralized in the World ORT Union, headquartered in London. ORT's worldwide programs are supported through the American ORT Federation via the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee which is funded by the National United Jewish Appeal and through yearly fund raising campaigns.

ORT Schools

Students at ORT schools learn skills ranging from mechanics and welding to communications and computer technology. ORT prepares them to enter the labor force as highly valued craftsmen and technicians. From Jerusalem to Buenos Aires, tens of thousands of Jews look to ORT for the skills they need to live meaningful, productive lives and to face the future with hope.



While ORT students range in age from six to sixty plus, two out of three are teenagers. In each country where ORT operates, the technological and academic skills taught are selected according to real job possibilities that offer career futures in line with current economic development.

A Variety of Programs for a Variety of Needs

ORT programs provide diverse services in a wide range of settings. While most ORT programs operate in high schools, ORT also operates highly effective apprenticeship centers, technical institutes, afternoon and evening adult courses, language training for refugees, teachers institutes and special training programs for troubled youth. When necessary, ORT schools also provide students with meals, clothing, medical care, recreation, school supplies and other material necessities.

Many occupations demand highly sophisticated educational programs. To open these opportunities to an increasing number of young people, ORT has created a variety of post high school institutes, including ORT technical colleges in Israel, France, Italy, Argentina and the United States.

ORT Throughout the Jewish World

In France, ORT's technological, vocational and academic training programs serve thousands of French Jews, many originally from economically deprived Jewish communities in North Africa.

In Italy, in addition to serving the needs of the Italian Jewish community, ORT together with HIAS, offers classes to newly arrived Jews from the Soviet Union, geared to preparing them for their new lives of freedom.

With major programs in Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay, Brazil, Chile and Peru, ORT meets the needs of students in Jewish communities throughout Latin America with programs ranging from creative education and carpentry to advanced courses in medical electronics and data processing.

In India ORT plays a vital role in preserving Jewish continuity and tradition through its network of schools in Bombay for the Indian Jewish community.

In Morocco ORT training in fields such as electronics, mechanics and computer training provide viable futures for the young people of this ancient Jewish community.

ORT also operates schools and training centers in the United Kingdom, South Africa and Ireland.

ORT Department of International Cooperation

With a background of over a century in vocational/technical education and training, ORT shares its experience and expertise with the people of developing nations through its Department of International Cooperation. Technical assistance programs are provided, funded under contract to the U.S. government and other governmental and non-governmental agencies. The ORT technical assistance program, in operation since 1960, provides on-the-job training and formal skills development carrying ORT experts and expertise to countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe and the Pacific.

ORT Israel

ORT Israel's activities are carried out in cooperation with the government, local municipal authorities, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), industry and various public bodies. Some 70,000 students attend the 110 ORT Israel schools every year:

Junior High Schools for youngsters between the age 13-15.

Technological and Vocational High Schools, under the supervision of the Ministry of Education and Culture, offer over 50 subjects in addition to regular academic studies which enable students to matriculate.

Factory Schools offer courses of study in partnership with the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and the IDF industrial enterprises. These consist of classroom lectures, training in school workshops, and on-the-job experience in the plant on the school premises.

Apprenticeship Centers for working youth who attend school part-time.

Junior Colleges for students who continue their studies after high school for a period of 1-2 years thus qualifying as technicians or practical engineers.

A Teachers' Seminar on college level for training teaching staff in electronics and computers.

The ORT Institute for Training Adults

The Institute, a joint effort of ORT and the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, was established to provide short— and long-term solutions towards shaping Israel's labor force. The methods are based on innovative thinking, initiative and understanding the economy's needs.

The Institute trains and retrains thousands of students every year, throughout the country. Rapid technological development, the unstable economic situation, forecasts of unemployment, problems of the older generation close to retirement age, the need for professional retraining; all these factors call for immediate action as well as provision for the future. The activities are grouped in three sections:

The Institute for Combined Training on the basis of study programs prepared by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.

A unit for administration and language courses and preparation for matriculation.

The Technology Training Center — a joint venture of ORT, the Ministry of

Labor and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Education and Culture — offers preparatory and complimentary studies for students lacking the formal education required for various courses.

In addition to workshops and laboratories, ORT schools are furnished with facilities for extra-curricular studies, sports, social activities, music, drama circles, dancing, art courses, photography, chess playing, etc. The students are also active in the community.

ORT teaches skills that lead to jobs. It trains the minds and hands of those who will become the human building blocks of Israel's future. It helps people help themselves and it is the country's basic resource for the molding of skilled manpower.

The ORT Moshinsky Pedagogical Center

This center is the beacon for the ORT Israel educational staff, providing technical and pedagogical services for teaching and curriculum enrichment in the network's schools. The Moshinsky Center houses the following departments:

★ Research and development of teaching material;
★ Production of documentation used in school workshops and laboratories;
★ Teaching and learning systems such as graphic arts, audio-visual recording and filming, booklets, exercise kits, films, slides, tapes, video cassettes, transparencies, etc.;
★ A publishing house;
★ A central library for teachers.

Max A. Braude ORT International School

The Max A. Braude ORT International School, to be built in the development town of Carmiel in the Galilee, is a prime example of the ORT approach to both high technology training and Jewish education. Drawing high school and post high school students from throughout the Jewish world as well as from Israel, the school will concentrate on subjects such as computer science, computer aided design, robotics and chemistry — taught in Hebrew, English, French and Spanish.

Scheduled to open in 1988, with an enrollment of 300 students, the school is located in the center of Israel's new Region 2000 high technology area. The Carmiel municipality and other Israeli sources are providing land for the construction of the school and student dormitories. Worldwide ORT chapters are engaged in a major capital and endowment fund effort to promote international Jewry's part in the project.

High Technology and Jewish Values



Prof. Ephraim Katzir

President of World ORT

"As a scientist I believe it is worthwhile to look at the development of the modern society in which we live and in which ORT's students will continue to function. It's a new world and if one examines the changes human society undergoes in the course of its history, one can define three main stages: the pre-industrial agricultural society, the industrial society and the post-industrial society of today. The first stage — the agricultural — characterizes most of what are called developing countries; the second stage — the industrial society — is characterized by the developed countries; a number of the most advanced countries have attained the third — or post-industrial — stage. We, in Israel, I think, are on the verge of entering this period.

In the post-industrial era, the number of experts gradually increases. Engineers, technicians, physicians, teachers and administrators have a growing influence within society. The citizen wants to live in an affluent, progressive society. Therefore, health, education, communication and transportation services continue to develop. The economic changes involved in the transition from the agricultural era to the industrial and, thereafter, to the post-industrial era are usually linked to the profound changes in the citizen's concept of his society and state. He desires a good and interesting life.

The main new directions are micro-electronics, computer sciences, robotics and bio-technology. With them the concept of the society's structure changes and life will be much more interesting and enjoyable for many people. But they lead to something that is unavoidable — due to the quick changes, one will have to continue studying all his life and also learn new trades. One will have to know theory with great precision as well as understanding its practical application. When one discusses education, it is not only vocational training, but the way and the means to really educate, to introduce ethical and moral values as well. I came to realize that no society can survive without adhering to a moral and ethical code which guides the behavior of each individual in the society. And as a Jew, and a young scientist, I was proud of the values enshrined in my own moral heritage. Judaism champions the cause of universal peace and abhors all violence. It emphasizes the sanctity of human life and freedom and the kinship of the human race. The Jewish people are scattered all over the globe but they are held together by a common history and the sense of a common destiny. The thread of suffering that runs through the Jewish experience in every land and in every era has knitted the Jewish people together in a kind of universal sharing of responsibility and caring about one another. It is true that modern science and technology provide us with wonderful tools, but how to use these tools are deep moral and ethical problems, and here Jewish education and Jewish heritage might help a lot. We need both. We need the modern vocational training, these wonderful tools that man has developed in modern science and technology. But we must also be guided by deep moral values.

As a scientist and humanist, I have not given up hope that scientific and technological achievements will be used for the benefit of mankind and that the exercise of these great achievements will be guided by those great moral and ethical principles developed by the Jewish people."

Excerpts from the inauguration speech of Professor Ephraim Katzir, newly elected President of World ORT Union, and former President of Israel.



Science and Society

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

It is impossible to conceive of the growth of this nation without the Haifa Technion and its engineers. These technically trained personnel, deeply attached to the country, had a very large share in enabling a neglected and undeveloped area to build a modern infrastructure and modern industries and so absorb millions of people. It is often forgotten that the Technion was this country's very first institution of higher learning. What prescience they had in 1912 — those respected German-Jewish leaders in their Hilsverein when they set about establishing the school in the Turkish province of Palestine.

They were then reinforced by concerned and generous Jews in Russia and the United States, but the Technion must, I think, be seen as intrinsically one of the splendid achievements of the German-Jewish community that had reached such heights and was destined to survive for only another quarter of a century. The founders could hardly have envisaged the broadening of the curriculum to include such then unknown and now essential departments as Aeronautical Engineering, Nuclear Science and Bio-technology. The distance between the pre-World War I curriculum and that of the sixties, seventies and eighties is virtually the distance mankind has travelled into this dazzling, unprecedented age of high technology, space exploration, incredible communications and computerization.

It is good, very good, that the Technion with the help of its friends, keeps pace with the changes and advances. It is also, as far as Israel is concerned, absolutely essential. Without abundant natural resources we are particularly dependent upon the sophisticated technological capacity and imagination of well-trained scientific personnel.

Despite the economic problems the State has been grappling with in the last few years, it has become evident that the infrastructure laid during four decades and more can serve as the basis of a modern industrial society. As I invariably point out when discussing our economy, this is a country which can manufacture one of the best main battle tanks in the world; a country which has supplied some eight percent of the total world market in nuclear Cat Scanners, which has produced every third mamograph used in the United States; a country whose manufactured components are on U.S. spaceships; a country which is one of the three leaders in the world — the other two are the United States and Japan — in the use of solar energy; world leaders in the world of agricultural development and irrigation, particularly in arid zones, and in cloud seeding, a process which increases precipitation by some 25 percent. Such a country is surely capable of moving with the leaders of industry and of advancing towards a sophisticated technological future.

As I travel around the country, I see the agricultural and industrial results of the investment we have made in our vocational and higher education system including notably, the Technion. This has enabled us to make the strides we have made in the fields of bio-technology and genetic engineering; in the application of nuclear techniques to medical instrumentation; in the development of agricultural machinery based on our impressive experience; in many aspects of military sophistication where we have applied the lessons learned on the battlefield, with the inevitable spill-over into various technological fields in the civilian market.

To generalize thus is of course to pass over the many problems that even high technology and science-based industries must daily face. Theirs is a complicated, highly competitive world. But the will and capacity are there, and they must constantly be reinforced by the Technion as a source of advanced research and highly trained manpower. This is no small order for the Technion, but I have confidence in my new Alma Mater. I am certain that it will continue to play the centrally important historic role that has belonged to it for more than seven decades.

Yet as technology progresses it carries swift revolutionary changes, great social impact on our way of life and on the image of the human being in modern society. We are in the throes of powerful processes which change the realities of life and rapidly create new social and cultural molds, which will dramatically revolutionize the future and move us away from the realities we know today.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to keep pace with these rapid changes, and to develop new concepts which will meet the requirements of a society absorbed in overwhelming and continuing development. Many ideological concepts which spring from the social realities in 19th century Europe which had an enormous and decisive influence on the political and ideological structure in the world, are anachronistic today. Of course, the basic concepts of social justice, protection of the weak and commitment to the dignity of man, will persist, but the true challenge today is to seek ideas and ideals which will be sufficiently flexible and undogmatic to adapt to changing society.

One of the basic questions to be tackled is that affecting the place of the working man and the relationship between him and the new systems of automation — or in other words, between man and the machine. There is no doubt that the modern industrial revolution in which the machine replaces man, his skills and technical abilities, poses very serious questions. There is no point, obviously, in trying to swim against the current and to oppose this process which is an inexorable one. What society must find is answers to the dangers inherent in this process. For while modern technology brings with it great blessings for humanity, it is also liable to become a 'golem' which will turn on its creator. If modern society will not be deployed to give the social answers to the advance of man's condition, his welfare and his place in the new very confusing reality in the world, the technological revolution may well bring about a "future shock" which could give rise to catastrophic crisis in our societies.

The scientifically and technologically trained man is perhaps the most representative of our age: the man who knows that the world is not finished; that its frontiers are not exhausted; that there are new challenges in the air, in the sea, in the laboratory, and in the hearts and brains of men. Makers of modern miracles.

As President of this country I am only too aware of the paradoxes which characterize our society. On the one hand we have great institutions of learning — such as the Technion. On the other hand there is increased concern and soul-searching as to the place of the human being in society, i.e., dangerous polarization on religious issues; problems created by the existence of two peoples, each with a great historic and cultural background, living side-by-side in this country; the appearance of insidious philosophies, albeit on the extreme fringes. I believe it is essential to bridge the gap which at times exists between our great centers of learning and the problems besetting the ordinary man in the street who is confused as he faces the dangers inherent in the rapidly changing society brought about by the technological revolution. Jointly we must endeavor to confront and answer this challenge.

Whether we like it or not our society is bound to have to confront the problems these various issues pose, problems complicated by the effects of the technological revolution on our society. While we have achieved wonders of which we can be very proud in this young society of ours, we dare not be passive about the challenges facing us as a people and as a society. For despite our great achievements, and believe me as one who visits a different corner of this country every week, they are great, very great, one senses at times feelings of frustration about various aspects of our society. Our capacity for criticism as a people is most highly developed. It seems to me that the issues which I raised earlier and indeed the many issues which exercise the public-at-large, should arouse our academic world to greater social involvement. There is a feeling abroad that our students and our faculty tend to focus on matters which affect them, but not with the same vehemence on matters which affect our entire society of which they are an integral and important part, matters which affect their future too. The challenges facing our society are vital and critical. The faculty and students of our institutes of higher education have a most vital part to play. It is time for them to face up to these challenges. I feel that jointly we must endeavour to confront and answer them. Let this be our resolve.

Address by Mr. Chaim Herzog, President of Israel, on the occasion of receiving an honorary doctorate at the Haifa Technion.

The Churchil Auditorium on the Technion campus in Haifa

Amal Celebrates its 60th Anniversary

The Histadrut Labor Federation's Amal educational network marks its 60th anniversary in 1988. When Amal's management address the visiting teachers and trade union representatives in Israel for the festivities scheduled to commemorate this event, they will be able to portray the growth of an educational network which can genuinely be described as one of Israel's greatest achievements. Without the opportunities provided by Amal, a large proportion of the country's population — particularly the underprivileged — would be deprived of the means to embark on a rewarding career; and the country itself would lack the skilled manpower necessary for expanding its industrial base.

While the education and integration of all sectors of society is one of Amal's major aims, it can also proudly claim that 80 percent of the country's underprivileged youth — among them those who would have otherwise left high school without matriculation certificates — are now able to continue their education. Some 80 percent of Amal's $35 million annual budget is funded by the Ministries of Education and Labor, with the remaining 20 percent provided by the Histadrut.

Since 1928, when it established the Max-Pine Vocational Training School in Tel Aviv, Amal has grown to include 106 schools and vocational centers with over 40,000 students. There are four main categories of Amal schools:

★ comprehensive and vocational high schools where, apart from general academic subjects, students learn a trade such as electronics, electrical maintenance, mechanics, metalworking, carpentry, clerical work and sewing;

★ apprentice and industrial schools where youth study at least one day a week, spending the rest of the time in their regular occupations or receiving on-the-job training;

★ settlement (kibbutz or moshav) schools, where Amal is responsible for organizing technical studies;

★ vocational training centers for adults (a more recent development), where industrial workers are able to further their training in order to progress in their careers.

A Dual Role

First and foremost, Amal fulfills a dual — social and technological — role. As Uri Agami, chairman both of Amal and the Histadrut's Education Committee, explains: "This role is furthered by a combination of general and advanced technological education which provides our younger generation with an assured future. Our educational facilities are available in the country's smallest settlements as well as in its largest cities. At the same time, Amal does its utmost to teach its students the values of Israel's Labor movement, preparing the students to take on active roles in the life of the community."

Amal has begun recently to make its existing schools available for general adult education courses in the evening. This trend towards education for all, at every hour of the day, underlines Amal's and the Histadrut's determination to fulfill a social as well as a purely functional service role.

Another recent step in this direction has been the chairman's decision to establish a network of Amal community centers on its schools' premises to provide sports, cultural and other facilities. Needless to say, although many people who frequent the existing nine community centers certainly regard them purely as places for enjoying their leisure hours, the activities are planned to instill a sense of communal identity and responsibility.

Since 1983, Amal has succeeded in almost trebling the number of Israeli Arabs who receive a technical education. Four years ago, while 63 percent of the country's total (Jewish and Arab) population was receiving some kind of technical education, the corresponding figure for the Arab sector alone was just five percent.



As Uri Agami points out, this was largely because of a lack of understanding among Arab local councils, rather than deliberate discrimination. Members of these councils are often university graduates who prefer to encourage university studies alone, neglecting those young people who are more suited to a technical education and career. Today, 13 percent of young Israeli Arabs are studying for a technical qualification in the 14 Amal schools which have been established for the Arab sector.

Amal — 60th Anniversary — Table of Events

Dec. 13, 1987	— Special artistic performance ”Amal honors Jerusalem” at the Jerusalem Theater under the auspices of the mayor of Jerusalem, Mr. Teddy Kollek. Amal ensembles will perform their ”60th Anniversary Show” for the first time: dancing, acting, singing and orchestra. Award of scholarships to distinguished or needy students:
Dec. 29, 1987	— Amal School, Tiberias — northern region.
Dec. 30, 1987	— Max-Pine School, Tel Aviv — central region.
Jan. 4, 1988	— Lady-Davis School, Tel Aviv — Pinsk-Panai Scholarship Fund.
Jan. 12, 1988	— Amal Professional Training School, Beer Sheva — southern region.
Jan. 12, 1988	— Planting of a Keren Kayemet le Israel Forest in the Negev desert in honor of Amal’s 60th anniversary. — Gathering of active graduates together with planting project.
Feb. 16, 1988	— Amal athletics competition at the Hadar-Yoseph stadium, Tel Aviv.
March 1-31, 1988	— Technical Education Labor Councils and Municipal Committees will promote Amal’s concept and the advancement of its technological-scientific-humanistic education throughout the entire month. —Factories will open their gates for visitors: students, their parents, graduates and friends.
April 3-6, 1988 (Pesach holiday)	— ”Amal Art Week” in Safed with participation of Amal’s art students.
April 17, 1988	— (morning) Planting of a ”Friends of Amal Forest” in Mevasseret Zion outside JerusalemincooperationwithKeren Kayemet le Israel and with the participation of Keren Kayemet

le Israel chairman Mr. Moshe Rivlin and representatives of Amal Friends from abroad.

April 17, 1988 — (evening) Festive opening of ”Amal and Histadrut Friends Convention” at the exhibition center of the Tel Aviv fairground. Participants: Vice Prime Minister and Minister of Education and Culture Mr. Itzhak Navon, General Secretary of the Histadrut and Member of Knesset Mr. Israel Kessar, Chairman of the local municipalities and the mayor of Petach Tikva, Mr. Dov Tavori and the member of the Central Committee and Chairman of Amal schools Mr. Uri Agami. The second half of the evening consists of an entertainment program.

April 18, 1988 — (morning) Discussion on the following subjects: How to keep social values in a time of technological revolution. Perception and place of the industrial school in Israeli society. Different tours will present Amal schools to guests from abroad; these will be accompanied by special guides in order to explain the problems of the various study directions and will include meetings with teachers, administrative members and students.

April 18,1988 — (noon) Lunch at Gan-Oranim and lecture by Minister of Labor Mr. Moshe Katzav.

April 18, 1988 — (evening) A cocktail party for guests from abroad and Amal Friends in the presence of Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mr. Shimon Peres, the President of Amal Friends and Knesset Member Mr. Abba Eban and the Mayor of Tel Aviv Mr. Shlomo Lahat. During the cocktail party, special awards will be presented to contributors in Israel and abroad.

April 18, 1988 — (evening) An audio-visual musical ”The Story of Amal” will take place at the fairground in the presence of Mr. Chaim Herzog, President of the State of Israel and other V.I.P.’s and honored guests.

— ”Workers’ Day” of the Amal family will be integrated into these events and begin at 5.00 P.M. A special program for workers and their families will take place at the fairground, afterwards everybody will join the audio-visual musical evening.

May 1, 1988 — Final of ”Amalit” tournament, named after the late Yigal Alon — basketball, volleyball and mini-soccer.
— The Histadrut pays its respects to the State — Amal — 1st of May Parade.

May 5, 1988 (Lag-be-Omer) — Celebration of 50th anniversary of Amal Tiberias, ”Amalit” festival in Tiberias.

May 15, 1988 — Festivities 40 years Amal Ramla and gathering of graduates.

June 9, 1988 July 2, 1988 — Exhibition ”60 Years of Amal” at Histadrut building within the framework of ”Israel’s 40 Years of Achievements
Exhibition” in the courtyard of the fairground.

July 6, 1988 — Commencement of 1988 school year will be celebrated in every school within the framework of Amal’s 60th anniversary.

Christian Support for Israel

Jan Willem van der Hoeven

Spokesman, International Christian Embassy, Jerusalem

The International Christian Embassy, Jerusalem (ICEJ) is a worldwide movement of Christian support for the people of Israel. It was founded in 1980 — after the exodus of the last secular embassies out of Jerusalem, the capital of Israel — as a spontaneous expression of love, comfort and solidarity with the Jewish people.

The Embassy employs 25 people from several nations. It has co-ordinators for Soviet Jewry and social assistance to all kinds of needy institutions in the land. It organizes the yearly International Christian celebration during the Feast of Tabernacles.

ISRAEL
SHALL
LIVE

In August 1985 the International Christian Embassy, Jerusalem sponsored the first International Christian Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland. The Congress met for three days in Basel's historic Music Hall and Stadt Casino, site of the first Jewish Zionist Congress convened by Theodore Herzl over the same dates in 1897. The groundwork for the modern State of Israel was laid by Herzl and others during those early Zionist Congresses.

Biblical Basis

Eighty-eight years later the 1985 Christian Zionist Congress was also an attempt to lay groundwork — this time among Christians. The object of the Congress was to examine both the biblical basis and the historic roots of Christian attitudes toward Israel and the Jewish people and to harmonize Christian support and care for this people and Land.

Herzl Used It

Care, after all, is a large part of the work of the Christian Embassy; care and comfort for the Jewish people while we affirm the Word of God concerning His eternal covenant with them and their return to Zion. This is the essence of Christian Zionism.

Christian Zionism is the term which comes to mind most naturally when seeking to describe specifically Christian support of Israel. It was used even by Herzl and other Jewish Zionist founders at the turn of the century. Since then it has been popularized and thus predictably misused and misunderstood.

It does not intend to be divisive or to indicate a new Christian sect, nor does it mean wholesale adoption of Jewish Zionist goals. It is not exclusive of Christian concern and action for Arab rights in the Land, nor does it promote the civil rights of any one man over another. Christian Zionism does, however, support the right of the Jewish people to a regathered national existence which is believed to be at least a partial fulfillment of God's promises to them recorded in the Bible.

Common Ground

This biblically-based concern was the common ground on which so many diverse kinds of Christians (over 600 from twenty-seven countries) were able to come together at Basel. Catholic, Protestant, Evangelical and Charismatic believers met for three days to consider the important issues raised by their shared love for Israel.

Topics ranged in perspective from biblical to political, from historical to the contemporary and practical. Dr. Bernard Resnikoff, Director of the American Jewish Committee's office in Jerusalem, addressed the Congress on the Value of Jewish-Christian Relations. He perceived the Congress to be "an historic milestone...a ninety-degree turn in the stormy history of Jewish-Christian relations.” No single Congress could, of course, hope to exhaust the wide ramifications of Christian support of Israel. But the Basel Congress was a significant beginning.

The ICEJ is planning, in honor of Israel’s 40th Anniversary, a second such congress for April 1988 in Jerusalem.

The Embassy is one of the most interviewed Christian institutions in Israel and through its spokesmen, both within Israel and without, is able to reach millions of people especially Christians with the message of the need to stand by Israel in the light of all that God has promised in His Word.

The Embassy basing itself upon that Word firmly believes that God according to His foretold promise has brought the Jewish people after all their suffering back into the land of their forefathers which He promised them as an everlasting possession.

Through its Newsletter, articles worldwide, speaking tours, continuous television, radio and press coverage, the Embassy has the opportunity to do what is written — ”Publish ye abroad that He that scattered Israel will gather him and keep him as a shepherd does his flock.” (*Jer.* 31:10) It is this that the International Christian Embassy has been able to do from its inception to proclaim to far and wide God’s unfailing plan and love for His people, Israel.

Thus the Embassy has become an international focus point for Christians from many different nations and churches, nations that in themselves may not have diplomatic relations with the State of Israel. But the Christians that love the God of Israel and the people of Israel, like the gentile believer Ruth of old, have an Embassy in this city to stand by Israel and love her even in obedience to God’s Words: ”Comfort ye, Comfort ye, My people says the Lord.” (*Isaiah 40*).

Israel's Leaders Comment on the ICEJ

"You have given life and relevance to Zechariah's prophecy that in time to come the nations shall come up from year to year to keep the Feast of Tabernacles in Jerusalem. I cannot conclude without adding my appreciation for the Zionist Resolutions of your Basel Congress. Thank you all for coming."

President Chaim Herzog



"Your decision to establish your Embassy in Jerusalem at a time when we were being abandoned because of our faith was an act of courage and a symbol of the closeness between us. Your gestures and acts gave us the feeling that we were not alone."

(Former) Prime Minister Menachem Begin



"We thank you all for being here, for coming here faithfully every year. Your faith gives us strength. We know that you are many but we know that you are representing many, many more."

Mayor Teddy Kollek



"Your presence has not only caused us to remember. It has caused us to be comforted."

(Former) President Yitzhak Navon



"The Christian Embassy in Jerusalem and your pilgrimage to this city carry a message which cannot be overlooked or discounted by governments and statesmen in all five continents. It is a message of truth, a message of conscience, a message of plurality, of decency, and of human brotherhood."

Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir

"Your sympathy, solidarity and belief in the future of Israel — this to us is tremendous. We consider you part of the fulfillment of the prophetic vision expressed by Zechariah in Chapter 14. Your presence here will always remain a golden page in the book of eternity in heaven. May the Lord bless you out of Zion."

(Former) Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren

"It is a moving experience for me to see you among us — thousands of inspired pilgrims from five continents and forty countries. There is no more fitting place for such an assembly than Jerusalem. Since we reunited the city in 1967, we have been firm in our resolve to allow all followers of the faith of Mohammed, the faith of Jesus and the faith of Moses to worship without restriction and in safety."

Prime Minister Shimon Peres

Will There Be Enough Jews for all of Judea and Samaria?

Jan Willem van der Hoeven

Spokesman, International Christian Embassy Jerusalem

True faith opens the eyes to see possibilities for which others are blind!

It is not without reason that Israel's prophets were also called "seers" as they, through their faith in God and in His Words, foresaw what good and bad would happen to His people Israel. They foretold that Israel, because of its sin, would be scattered all over the earth but also that they would in the end be gathered back in their land from all the countries where they had been scattered. It is for this reason so many Christian Zionists all over the world have stood by Israel from the very beginning of the Jewish Zionist Movement. Much more than some of the early and present Jewish Zionists themselves, they see in the miraculous restoration of the State of Israel nothing short of a fulfillment of the words of God's own prophets made centuries before.

Some of these Christian believers were in the foreground of support for Zionism from its earliest stages. In Finland there is an Association called "Christian Friends of Israel" that was founded in 1910 even before the State of Israel was formed. Rev. William Hechler who introduced Theodore Herzl to some of the top European statesmen became his faithful friend and supporter; and Captain Orde Wingate who helped train the Haganah in its beginning stages are some examples of this.

Today this Christian Zionist Movement has spread all over the world in different countries and different churches. It stands by Israel not so much from a political-based Zionism as a Biblical-based Zionism. That is not to say that this movement is apolitical; it will often express itself more forcefully on different issues than some of the Jews and Israelis themselves.

One such point is Judea and Samaria. The Bible clearly states God's promise to Abraham, "And I will give unto you and to your seed after you the land wherein you are a stranger — all the land of Canaan — for an everlasting possession!"

Many Christians believe these words with implicit faith and to make fun of them as if because of their faith they are not realistic is cheap and easy.

Daoud Kuttab wrote in an open letter to Shultz published in the Jerusalem Post on October 18, 1987, "Israel cannot rule 1.4 million Palestinians against their will. It has to share either the land or the rights; it cannot have both." A similar point was made by Gad Ya'akobi in a previously published article: either Israel recedes land — remaining essentially a Jewish State — or retains Judea and Samaria, chancing the loss of her distinctive character, forfeiting her democratic character and becoming a racist state.

Is this true? The arguments sound very plausible but on closer inspection are not so self-evident at all.

Many Arabs would leave Israel themselves selling their land or property for a handsome price if the Israelis would have dared to believe in the words of the Almighty.

With the potential influx of the 400,000 Jews from the Soviet Union who have requested exit visas to immigrate to Israel as well as Jews immigrating from other lands, there may not necessarily be a risk of Israel losing its distinctive Jewish character, even if it keeps Judea and Samaria.

The Bible tells clearly that the Israelites were supposed to treat the stranger that peacefully dwelt within their midst with care and respect. Therefore, there is no excuse for unjust behavior towards any of the inhabitants of the land be they Arab Muslims, Christians or Druse. Every non-Jewish resident that desires to live in Israel should be given equal rights but have the same obligations as an Israeli Jew, including some type of national service.

If abortion as an unholy gentile practice would be abolished in Israel's society it would, in some cases, result in a more equal population growth between Jewish and Arab families. If not aborted, hundreds of thousands more Israeli Jews would be alive today!

The dividing of the land suggested as the other solution to the Middle East conflict isn't a solution. Simply, because the PLO, whatever wishful thinking exists, is still the sole and legal representative of the Palestinian Arabs whose declared purpose is not the West Bank but the whole land of Israel. And no Israeli Jew would agree to the dismantling of the Jewish State!

One of the most important things for all Israelis and friends of Israel is to use their influence with the help of God to urge their people to make Aliyah.

This will be the most important answer to all squabbling about the future of Judea and Samaria. If only the Israeli emigrants would come back there would be an increase in population of around 400,000. This matter should be a top priority for every Israeli who loves his people. It is fully in accord with God's own repeated promises, "Behold, I will gather them out of all countries where I have driven them in mine anger, and in my fury, and in great wrath, and I will bring them again unto this place and I will cause them to dwell safely and they shall be my people and I shall be their God."

"Yea, I will rejoice over them to do them good and I will plant them in this land assuredly with my whole heart and with my whole soul." (*Jeremiah* 32:37, 38, 41)

The greatest Mitzvah for a Jew is to make Aliyah. This was also the first thing God asked of Abraham: "Get you up out of your country."

May all Jews living abroad realize that in the end their future is linked to living in this land rather than in the Diaspora.

With this divinely promised massive Aliyah there will be no demographic question whether Israel will remain essentially a Jewish State by keeping Judea and Samaria. Rather the opposite will be true. Unless Israel's leaders have this faith and foresight there may well not be enough land for the Jews to return to when the time comes for this greatest of all Aliyah as Isaiah prophesies: "Lift up your eyes round about and see they all gather, they come to you. Surely your waste and your desolate places and your devastated land, surely now you will be too narrow for your inhabitants. The children born in the time of your bereavement will yet say in your ears, the place is too narrow for me, make room for me to dwell in." (*Isaiah* 49:18-20)

Middle East Survey: Anti-Semitism or Anti-Zionism. Is There a Difference?

Jan Willem van der Hoeven

Most people realize that since the Holocaust one cannot easily be an anti-Semite but maybe one can still be a respectable anti-Zionist. Even national leaders, in an official U.N. vote of condemnation, equated Zionism with the agent of Jewish massacres, racism.

But is there such a real difference between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism? Zionism was born in the heart of its founder, Dr. Theodore Herzl, as a direct result of and response to blatant French anti-Semitism in the case of the Jewish Captain Dreyfus. The return to Zion, to Eretz Israel, was the answer of the Jewish Zionists to the horror of anti-Semitism. Whatever convenient separation people want to make, the close historical link between anti-Semitism and the Zionist movement cannot be denied.

Although Arabs are Semites, in their campaign of hatred against the Jewish "intruders" they have often shown the same characteristics as some of the worst anti-Semites in history. It seems that their hatred against the Jews goes much deeper than the dispute about Palestine. As years went by this became more the excuse than the reason for their deep-seated hatred of the Jewish people.

This has been documented by many books: *The Dhimmi* by the Egyptian-born Jewess, Bat Ye'or; *From Time Immemorial* by Joan Peters; and work by Professor Moshe Sharon, Dr. Ron Nettler, etc. all reveal this underlying trend that at times was openly expressed by Arab leaders, who stated their admiration for Hitler.

The Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin al-Husseini, a Palestinian leader, stood beside Hitler in Berlin in 1944 and said on German radio: "Arabs, kill the Jews wherever you find them. This pleases Allah, history and religion." He gloated over what he saw when Adolf Eichmann showed him the mass extinction of the Jewish people taking place in Auschwitz.

Even the late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, when it was rumored in the 1950s that Hitler was still alive, wrote a letter of congratulation to him.

Hitler's *Mein Kampf* has been required reading in the military academy in Cairo and the notorious forgery *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion,* that Hitler used so successfully in stirring his people against the Jews, is given to visiting dignitaries to Saudi Arabia.

Probably many will know that the more radical Arab leaders agree with the aim of President Assad of Syria, "to drive the Jews into the sea for good." What is probably not known is that some of the statements made by the Western media-called "moderate" Arab leaders show how close they are, basically, to these aims.

Listen to the words of King Hussein, "The removal of the Israeli occupation from our land, Palestine, is the first and basic condition for just peace. The Islamic nation and just believers in any religion or creed will not accept the situation of the land of the prophet's flight to heaven, the cradle of prophets and divine messages being captive of Zionist occupation."

In 1954 Kind Saud ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia said "Israel to the Arab world is like a cancer to the human body and the only way of remedy is to uproot it."

Yasir Arafat in 1983: "The war of attrition against the Zionist enemy will never cease...It is in my interest to have a war in the region because I believe that the only remedy for the ills of the Arab nation is a true war against the Zionist enemy."

In a speech in Geneva before the United Nations "Commission on Human Rights" David Littman has shown that even the Soviet Union often follows this line of the enemies of Israel. He said:

"*The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion,* a vile racist tract, was one of the pillars of Hitler's demonic hate propaganda. It was forged by a Russian priest in 1903 and circulated by the Tsarist secret police. After the Second World War, it resurfaced in various places and is today actively propagated by many totalitarian regimes."

In response to this campaign against the Zionists we see in the still-free world the same variations of anti-Semitism as were seen in the reactions of the nations and politicians towards Hitler's campaign of extermination: reactions of indifference and political expediency or at times even hidden or open support.

Is There a Way Out?

Much of what has been written here makes gloomy reading. Is there no solution? What can men of goodwill do to facilitate a solution and advance the cause of peace in the Middle East?

That is one of the most essential quests facing anyone who is truly interested in the peace and well-being of the people of the Middle East. Wherever Arabs express, in hidden or open ways, this Hitler-like intention of the ultimate destruction of Israel they should find themselves against political leaders, media people and educators who will let them know, in no uncertain terms, that they refuse to condemn such attitudes among their ranks.

If this message was clearly and forcefully sounded to all warmongering influences in the Middle East it could bring peace in this region an enormous step nearer. But alas, where are there such men of courage and integrity among Western leaders!

How applicable are the words of Psalm 129:5, "Let them all be confounded and turned back that hate Zion."

But what can we Christians do?

We cannot prevent anti-Zionists from hating Israel but may we, as children of the God of Israel, love her as much as she is hated by her enemies — not in words, but in deeds and in truth. It is for this that the Embassy was raised up, to form Christians worldwide into a ring of love and a wall of heartfelt prayer around the people of Israel. Then God can thwart the purposes of the evil one and establish the Jews in their land and in their city, Jerusalem, thus fulfilling His promise to them: The sons of them that afflicted you shall come bending unto you; and they shall call you The City of the Lord, The Zion of the Holy One of Israel. Whereas you were forsaken and hated... I will make you an eternal excellency, a joy of many generations." (*Isaiah 60:14, 15*)

May we all be faithful to this call.

Particularization Not Ghettoization



Dr. David Hartman

Director of the Shalom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem

Many have argued that the instinct for survival found in Judaism and the Jewish people is a reaction to extreme hostility and persecution. There is nothing that cements a group as much as external enemies. Nonetheless, the thesis that persecution created the stubborn refusal of the Jewish people to assimilate reflects a basic misunderstanding of the internal value system and way of life of Judaism.

If a traditionalist Christian theologian or a historian like Toynbee starts from the presupposition that Israel has ceased to be a vital spiritual people in history, then naturally the explanation for the survival of Judaism can be found not within the Jewish community, but rather only in the external pressures upon it. Were that true, the best way to destroy the Jews as a people would be to love them. Some cynics have suggested that if the Arabs ceased forcing war upon us and instead built bridges of peace, then eventually Israel would disappear through assimilation.

Implicit in this approach is the assumption that minority groups, but above all the Jewish people, survive through rejection and hostility. It supposes that the desire to be identified with the majority culture is an unalterable law of civilization.

We are all familiar with the ghetto mentality as a means of Jewish survival. I use the term "ghetto mentality" not in a pejorative sense, but rather as a description of an attitude towards cultures different from one's own. Appreciating cultures different from one's own would be a threat to the viability of a ghetto culture. A ghetto mind can function economically within a different larger culture, but it refuses to admit that the larger culture embodies any serious spiritual and ethical values. From that culture, it picks out exclusively that which confirms the superiority of the ghetto. One can live in Times Square with a ghetto mentality. The ghetto is not defined by physical boundaries, but by perceptions, by the way one appreciates and evaluates the world.

A serious argument among Jewish thinkers today concerns the question: can Judaism and the Jewish people solve the problem of the breakdown of the ghetto? Can we really maintain our minority status with dignity while at the same time appreciating the living in close contact with cultures which have attractive features, yet are at variance with our own particular tradition?

For the majority of Jews, however, the ghetto mentality is not any more a living option. I believe that it cannot be a method of Jewish survival in the modern world, since it will lead to the majority of Jews losing respect for Judaism. If Jews, in order to say "Yes" to their own tradition, must be closed to whatever is different from themselves, many of them will feel forced into an unbearable situation. The majority of Jews have tasted the fruits of world culture. To ask them to deny its validity for the sake of Jewish survival is to build a people on the forces of guilt and not love. A ghetto community is prone to arrogance and dogmatism. An identity built upon repression and fear leads to bitterness and guilt. This is true of an individual as well as a people.

Israel offers the Jewish people a new concept of Jewish survival in modern history which does not demand a return to the ghetto as a mental and spiritual attitude. Israel, although it is a reality which concentrates and localizes the Jewish people in one geographical area, is the very antithesis of the ghetto. Israel expresses the belief that the Jewish people can participate in the world, can establish economic, political and social dialogues with the world, without at the same time abandoning its concern with perpetuating the particular quality of Jewish spiritual culture.

There is no doubt that Israel can become like all the other nations of the world. We often hear people remark that Tel Aviv reminds them of cities in Europe or that Haifa has the quality of San Francisco. There is no doubt that many Israelis are more involved with the television drama of 'Dallas' than with the drama of Jewish history. That is the admitted risk posed by the openness of Israel to the world. But the essential meaning of our return was not merely to provide a physical center for Jewish survival, but also to build a society which is capable of producing its own cultural heroes who can live in dialogue with the best of western and eastern civilizations.

Israel offers us the opportunity to build our own unique culture without cutting ourselves off from the world. Israel challenges the Jewish people to integrate the best of human culture within its own particular framework. We of the Institute believe that the Jewish people can be open to the world without being overwhelmed by it, if we bring to the world the weight and dignity of our own historical roots. To assimilate to the majority is to make a choice which is often not rooted in reflection and freedom. The majority offers the ability to live through unthinking habit. For a minority group to survive, there must be conviction and freedom of choice.

Israel challenges us to build an identity that accepts philosophical awareness and a critical appreciation of outside cultures, while at the same time maintaining loyalty to our own history and culture. Israel inspires us to build an identity founded upon love and understanding and not upon fear of a hostile world.

The new challenges of Israel motivate the research scholars of our Institute to uncover and shed new light on the intellectual roots within our heritage which show how Judaic particularity can flourish within the heart of a people that affirms the dignity of all men. We are far from fully explicating a *Guide of the Perplexed* for our generation. The intellectual task is enormous. The strength to explore new approaches to the classic Judaic heritage grows from our commitment to the eternal significance of the Sinai covenant, which we believe was meant to be lived in a total Judaic society that combines the dignity of particularity with openness and respect for all of human life and culture.

The Balfour Declaration Paves the Way

Mr. Chaim Herzog
President of Israel

Who, seventy years ago, would have dreamt that 70 years hence we would be celebrating in the building housing the parliament of an independent Israel 40 years old, of an Israel which had achieved a peace treaty with the leading Arab country — Egypt, of an Israel rapidly becoming a major center of learning and science in the Jewish world, of an Israel which has become the focus of the Jewish people throughout the world.

Balfour was not an isolated phenomenon who happened on the scene. I doubt if a Balfour could have emerged in other countries. He was the product of British culture over the centuries, based as it was, in literature, in thought, in philosophy and in ideas from the Bible, its history and its message. This affinity produced great literature, great speeches which have survived through the ages, and great ideas. One of them was the Balfour Declaration.

Nobody has given better expression to what motivated Balfour than he himself in his maiden speech to the House of Lords in June 1922 when he said, *inter alia:* "I hold that from a purely material point of view, the policy that we initiated is likely to prove successful. But we have never pretended — certainly I have never pretended — that it was purely from these materialistic considerations that the Declaration of November, 1917 originally sprung. I regard this not as a solution, but as a partial solution of the great and abiding Jewish problems."

There is no parallel to it, there is nothing approaching a parallel to it in any other branch of human history. Here you have a small race, originally inhabiting a small country, I think about the size of Wales or Belgium, at any rate, of a comparable size to those two, at no time in its history wielding anything that can be described as material power, sometimes crushed between great Oriental monarchies, its inhabitants deported, then scattered, then driven out of the country altogether into every part of the world, and yet maintaining continuity of religion and racial tradition of which we have no parallel elsewhere. That in itself is sufficiently remarkable, but consider, it is not a pleasant consideration but it is one that we cannot forget, how they have been treated during long centuries which in some parts of the world extend to the hour and the minute in which I am speaking. Consider how they have been subjected to tyranny and persecution, consider whether the whole culture of Europe, our whole religious organization of Europe has not from time to time proved itself guilty of great crimes against this race.

Our policy may fail. I do not deny that this is an adventure. Are we never to have adventures? Are we never to try new experiments? I hope that your lordships will never sink to that unimaginative depth, and that experiment and adventure will be justified if there is any case or cause for this justification. Surely it is so that we may send a message to every land where the Jewish race has been scattered, a message that will tell them that Christendom is not oblivious of their faith, is not unmindful of the service they have rendered to the great religions of the world, and most of all, to the religion that the majority of your lordships' House profess, and that we desire, to the best of our ability, to give them that opportunity of developing, in peace and quietness under British rule, those great gifts which hitherto they have been compelled to bring to fruition in countries that know not their language and belong not to their race. That is the ideal which I desire to see accomplished; that is the aim which lay at the root of the policy I am trying to defend; and though it be defensible indeed on every ground, that is the ground which chiefly moves me."

Those were the words of one steeped in the traditions which made Britain great. They were the words of one who saw the State of Israel in his mind's eye and indeed at a meeting of members of the Cabinet with Dr. Weizmann, one month after the speech, we find that "L.G. and A.J.B. both said that by the Declaration they always meant an eventual Jewish State."

Our meeting here recalls the historic Balfour Declaration which gave hope to the Jewish people and to the Zionist leadership that a dream of some two thousand years might come true. Britain was for so many years the center of political Zionist effort throughout the world. It was the country which was the home of the immortal Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the first President of the State of Israel. It was led by those great friends of Israel, whose names are indelibly imprinted in the history of our national liberation struggle — Balfour and Lloyd George, Churchill and Amery, Cazalet and Wedgewood, Wingate and C.P. Scott. From the Anglo-Jewish community such names as Moses Montefiore, Rothschild, Samuel, Sieff, Sacher, Marks, Brodetsky emerged in the struggle for the Zionist ideal. This gathering must evoke so many memories of the grandeur and greatness of one of the great communities of world Jewry. This building which hosts us is surely a symbol of the vindication of those years of struggle and sacrifice — the symbol of an age-long dream come true.

In the struggle for our independence much bitterness and hostility marked our relationship with the British Mandatory power, but even the heat of struggle did not erase the deepest innate respect for the principles and values of British civilization. Indeed, many of the very positive aspects of our society owe so much to the British example and standards which influenced many of the institutions in our new State: our magnificent judicial system of which we are so justly proud; our parliamentary democracy; our military tradition, all owe much to the British example.

Many new countries which achieved independence since World War II were nurtured on Balfour principles and tradition. Few retained or respected them. Israel is one of this few. In the wave of nationalism that swept so many countries, every vestige of former British association was eradicated. Not so in Israel, which knew how to draw a dividing line between the political differences which divided our two countries, on the one hand, and the respect and appreciation for the good that Britain did, on the other. How many countries who achieved their independence within the Empire either by struggle or otherwise, abound in streets called after King George V or Balfour or Wingate, or forests named in honor of the kings and queens who reigned in England since the Balfour Declaration, including Her Majesty the Queen?

Over the years as the bitterness of our struggle has receded into history, cooperation has developed for the trade, tourism and other endeavors here for the benefit of both countries. Indeed, our mutual annual trade has grown to over one-billion dollars, in both directions. Britain is, indeed, today one of Israel's major markets and British tourism to Israel, the second largest from Europe.

When one recalls historically the Second Temple and the Second Commonwealth, the name of Cyrus — which has been revered by Jews throughout the centuries — comes to mind. "My servant Cyrus," the prophet says in the name of God. Arthur James Balfour, Scottish earl, British statesman, and eminent philosopher, might well have been embarrassed to be called the servant of the Lord, but in the consciousness of the Jewish people in World War I he emerged virtually as a second Cyrus.

The Third Commonwealth could hardly have been established forty years ago without the legal foundation provided in the first place by the Balfour Declaration. Indeed, the masses of Jews in Russia, America, and everywhere else saw it as an almost messianic phenomenon. Few governmental pronouncements have been greeted so ecstatically.

As matters turned out, the post-Declaration mandatory period in Jewish and Palestinian history was far from a gloriously messianic time. Sad and perplexing, sometimes tragic memories of misunderstandings and conflict cloud the history of the British Mandate in Palestine. Yet practical progress was made in modernizing the country's infrastructure, and despite the limitations imposed, Zionism made gigantic steps forward. The Jewish national home in-the-making absorbed many tens of thousands of immigrants and developed the agricultural and industrial, social and cultural institutions and forms which were later to be incorporated in the State of Israel. Certainly the positive legacy of British Mandatory rule must not be forgotten.

The international legal implications of the Balfour Declaration are by far its most significant aspect. In the statement that the British government "view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", we have the first recognition in modern history of the existence of the Jewish people. The Declaration was adopted by the principal Allied Powers, and finally by the Palestine Mandate entrusted by the League of Nations to Great Britain. It will be recalled that the Preamble to the Mandate quoted the Balfour Declaration and notes that "recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country."

It is of course notable that the Balfour Declaration omits any reference to political rights for the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine: "Nothing shall be done," it says, "which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The deliberate wording was to be expected after the long and careful discussions held by the War Cabinet. It is noteworthy that it emphasized in issuing that unusual declaration of "sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations," aspirations previously unknown to many members of the Government and most of the public.

If the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate gave Zionism — up to a point — opportunities it could not otherwise have had, the Jewish community in Palestine was to give Britain and its allies their only really reliable foothold in the Middle East during World War II.

We tend to forget that one of the most distressing — and almost grotesque — chapters of this remarkable historic saga concerns the violent opposition of a small number of British Jews to the Balfour Declaration. The situation was summed up sharply by Weizmann himself in a letter dated October 16, 1917 to Gaston Wormser who worked with Baron Edmond de Rothschild in Paris:

"Today we have telegraphed you a summary of the position. Here and now I shall outline the facts to you in their chronological order. First the Minister for Foreign Affairs received Lord Rothschild and myself about two months ago and has asked us to present him with the text of a Declaration which H.M. Government should give to the Zionists. We have presented the text and I enclose a copy of it. This text has been approved both by the Foreign Office and by the Prime Minister and it was telegraphed to America and has been approved also by President Wilson, but the matter had to come up for discussion before the War Cabinet. In the meantime our opponents used every means in their power to prevent the granting of this Declaration. They have published a series of anti-Zionist pamphlets which have been broadcast; they have tried to influence members of the Cabinet; they have made statements tending towards compromising the Zionist movement in the eyes of the government; in short they did not stop for anything in order to defeat us. Naturally they are in a very advantageous position as one of the members of the government, namely Mr. Montague, has been able to conduct this campaign very effectively..."

"The enclosed text has been presented to the War Cabinet about three weeks ago at a meeting when neither the Prime Minister or Mr. Balfour were present. The decision was therefore adjourned. The second meeting of the War Cabinet dealt with this question on October 4th. Again, Mr. Montague violently opposed us and the Cabinet suggested to invite me to the meeting so as to lay the Zionist view before them. I was too late to appear before the meeting on October 4th but no doubt I shall be asked to come before the Cabinet next week. In the meantime, the government has revised the text and has suggested a formula as indicated in our telegram. The formula has been submitted to Lord Rothschild, Mr. Herbert Samuel, the Chief Rabbi — Dr. Hertz, Mr. Sokolow and myself; also to Sir Stuart Samuel, Chairman of the Board of Deputies, Sir Philip Magnus, Claude Montefiore and Leonard Cohen. The first five members will be of course favorable, Sir Stuart's reply may be neutral and the rest will be deadly opposed; so here you have the history of the whole case. I hope we shall win the day and it will be a great victory; indeed it is inconceivable that it should be otherwise but I think you can help us greatly by sending us a private message from Baron Edmond, a message of encouragement and hope. I assure you it will carry the greatest possible weight and I implore you to use your best endeavor to help us. It is a critical moment and a decisive one, the government is anxious to do something for us and would like its hands strengthened by the Jews in view of the opposition coming from a part of the Jewish community."

The Zionists did win their battle at the last moment. Lloyd George's reaction to the internecine Jewish struggle was most meaningful. He had to decide between two groups of Jews, but "yours," he said to Dr. Weizmann, "stands for a great cause."

Montague was never reconciled to the Declaration. One of Montague's allies was Claude Montefiore. At this point, homage must be paid to Sir Herbert Samuel, actually a close relative of Montague's who had himself adopted the Zionist solution and spoken of it to other members of the Cabinet even before Weizmann began to present his case. So, too, a large part of the Rothschild family allied themselves with Weizmann.

Those "other" Jews whose Zionist fervor so impressed Balfour and Lloyd George were the masses of British Jewry in the cities and countryside. They too, were weighed in the balance and contributed to the success of the struggle for British support of the Zionist endeavor.

And in the coming to Israel from Russia these days of dedicated refuseniks we have a partial reversal — very partial but very moving — of the great loss the Jewish people suffered precisely at the time the Balfour Declaration opened the way to Palestine. Russian Jews — those who in their hundreds of thousands were ready and eager to settle in Palestine — were cut off from the Jewish world by the Bolshevik Revolution. It was a loss that affected our fate here sadly and seriously.

The ways of history are strange and unpredictable. The Declaration and the changes in Britain's relationship to Zionism are certainly examples of history's complexity. But drawing up a balance sheet here now, we will surely see the overwhelming positive significance for our people's life of the Balfour Declaration.

The story of the Balfour Declaration is a fascinating one indeed. It reflects the great historic upheaval created by World War I, the relentless drive and devotion of the leaders of the Zionist Movement and Anglo Jewry who followed in Herzl's footsteps and those of Dr. Weizmann.

The Balfour Declaration paved the way. Historians in centuries to come will debate to what degree the Jewish people took advantage of a one-time historic opportunity open to them for the first-time in 2,000 years. Not all the dreams and expectations of those who succeeded in 1917 were realized. As to relations with the British government, anguish and sorrow, frustration and disappointment, achievements and gains were to mark the coming years. It is now all part of history. "If" is a big word and it must be applied to many of the subsequent developments in Palestine following the Balfour Declaration. But the memories of hostility, of bloodshed, of adversity, of seeming hopelessness, of achievements — of all that occurred in Palestine and Israel over the years must remain blurred today until they are clarified by the sharp perspective of history. But, against the background of the Balfour Declaration and all that preceded it and followed it, as the President of a sovereign State of Israel recalls the great events in the main hall of the Knesset, there comes to mind the unforgettable words of Theodor Herzl — "If you will it, it is no fable." These words are as applicable today as they were when they were first uttered.

Address by Mr.Chaim Herzog, the President of Israel, on the 70th Anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the Knesset, 28 October 1987.

Israel: Reconciling the Opposing Dreams

David Hartman

Robert Nozick observed that the essence of extremism is the sense of the delegitimization of the "other." This notion may indeed be a clue to a perception of Jewish self-understanding. Insofar as Jews are concerned, the regard of the "other" as a threat, or as of no value, is a result not only of 20th-century emotional stress, but is deeply rooted in the notion of the election of Israel, which has been a guiding motif in Jewish self-understanding.

Initially, we of the generation in which the Jewish state came into being thought that the trauma of suffering — the Holocaust most immediately and tragically — the trauma of Jewish exile and alienation, indeed the profound sense of Jewish loneliness that has permeated Jewish consciousness, would be a sufficient basis for the cementing of a society into a unity, a common polis, in the reborn State of Israel. By awakening Jewish visibility and mitigating those features that constituted a threat to the Jewish community in a hostile world, the establishment of the Jewish state would serve as a central focus of Jewish existence.

Israel, I think, has succeeded in that regard. It has been a catalyst for Jewish visibility and Jewish self-assertion. It has afforded an opportunity for Jews all over the world to express a sense of defiance against anti-Semitism. It has made us into a community of action. Because of Israel, there is now a certain maturity in our lives as Jews, and what is happening now in Israel is a kind of liberation. We are now free to talk about our own internal life and the divisions taking place among us, which we weren't free to do before. We now have the luxury of expressing our anxiety and of coming to terms with our differing perceptions of what we mean by a Jewish people, by Zionist, as well as the different perceptions of what our presence in Israel signifies.

However, there is more. The Zionist revolution that we have witnessed was not only intended to solve the problem of anti-Semitism, but to invite the whole Jewish world to come live in one house. Indeed, that is the true meaning of *kibbutz galuyot* — the ingathering of exiles — not just physical survival to solve the problem of alienation and suffering, but calling the divided Jewish people — living in the postmodern age in which the consensus of the understanding of Jewish existence has been broken — to come home, as it were. In other words, what the reality of Israel has done is to force Jews to confront the profound disagreements that go on in Jewish life, in a way that cannot be done in the American Diaspora, where there is the umbrella of pluralism. In Israel, where Jews are a majority, they cannot hide behind the status quo.

In one important view, therefore, contemporary Israel is to be regarded as a continuation of the biblical understanding of Israel, as an invasion into the world against the world's will. This is the notion of election: a people who posit themselves in opposition to the world. The notion runs deep in the biblical tradition — the acceptance of Abel's sacrifice over Cain's; the rejection of Ishmael in favor of Isaac; the giving of the blessing to Jacob over Esau. Israel is born in the defeat of Pharaoh, and the entry into the Land is achieved in opposition to the seven nations — the Hittites, the Amonites, et al. — whose altars, as commanded in Deuteronomy, are to be torn down, whose pillars are to be smashed and sacred posts cut down, whose images are to be consigned to fire, "for you are a people consecrated to the Lord your God," chosen, of all the peoples on earth, to be His treasured people. The very entrance into the Land necessitated battle; and to be a holy people is to be a separate people, whose identity is nurtured by the awareness of living in opposition to the environment.

This thread also runs through the talmudic tradition, which, in effect, teaches that for the committed Jew there is nothing of value "out there" and that life is to be conducted only within the four cubits of the Halacha, within a totality of engagement. The halachic framework is the means whereby the enemy from without is defeated through the development of a total culture, which claims exclusivity in every aspect of being and leaves no room for valuing what is other than yours. The talmudic structure — or, one might say, stricture — has thus succeeded in overcoming idolatry, in creating a people who have internalized their separateness, and erected a frame of learning and living which is in opposition to the world.

The Jewish philosopher who expresses this best was Yehuda Halevi, for whom the meaning of Jewish election is created by a different ontological reality and for whom the meaning of revelation was motivated by a quest for certainty. Informing the Jewish battle between philosophical religion and revealed religion in the Middle Ages was the sense that philosophical religion is really indifferent to the forms of Halacha, but is concerned only with functional and instrumental values — what will work politically, so to speak. Yehuda Halevi, in his *Kuzari* says that the king, the protagonist of the work, is not satisfied with that type of understanding of ritual, because of a dream he had that told him: "Your thoughts are noble, but your actions are not," meaning that there is absolute significance to getting it right in terms of behavior. To get it wrong for Halevi is to invite death. Revelation has radical importance; it is in opposition to a spiritual life brought about through reflection. The philosopher can tolerate differences, Halevi says; but revealed religion has its holy wars and it is in the very nature of revelation to invite holy wars. The fight is not over intention, nobility of purpose, moral character. The fight is for the purpose of securing Halacha, *mitzvot,* ritual; to miss a detail is to miss the whole.

This perception of revelation and *mitzvot*, of Jewish self-understanding, is still a very real part of the Jewish mindset. As Chanan Porat of Gush Emunim (Land of Israel Movement) once remarked to me, "You talk about the Land like a philosopher, as if it's of instrumental value alone, as the place where Jews act out their Halacha. With me the Land is the body of God in a very significant sense; to give back the Land is to cut off one's arm." For thinkers like Porat, to understand Jewish history is to view it in a redemptive scheme, which is in opposition to the world, unlike philosophers like myself, who talk about realism and considerations of political discourse with those who are different from us. Such thinkers dismiss our criteria of rationality and sobriety.

For those who view Jewish history in redemptive terms, reality is a matter of *kedusha*, holiness. Thus, to surrender any part of the Land is to violate the covenantal drama of Israel's redemptive scheme. This may be called extremist, even though nothing is clarified by terming it so. I regard this view as one perception — and a legitimate one — of what is meant by Jewish history and the Jewish people, and what our presence in the Land signifies. That is why, to bring this discussion to our specific points of reference, Geula Cohen, Knesset member of the right-wing Tehiya party, speaks as she does. From her point of view, to accept the validity or legitimacy of the other's claim is to undermine the very will to fight. For Geula Cohen and those for whom she speaks, there is no question of the "passionate middle."

The question thus follows: Is this utter belief in the absolute righteousness of one's views a necessary condition for nurturing the will of a people to live in permanent conflict? For Chanan Porat — and possibly for Geula Cohen too — the answer has a theological thrust and a messianic significance necessary to the scheme of re-election. Looking from this perspective, I don't know if one can regard this as extremism.

It is an attitude deeply rooted in a certain perception of Jewish history. It is innocuous enough when it appears in our prayerbooks, when, for instance, we express hope every year on Rosh Hashana that the whole world will acknowledge the God of Israel. So long as this is restricted to prayer, we could ignore the implications. However, with the realization of contemporary Zionism and the consequent emergence of contemporary ideologies, it has now become a political matter.

I claim that that position is not extremist, but one grounded deeply in the historic sense of the meaning of the election of Israel and of the Land of Israel. It is a continuation of the notion of the biblical drama, of nurturing the will of the nation to live in opposition to the world — "a people who dwell apart." At a time of great Jewish loneliness and widespread anti-Semitism, this sense of apartness became a confirmation of the sense of Jewish isolation from and opposition to the world. It served to nurture the will of the people to survive amidst hostility. This special view of Jewish existence has extended to the present-day State of Israel, where, in a certain theological view, as I have noted, Israel again stands in opposition to the world, in a fulfilment of its destiny.

There are, of course, other views of what constitutes Zionism, particularly the view that regards Zion restored as instituting a normalization of Jewish existence. This is to be understood not in the vulgar sense — that the Jewish polity becomes normal when it too can boast Jewish thieves or prostitutes — but as a radical redefinition of Jewish identity, an identity that is not in opposition to the world but an expression of the desire to perpetuate Jewish history and existence. Here the Zionist revolution is seen as fueling the passion that might enable the Jewish people to talk to the world from its own national consciousness, its own particularity — and not from its sense of opposition to the world. I would, therefore, not describe Zionist as "ghettoization, " as some would, but as an attempt to construct a society which, though infused by particularity, can also be understood by the world. What nurtures me, as a Jew and as a Zionist, is not my sense of isolation from the world, but my being able to share with the world what we may even have in common.

Jewish existence is characterized by its uniqueness, to be sure, but not in terms of distinctiveness or separateness. It is a total way of life, of accepting who one is. It also implies a mature self-acceptance that is not defined in terms of opposition to the world. I submit that these two views of Jewish history and experience — the sense of a people apart and mature acceptance of self — can be affirmed without radical claims of uniqueness. We can be a normal people without having to legitimize any exaggerated myths of what the Jewish people can be, to arrive at an empirical acceptance of particularity. This is the present battle; this is what infuses the Jewish discussion. Whether or not we burn bus shelters is not the issue. The question is, what do we dream about? We have opposing dreams, and because we are a divided people, the conflict persists. The least we must hope for, in Israel specifically, is that a neutral government will come about that doesn't force the issue, but navigates the conflicts and allows them to surface without having to decide who is right.

In the Talmud, in the famous disputes between Hillel and Shammai, the law is invariably decided according to Hillel. The reason for this is usually ascribed to Hillel's humility, as opposed to Shammai's arrogance. But questions of law are not decided on such grounds. Hillel's judgements were favored because, before he quoted his own opinions, he adduced the opinions of his opponent. The way of Hillel can serve as our own model. The exponents of polarization in Israel, as represented by Gush Emunim and Peace Now, must learn to respect and understand each other's views, without hurling such epithets as "barbarians" and "fascists" at each other. Our urgent task is to clarify what our disagreements are really about. In this way alone will we achieve the reconciliation we so devoutly seek.

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

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

I stand here proudly before this great assembly and think back to the years of struggle and sacrifice which have led to this occasion, a milestone in the age-old history of our people — that of a first State visit of the President of Israel to its closest ally and friend — the United States of America, and that of the honor accorded my people by these two Houses with all that they signify in terms of human hope and dreams.

This is the year of the 40th anniversary of Israel's independence. When I recall the enormous sacrifices that we made for our independence — when I recall how the flower of our youth gave its life so that we should live — when I recall how as we struggled for our existence we opened our gates and absorbed five times our original population including those refugees who had emerged from the ashes of the Holocaust, I can but feel satisfaction and pride at the enormous advances that we have made in creating a free society with all its inherent strengths and despite the numerous challenges it faces.

We have achieved peace with the largest Arab state, namely, Egypt, and are advancing slowly but inexorably along the road of the ultimate goal of comprehensive peace in the Middle East. We have become in our area a major center of technology, agricultural, scientific and medical advances. We have made very painful sacrifices in order to reach our 40th birthday celebrations with all the accomplishments of which we are so proud and with all the problems we have to face.

Many milestones in our history occurred in this one month — November: 70

years ago this month, world Jewry was electrified by the Balfour Declaration in which the British government acknowledged the Jewish people's right to a homeland in Palestine. This was at a vital stage in World War I. The content of the letter sent by Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild was incidentally approved by President Wilson. This document gave rise to the British Mandate of Palestine granted by the League of Nations in order to implement the Balfour Declaration.

49 years ago today, Nazi Germany's major onslaught against Jews and Jewish culture assumed its most brutal expression in the terrifying Kristalnacht — the Night of the Crystals — when Jewish synagogues, homes and schools were set ablaze throughout Germany, and our Hebrew Bible and holy books were burnt in bonfires across the land.

40 years ago this month, the U.N. with the support of both the United States government and the Soviet Union, voted for a resolution which determined, *inter-alia*, the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. We were thereupon attacked by seven Arab armies bent on our destruction. We literally fought for our lives, sacrificing one percent of our population in bloody battle, and achieved our independence.

12 years ago today I had the privilege of defending Israel and the Jewish people against the scurrilous attack on Zionism launched at the U.N. General Assembly by a sordid assortment of totalitarian dictatorships. In that memorable struggle which split the U.N. and in which,as I pointed out in the debate, the world has divided itself into good and bad, decent and vile, human and debased, the U.S. and other western governments stood staunchly by us. We shall never forget the proud and impressive pro-Israel stand taken on that memorable occasion by the U.S. delegation led by a distinguished member of this Senate — Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Senior Senator of New York. He represented in his remarks and in his proud stand the greatness of this country, its courage in standing up to an alliance of dictatorships and its unequivocal support of Israel in what was one of the memorable and historic debates at the U.N. Senator Moynihan's words on that dramatic occasion will long be remembered by our people.

Again in November ten years ago, President Sadat made his historic trip to Jerusalem and addressed the Knesset. This visit marked an historic watershed in our region which was to lead to the first peace treaty between Israel and an Arab state — indeed, the leading Arab state. That peace treaty was signed in Washington on the White House lawn by the late President Sadat, by Menachem Begin, the former Prime Minister of Israel and was witnessed by President Jimmy Carter. This peace would never have been achieved but for the intense involvement of the President and his Administration in the entire process leading up to it.

I represent a 40-year-old democracy in the heart of the greatest democracy in the world, celebrating the 200th anniversary of its Constitution. I represent an ancient people and a young state, but what binds us is not our age but our values. Israel represents the belief in man and in his right to the basic freedoms and to peace. We believe that the democratic system of government is the only one valid for mankind. In the great trials of our times between totalitarianism and democracy, democracy has invariably emerged triumphant. We believe that man must help his fellow man. We believe that prosperity comes only to those who share it with others. We are a society that has made enormous strides and advances in agriculture, in industry, in science and as such see ourselves as a bridge between the developed world and the developing world. Our great ally, the United States, unselfishly supports other nations in the world. So do we, as a matter of national policy, aid, support and share our experience and our progress with developing countries who require it.

We live in a world in which a minority of the members of the United Nations are democracies. We live in a world in which hundreds of millions of people wake up every morning hungry. we live in a world in which the scope of ignorance exceeds that of education, in which helplessness exceeds ability. We live in a world in which insensitivity is greater than enlightenment. We live in a world a great part of which believes in violence and the solution of problems by force. We live in a world of holy wars, racism and prejudice, a world which experienced two world wars and has been incapable of putting an end to war. A world which believed in the League of Nations and has been frustrated and disillusioned by the United Nations. It is a world which is in dire need of hope and of aid and which instinctively turns to this country, the powerful keeper of the seal of democracy in the world, a fortress that no upheaval, political or economic, can move from the basis which was created by its Constitution 200 years ago.

I represent a country which is proud of the fact that despite five wars, despite the defense and economic burden which it has borne since its inception, has never hesitated on the issue of its basic values. Like you, we have never known one minute without democracy. Our democracy faces the most involved challenges — a constant state of readiness, long military and reserve service and the complex problems arising out of the refusal of our neighbors to enter into negotiations for peace with us.

We absorbed several times our own population, many of the immigrants coming from countries that have never known democracy. We have overcome the desert and the wilderness, we have created new forms of society. We have constructed a most sophisticated agricultural system, and an industry based on high technology and have created important centers of scientific research. Truly, we are entitled to look back with no small measure of pride and to say that we have created something that perhaps those who dreamt of the future never believed would come to pass.

Never in the history of man has there been such an unselfish approach to the less fortunate countries of the world than that of this great nation. For in the spirit of the prophet Isaiah "Each one helps his neighbor and every one said to his brother be of good courage." We note that the aid provided to Israel is extended as a function of the vital interests of the United States. Today in the Near East the longest war in this century is being waged — a brutal bloody war motivated by fanatic religious fundamentalism on the one hand, and the ambitions of a megalomaniac dictatorship on the other hand. An unconventional weapon, poison gas, has been introduced, and the world has stood by in mute helplessness. The figure of those killed has gone well beyond the million mark. A war which threatens one of the vital arteries of the Western world, with all that this implies for the freedom of the world, a lifeline which the United States is so valiantly defending today.

The world has in many ways been misled in viewing the Israel-Arab conflict as being the main issue in the Middle East. Today, you know as well as I do that if the Israel-Arab conflict were to be resolved and to disappear, as I certainly hope and pray that it will, all the centers of bloodshed, war, instability and fundamentalist religious fanaticism from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf, would persist. It is against this background that we must view the sole bastion of democracy in our region — Israel. A glance at the map of the Middle East must surely emphasize the vital significance for the security of the U.S. and the free world of this solid island of stability, loyalty and friendship to the U.S. We are proud of our alliance and of the joint mutual base of common values and traditions on which it stands.

A few weeks ago we welcomed to Israel a number of prominent Jews from the Soviet Union. It was not coincidental that the first people to speak on the phone with Ida Nudel, after she arrived to freedom, were the President of the U.S. and the Secretary of State. That act reflected the gratitude of an entire nation and of countless numbers of our brothers and sisters in the Soviet Union who pray for freedom and who know of the great efforts of the leadership of this country and the members of these Houses, to bring them to freedom. The winds of change may be blowing in the Soviet Union, but for us there is one litmus test; that is, the granting of full rights for Jews in the Soviet Union to learn Hebrew, to adhere to their traditions, and to be free to practice their religion as they wish. This, together with the exercise of their intrinsic right to be free to move and to rejoin their people in Israel, if they so wish. For us this is the crucial test and we will judge the behavior of the Soviet Union by its attitude towards its Jewish population.

In expressing our gratitude to the members of Congress, we would urge you to maintain your deep interest in favor of the reunion of Soviet Jewry with their brothers and sisters in Israel.

I would urge you too to help us in our efforts to reunite with us the Jews from other repressive countries, such as Syria.

We see as our major challenge the achievement of peace between us and our Arab neighbors, including the Palestinian people. In our Declaration of Independence we held out our hand in peace to our neighbors. After the Six Day War in 1967, a week after the sounds of battle receded, the Israeli government — at that time a National Unity government, called on the Arab countries to begin peace negotiations. The reply given us by the Arab world at that time was the three 'NOs' of the Khartoum Conference — No peace, no recognition, no negotiations.

A great man arose in the Middle East — President Anwar Sadat. His dramatic offer was matched by the no-less dramatic response of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the warm and enthusiastic welcome accorded him by the Knesset of Israel and by the people of Israel. The President came, spoke, negotiated and thanks to the active involvement of the American President and his Administration, we achieved a peace treaty.

We have never advanced without negotiations. We have never negotiated with our Arab neighbors without achieving an advance. This is our message, and hence the unanimous desire of our people for negotiations. There may be differences of opinion as to procedures and modalities, but not as to the vital necessity of achieving peace through direct negotiations. On this our people are united.

Since President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, not a single Israeli or Egyptian soldier has fallen along our border. What greater recompense can both of our countries ask for? A bus departs from Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv every morning for Cairo — and vice versa. We pray for the day when similar buses will depart daily from Israel to all the other capitals of our neighboring Arab countries.

We are moving inexorably towards peace and that is the major goal of our people reflecting as it does the prayers of millions who cannot express themselves freely in our area, torn by fundamentalist religious fanaticism. That peace will be achieved because we want it and because the people of the Middle East want it and because we know that we will be supported in this endeavor by the President, the Administration and Congress of the United States.

Since World War I you have borne the burden of Western civilization and guaranteed the forces of democracy. You have experienced a difficult period and may be facing further trying problems. This nation produced the greatest and most powerful economy on earth. Your achievements in science and technology, your advances in arts and culture have opened up new vistas for mankind and for the world. You are a strong, great and dynamic people who have given the world a constitutional system which has weathered the storms of 200 years and still maintained your freedom as a nation. It is particularly at times such as these when clouds hover in the skies that the ordinary individual, wherever he may be, realizes in his heart what the United States means to the world.

You know that, as you face challenges, countless people of the world depend on you. They look to you and draw courage and inspiration from your moral fabric. It is at times such as these that the little man wherever he may be in freedom or in bondage realizes what the United States and the American dream means to the world.

Thanks to American aid my small country is capable of defending all that the United States stands stand for in terms of human freedom and dignity in an area buffeted by the winds of extremism and fanaticism. It is proper and just that we remember what free people owe to this great nation and of the hope this mighty country keeps alive in the hearts of people in bondage wherever they may be.

Address by Mr. Chaim Herzog, the President of Israel, before the Two Houses of Congress, Washington D.C., 10 November 1987.

President Chaim Herzog addressing a joint meeting of the Senate and the House of Representatives on Capitol Hill in Washington



Power and Responsibility: Reflections on the Ethics of Jewish Statehood



Dr. David Hartman

When an Israeli walks in the capitals of the world today, he experiences the painful trauma of human isolation. Military power coupled with a sense of political vulnerability is the paradoxical burden of the modern Israeli. We know that no victory in war will alter our political position in the world. The breakdown of a moral dialogue with the world, the feeling that the economic power of the Arab oil states influences political considerations towards Israel may contribute to the moral disillusionment of the Israeli. Many are beginning to wonder regarding the significance and importance of our national renewal.

How do we relate to the world, given our profound sense of political vulnerability and loneliness? Our political position in the world may lead us to abandon any possibility of integrating morality with power and any hope of being morally and humanly understood by the nations of the world. Let us examine the relationship between power and responsibility on both the personal and the national level in order to gain some insight regarding our political isolation and the use of national power.

Esteem, dignity and recognition are various terms used to express the positive consequences of power in human relationships. Power gives weight to a person. Whether the source of power be economic, social or political, the effect is that the person with power becomes a weighty entity, an object of serious consideration and regard.

Power is also a condition for freedom. Without power, one is deprived of the means to behave as an autonomous agent.

The powerless person is vulnerable to what others initiate. When you are weak and helpless, you experience the source of what happens to you as being outside of yourself. You have no control over the decisions and events determining your life. You can learn to maneuver within the limits of your relative powerlessness, e.g., by the use of "influence" or by appealing to the mercy and goodwill of those in power. Nevertheless, when your overall situation is in the hands of others, you cannot escape a deep feeling of alienation and impotence. Freedom, in the sense of self-direction and self-governing autonomy, presupposes a measure of power.

Power transforms passive objects into autonomous agents. It restores the individual's image of himself as an effective decision-making, self-generating agent. Not being at the mercy of others, not being alienated from the decisions that determine the events and overall framework of one's life are some of the positive consequences of power in human relationships.

The possession of power, however, contains its own potential dangers. The liberating experience of newly acquired power tends to generate an insatiable quest for more and more power.

The quest for wealth and influence can turn into an obsessive drive to destroy anything that limits one's will. In reaction to being dominated by external forces, a person can pursue a policy aimed at eliminating any obstacle impeding the satisfaction of his wants and desires.

Power can give rise to a world picture wherein one's will knows no limits, where freedom becomes synonymous with the total absence of inhibition and restraint. The writer of Ecclesiastes describes how he was sucked into such a voracious question for total and unrestricted satisfaction of all his needs and wants. No desire was left unsatisfied. No conceivable source of pleasure was beyond his reach. He met no resistance to his seemingly all-powerful will. As a protective reaction against the futility of human effort and the absurdity of life, he indulged his every desire and fantasy; he desperately and unsuccessfully sought to find meaning in a world that presented him with no limits.

Power can be used to blind oneself to human contingency in two ways: 1) by supporting the illusion of total control and domination of others, and 2) by providing an escape from involvement with others. By limiting one's contact with others and by withdrawing into a private, protected world of experience, one minimizes the pain and vulnerability that exposure to others involves. Power enables a person to overcome feelings of helplessness by increasing his control over the external environment, or by providing him with the opportunity of turning away from the external environment and taking refuge in stoic-like privacy and detachment.

The crucial issue facing those concerned with the ethics of power is: Where does power lead? Does it lead to a type of insanity that aims at abolishing all limits? Or can it awaken one to the expanding range of responsibilities which it creates?

Power need not lead to an insane quest to overcome limitations, but rather, it can create an ability to accept limitations freely. On considering the moral problematics of power, one must be awake to the distinction between the use of power to overcome limitations or freely to accept limitations. For the mature human being, acceptance of finitude and limitations is not born from necessity and weakness, but from choice and reflection on the nature of man.

Nations, like individuals, respond to the growth in power in ways analogous to those discussed previously. The rebirth of the State of Israel represents the change that the acquisition of power brought about in Jewish consciousness. The future direction of Israeli society may be evaluated in the light of the options that power creates. Will power engender a compulsive need to control and manipulate? Will it lead to a socio-cultural withdrawal into unconcern about the external world? Or will it lead to a greater sensibility to the expanded range of responsibilities accompanying an increase in power?

There are people who are afraid of the change in the Jewish psyche that Israel has brought about. In Israel the Jews constitute a modern nation and not merely a religious community. It is not a simple task to instill a spirit of moral responsiveness in a modern state motivated by self-interest and the quest for power. Balancing power with openness to moral claims, perceiving power as a reason for self-imposed limitations and not for boundless license — these are among the weighty challenges facing modern Israel.

The Midrash writes that the Torah was not meant for angelic scholars who live in pure environments. The community of Israel was commanded by God to leave the conditions of the desert and enter a land which forced it to face the complex struggles and challenges of normalcy. In the book of Samuel, God accepts the cries of the community for a king. This compromise on the part of God teaches us that Judaism is to be realized within the imperfect conditions of political realities which often demand institutionalized power structures to guarantee and safeguard the survival of the community. The laws regarding the king in the book of Deuteronomy (Chapter 17:14-20) are the way the halakhah structured and gave direction to the compromise between reality and the idea of a holy people that must bear witness to the kingdom of God in history.

The biblical tradition insists that the prophets and kings must live within one political reality. One destroys the biblical tradition if prophets and kings are unable to talk to and understand each other.

Contrary to Franz Rosenzweig, Hermann Cohen and Steven Schwartzchild, Judaism is not exclusively a messianic vision. Jews are meant to bear witness not only to the messianic goal in history, but as well to the endless process of man striving to realize the demands of the covenant in an imperfect world. Judaism does not only mirror the sacred. The covenantal community of Israel is not a liturgical community. Judaism is not a synagogue-centered religion. It is a mistake to understand the role of the synagogue in Judaism in the same way that one interprets the role of the church in Christianity. In Judaism, the living community of Israel struggles to bear witness to the sanctifying power of God and His Torah. The crucial question for Jews today is: Under what political conditions should this community exist in order for it to realize its covenantal destiny?

The modern Zionist revolution offers the Jewish people a total Judaic society in which to test the viability of Judaism as it confronts the issues of power, modernity and secularity. Those who exclusively emphasize the holy, those who seek security and purity in an unredeemed world, will be permanently embarrassed by the imperfections of the State of Israel. Those who do not have the faith and courage to realize the mitzvoth in the real world seek to reduce the Jewish people to a faith community that lives on the margins of history. Purists prefer to live with the dream of Jerusalem rather than with the difficult and pulsating reality of an imperfect earthly Jerusalem.

Those who wait for a perfect messianic world before they accept a Jewish political reality have lost faith in Judaism as an all-embracing way of life to be realized by human beings who must struggle with the weaknesses inherent in the human condition.

A Judaism which only offers purity, perfection and solace can never provide modern man with a full spiritual life. This is the choice before us: Is Judaism a way of escaping from modernity, a refuge against turbulence and imperfection, an anchor-point which restores man's sense of eternity above time — or is it a vibrant frame of reference which teaches man to live within the absurd, to discover partial meaning in an unredeemed world and to struggle constantly with the fragmentary and imperfect features of human life?

One of the concrete ways of testing our Judaism within the conditions of normalcy is the way we deal with the issues of power. If one takes the Bible seriously it would appear that Judaism was not meant to be lived under conditions where one does not have to face the moral dilemma of power. The viability of Judaism as a way of life for modern man depends in part on how Israel will respond to the moral opportunities of statehood, normalcy and power. Do we accept the possibility of integrating morality with power? Or must all power corrupt? If corruption is inevitable, then the biblical covenant is over!

The twentieth century has taught the Jewish people the need to develop a strong nation which respects the importance of power. The revolution in the Jewish people in Israel came about because of our terrible revulsion against the suffering of the Jews before the modern diabolic expressions of human evil. In a messianic world, swords can be turned into ploughshares. In the messianic world, Maimonides challenges us to cultivate intellectual love of God. But in a world of Auschwitz, in a world where morality and politics are often separated, one must learn the art of self-defense. One must build an air force if one seeks to survive in an unredeemed world.

The biblical Jew of the twentieth century is not frightened to acquire power. However important power is for our survival, we misunderstand and distort the significance of our return to nationhood if we do not bring a covenantal perspective on its use. Just as modern technology can be either a blessing or a curse, so too can all forms of power be utilized either for enhancing or for destroying the dignity of man. Reborn Israel has returned to the framework of biblical spirituality where ”kings” are responsible to implement the prophetic understanding of Jewish nationhood. In a biblical land, political leaders must be fully awake to the dangers of idolatrous possibilities of power.

The rebirth of Israel affords us the opportunity of building a society which demonstrates how power and moral responsibility are compatible and require each other. From a biblical perspective, there is nothing more noble than a human being or a nation that combines power with compassion and responsibility toward the stranger and the weak. Judaism does not teach us that weakness is a necessary condition for moral sensitivity. Galut powerlessness is not the only framework for the cultivation of the messianic dream. The prophetic aspiration for justice and the biblical challenge that Israel become a holy people were meant to be realized in a Judaic national political reality.

Grandiosity, exaggerated self-righteousness, arrogant belief in one’s moral purity (a mood that may result from political loneliness and isolation), or compassionate respect for minority groups, a healthy appreciation of human finitude and a widening of our sense of normative responsibility (a mature expression of power), are some of the options that our people will have to agonize over as we cope with the modern renewal of the Jewish people. Our political leaders’ sincere appreciation of the dangers of power will be a concrete manifestation of the biblical roots of our national renaissance.

In spite of the cynical use of power in the world, we must never give up our hope that political considerations must be infused with the moral pathos of the prophets. This must be the burden of a people tied to a land which carries the spirit of the biblical covenant. Our belief in the eternal significance of that covenant taught our people that in spite of the brutalities of human history, we must believe in the dignity of man created in the image of God. A people that is burdened by that belief can never accept Jewish political isolation as a permanent feature of our human condition.

I do not minimize the burden our political leaders must carry in trying to build a viable political reality in an unredeemed world. But as a people whose roots lie in the biblical and talmudic tradition, we are not free to respond without agonizing over the covenantal quality of our survival. Israel must realize that only because we are prepared to agonize with the prophetic understanding of Jewish peoplehood are we entitled to claim the support and concern of the whole Jewish world. However, equally as well, the Diaspora must understand that when one seeks to implement Judaism within the normal structures of a political society, one must be open to the dangers that go with normalcy. Judaism, as understood from a biblical perspective, is permanently exposed to the assimilatory dangers of "wanting to be like all the nations of the world." Our covenantal destiny does not allow us to escape from this risk and danger. In this sense, Zionism has restored our faith in the power of covenantal Judaism to live in the modern world.

Ethics within the Reality of War

Rabbi Tzvi Marx

Whoever witnessed the rapid events of the Peace for Galilee War in June 1982 must be struck by the startling contrasts in connection with attitudes towards human life. On the one hand the swift power of the Israel Defence Forces through its air, land and sea forces has brought about the destruction of many of the enemy as well as sadly contributed to the deaths of many innocent civilians whose misfortune (as one interviewed officer said) was that "they were in the same place as the enemy." The reality of modern warfare and especially in the case of war against guerilla enemy forces poses an unavoidable dilemma for a morally concerned people: to desist altogether from waging war because of its price in innocent blood or to accept the imperfect morality that requires one to destroy the innocent with the enemy when the two are unavoidably intertwined. Jewish morality does not as a matter of principle require one to forego the use of force in this case. A justified war does not, however, relieve one of the moral anguish of the pain and destruction nor of the need for constant moral re-evaluation. Numerous interviews with soldiers and officers as well as public statements by leaders reveal the heavy soul-searching that accompanied this Peace for Galilee offensive and that in many instances tempered the maximal use of force available even at the cost of Israeli soldiers.

This war is not the first one in which this issue influenced the conduct of Israeli soldiers. Concern with this issue is subsumed in the Israel's army training literature as "*Tohar Haneshek*" — "The Moral Use of Weapons". It reflects upon the values involved in the moral legitimacy of bearing arms for self defense. The right to bear arms is not to be construed as a dispensation to kill under all conditions on the battlefield. The painful efforts to articulate guidelines that will be meaningful and practical for application on the battlefield are fraught with contradictions, borderline situations, and inconsistent compromise. The mark of this literature is its refusal to accept moral simplicity as a substitute for moral clarity. The right to self defense is balanced off by a continued emphasis on a very deeply held Jewish value about human life — "Whoever kills a human being" proclaims Rabbi Akiva, "is as if he diminished the Divine image." The Mishna cites the opinion that each individual person is deemed so precious that he is to consider himself worthy "for the world to have been created only for him." (Mishneh Sanhedrin)

It seems an absurdity to raise the issue of the sanctity of an individual human life in the context of war whose means of achieving its goal is to destroy so many lives. How can one speak of the sanctity of God's image in man in the midst of a bloodbath?

A similarly odd juxtapositioning of destruction and compassion appears in the talmudic discussion of capital punishment. The Talmud Sanhedrin in its discussion of various forms of capital punishment insists that the court resort to the most humane means of execution invoking the principle to "love your neighbor as yourself." There can surely be no stranger juxtaposition of moral principles than the execution of a convicted criminal and the admonition that this execution be balanced off by the Golden Rule. One is sorely tempted to understand this text either as a naively ludicrous miscast of principles or alternatively as a cynical comment upon the price that society pays for exacting the extreme penalty altogether.

And yet careful thought may reveal a very delicate moral position. One can argue that when one is involved in an act of legal violence whose very nature expresses a disregard of human life, it is precisely the time to underscore the gravity and moral risk of this violation. To this end some measure of emphasis of the personhood of the condemned may be absolutely essential. Harsh human treatment (though necessary) cannot be allowed to penetrate human reality in a casual manner.

In another related discussion, the biblical law is recalled that the corpse of the executed criminal is to be briefly hanged in public as a warning and lesson to others. Yet at that very instance, the Bible (*Deut.* 21) enjoins us not to let the body lie unburied overnight because "it is an affront to God." This affront is disclosed by the human image disfigured through death and through the hand of man. Man in dishonor reflects on the dishonoring of God. Again the legal justification and moral rightness of society's acts cannot be allowed to casually transgress on the incommensurate value of human dignity without even a symbolic gesture of protest.

Rape was a given in ancient warfare. It was one of the prizes of victory. The difficulty of its elimination is evident even in modern warfare. Its obvious loathsomeness is contradictory to the moral attitudes of the Torah and is reflected in the rabbinic understanding that its presence is a concession only to uncontrollable passion. What is one to say in this situation? Is one to withdraw from this morally obnoxious arena in which moral instruction can affect only minimally? Judaic morality did not permit this kind of moral strategy. It did not accept the argument that when maximal ideals are not realizable, then a moral system may offer no guidance. To refuse to deal with morally repugnant contexts was tantamount to letting the ethics of the jungle totally dominate with its unbridled power and violence.

One may argue that it is better to abandon this no-win moral battlefield. In compromising one's moral stance for small moral rewards one may appear to be condoning the larger violence. Yet I would suggest an alternative understanding that this compromise reflects the maturity of a sophisticated moral system. It does not blind itself to the complexities and the inconsistencies of the human situation. It does not withdraw and leave a moral vacuum when lacking the option of moral elegance and completeness. The risk of rationalizing evil must be weighed against the possibility of alleviating if only in a partial way real human suffering.

The price of statehood is the need to go to war in defense of the lives of its citizens. This inalienable right is inscribed in the Torah and the Halakhah. It is certified by the UN charter as well as all documents concerned with the international protection of national human societies. The fact of war and its legal warrants must not, however, become the basis for a callous attitude and treatment of life. If they do, then in the defense of what values do we go to war? The images portraying the sensitivity for the individual generated by this war situation is an indication that this callousness has not penetrated the lives and hearts of our soldiers. On the contrary, they make us realize that that tough Sabra who often gives the impression of exaggerated uncaringness through the tough macho exterior that he perpetrates is just that — a tough exterior. Within there resides the traditional delicate "mensch" whom the rabbinic sage characterized as "compassionate, modest and empathetic."

The image of the nation Israel rallying its resources to help heal the wounded in the aftermath of suffering speaks volumes for the absence of hatred and animosity with which they engaged the enemy. Golda Meir expressed that attitude in her day when she said that we may be able to forgive the Arabs the losses they inflicted upon us but we can never forgive them the losses that they forced us to inflict upon others. One may regret the absence of bolder statements by our present leaders in this matter. This emotion is not a passing hyperbole of an eloquent madame prime minister. It reflects a deeply held value of a people that through its biblical prophets as well as in its talmudic-rabbinic understanding of its Bible and in the contemporary discussion of *Tohar Haneshek* considered again and again: how to inculcate concern for human dignity within contexts that others might have seen as legitimate opportunities for crass cynicism. Israel at war is a truly fierce fighter but Israel at war is a fighter imbued with compassion.

One may debate the pros and cons of a particular war. But given that a war was conducted, there are grounds for feeling that the tradition's Jewish values have permeated to the psyche of the Israeli at its most basic level and have succeeded in preventing the ugliness of necessary warfare from robbing him of his sense of human significance. This deep ground of decency ought to serve as a starting point for introspection and self-renewal in the aftermath of war.

The 20th century has humbled man's exaggerated sense of moral achievement. It has brought home his capacity for moral evil. However, this should not bring modern man to a state of hopelessness regarding his moral aspirations. It should rather make us appreciate the effort needed for even small achievement in man's moral progress.

We must learn to temper our demand for absolute morality in a world of ambiguous moral and complex situations. We are responsible for improving the status quo although we need not have an exaggerated sense of guilt for the ugly moral dilemmas which ensue. All praise to the Israel Defense Forces for walking this narrow moral tightrope in our struggle to build a nation state.

Strengthening the Jewish Spirit

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

Our people in Israel yearn for peace. Not a single mother in Israel wants to send her husband or her son to war ever again, if we can possibly avoid it. The last decade, since the signing of the peace treaty with our largest neighbor, Egypt, has seen a steady, if slow, progress towards a genuine peace in the Middle East — a process in which the United States government has been instrumental. That peace with our neighbors is vital for Israel. We did not build a Jewish state to go to war; we built a Jewish state to live in peace.

We dream in Israel of the day when peace will come. Our writers, our poets, our songwriters, our authors and our playwrights — Jewish, Arab and Druze — give constant expression to the natural desires of our people for peace. We dream of the day when we can share the fruits of our research, our scientific advances and our technological developments with the nations of our area on a reciprocal basis. These have brought us to be among the leaders of the world in the development of solar energy, in the technologies of irrigation and fertilization, in the science of turning arid zones and deserts into fruitful orchards and farms.

But there is another dimension of peace that we must have and that is internal peace. I am proud that despite the strains and struggles of nation-building, our people have held firm to their democratic values, and strive for mutual understanding and respect that manifest themselves in every area of daily life, among the overwhelming majority of the population. There are problem areas. Let me recall that twenty or thirty years ago every commentator and every pundit said that the ethnic or so-called "Sephardi-Ashkenazi gap" as it was termed, was unbridgeable — we bridged it. It is no longer an issue, and is disappearing as a problem as educational opportunities and intermarriage encourage integration. In a similar way, we will solve our current problems of relationships between religious and less religious elements of our society. My greatest fear is of polarization and extremism on all sides, which will solve nothing, and only have one effect: alienating our young people from Judaism. There is an alarming tendency on the part of representatives of U.S. Jewry to raise their hands in horror and castigate Israel for the expressions of extremism in Israel society as reflected in the propagation of a racist philosophy by an unfortunate peripheral element in our society or occasional violence on religious issues, again on the part of a peripheral element. These elements, however marginal they are in our society, are obviously very disturbing. But I want to emphasize that they do not constitute an exclusive Israeli problem as is frequently intimated by leaders of American Jewry, they are a Jewish problem and in particular an American Jewish problem. And whilst I respect the views and opinions coming from the American Jewish community on these issues, I want to be very clear: Some of the most divisive and most provocative voices in Israeli public life have come from and are funded from the U.S.A. They could not exist for a week if they had to rely on the Israeli public for support. This surely addresses a problem to American Jewish leadership. I cannot escape the feeling that the issue is being sidestepped. How can we view with equanimity demonstrations against "Nazi" Israel — "Nazi Israel" — with no adequate Jewish response to them and to their backers in the community?

I trust that the voices of moderation, of reason and of compromise will assert themselves. I am glad to see, too, the major movements of American Judaism establishing themselves inside Israeli society, where they will eventually join our national debate as Israeli participants. No one can fail to be impressed by the efforts which your component bodies have made to set up centers in Jerusalem. The magnificent campus of Hebrew Union College, the impressive program of Neve Schechter, and the recently established Bet Midrash of the Rabbinical Council of America, are all powerful recognitions and affirmations of the dictum that "the light will go forth from Zion."

This year for the first time in history, and indeed, for the first time in the forty years of the existence of the State of Israel, a President of a sovereign independent Jewish State was received at the White House with the full military honors accorded heads of states on the occasion of state visits to the United States of America. As I stood there and listened to the "Hatikva" Israel's national anthem and watched our national flag flying proudly in the land of the brave and the free, I was moved beyond description. What prayers over the centuries, what enormous sacrifices, what great efforts here and elsewhere went in to making those moments possible. For who can fail to recall the great historic developments, the tragedies, and the triumphs to which many of us have been witness in our lifetime, which have led to this great occasion. An occasion on which the President of a free and sovereign State of Israel addressed both Houses of Congress in this great country, the symbol of civilization and human tolerance and freedom and leader of the free world.

We tend to take our independence for granted. After all many in this audience, and, indeed, in this community have never known a world without an independent State of Israel. But to those of us, as myself, who have been witness to the ravages of the Holocaust, who have borne arms against unbelievable odds in the defense of our small Jewish community in Palestine and who have lived through the epic of our War of Independence, it is impossible to take our independence for granted. In that grim and bitter struggle for our independence, outnumbered and poorly equipped as we were, a small population of 600,000 withstood an invasion of seven Arab armies, determined to destroy us and throw us into the sea. As I think of our sacrifices in that heroic struggle under the leadership of the great David Ben-Gurion, the hundredth anniversary of whose birth the Jewish community in particular and the world community in general, have celebrated this year, as I think of the losses we incurred including 1 percent of our total population killed — I am incapable of taking for granted the outward expressions of our independence.

I cannot but think back to my encounters as President of the State of Israel with Jewish communities throughout the world. In my period of office it has been my privilege to visit some of the great Jewish communities including those of the United States, Great Britain, Holland, Belgium, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the small Jewish communities in Zaire during my visit to Africa, not to mention the tiny community in Fiji. I addressed the Jewish community in the magnificent ancient Portuguese synagogue in Amsterdam on the occasion of my visit to Holland to attend the 40th anniversary celebrations of the battles of Nijmegen and Arnheim, in which I had participated. From the Square outside the synagogue, where today stands a monument in memory of the victims in the Holocaust of Dutch Jewry, members of the Jewish community in their tens of thousands had been concentrated before being shipped off to Auschwitz. And here facing the same square, I stood as President of the State of Israel in this magnificent edifice, illuminated for the occasion by thousands of candles recalling the greatness of that Jewry over the centuries. And as I stood there in the majestic historic synagogue, before the magnificent holy ark I recalled my encounter in the beautiful synagogue of the community of Lumumbashi in the province of Shaba in Zaire, still maintained by the eighty remaining Jews, the remnant of a once prosperous community which had numbered over 8,000 people. I stood there before the holy ark in the midst of Central Africa as the Rabbi who had served the community for over 50 years read the traditional blessing for the President of Israel and broke down in emotion and tears as he read a prayer for the Israel Defense Forces.

Recently I visited Denmark on a state visit as the guest of the Queen of Denmark. It was a special occasion because it gave me the opportunity to thank the people of Denmark on behalf of the people of Israel and indeed the Jewish people, for their heroic rescue of the Jewish community of Denmark during World War II. Perhaps the most significant moments were when I visited the small fishing village of Gilleleje with Her Majesty the Queen. 20 percent of Danish Jewry was saved by the people of this village and shipped across to Sweden. I met the rescued and the rescuers. Few had dry eyes in the audience in the municipality as they described their heroic rescue and I described to them what this meant to the Jewish people.

The question that must face us as a responsible Jewish community today, is the degree to which the Jewish world is, or is not, drawing the logical conclusions from Israel's centrality in Jewish life.

Obviously, to us the logical corollary is that we must do everything possible to encourage Aliyah from the free world so that it be normal and natural for Jewish youth throughout the world to accept Aliyah as a natural objective. The technological challenges of modern society in Israel are to some degree as sophisticated as in the United States. This requirement, together with the problem of the erosion of the Jewish people, which according to the forecasts of the demographers are most pessimistic, must bring us all to the conclusion that the major challenge of the American Jews and, indeed, of Jews throughout the Diaspora and free world in particular is that of Jewish education. Where there is a highly organized system of Jewish education, there is Aliyah. Some 80 percent of the Jewish children in Australia study in Jewish schools and speak Hebrew resulting in a 10 percent rate of Aliyah to Israel.

The bulk of the Aliyah coming to Israel today from the free world and in particular, from the United States, is a product of orthodox Jewish schools and the result of advanced Jewish education. It seems therefore, that the highest priority in the Jewish community must be that of a comprehensive Jewish education for our youth. Everything flows naturally from that — halting the decline of the Jewish population and increasing Aliyah. This is the message I feel I must give today to every Jewish community abroad emphasizing the central importance of Aliyah.

As I look back over the past forty years, in celebration of which anniversary I have been invited by the President of the United States to make this visit, I cannot but recall the unbelievable miracle of achievement which Israel represents today both as an independent state and as the center of world Jewry. We have every reason to be proud of ourselves.

Yes, we have every reason to be proud of ourselves and of what we have done. As I looked out upon the assembly of nations at the U.N., in the first appearance of an Israeli head of state in the history of the U.N., I computed what the delegates in the hall represent in lack of freedoms, in concentration camps, in prisons, in torture, in diseases, in malnutrition, in lack of education and opportunity, in absence of the basic freedoms of press, of thought, of expression, of movement, of political opposition. I could see before me the hundreds of millions whom they represent who have never known and will never know the taste of the basic freedoms we take for granted. I looked out on this vast assembly and saw before me the misery, unhappiness, human sadness and tragedy which is represented by the majority in the hall.

I then thought of the country which I had the honor to represent, this small country with its unbelievable and seemingly insurmountable problems, and saw before me our free, open and multiracial society in which all the basic freedoms of man are guaranteed. I thought of the amazing progress which we have made, and the unselfish support which we have given to other developing countries. I thought of all this, accomplished in an atmosphere of freedom and human dignity in which the dignity of man is the supreme value. I thought of the Jewish people, their commitment to each other, of our history, of our values, our contributions to society, and what we stand for and respect.

I looked out from the rostrum and saw them all. I thought of what I represent. And believe me, my only feeling was one of pride, pride to belong to such a people, pride to represent such a nation, pride to head such a country. I was proud, very proud. We have very much to be proud of, each and every one of us. And it is in this spirit of pride in ourselves as Jews that we must go forth inspired and fortified by what we have done and dedicated to the immense task we have set before ourselves as a great and ancient people.

Jerusalem and Pluralism — A Public Discussion

Participants:
Paul van Buren
David Hartman
Teddy Kollek, **Mayor of Jerusalem**

Teddy Kollek

Let me start from what the Bible says about the Jubilee year; "Proclaim liberty throughout the land to all its inhabitants" (*Lev.* 25:10). I take this to mean that the people who dwell in the land are as important as the land itself. Moreover, since the Torah assumes that non-Jews are dwelling permanently in the land, I take "all its inhabitants" to include them as well. However, anyone who looks into the matter will find that all of our religious sources, be it the Bible or the New Testament or the Talmud, equally contain statements that favor tolerance of the stranger and ones that point in the opposite direction. The advocates of democratic pluralism and the protagonists of exclusivist fanaticism can both find in the sources passage after passage which serves their purpose.

What troubles me is that nowhere I look do I find a lot of tolerance. Of intolerance I can give many examples, not just between Jews and Muslims. We have in the city almost forty different Christian denominations. Recently, the Israeli authorities were able with great difficulty to prevent a real battle, to be fought with sticks and crowbars, between teams from two churches over the right to dust, once a year, a wall in the Church of the Nativity. And afterwards, when on two different occasions we visited leading representatives of those churches, both bitterly complained that we did them an injustice in dividing up the percentage of wallspace and in not letting them fight it out among themselves.

Just among the Christians, the tensions are many, although it may be a certain consolation that they are less today than they ever were. In my first years as mayor, the whole of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher was still unrepaired from an earthquake in 1927, because the three major churches there, who have to agree over every detail of any modification, could not decide, for instance, about the form of the capitals in the main body of the church. So no progress was made, and the scaffolding had stood there from 1927 until 1967. Today, most of the work of restoration has been done.

In this city, the various communities lived for many centuries in separate quarters in the Old City. Recently, we received on loan a model of the Old City that was made in the last century. It shows Jerusalem very exactly in the year 1864 or 1865. You can see the various quarters. People lived separately, sometimes on better relations, sometimes on not such good relations. Each community led an absolutely separate life, certain in its own culture, certain of its own tradition. You could have walked in through the Jaffa Gate, which was then a narrow opening, and found the Greek Orthodox on the left and behind them all the Latins, then on the right the Armenians and a little further down Copts and Ethiopians, and on the hill opposite the gate the tiny Maronite church. If you had walked on, you would have come to the Moslem Quarter on the left, or to the Jewish Quarter on the right, which was then already probably the largest quarter, or at least had the largest population. There was tension from time to time. But people were so certain of themselves, so steeped in their own traditions and in their own community, that the issue of tolerance almost did not arise. The issue arose in the city, more than it ever could have before, only with the mixture created by modern society and the changing political situation.

There was already Christian missionary work in those days. It was very limited, however, and the Jews were so certain of their religious identity that Christian mission did not provoke the same kind of tension and apprehension that it arouses today. If you walk in through the Jaffa Gate and turn right, on the left-hand side there is Christ Church, which was built by the British Mission to the Jews. The church is still registered as belonging to that organization, except that it is now called the "Mission among the Jews." Forgive me for being a little flippant about it. When I first heard about that mission to the Jews, it was before World War II and I was a member of the kibbutz in Ein Gev. I made accounts and I found that it cost the British Mission about 120,000 pounds sterling in terms of 1935 to convert one Jew. I thought I could solve all the problems of the Zionist budget and of Jewish absorption by having one convert every year.

To speak seriously, however, somehow people today are much more worried about mission than they were before. Maybe it is because the Jewish family does not stick so closely together as it used to. The parents are not so certain about how their children will think and where they will end up. They seem to be more worried about this than about drugs or anything of the kind. Certainly, it does not lead to tolerance.

The attitude of the churches toward the Jews, too, is not necessarily always tolerant. There is still a strong attitude among many Christians that the Jews do not really have any rights to this country, because as they killed Christ, or at any rate refused to believe in Christ, they have lost their rights and their patrimony. You hear such things less since the Second Vatican Council, but you still hear them in some Catholic circles as well as in some Protestant circles. Although we have in Jerusalem a very good group of interfaith activists, it is a small group and not very influential. If at all, it is more influential in Jewish intellectual circles than among Christians.

Again, we have done things which are very nice, but which remain symbolic and do not take us very far. The very real true fact that we have a Dominican priest as the head of the philosophy department at the Hebrew University, a Frenchman who acquired Israeli citizenship, is certainly nice. But we make too much of it. Such things should be natural without raising any problem. But we always tell it again and again to prove how nice we are.

We have a tough time of it in the city. There are no Christians on the city council, because they have chosen not to be on it. They could be if they so desired, since there are enough Christians to elect one or two members, on a 31-member council. There are quite a number of Christians who do vote in municipal elections and they also have the right to be elected. Our law is such that all residents, whatever their citizenship, can participate in municipal elections, both as voters and as candidates. I know some nuns who have been here for fifty or sixty years and consider themselves rightly to be at least as good Jerusalemites as I am. But all the churches are uneasy about having elected representatives, because they are worried what would happen to their brethren in Arab countries if they suddenly, by being elected, implied recognition of the Zionist entity of Jerusalem. That worry weighs more than the fact that during our twenty years of rule the Christian community started growing a little bit, whereas it lost ground under Jordanian rule and in the last years of the British Mandate. It lost ground for a variety of reasons, less because of any pressure than because there was little economic opportunity. Moreover, the Christian churches educated here in a manner which unintentionally promoted emigration. You studied French nursery rhymes and then you went to a French university, after which you had no intention and no reason to come back. You did not have an education toward belonging here. This has changed slightly in recent years. There are more economic opportunities. So the Christian community is slightly growing and the Arab population has actually doubled under this Zionist administration.

Ever since we took over, the demands in the part of the city that was formerly under Jordanian rule have been much greater than the demands on the western side. In 1967, only ten percent of the population on the eastern side were linked to water. The others went to the public well. We had to introduce a water supply everywhere. Now a hundred percent do have it. We have not yet finished building and renewing all the sewage system, which was not seen as a necessity when the water supply was so limited. You solve one problem, you create another. But still, many services have been created. A great deal has been done to restore a city that had been neglected.

Whenever we try to do something for the Arab population, we have a tough time in the city council. Why spend money, I am asked, for people who do not appreciate it, who do not participate in the city council, who do not come to say thank you, who only feed complaints to their friends abroad? We have spent $2,000,000 or more on cleaning and renovating a very dirty and smelly Via Dolorosa. Similar amounts were spent on the infrastructure around the Holy Sepulcher. We are preparing now to spend a larger amount, in the next year or so, on removing the bus station from below the Garden Tomb. This is partly for traffic reasons, but also partly because the Garden Tomb is important to 200,000 pilgrims a year and the bus station below makes it noisy and smelly. If we can remove the bus station, to the advantage of the city and to the advantage of all those visitors, we see it as worthwhile.

Yet we are always told, when these expensive plans come up in the council, that we have so many other needs. There are not enough kindergartens, not enough schools, not enough synagogues, not enough cultural activities, not enough this and that. Why spend millions on people who do not say thank you? We answer: if they should say thank you, they would get themselves into trouble and physical danger. They pay taxes like others. Do Israelis come every day to say thank you for what we do in the various streets of the city? The fact that we have to treat everybody equally is not easily understood, although that is the basis for tolerance: an equal attitude toward everybody.

Every day, however, something happens to remind us of what intolerance can mean. Today we are all very joyful about the Spanish recognition of Israel and the accompanying agreements. Moreover, the Spaniards are so enthusiastic about it. I was in Spain a year ago. It was the first time that I took a holiday during my term as mayor. Everywhere I encountered high regard for the Jews. What one cannot quite understand, however, is why people whose ancestors killed the Jews five hundred years ago now show so much appreciation and why we should appreciate that appreciation. I find it tasteless to speak about our golden time together without even mentioning the Inquisition. It would have made the opening of official relations much more truthful if people on the Spanish side had faced the issue. Nobody is responsible for what his or her ancestors did five centuries ago. But if you deny it or hide it, I think it is shameful.

Intolerance is easy; tolerance demands effort and sometimes a lot of thought. Some of you may have read in the newspapers about an argument between the municipality and one of the Christian hospices over the rate of city taxes it should pay. You may also know that the church concerned nearly lost the building some years ago when one of its local representatives sold it. Eventually, we persuaded the purchaser to return it to the church for the original sum paid, although the value of the property had appreciated seven or eight times in the meantime.

What most probably do not know is the following detail. When the church renovated the property, it introduced an arcade on the streetfront, which meant that effectively the sidewalk had been extended. Now, the city is supposed to own every inch of sidewalk, because we have the responsibility to clean it and maintain it. But the church argued that its own law forbids it to hand over property in the Holy Land to anyone who does not belong to its faith, not even a piece of sidewalk. We debated it and eventually we passed a special law, according to which the church can retain legal ownership of the sidewalk, only it has leased it to the city.

This is the kind of effort that we constantly try to make for the sake of tolerance, even without thank you letters. Amusingly, we did once get a real thank you letter from a senior church representative. Only, he asked us to keep it confidential, because his church could not afford to let such things become known.

I could go on telling you funny stories — and not so funny stories — about where tolerance enters into city management, about where you have to uphold tolerance even though it looks ridiculous. We do it even if our own people attack us for giving in to the Mormons on the Mount of Olives, for giving in to the Muslims on the Temple Mount, for giving in to the Catholics somewhere else, and even if the return for it is very meager.

As long as Jews were in the ghetto, be it the Jerusalem quarter or in Eastern Europe or even Williamsburg in Brooklyn, they felt the warmth of their own community and their mutual support. In some ways, it was much easier for them than it is today. When you regain political independence after nineteen hundred years, you start on a very high note. There is indeed no better statement of principles than our Declaration of Independence. Since then, however, for almost forty years we have been under attack all the time. We see very few friends around and we are subjected to criticism over every imagined injustice, while the very real injustices in the surrounding countries are ignored. Nobody says a word about hundreds of Arabs being killed weekly in the war between Iraq and Iran or in the Lebanon. No Security Council debate is held about it, no Security Council condemnation is expressed. Although we are the ones who have repaired Muslim structures and Islamic architecture in the city, more so than anybody else ever before, the accusation will be that we have destroyed everything, and changed the character of the city, and not allowed free exercise of religion, etc.

We have not got the strength and the certainty of ourselves to laugh all this off. So you have reactions on our side which come out of the old ghetto spirit, only the ghetto spirit no longer has the strength and cohesion of the ghetto behind it. As a result, the reaction from some of our people is as bad, or almost as bad, as what others are trying to do to us, like the echo that comes back from the forest.

In general, I believe that we are still a little bit more tolerant to others here than most others are towards us. But we are far from being where some of us would like us to be. I regret especially that our religious establishment in this respect has hardly been better than other religious establishments.

Paul van Buren

I am here as a Christian, specifically as an American Episcopalian. That means that I was born and grew up in a family which was the first shaping influence upon my life. It was not only the immediate family circle, with the blessings we said at table and our family prayers, but also a rather large extended family, very extended for today's world. I grew up in a world not only of aunts and uncles, but of great-aunts and great-uncles — it seemed by the dozens — and God knows how many cousins; first cousins, first cousins once removed, second cousins, second cousins once removed, third cousins, fourth cousins . . . .

As I became aware of a larger world, the second shaping influence in my life was a community, consisting of the village in which I grew up with its church and the school. All this was a kind of coherent whole. If you will, it was my ghetto.

When I grew older, I began to become aware of other factors that shaped me and made me what I am. As I would describe it now, I became aware of belonging to a tradition. This tradition was closely associated with family and community, but also with two other features about which I was not self-conscious at the time, but of which I have since become aware. They were a form of language and a set of practices, that is, a way of talking about oneself and the world, shaped by family, community and church, and a lot of things one did and did not do. We never had meat on Fridays, but always fish. No candy during Lent. People sometimes say that Episcopalians are those Christians who think it is wrong to sin during Lent. Well, I never had candy during Lent except on Sunday. That was the important exception to which one looked forward. But that is also a way of saying that I grew up in a time frame: both a yearly schedule, marked by the major feasts and festivals, and a weekly time frame, in which not Shabbat but Sunday was the turning point.

This brief account of where one Christian comes from may help you to unlearn whatever you may perhaps have learned about Christianity from Martin Buber. For all of the wonderful services he performed, Buber did a considerable disservice by causing many Christians to misunderstand Judaism and many Jews to misunderstand Christianity. When I read Buber's *Two Types of Faith,* I just do not know where to find myself in that book.

It pains me, incidentally, to hear Buber and Franz Rosenzweig so often mentioned together. I would like to make a separate recommendation for Rosenzweig, if only because he has probably given the most penetrating criticism of Buber, going to the heart of the matter. I think a feast still lies ahead for the Jewish world when it takes the patience and does the requisite homework to understand Rosenzweig and perceive what he was up to. It will discover his marvelous Jewish way of undoing and reconstructing Hegel's dialectic in order to turn it into something else: a fascinating tool for interpreting the reality of the Jewish people.

At the same time, I would caution you also to be just a little careful about trying to learn about Christianity from Rosenzweig. Here I would cite an opinion that goes back to Justin Martyr: that it is bad business to try to learn about Jews except from Jews. And I would add that it is bad business to try to learn about Christianity except from Christians. We do not yet know each other well enough to be able to explain each other to each other. So I have had to learn from Jews what I have learned about Judaism.

This brings me back to where I come from as a Christian. That whole complex of family, community, tradition, language and practice gave me, as you would call it now, my identity. From that complex, I found out who I was, or I got a picture of who I was, or I made up my mind about it, or my mind was to a large extent made up for me. But it gave me my identity without requiring me to pay any attention to the "other". Of course, I knew that there were others. Where I grew up was not so far away from Cincinnati that I did not know there were Jews around. But I did not have to think about that, and indeed did not think about that, as I formed my own identity.

So it came to me as a shock to discover, much later on in life, how much forming one's own identity without paying attention to the identity of the other had done damage in the course of your history. When I discovered what my ancestors did to your ancestors, it was quite a shock. They did it, to a large extent, because my Christian community had formed its own identity in such a way that Jews did not need to be part of it. Ultimately, you did not need to exist. Ultimately, it would be better if you did not. It was indeed a shock to discover that about my tradition and myself: that we had so come to understand ourselves that the "other" was dispensable.

When you learn something like that, you are not faced with many choices. One choice, if you have any shred of moral sense in you at all, is to renounce that identity and all that went with it. I could no longer, in any moral sense, continue to identify myself with that tradition. One option, therefore, was not to continue to call myself a Christian.

It is not that easy to give up your identity. I found that I could not do it. Moreover, it would have been irresponsible, because it would just have left the problem behind. So I felt I had to go another way, without totally abandoning my tradition, and I tell you my story because that is the one I know best. Furthermore, I know others who have made the same kind of choice in their own way. So what I am telling you here is not just a private story. It resembles the stories of many others in my community.

The route that I took was to remain with my identity, to remain with my tradition, but to do so responsibly. That means, first, that we acknowledge our past, and second, that we set out to do whatever we can to change it. I am supported daily by the great saying in *Pirkei Avot* 2:16, which I paraphrase loosely to say that you do not have to complete the task, but you for sure cannot walk away from it. Having found it morally intolerable simply to remain the kind of Christian I was, I could be a Christian in a tolerable way, and then gladly be a Christian, only if I set out to see what we can do to change the picture.

Now this problem of relating to our tradition is not just a problem for Christians. The mayor has told us in how many forms this same difficulty can arise; among Christians, among Jews, not to speak of all the other traditions of this world.

So it is not just a problem between Jews and Christians. Rather, the problem is, it seems to me, a very large universal one that is getting extremely dangerous, not just for the beloved mayor of this city, and not just for those who live in Israel. Certainly, here it is dangerous. But we are now living in a world that is liable to make a final solution of us all because of this problem of identities that ignore one another.

The problem for all of us is indeed one another, because we have shaped and established our various identities by closing our eyes to one another. So there is a human task before us which I think is global: to come to understand ourselves while looking the other in the eye, face to face. Now, I am not going to try to take on the whole of the global task, because it is more than I can ever think about. But if I think only about the Christian task, which I have to think about as quite specifically my task, then it is the question of rediscovering my own identity while looking you in the face.

In working on that, I find for myself that neither the word ”tolerance” nor the word ”pluralism” gets at the problem, despite the magnificent example that Teddy has given not only in Jerusalem, but also to the world, of how to achieve a workable practical minimal level of tolerance that allows a city simply to function. With all due respect for his achievement, I have to say that I cannot use, in thinking about my problem, either the word ”tolerance” or the word ”pluralism”. As I see it, the problem is not merely how can I so define myself as to leave some space for you to exist. That is a minimum, but it does not go far enough. The question that I think the Christian church, at its best, is trying to wrestle with today, is how Christians can define themselves in such a way that for their own soul's health, for their own bodily health, for the health of their faith and church, they recognize the necessity of you being yourself and not like them. So I want not just to find how to make room for the other, but to find a positive need for you to be yourself and not me, for you to be other and different within my own self-identity.

I do not know that I can accomplish it even for myself. But that is the job that I cannot leave undone without at least trying to work on it. So, if you want to know what I am doing here, I am working on the question of defining myself in your presence, where the Jews are the majority and the Christians are the minority. A very healthy environment in which to think about who on earth I am.

In the seminar we are holding here, we are working on only a tiny little piece of this huge problem. It is an important piece, but only a piece. What I want to show you, however, is how coming here and studying Jewish and Christian texts in your presence connects to the larger problem.

We have picked texts spanning the period from about a hundred years before the beginning of the Common Era up to about five hundred years after. They are Christian and Jewish texts in about the same proportions. We are asking how the people who composed these texts understood their tradition, whose principal form was the Jewish scriptures. I say ”the Jewish scriptures” and not ”the Hebrew scriptures”, because you must know that for the early Christian communities the text of the scriptures that they knew and lived with and called sacred was of course the Greek translation. Although in many places one might call it a mistranslation, nevertheless that was the translation of the scriptures for the Greek-speaking Jewish world as well as for the church.

We are asking about these communities: what were the scriptures for them? In what sense were they scriptures? How did their traditions help those people to understand themselves? We already see in them the beginnings of our problem. Those communities were not looking at each other as they formed their own identities on this supposedly ”common” scriptural source, which was in fact so different because they were so differently read.

What we are trying to find out is whether we can in some way begin to feel our way toward finding how two so different communities, looking back to more or less the same text regarded as sacred, as laying a claim upon one, as giving one the vocabulary, imagery and history of one's own identity — how two communities could end up with such different readings of that tradition. Moreover, we want to see if there is any glimmer of a possibility that either of the two communities — or both of them — could today claim those scriptures as its own in such a way as to acknowledge in its reading of them that they are also claimed by the other, and rightly so. That is another way of putting the larger problem. This is how I see the work of our seminar connecting with the larger problem and even, in some tiny little way, being a step in the direction of creating a solution and not more of the problem that Teddy has to cope with.

David Hartman

When I listen to Teddy describing the concrete problems that he must deal with as mayor of Jerusalem, I feel the inadequacies of philosophy. What he said supports my evaluation of him as one who participates in the halakhic tradition, since he deals fundamentally with the pragmatics of daily life and not with metaphysical theory.

I was also very moved by Paul's account of his personal struggle to discover the "other". It has been my privilege to be in his presence as he goes through that profound agony. For years, I have watched him, learned from him, and become a more rooted Jew while listening to his own theological quest to find his roots in Christianity in my presence. What I would like to do now is to continue the discussion of Paul's question.

How do we think about ourselves and about our tradition in relationship to the "other"? I would say that the future of this country and of the Jewish return to full political action and responsibility will hang upon the issue of how we deal with the question of pluralism. It is not merely a pragmatic political issue, but also touches at the very soul of our understanding of our covenantal history.

The Judaic teaching regarding creation, revelation and redemption plays a certain role in the problem of religious tolerance and pluralism. The notion of one universal god of all humanity is partly responsible for the widespread tendency to value the universal deeply as a category of authenticity. Tribalism — being concerned only with *my* community, *my* nation, *my* people, *my* family — is antithetical to the very religious experience of meeting the universal God of creation. And therefore the Mishnah can say (*Sanhedrin* 4:5): "He who saves one life is as if he saved a whole world." Because the creation story of Genesis tells you that humankind is created in the image of God, it forces you into a universalist consciousness.

In the Bible, however, that idea then gets filtered through the story of God's relationship to a particular family, Abraham and his descendants. Here the universal God of creation is suddenly found relating to one person. Even with that one person, however, God's universality is involved, because all the world is promised the opportunity of being blessed through Abraham (*Gen.* 12:3). So we see the universal meeting the particular, only the particular is an instrument for the universal. Abraham becomes a paradigm for how God expresses His universal concern for human history. The role of Abraham in Islam and Christianity as well as Judaism is central because of that very important filtering.

Noah is not described in the Bible as the paradigm of a universal mission. Therefore Noah cannot be the carrier of universalistic history, whereas Abraham can. Out of this there begins the election of Israel, whereby Israel becomes the carrier, as understood by the prophets, of the universal God.

That election of the particular people Israel by the universal God forms the ground for the problem that we have to face in Jerusalem. Out of the desire to save all humankind, to care about all people, Judaism was accused of tribalization, of seeking a tribal God for a tribal people. The universal concern with the redemption of all humankind was held to be a much more authentic appreciation of the universal God. That universal concern also expressed itself in Kant's notion of the ethical. According to his ”categorical imperative”, you should act in such a way that you would want all other human beings to act the same way. The spirit of rationality is the spirit of universality. if something is rational, it should be compelling for all men.

In one sense, therefore, wanting all of humankind to embrace one way is a noble idea. It expresses largesse, love, concern and renunciation of jealousy. I do not wish to keep God only for myself, but to share my truth and my wealth. Yet, strangely enough, that kind of moving noble universal idea destroyed more human beings in history than nearly any other idea. In the modern world, Marxist universalism has been responsible for the death of over forty million people. Blindness toward the different one is often characteristic of revolutionaries who believe that they have the universal truth for all. We have killed more people in the name of love and justice than we have in the name of demonic evil. This is the important lesson of history. The idea of universal concern may sound noble, but in fact it has functioned as one of the most dangerous ideas of history. Moreover, the people who have been a stumbling block to all visions of universality, Marxist as well as Christian and Muslim, have been the Jewish people. A very interesting phenomenon: Jews who taught the world this universal idea, a universal vision of history reflecting a universal God, were the community that always suffered from it. Judaism invented that universality and the Jewish people's suffering proved it to be a destructive idea.

Therefore the question is: to what do I primarily owe loyalty as a Jew who is rooted in his tradition and loves his Torah? Is it to the prophet's dream (*Zech.* 14:9,16) that God will reign and all humankind will one day come to Jerusalem and say "The God of Israel is King"? Do I owe exclusive allegiance to the prophetic dream of universality, or do I owe allegiance first to the lived history of my people, whose body testifies to the brutalization of the human spirit when this idea seeks to be translated into concrete reality? Is it the abstract aspiration or the lived history that claims me?

My own decision is that my allegiance has always been not to a written text as such, but to a living tradition that embraced it. I come out of the rabbinic tradition in which what guides me is not just a book but a living people. History as it has been concretized in the lived community is what obligates me and not necessarily the original beautiful vision of a prophet. From this perspective, Jewish history cries out urgently for us to rethink the original Jewish idea. Jewish history provides a critique of its own biblical roots. Since in the Jewish tradition the oral law has primacy over the written law, my people's history has primacy for me rather than the text itself.

Therefore, in my own understanding — and this is one reason why we feel so enriched in the Shalom Hartman Institute by the presence of serious Christian theologians — we Jews have come home to our biblical land to tell the world that you misinterpreted what our biblical ancestors wrote. The founders of the universal vision have come home to correct the way that Christianity and Islam took our message, applied it and destroyed so much of our people through giving allegiance to the text of the Torah to the exclusion of the living people of Israel. Like Paul van Buren, however, some Christians have rediscovered the living people of Israel and for them the text has to fit into that existential experience instead of the people having to become secondary to the text.

So the issue is: does our own immediate experience of reality have a normative claim or must we legitimize our feelings only by prior utilization of texts? As Teddy rightly said, you can quote texts either way. But one thing that the Zionist revolution did was to give a normative weight to immediacy over against tradition. The Zionist revolution, in its essence, asserted that reality can be trusted prior to a legitimization derived from the texts. The texts will have to come to grips with reality. Our task is first to create reality.

That is why I see it as so urgent that we find a new way of understanding the election of Israel and the scheme of redemption in history. What we have to learn from the concept of election is not that any one people mediates the universal God, for then the question arises — which people? Is it Israel or the Christian church or the Muslim nation or the working class? What we should learn from election is the very opposite: the dignity of the particularity of distinct faith communities. Not that the particular mediates the universal, but that the particular is acceptable in the eyes of God, that the universal God of creation can also love and be interested in this particular people or that particular people in particular ways. Election is then not an excluding category. It simply signifies that the universal God of the world does not find it beyond Himself to be engaged by the particular limited framework of a concrete community.

Aristotle's God could not manifest such an interest, because to be interested in the history of a human community is to be interested in that which is limited. In relating to the particular, God also has somehow to limit Himself. For Aristotle, therefore, God's perfection would be marred if there were any such relational nexus.

In my theology, the principle of covenantal election is that God, who was universal in creation, imposes limits upon Himself when he becomes involved in human history. Not that history is the carrier of a universal God who acts in one way for all of humankind, but that when God chooses to speak to some particular community, He speaks as a limited particular God and not as a universal God. Divine speech, to human beings in their particularity is intelligible to them only if that speech makes itself limited and human. As the rabbis frequently remind us: "The Torah speaks in the language of human beings."

Self-limitation is the condition for any personal relationship. For example, if you have a perfect father who thinks he knows it all, who thinks he is capable of doing everything, it may be wonderful to admire such a father, but it is impossible to live with him. You can only live with a father who makes room for you, but he makes room for you only when he limits his role and does not insist on being everything.

You cannot relate personally at all to that which is totally perfect, omnipotent, omnicompetent. God as the Creator has no relationships. He stands in splendid isolation as the God of the universe. When he becomes the God of history who seeks relationships with human beings, He then has to limit himself.

Here is also an answer to Paul van Buren's question: why in the past did we not define ourselves in relationship to the other? It was because if the requirement of limiting yourself is something you cannot bear, then you cannot have a relationship. Why have we defined ourselves in isolation? It is because if you think of yourself as being endowed with the total perfect religious truth, you cannot live with others whose dignity stems from a different world view. How can you relate to others who have joy and dignity if you think you have the only truth? The very existence of their joy is a threat to your own illusions of omnicompetence and totality.

One who has the perfect truth does not have to listen to anyone else, but at most to sit waiting for his or her turn to speak. Here is where I would distinguish between tolerance and pluralism. Tolerance is the quality of those who think they have the whole truth, only they do not impose it on anyone else, unlike the revolutionary or the missionary. A person can thus be a universalist and be tolerant. Ultimately, however, that tolerance keeps him or her fundamentally isolated from the other. Such people do not learn from the other, because they are already complete unto themselves.

There are degrees of tolerance, depending upon how compulsively one believes in one's own total truth. One degree is to become paternalistic and say: "The other is a child and does not know yet." Another degree is to pray that ultimately the other will see the light. When prayer does not help, you may go on to pinch the other a little bit, to encourage him or her to see the light.

Maimonides asks what allows us to do it and answers that "really" the person wants it, only the *yetzer hara* (the evil instinct) prevents that person from seeing the light. Much as I respect Maimonides, here he gives the answer of all enlightened coercers in history, be they Jewish or Christian or Marxist or whatever.

The same answer is given today by those who seek to impose religious legislation through the Knesset. They insist that they are not imposing anything, but only helping Jews to discover what they really want. For, according to the Midrash, all the Jewish souls of all generations were present at Sinai. Since we were all there, no one is really imposing anything on them, but just helping them find out what they really know themselves to be obligated to do. This exemplifies how tolerance ultimately tends to slip back into violence. For if you feel you have the whole truth, you may inhibit yourself for a while, but ultimately, if you have any sense of concern for people, you are going to force it down their throats.

Jews who choose that path here simply have not learned from our history. They are imitating all the non-Jewish despots in history who liked to tell us: aren't you grateful to me that I am helping you see the truth? Precisely Judaism's own religious joy was a stumbling block in history for all forms of universal despotism. The dignity of my people, their joy in performing God's commandments, was what deprived the despot of a sense of security. Despots had to persecute us, because the very joy of our particularity was a stumbling block for anyone who wanted to save all humankind. That we did not want to be saved was a scandal for their redemptive schemes of history. It is a scandal today for Marxism as it was a scandal for Christianity and for Islam. Their inability to deal with our vibrant life in Jerusalem arises because they fundamentally cannot recognize the vitality of this people.

What it is my responsibility to admit and correct, however, is that there is much to the Jewish tradition that can provide an excuse for such despotism. The root of it lies in a mistaken understanding of what divine revelation gives us. Human beings never intuit eternal truths, not even in revelation. Human beings never transcend their own limitations. Revelation does not liberate you from your finitude as a human being. Revelation only gives you a God who accepts your finitude, not one who gives you an opportunity to get beyond it. The covenant of election is God accepting Israel within that people's limits. It is not giving them a framework of the universal which lifts them beyond the limits of their human nature.

My loyalty to Judaism, therefore, is not a testimony to my having the only truth, but a testimony to the fact that one can find meaning in one's religious life without believing that it is the only game in town. There are people who think that in order to enjoy themselves, they have to believe that what they have is the only thing available. If you tell them that there is something else, they cannot sit still any more. They are like some tourists who come to Israel, get to know the place, and then return home. They were happy when they were here. But when they call on their cousin to tell him about their trip, the first thing that the cousin may do is to ask: "Did you see such and such?" Then the people who thought they were happy have to admit that they missed it. "What, you didn't see that!" It destroys their whole trip, because if there was something else which they did not see, then it is as if they saw nothing. For only if they think that where they are is the only place to be, can they sit still. If there could be something good in another place, how could they still be where they are?

This is the problem, our inability to experience the joy of the other person. To me, religious pluralism — or better the act of living as a humble person before God — is my ability to feel joy over your dignity. Paul van Buren and other Christians who have come to the Shalom Hartman Institute have contributed to my religious experience as a Jew, because these encounters remind me of how limited I am. Here are all these people, very seriously religious, very intelligent, very human and warm, yet they do not go to a yeshivah. How is that possible? Not only that, they did not eat my mother's "kugel" or "cholent". They have no Jewish neuroses, even if they may have a few of their own. And I say to myself, how is it possible?

My first reaction could be: it is not possible, so the most important thing is never to invite them again. But that would be to shut my eyes to the question. The question is: can I celebrate Judaism, can the fellows of this Institute celebrate love of the Talmud, and yet see other people working through the Pauline epistles and the writings of Augustine with the same passion that we have when we learn Torah? Does their joy threaten our dignity?

Here is where Teddy Kollek in a pragmatic sense has opened a way for us. For this I love him, that he has laid the foundations for our ability to meet here, because philosophers can come only after political statesmen have created some kind of reality for them. Philosophers can take reality in new directions, but it takes the courage of a pragmatist, of a mayor who has to rack his brain over sidewalks, to provide us with that reality in the first place. I would not like to be there for five minutes in Teddy's office. I would not know how to sit with one patriarch coming in after another, each with his own canon law that must somehow be respected. We think we are smart if we manage to sell our leaven to a gentile over Passover without violating halakhah. But look at Teddy, he is doing it all the time with sidewalks and who knows what else. I thought I knew how to play with the halakhah, but Teddy is the biggest halakhic manipulator in history!

Now the point is, therefore, that what we are doing when Christians come to the Institute, and we all study together in a serious framework, is that we are not just holding ecumenical meetings. It is not just sort of love-in. We are here to learn, to meet each other in our otherness. And as I met your dignity, I know before God that I can never be more than a limited human being. When I discover that, I discover afresh the foundations of the covenant, I discover the foundations of religious love, I discover a God who says: "I accept limits; I do not ask limited human beings to become universal." That rediscovery and confirmation of myself as a Jew is stimulated by people like van Buren, who comes here as an Episcopalian telling his story and feeling that he can appreciate his own tradition better when he appreciates the passion of our tradition of Torah, while we can learn Torah in his presence. If this kind of thing can spread, then maybe the pragmatics of Teddy has created a space in which we can try to prevent the differences between our traditions from destroying the world.

We have come back to rebuild a city that was filled with holy war. We have come back as witness to the dignity of particularity. There is not one key to the kingdom of God. Jews speak out of the joy of their particularity to a world waiting to hear how dignified individuals and nations can be when they learn to accept the full power and significance of being a limited creature in the presence of the God of creation.

Jerusalem and Pluralism — A public discussion held at the Shalom Hartman Institute, Jerusalem,

Renewing our Dedication to the Jewish World

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

In the course of the year, since the last Assembly I have, I believe, broken new ground, historically speaking, in a number of State visits which were, indeed, a growing testimony to Israel's stronger position in the world community today. Those trips included one which can be characterized "historic" in every sense of the word, becoming, as it has done, part of the story of the Jewish people against the background of the Holocaust. I refer to my visit to the Federal Republic of Germany. It is, I believe, relevant to recall the clear, unequivocal declaration by the Chancellor of the Federal Republic at a State luncheon in my honor in which, as has done President Von Weiszacker before him, on behalf of the present and future generations, he accepted full historic responsibility for the tragedy of the Holocaust, and what is more important, announced unequivocally the Federal Republic's special responsibility for the ongoing security of Israel. If you add to this declaration public opinion polls a month after the visit — a large majority accept the concept of Germany's responsibility for the security of the State of Israel — the significance of this visit can clearly not be underestimated.

If ever I have been guilty of sitting on a dais and feeling frustrated about the repetitious nature of the discussions, wondering where it is all leading, my encounter with the Jewish communities in various parts of the world and in particular in Australia and New Zealand gave me the answer.

In Australia some 80 percent of the Jewish children go to Jewish schools and it was possible for me to address them in Hebrew practically everywhere. I cannot forget the Zionist fervor and feeling of Jewish pride and dignity with which I was greeted by communities in general and by the youth in particular.

Australian Jewry's record as far as Aliya is concerned is about 10 percent. New Zealand's Jewry, unfortunately a very small community, is approaching some 20 percent of immigration to Israel. I wondered to myself, as I was present at the magnificent rallies and the proud demonstrations of the Jewish community in Australia, what enormous strides we could have made had the story been the same among American Jewry — particularly the story of Jewish education.

I thought of this but a few days ago when I visited the development town of Shlomi on the Lebanese border, which has in the past been through such difficult times. Shlomi is a small development town with a population of less than 3,000 people. It has been struggling for years but I believe that under its current leadership, which is typical of the new authentic leadership which has emerged in the development towns, it is on its way to stability, and can reach the standard which characterizes many other development towns today, a development which represents one of the great miracles of Israel's life.

I thought of what increased aliya could have done when I met a young American girl from Iowa. Her name is Sandy Iluz. She came here four years ago and after looking around Israel seeking a challenge, she picked on Shlomi because of the great problems that she found there. Single-handed she opened a school for adults in order to help them receive the education they never had the chance to get before. She won their confidence and was inundated with requests from the entire area, particularly industry. She now heads a vocational school retraining the area's unemployed that she set up with the help of local industry. She is also establishing a school in a Nahariya factory based on her center in Shlomi. This was done by one young, dedicated girl who came from one of the greatest centers of assimilation, the United States.

What obstacles could we have overcome were the Sandy Iluzes — and there are thousands of them in Israel — to come to Israel in the tens and hundreds of thousands. What a difference this would have made. How tragic it is that historians of the future will regard this failure on the part of the great free Jewish communities in the world and in particular that of the United States, as one of the missed opportunities of our national resurrection.

Soviet Jewry

One of the most important developments in this country in the past two decades has been the Soviet immigration. Its effects can be seen in every corner of the country and its positive influences cannot be underestimated. Their contributions are most marked in the field of music and the arts, in engineering and in medicine. There is hardly a village in this country without its youth band and orchestra or choir. In most cases much of the driving force comes from the Soviet olim.

We cannot tell whether or not we are facing a major breakthrough as far as the immigration of Soviet Jewry from the Soviet Union is concerned. I strongly recommend that we not be misled by declarations, statements or by indications of a new style of government in Russia. As far as we are concerned there is only one criterion by which to judge developments in the Soviet Union and that is the degree to which Jews are free to live as Jews in the Soviet Union, practice their religion and learn the Hebrew language and the Jewish tradition. That criterion is the degree to which they will be free to leave the Soviet Union for Israel. In this respect it is obvious that the outcome of superpowers' negotiations and the decisions taken in Moscow will be decisive in affecting the fate of the Jewish community in the Soviet Union affecting Israel's future too.

Thus we dare not let up in our efforts for Soviet Jewry with all the strength and resources at our disposal. But above all may I emphasize that it is vital that we, as a people, address ourselves to this issue in one strong voice. It could be a vital milestone in our struggle. We should not be at loggerheads. Instead we must close our ranks and speak out as one people on this issue.

The Demographic Factor

The forecast for the future of the Jewish people in the Diaspora is terrifying. Even the most optimistic forecast must give rise to very considerable concern. By some estimates every hour some ten Jews are lost to the Jewish people. The results by the end of this century or by the end of the first quarter of the next century reveal, according to the forecast, a picture that could be catastrophic. Like the weather, everybody talks about the issue but little is done about it.

Secular-Religious Conflict

We cannot ignore the grave religious polarization which is affecting our people. In considering how to meet this challenge, we must, however, see the development in its correct perspective. Virtually all the world's societies today, first and foremost those in the Middle East, are afflicted by the recrudescence of fanaticism and a widening rift between secularism and religion. This dangerous confrontation exists in most major Jewish communities in the world. However, in Israel the clash is more obvious and sinister because through our electoral system it is translated into political terms.

Frankly I am disturbed by the tendency of world Jewry to sit back and pass judgement on Israel. Some of the more obnoxious phenomena in our society today are American imports, financed by Jews in the United States. Many of the fanatic groups who do not recognize the State of Israel and wage an unrelenting struggle against its existence are financed primarily by Jewish communities abroad, particularly in the U.S. This means that the Jewish people as a whole has a problem which cannot by any means be regarded as exclusively Israeli. This problem or these problems must be faced up to squarely by Jewry abroad, particularly in the U.S. To date, their reaction has been, to say the least, half-hearted and indecisive. In Israel we are actively dealing with the problem but we must understand that this is a world-wide Jewish problem and as such we must approach it.

The only answer is clearly increased tolerance and civilized co-existence. Without them we will be hard put to continue the great work of building, which this Assembly symbolizes. This is a test we dare not fail.

Years ago we faced the problem of ethnic division. This is a problem which we can all be proud to say does not exist any more in Israel. Here and there are some remnants which have to be overcome by means of improved social work and increased educational facilities for those who have not had opportunities. But we are by now in the advanced process of becoming one people, a great part of which is unaware of its ethnic origin because of widespread intermarriage between Ashkenazic, Sephardic and Oriental Jews.

This is one of Israel's great success, seen today in our leadership both at the national and perhaps most impressive of all, at the local and municipal level, where an authentic impressive leadership has grown up. If we have solved this problem then we must with the same resolve address the problem of religious confrontation and solve it too.

You must be aware without my having to elaborate, of a sense of uneasiness in Israel and in the Diaspora as to the manner in which the Jewish Agency conducts itself. As one who is very concerned and who has on more occasions than one been compelled to step into the breach and defend the Agency, I would urge you to devote a major effort towards re-establishing greater trust on the part of the Jewish people and a more positive approach than exists today.

The Jewish Agency is the instrument which enables a direct involvement of the Jewish people in the development and advance of the national goals of Israel. It is your duty, together with the government of Israel, to seek out what has to be done in order to strengthen and consolidate the Jewish people in Israel, to bring about a true and complete integration of the various elements in our society and to help to advance and strengthen Israel as the national and cultural center of the Jewish people.

This will not be achieved by resolutions and formulations. This in the final analysis will come about as a result of the achievements of our State — achievements which will, indeed, enable our country to achieve the prophetic vision of being "a light unto nations".

German-Israel Relations

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

Standing here on this historic and, yes, moving occasion I cannot but look back on the history of my people in these lands, a past which has been immortalized in thousands of volumes, a past which includes periods of sadness and tragedy, which includes the persecution of our people through the Middle Ages, a past which recalls the great years in which our nation's genius flourished on this soil and produced over the centuries some of the greatest contributions in thought, literature, law, liturgy, philosophy, which were ever made by our people — contributions of the great Ashkenazi wing of the Jewish people. They have survived the ages and stand as major landmarks on the road along which both Western and Jewish civilizations have moved over the recent centuries.

The rich Yiddish language which sums up so succinctly much of Jewish joy and tragedy — a language which reflects years of persecution, of tragedy and of humor — mirrors much of Jewish life in these lands and the story of our people in much of Europe since the Middle Ages. It is an historic mosaic encompassing the shades and darkness of the horrors of the Middle Ages suffered by great and ancient Jewish communities together with the light of the great periods of German enlightenment and Jewish emancipation. Here in Germany some of the great leaders of Zionism laid the organizational foundation of our national liberation movement. The mosaic is dominated by towering figures, giants in the story of human civilization. The names Lasalle, Moses Mendelssohn, Heinrich Heine, Albert Einstein and hundreds more — poets, novelists, authors and teachers, playwrights, critics, religious and non-religious philosophers, stage directors, essayists, scientific geniuses, composers and musicians — all these have gained immortality, even though it all culminated in that firestorm of twelve years, which for those who passed through them seemed to be indeed one thousand years of the unspeakable.

We are, for better or for worse, part of each other's histories. Jews lived in Germany for 1,600 years at least before Nazi Germany; they helped build Cologne and Trier, Speyer, Worms and Mainz before the German people coalesced into the united nation they later became. Our people contributed to the great development of German culture in modern times, and they were the first Jews to come under the heels of a neo-pagan, anti-Jewish and anti-Christian ideology that threatened human civilization all over this world. We, in Israel, on the other hand, continue to admire amongst other things, the music of Bach and Beethoven, the literature of Goethe and Thomas Mann, and would not wish to do otherwise. We derive inspiration from the few people of moral courage who resisted injustice and evil and proved that in the darkest times of suffering, there are indeed rays of light.

I believe that at no time in the future will the ties between our two peoples be normal in the usual sense. I am saying this for the sake of both Germans and Jews. It is possible, indeed desirable, to have normal diplomatic and economic relations, and thankfully we do have them between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel.

But what happened in the first half of this century cannot be undone. For no people can step out of its own history and disown it. It is a legacy which can never be denied. Our children will remain the heirs of the past. This creates both a problem and a bond; a duty and a responsibility to work towards a state of affairs in which Auschwitz will not be able ever to repeat itself.

We have to look history in the face, and accept what is reflected in its however distant mirror. But we know that free men are capable of change, capable of forging a noble future. In this case although it is not in the power of mere mortals to forgive, the remembrance of things past is not, and should never be, viewed as moral self-paralysis. The opposite is true: it is a moral imperative, enunciating the determination that what once occurred must never occur again.

Much has been said and written about the problem of the relationship of these two democracies which bear the memories of the most terrifying Holocaust. In that terrible firestorm in history, the Jewish people were the principal victims, losing one-third of our nation at the hands of a cruel and inhuman regime from which the German people had to be liberated.

Our mutual State visits are testimony to a new relationship which has miraculously been developed between our two peoples — while the trauma still remains. There are so many among my people who are sole survivors of whole families who lived their lives happily together and who saw their entire world, the world of their children, their home and their family, go up in smoke.

Indeed, there were some among my people who questioned the timing of my visit. I cannot deny that I respect the depth of their feelings, even if I disagreed with them. If despite everything, we can meet and can bridge the chasm, if despite the flicker of the memorial flames we meet like this, it is thanks to the great spring of human hope and faith which wells up in all our hearts — Jewish and German, and which gives expression to an eternal oath ”Never Again” For, in this renewed meeting between the Jewish and German peoples, there is a human drama the likes of which has not been seen in the history of man.

The State of Israel, emerging from the depths of Jewish dreams and prayers over the centuries, and the new Germany have both arisen on the ruins of those years. Both bear a responsibility for different reasons to be a symbol of human justice, of the sanctity of human life, of equality without distinction of religion, race or color, of freedom and dignity. We are both committed to taking a stand against all wicked regimes that suppress the dignity of man and practice racism and discrimination. We both have to struggle for a world of peace, a world which will be the antithesis and complete rejection of all that Nazism stood for.

The State of Israel bears the prime responsibility of guaranteeing the future of a Jewish people which is strong and steadfast in its moral strength, in its human quality and its ability to protect itself. I believe that Germany has an historic responsibility to help Israel in this vital task of survival and to abstain from any act which might strengthen those who are our declared enemies.

After that terrible war the German nation was vouchsafed peace, healing and prosperity. Tragically enough my people have not yet achieved that. We have been obliged to struggle for our independence and our freedom on the field of battle, a brutal conflict which still continues in order to achieve security and peace with all our neighbors.

Over forty years ago, on the smoking ruins of a destroyed past, from the depths of human misery, courageous leaders began to reconstruct for improved relations between Israel and the Jewish people on the one hand and the German people on the other hand. On a scorched earth, seeped in blood and tears, on which it appeared that nothing would ever grow or flourish, a small group of unique people — the names of Theodor Heuss, Nahum Goldman, Konrad Adenauer and David Ben-Gurion come to mind — sowed the first seeds of the future. This group of people included those isolated heroes amongst your people who risked their lives to save Jews and to whom tribute is paid in Yad Vashem in Jerusalem, the opponents of the Nazi regime, statesmen of high principle and vision, outstanding ambassadors to Israel, so very sensitive to the problems and import of their mission, and courageous friends who dedicated themselves to true and unswerving friendship to the Jewish people and to Israel.

The European Holocaust swept away in limitless tragedy one of the most glorious epochs of Jewish history. The soul of the nation had been ravaged, its spiritual continuity was threatened and its very life hung in precarious balance.

The poignancy of our tragedy was without parallel in the annals of mankind.

There have been other periods of calamity in Jewish history, but one was followed by immediate recompense and revival. Seventy years elapsed from the exile to Babylon, after the destruction of the First Temple, till the return to the Land of Israel under the 'mandate' of the Emperor Cyrus of Persia. From the destruction of the Second Temple till the beginning of the restoration of the Third Commonwealth, there was a lapse of over 1,800 years. In our day and before our very eyes the revival and restoration came immediately in the wake of destruction. Only three years after the greatest crime in history had been perpetrated against our people, the Jewish nation restored its statehood. The scar of exile was healed; Jewish dignity was rescued and uplifted. A nation regained the sources of its eternal inspiration, and immortal prophecy was vindicated before its very eyes. A new and glorious epoch was opened to our people. The valley of death suddenly issued in the broad uplands of hope. Hope and dignity were vouchsafed.

As Israel advances along the road of accomplishment and progress, giving a helping hand as it does to developing countries which have achieved their independence, it represents a vindication of faith and prayer through the ages, a symbol of revival and a message of hope. Indeed, a lasting evidence of the integrity of the spirit. For in our religious belief the redemption of Israel is linked irrevocably with that of the human race. Surely our nation as it emerges from darkness and adversity must represent universal hope and faith in the human spirit.

The Jerusalem Talmud tells us of two great masters who were walking on the plain of Arbel as the first dawn broke. They contemplated the shafts of light penetrating the gloom, at once disappearing into darkness and rekindling themselves, until the morning set in. In prophetic vision one turned to the other and said: "Thus shall be Israel's redemption, slowly as the dawn arises, even as the light grows, so it will be." When the gloom seemed overwhelming, when the very survival of our people lay in question, the new dawn broke.

The Federal Republic of Germany, one of the leading members of the European Community is united in the cause of the advancement of the peoples of Europe. I cannot but reflect in sorrow how far removed in our area we are from the fulfilment of the European dream which has brought you so far. During 40 long years you have emerged from the ruins of war, have preserved peace and advanced on a common road to prosperity. We, in Israel — Jews, Moslems, Christians and Druze — dream of the day when peace will come. We dream of the day when we can share the fruits of our research, scientific advances and technological developments with the nations of our region. We dream that the nations of the Middle East will be inspired by this recent European experience and with it in mind we pray for peace and cooperation in our region which has suffered so much.

As I reflect on these historic moments I recall the words of our prophets and our sages who, while admonishing and rebuking our kings and our rulers, never locked the gates of hope and consolation. Their constant precept to the individual and to society was to live in justice, in righteousness and in human kindness. Generations of our people adhered to these ideals even in days of darkness, hardship and suffering.

Despite all the problems and difficulties which beset us, we shall always adhere to these ideals. Let us say in the words of the Psalmist: "Weeping may endure for a night, but joy cometh in the morning."

For us these words have a special poignancy and meaning, for they reflect so much the history of an ancient people which has lived thousands of years and stood at the graves of so many oppressors and so many vast empires. As we ascend the road leading from the valley of death from which we emerged, as we move from the night of weeping to the joy of the morning, let us, with our common experience in mind, devote ourselves to a great and challenging future, consecrated to the ideal of the advance of mankind in a world in which the dignity of man and his freedom will be a supreme and sacred value.

An address given by Mr. Chaim Herzog, the President of Israel, at a State dinner given by the President of the Federal Republic of Germany.

President Ch. Herzog laying a wreath at the memorial on the site of the concentration camp in Bergen Belzen

An Historic Visit to Berlin

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

There can be no doubt that the past shaped our present and, therefore, our future looms like an invisible wall between our two peoples — a wall before which we can only stand mute, erected as it was by the millions of my people who perished in the flames of the gas on the soil of these lands and this Europe.

As I stand here in Berlin I cannot but recall the momentous events which led to the collapse of democracy and the rise of Hitler, events which must always

President Ch. Herzog in W.Berlin looking over the wall into East Berlin

be in the minds of leaders of the free world wherever they may be, so that they may learn from the past. I cannot but recall the terrifying beginnings of a regime of oppression and most terrifying of all, the pusillanimous weak and cowardly reactions of the countries of the free world in the face of this threat. I cannot but recall Kristallnacht and all that it represents. The night in 1938 when Nazi stormtroopers launched a coordinated attack on the Jewish community in Germany, burnt the synagogues in all its cities and made bonfires in the streets of the Holy Books and the scrolls of the Holy Law and Bible. It was the night when Jewish homes were attacked and heads of families were taken away, many of them never to return. It was the night when the windows of all Jewish businesses and stores were smashed, covering the streets of the cities of Germany with a film of broken glass, which dissolved into millions of crystals which gave that night its name. It was the night which led eventually to the crematoria and the gas chambers: Auschwitz, Birkenau, Dachau, Buchenwald, Theresienstadt and others. It was the night which led to the most terrifying holocaust in the history of man.

As I stand here I cannot but recall the burning of the Reichstag with all that it implied. I cannot but recall the drama which occurred so near to here as the final hours of the Third Reich moved to their logical end in the bunker. I stand here immersed in that short period of horror — only twelve years long — which brought indescribable horrors on so much of Europe and which seemed to all who were there like a nightmare one thousand years long.

As the significance of my visit to Germany accompanies me on every step that I make on this soil, I cannot but be conscious of the fact that I am in one of the great cities of the world, which being sad and painful to observe, reflects the two basic ways of life open to mankind. This half to which we in Israel belong reflects the system adopted by a minority of the peoples in the world. We are proud to belong to that distinguished minority.

I have always maintained, and nothing has happened to modify my views, that one of the problems we have when explaining to the world the Israel-Arab conflict, is the lack of perspective on the part of those who deal with the subject. The whole picture is out of focus. The correct proportions are absent. As a result, both governments and the media, which have been observing the area for years, have awoken one bright morning on more occasions than one to surprising developments they had never anticipated. The Khomeini revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war come to mind.

I am not in any way suggesting that the Israel-Arab conflict is not an important one. Of course it is, and merits a determined effort towards its resolution. But it appears to draw an obsessive interest, to the exclusion of far more important issues in the Middle East. Observe the situation all around us, as we view it: Afghanistan, Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, the ongoing civil war in Lebanon, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, Chad, Sudan, the Western Sahara, all unconnected with our dispute with the Arab countries, and then perhaps you may give the correct perspective to the political picture in our area.

The Israel-Arab conflict is not, in my view, the central problem in the Middle East, as far as world peace is concerned. Those who point to it as such are willfully, or because of a lack of understanding of the issues and their implications, misleading public and indeed world opinion and ignoring a situation fraught with danger for the world.

Because, if the Israel-Arab conflict is resolved, by whatever means it is resolved, the main centers of bloodshed, warfare and instability will persist. The world faces the dangers inherent in the impact of the twentieth century coupled with untold wealth on medieval societies.

Today Moslems are killing Moslems in a bloody war between Iraq and Iran, the longest in this century, characterized by an unbelievable degree of brutality and inhuman savagery and in which the numbers of casualties are in the millions. The use of poison gas and the wholesale slaughter of prisoners already emphasize the barbarous nature of this struggle. More people were killed in the one battle for Khoramshar on the Shatt-el-Arab than died in all the Arab-Israeli wars on both sides. Arabs have been engaged in military conflict against Arabs on the borders of Yemen and South Yemen, as is the case to this day in the sands of the Western Sahara. The Libyan invasion of Chad created a potential and immediate threat to Sudan, and indeed to all the African countries bordering on Chad, and the events over the past years in Sudan, threatening as they do the security of Egypt, emphasize this point. Compare the coverage given by the world media in general and this area's media in particular to the Gulf war, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to mention but two instances, with the coverage given to isolated stone throwing incidents in the West Bank, and you will get an idea of the obsession with our conflict to which I referred.

One of the results of the distortion of the picture presented about Israel and about the Israel-Arab conflict has been a total lack of perspective and a failure to gauge the enormous advance which has been made towards peace in the Middle East.

The past year has seen the most intense political activity in an effort to move forward the peace process in the Middle East. In this process the United States government has been a central and pivotal figure. Living as we do with one-and-a-quarter-million Arabs in the territories administered by us, not to mention some 700,000 Israeli Arabs, we have been and are in fact maintaining a constant dialogue with the Arab world. The meetings of the then Prime Minister Peres with King Hassan in Morocco and President Mubarak of Egypt in recent months, reflect a new atmosphere which prevails in the area. Daily, for instance, 100,000 Arabs cross into Israel from the Judea and Samaria areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in order to work. Daily thousands of residents of the West Bank, Gaza and Jordan cross the bridges across the Jordan River into Jordan and the rest of the Arab world, and into Israel and Israeli controlled territory. In all, 1.1 million people cross the bridges annually. Millions of dollars worth of produce and exports are transported in both directions. Fifty percent of the Jordanian Parliament is returned by residents of the West Bank who are citizens of Jordan. Some 30-50 percent of Jordan's Cabinet at any given period is composed of Palestinians, many of whom have their homes in the West Bank. In Judea and Samaria, Jordanian currency is legal tender alongside Israeli currency. Recently a Jordanian Bank began operations in Nablus under the supervision of both the Bank of Israel and the Jordanian Treasury. The Jordanian legal system applies in Judea and Samaria as does the Jordanian educational system. Many of the civil servants in the West Bank continue to receive salaries from Jordan. In other words, the daily contact between Israel and the Arab world via the Arab society in the West Bank and Gaza is far more intimate and complex than is generally appreciated. Furthermore, the West Bank population is in many ways part of Jordanian society, as the inhabitants move freely in both directions across the Jordan River. The only free Arab press in the Middle East is published in Israel and in the territories administered by Israel. Few people outside of Israel appreciate the scope of contact between the Jewish and Arab populations in Israel and in the territories, and hence with the Arab world. Yet this must be a most important factor in evaluating the situation in the area.

A dramatic outcome of President Sadat's initiative in coming to Jerusalem in 1977 has been a psychological revolution in the area. An historic watershed has been crossed and Israel is today accepted in the area. One only has to compare the reaction of the Arab world to Egypt's initiative in 1977 with the comparatively mute reaction of the Arab world to then Prime Minister Peres's official visit to Morocco as a guest of King Hassan in summer and to his recent summit conferences in Alexandria and Cairo with President Mubarak.

Three Arab governments have formally accepted the principle of direct negotiations with Israel: Egypt, Morocco and Jordan. Many of the others have given this approach their tacit approval. Who would have dreamt of a situation such as this only ten years ago when our borders with the Arab world were hermetically sealed?

The debate in the moderate Arab world today is not whether or not to negotiate with Israel — that is more or less accepted as self-understood — the debate is on what issues to negotiate. The visit of an Israeli minister to Egypt or vice-versa, is no longer headline news. The appearance of Israeli delegations at academic and professional conferences in Cairo has become commonplace. Tens of thousands of Israelis frequent Egyptian hotels. Thousands of Arabs from all over the Middle East benefit from the medical facilities in Israel. Last summer 200,000 Arabs from all over the Middle East crossed the Jordan River during the vacation period. Annually thousands of Israeli Moslems make the Haj pilgrimage to Mecca, and hundreds of trucks cross daily loaded with agriculture produce and exports to the Arab world. The Egyptian flag flies over the Egyptian Embassy in Israel. The Israeli flag flies over the Israeli Embassy in Cairo.

I am the Head of a State, 17 percent of whose citizens are Arabs and Druze. Given the problems which we have faced over the past thirty-nine years, the condition of our Arab population which is a loyal and integral part of our society, is perhaps the greatest tribute to our free and democratic society. Our Arab and Druze citizens are an integral part of the political life of our country, participating as they do within their own ethnic frameworks or within the general framework in the country, and represented as they are in the Knesset.

Bedouin and Druze officers and men command and serve in our armed forces, defending Israel's borders. There are many hundreds of Druze and Arab officers in the I.D.F. and the border forces, including some seven in the position equivalent to that of Brigade Commander. Only recently the first Druze officer was promoted to the rank of General, and the first Arab was named head of a diplomatic mission.

I am not saying that there are no problems and that complete peace reigns — far from it. But the impression as reflected outside Israel of a black and white confrontation between two peoples, is utterly false. The shades of grey in the picture far outweigh the extremes of black and white.

But the struggle for peace is not one-sided. It demands courage on all sides. Israel's courage in its quest over the years for peace is a fact, but with the exception of the late President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, this courage has unfortunately been lacking on the part of our Arab neighbors. Peace is not only a noble concept but is an imperative even in a cruel reality. It is the quest for security and well-being, for stability in a hostile environment.

The achievement of peace demands direct and unfettered negotiations. We will be only too happy if friends around the world who are so free with political advice will advise us how to convince our neighbors to enter into direct negotiations without preconditions. Only such negotiations can lead to real progress for peace for which my people, and indeed the whole area, yearns.

I believe that Germany has an historic responsibility to help Israel in the vital task of survival and to abstain from any act which might strengthen those who maintain that they are at war with Israel and are its declared enemies. And to those who justify the sale of arms as being essential to maintain internal stability in the country in question, let me remind them that the U.S. poured over 20 billion dollars worth of the most modern arms into the Shah's Iran in order to preserve such stability. With what result we are all witnesses.

Indeed, the question of viewing our problems from Europe in their correct proportions and perspective must, surely, be a major source of concern for us as we sometimes see even a disturbing degree of bias in the manner in which events in the Middle East are reported and, therefore, addressed.

In 1982 when Palestinians were massacred in Sabra and Shatilla by Lebanese Christian troops — there arose a worldwide uproar which was directed not against the Lebanese but against the Israeli troops who had happened to be in the general area of the event. Compare the attitude of the world to those tragic events with its reaction to the recent siege lasting for many months of Palestinian camps by Moslem Amal troops in Beirut in which not only some 900 human lives were lost but in which women and children were starved, in which whole populations were reduced to eating cats, dogs and rats, in which a religious edict was sought and given by Moslem religious leaders, permitting the consumption of human flesh. These terrible events went on for months before the eyes of the whole civilized world. I noted no uproar. Indeed, the Western world virtually ignored this terrifying situation. How many editorial writers thundered against this unspeakable tragedy, those self same writers who were so free with their pens at the time of Sabra and Shatilla.

In the meantime, as we pursue our struggle in the ongoing search for peace, we continue to develop as a free vibrant society, which stretches out its hand for the cooperation with each and every one.

After all, in the period of 40 years we have created an open, democratic society in Israel in which the dignity of man is enshrined as a supreme value. We have a free and independent judiciary, a democratically elected parliament, a free press and a system of universal education. We have created a highly developed system of agriculture, and an industry which is capable of producing advanced equipment, including some of the more sophisticated high technology and bio-technological engineering, supersonic planes and some of the better medical scanning equipment existing today, supplying eight percent of the world market in this particular field. Israeli manufactured items are in spaceships, on the moon and on Mars and in more advanced planes produced in the United States. We are one of the three more advanced countries in the world — the other two are the United States and Japan — in the development and use of solar energy.

We know our shortcomings, we know our failings, but as a free, vibrant, multi-racial society, we are conscious of a continuous effort to overcome them. No society is without its weaknesses but every society must be judged by the freedom of its population to deal with these inadequacies, by the consciousness of its people of its duty to moral imperatives and by its willingness to accept the vote of the majority in support of the Rule of Law and of the dignity of man which must be the supreme value in any modern society. Because, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out, "nothing is unchangeable but the inherent and inalienable right of man." By this criterion we, a small country beset by problems from within and without, constantly maligned in the Community of Nations, are proud of our record in forging a free, open, democratic society, in which the dignity of man is enshrined as a supreme value.

We dream in Israel of the day when peace will come. Our writers, our poets, our song-writers, our authors and our playwrights – Jewish and Arab — give constant expression to the natural desires of our people. We dream of the day when we can make available to the nations of our area the fruits of our research, our scientific advances and our technological developments. This is our message to the world and to our own neighbors.

It is fitting, indeed, that this call of ours should be sounded in this great city which reflects so much the struggle of mankind for freedom and the basic rights of man. It is fitting that it be sounded here so that the call is echoed across the wall and reaches the ears of those who hold the power of decision-making in Eastern Europe. Winds of change may well be gathering momentum in the Soviet Union, reflecting undoubtedly the desires of countless millions. It is too early to assess the scope of the possible changes. Suffice it, however, to say that as long as the Jews of the Soviet Union are not free to exercise the inherent human rights to choose to live wherever they wish, to practice their religion and teach and study their ancient language, it is clear that a new reality has not yet taken root.

This is the hope to which I would like to give expression. Across the dividing wall, praying that the forerunner of a true wind of change will be the opening of the gates of the Soviet Union for our people. For that will be a development which will herald a new era — an era which will mean the disappearance of forbidding divisive walls and free fraternization between peoples. I would like to direct a message from here and call on the leaders of the Soviet Union and on its people to open a new chapter in the relations between our two peoples. Let us cease talking about each other and start talking to each other, even about our different approaches to the world problems, including those of the Middle East.

It is in this spirit of the message which emanates from here across walls, borders and no-man-lands that I greet Berlin and this audience representing as it does a fellow democracy and a free press, dedicated to the highest values and traditions of journalists and all that it stands for.

Extradition of John Demjanjuk to Israel

On 28 February 1986, the United States extradited John Demjanjuk to Israel, to stand trial for murders he allegedly commited a the Treblinka death camp during World War II. This is the first time that the United States has recognized Israel's right to try alleged war criminals under its 1950 Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, and has extradited such a person to Israel.

Chronology of Events

1981 – US District Court at Cleveland, Ohio, revoked Demjanjuk's US citizenship on the ground that he had lied about his wartime activities when he applied, after the war, for an immigrant visa to the United States and, subsequently, for US citizenship.

18 October 1983 – Judge Aharon Simha, Chief Judge of the Jerusalem Magistrates Court, issued a warrant for Demjanjuk's arrest on suspicion of violating the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law.

30 October 1983 – Israel submitted a formal request to the United States for Demjanjuk's extradition, under the terms of the US-Israel extradition treaty of 10 December 1962.

15 April 1985 – US District Court Judge Battisti ruled that Demjanjuk was extraditable to Israel in accordnce with the terms of the extradition treaty.

31 October 1985 – US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, at Cincinnati, Ohio, denied Demjanjuk's appeal to rescind the extradition order and affirmed the District Court's decision.

24 February 1986 – US Supreme Court turned down Demjanjuk's request for a Writ of Certiorari, after which the Secretary of State signed a formal warrant of surrender of Demjanjuk to Israel.

28 February 1986 – Demjanjuk was extradited to Israel.

2 March 1986 – Jerusalem Magistrates Court Judge Aharon Simha acceded to the Israel Police's request to extend Demjanjuk's custody for 125 days, to permit continuation of the investigation of Demjanjuk's alleged crimes at Treblinka. A third remand extension for an additional 15 days was granted on 28 March. Upon completion of this investigation, Demjanjuk will be brought to trial before the Jerusalem District Court.

Case Against Demjanjuk

John (Ivan) Demjanjuk (b. 1920, Ukraine) was conscripted into the Russian army in 1940. Captured by the Germans in 1942, he was first tranferred to the POW camp at Rovno (western Ukraine), then to the POW camp at Chelm in Poland, and subsequently to Trawniki, a German SS training camp in Poland. During 1942–43, Demjanjuk served as a uniformed guard at the Treblinka death camp, where he allegedly herded tens of thousands of Jewish prisoners into the gas chambers and operated the motors that sent poisonous gas fumes into the chambers to kill the prisoners inside. In addition, Demjanjuk is accused of murdering many more Jews when he sadistically and savagely beat them to death as they were on their way to the gas chamber or on forced work details. As noted by US District Court Judge Battisti, "the savage cruelty of this notorious man earned him the special nickname among the camp's Jewish inmates, "Ivan Grozny" or "Ivan the Terrible."

Document

In the District Court of Jerusalem (Special Panel)
Criminal Case /86

State of Israel
by the State Attorney's Office
Ministry of Justice
29 Salah-a-Din Street, Jerusalem
The Accuser

versus

Ivan (John), son of Nicholai, **Demjanjuk**
Born at Dub Macharenzi, Ukraine, Soviet Union, on 3 April 1920
Lately residing in the State of Ohio, USA
At present in custody in Israel
The Accused

Indictment

The Accused is hereby charged as follows:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. 'Operation Reinhardt'

1. (a) With the rise of the Nazi Party to power, the persecution of the Jews became the official policy of Germany. Between 1933 and 1945 Germany's leaders developed this policy and carried it out in stages – beginning with measures to isolate and dispossess the Jews and culminating with their annihilation in all territories subject to the rule or influence of the Third Reich.

(b) The Nazis called this plan of annihilation the "Final Solution of the Jewish Question in Europe.

...

5. (a) On 20 January 1942, Heydrich convened a conference in Berlin, which was later known as the "Wannsee Conference." At this conference, senior representatives of the Reich authorities decided on the practical steps to be taken to implement the plan for the "Final Soluion."

...

6. (a) About the time of the Wannsee conference, Heinrich Himmler, the head of the SS, appointed Odilo Globocnik to be commander of the operation for the annihilation of Polsih Jewry within the area of the General Government. Globocnik set up his headquarters in the town of Lublin, Poland.

...

(c) This annihilation plan was later known as "Operation Reinhardt," after Reinhardt Heydrich, who was killed in May 1942 by the Czech underground.

7. (a) A small group of SS personnel, some hundred in number, were assigned to the command of Globocnik. The members of this group were to serve as leaders of the death camps to be set up under Operation Reinhardt. ...

(b) In addition to these SS personnel, Soviet prisoners-of-war who had expressed their readiness to serve the Nazis were recruited for Operation Reinhardt (hereinafter – the "auxiliaries"). The auxiliaries were prepared for their tasks at the SS training camp at Trawniki, and some of them were later assigned to serve in the death camps.

(c) The auxiliaries played an essential role in the annihilation of the Jews; without them, the commanders of Operation Reinhardt could not have carried out their plan.

(d) Serving as one of these auxiliaries was the Accused.

B. The SS Training Camp at Trawniki

8. (a) In the autumn of 1941, a camp known officially as a "Training Camp of the SS" was set up near the village of Trawniki, 36 kilometres east of the city of Lublin (hereinafter – the "Trawniki Camp").

(b) The Trawniki Camp served as an important link in Operation Reinhardt by supplying trained personnel and equipment for the annihilation programme.

...

11. (a) During their stay at the Trawniki Camp, the auxiliaries acted together with the SS personnel in carrying out all tasks connected with the annihilation programme. Among their other tasks, the auxiliaries participated in round-ups in the ghettos, put down any displays of resistance, guarded the freight trains used to transport the Jews to the death camps and prevented attempts to escape from the trains.

(b) Many of the auxiliaries were sent to serve in the Operation Reinhardt death camps, where they played a central role in the annihilation of the Jews.

...

C. The Death Camps of Operation Reinhardt

12. In accordance with the plan formulated at Operation Reinhardt Headquarters, three death camps were built in Eastern Poland between the months of February and July 1942: Belzec... Sobibor... and Treblinka...

13. (a) The three camps operated as one entity in implementing the common aim of murdering the Jews of Poland and of other countries conquered by Nazi Germany.

(b) The commanders of the camps and the Headquarters staff at Lublin improved upon the murder systems employed at the camps by exchanging information and by transferring experts, other personnel and equipment from one camp to the other.

14. (a) At each of the three camps, some 30 SS personnel... were assigned to positions of command.

(b) At each camp, about one hundred auxiliaries, who had received their training at the Trawniki Camp, served under the command of the SS personnel. These auxiliaries, in the main Ukrainians, worked together with the SS personnel in carrying out all the acts of annihilation, murder and oppression committed against the Jewish victims in the camps.

15. (a) The main focus of activity in each of the three death camps was the gas chamber facility, in which hundreds of thousands of victims were murdered.

(b) This facility was a concrete building divided inside into separate chambers, with doors which were sealed after the entry of the victims. A powerful engine, (diesel or petrol) was installed at the side of the building. The engine's exhaust was attached to a network of pipes, which branched out into the chambers.

(c) Operation of the engine sent poisonous fumes (carbon monoxide) flowing into the chambers and choked to death the masses of human beings within.

16. (a) The three death camps operated for about a year-and-a-half.

(b) During this period, about 1,800,000 human beings were murdered in these camps.

(c) From among this community of martyrs, more than 850,000 men, women and children were murdered at the Treblinka Camp.

...

The Accused

H. History of the Accused Prior to his Enlistment in the SS Auxiliaries

49. In the winter of 1940–1941, the Accused was conscripted into the Soviet army and posted to an artillery unit.

50. In 1941, during the fighting, the Accused was injured in his back by shrapnel from a shell and during the autumn months of that year stayed in various front-line hospitals until his recovery. This injury left a scar on his bck which remains to this day.

51. Following his recovery, the Accused was posted to another artillery unit which, at the end of 1941, was sent to the front in the Crimean Peninsula.

52. At some date between his above posting and 21 May 1942, the Accused was taken prisoner by the Germans in the battles in the Kerch area of the Crimean Peninsula.

53. Following his capture, the Accused, together with other prisoners-of-war from the same battle area, was transferred to a prisoner-of-war camp at Rovno in the Western Ukraine, an area which at that time was under the control of the German army.

I. The Accused's Enlistment in the SS Auxiliaries

54. At some date after ther Accused's transfer to the Rovno prisoner-of-war camp and no later than 19 July 1942, the Accused was recruited to the SS auxiliaries from the prisoner-of-war camp in which he was being held and transferred to the Trawniki Training Camp.

55. On his arrival at Trawniki, the Accused was given Identity No. 1393 and went through regular induction procedures, including receipt of an identity card bearing his photograph and personal particulars. In this ,Camp, the Accused was trained to serve with the auxiliaries, who were to perform duties within the framework of Operation Reinhardt.

56. No later than the beginning of October 1942, the Accused was transferred to the Treblinka Death Camp, where he served with the SS auxiliaries for some eleven months, i.e. least until September 1943.

...

J. The Accused's Part in the Mass Murders at the Gas Chambers

59. The Accused played an essential and active role in all stages of the annihilation of the Jews in the gas chambers at Treblinka.

60. The Accused used to stand at the entrance to the gas chambers, sometimes armed with a sword or bayonet, sometimes with a whip or iron pipe. Whenever a group of naked Jews, coming from the Himmelstrasse, would arrive in the vicinity of the gas chambers, the Accused would force his victims into the chambers while tormenting them on their way to their death.

61. With the weapons in his possession, the Accused stabbed his victims in various parts of their bodies, tore pieces of flesh from their limbs and injured them with great force. All this was done while the victims, bleeding profusely, were driven into the gas chambers.

62. The Accused forced a maximum number of victims into the gas chambers so as to exploit to the full the volume of the chamber and to hasten the victims' deaths.

63. After taking part in driving the victims into the gas chambers, the Accused proceeded to the engine room and operated the motor which sent poisonous exhaust fumes into the chambers. In this way, the Accused, by his own acts, caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of human beings.

64. From time to time, the Accused would select individual victims for his torments

from among those going to their deaths in the gas chambers. On more than one occasion, the Accused selected an elderly Jew with beard and side-locks, and led him naked to the nearby barbed wire fence, while beating the unfortunate man's body with his whip. The victim, writhing about from the severity of the pain, would strangle himself to death on the strands of barbed wire between which his head was trapped.

65. Sometimes the Accused would join the SS personnel and auxiliaries in Camp 1 when victims were being removed from the trains to the "Ramp." Here, too, the Accused would beat his victims mercilessly and, on one occasion at least, shot and killed a young woman who tried to escape.

K. Murder and Torment of Jews in the Work Parties

66. In addition to his role in operating the gas chambers and in tormenting the victims driven into them, the Accused regularly murdered prisoners from among the work parties in Camp 2.

67. In both parts of the Treblinka Camp, the SS personnel and auxiliaries operated a system of slaughtering prisoners in the work parties. Whenever a member of the SS personnel or an auxiliary wounded a prisoner on his face or body, that prisoner was regarded as "marked". Marking a prisoner in this way meant that the prisoner would be executed by shooting the very same day. The Accused was aware of this system and used to slice the noses or cut off the ears of prisoners with the sword or bayonet in his possession. By doing so, the Accused condemned the victims to death, since they would by shot dead the same day, as indicated above.

68. In one of many such incidents, the Accused cut off the ear of a prisoner named David Auslander and sent him on his way, bleeding profusely. Despite his serious injury the prisoner carried on with his work – carrying corpses to the pits. When he reached the edge of the pit, the prisoner was shot dead by the SS man stationed there.

69. Sometimes the Accused was not satisfied just to "mark" the victim, but ordered him to undress and then shot the victim himself.

...

72. (a) Whipping played a large part in the punishments meted out at the Treblinka Death Camp. The victim was forced to lie on his stomach, with buttocks bared, and was then tied to a special whipping bench. Sometimes the victim was required to count aloud the number of blows without making a mistake; at other times, he was forced to keep quiet despite his pain.

(b) In Camp 2, the Accused was among the leading "whippers" and used to lash his victims mercilessly. The Accused used to beat victims to death or shoot those who erred in counting or cried out from the intensity of the pain.

...

76. Because of his special cruelty, the Accused was nicknamed "Ivan the Terrible" – the only name by which the Accused was recognized and known to many of the prisoners in the Death Camp.

...

M. The Offences Committed by the Accused

81. In his deeds described above, the Accused – together with other persons – caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Jews with the intention of destroying the Jewish people in whole or in part. By so doing, he committed crimes against the Jewish people.

82. In his deeds described above, the Accused – together with other persons – took part in the murder and annihilation of a civilian population. By so doing, he committed crimes against humanity.

83. In his deeds described above, the Accused – together with other persons – in a conquered territory, took part in the murder of members of the civilian populations of countries conquered by Nazi Germany. By so doing, the Accused committed war crimes.

84. In his deeds described above, the Accused, with premeditated intent caused the death of persecuted persons as such. By so doing, the Accused committed crimes against persecuted persons; had he carried out those acts in Israel territory, the Accused would have been guilty of offences of murder under Section 300 of the Penal Law, 5737–1977.

Provisions of the Enactment under which the Accused is Charged

1. Crime against the Jewish people, an offence under Section 1(a)(1), as defined in Section 1(b)(1) of the Nazi and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710–1950.

. 2. Crime against humanity, an offence under Section 1(a)(2), as defined in Section 1(b) of the said law.

3. War crime, an offence under Section 1(a)(3), as defined in Section 1(b) of the said Law.

4. Crimes against persecuted persons under Section 2(f) of the said Law, together with Section 300 of the Penal Law, 5737–1977.

Jerusalem
29 September 1986
25 Elul 5746

Yosef Harish
Attorney-General

John Demjanjuk in handcuffs being escorted to police car by U.S. marshals at Ben Gurion Airport

General view of the courtroom during the session of the Demjanjuk trial in Jerusalem, 1987

Reflections on the Trial of John Demjanjuk



John Demjanjuk sitting in the dock near defence attorney John Gill

Ernie Meyer

The hearing of the prosecution and defense testimony in the Demanjuk trial came to an end after 10 months. It was perhaps symbolic that the last word heard was that of the accused himself.

He was called to testify on a relatively inconsequential matter concerning the date of a photo showing him in the uniform of a policeman at a DP camp. But there he was, having his say in Ukrainian in his resonant voice.

A layman will be likely to emerge from a full week of listening to the prosecution convinced that the accused is indeed Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. But after another week of counter-arguments by the defense, his conviction will probably be shaken. It remains for every citizen who has followed the case on radio and TV or in the press to imagine what his verdict would be if Israel had a jury system and he or she were on that panel.

It may be a good thing that such an emotion-laden case is in the hands of professional judges rather than laymen. These judges can call on their long experience to help them neutralize the emotional element in the case. This was illustrated in the early months, when Levin told the then defense counsel regarding a certain point: "Mr. O'Connor, when the case is over we'll sit down and discuss this over a cup of coffee." This is how professionalism takes over.

What the judges have to decide is whether the prosecution has proved its case beyond any reasonable doubt or whether the defense has raised sufficient uncertainty about the accused's guilt. In this case, of course, the basic question is that of identity, since there is no doubt that Ivan the Terrible, whoever he was, committed unspeakable crimes. This point was often stressed by Mark O'Connor.

After the two leading counsel gave their final pleadings, the three judges, Dov Levin, Dalia Dorner and Zvi Tal, retired for several months to devote themselves to the awesome task of going over the entire trial record and finally arriving at a verdict. It should be borne in mind that no half-measure is possible. If the verdict is guilty, the death penalty is mandatory. If the verdict is not guilty, the prisoner must be released.

Onlookers may have been puzzled by Levin's repeated references to an appeal. Thus, he recently told defense counsel Yoram Sheftel in reply to a complaint: "Save this for the appeal." One onlooker interpreted this as indicating that the judge had already made up his mind on a verdict of guilty, and that he anticipated an appeal by the defense.

But that is not so. Under Israeli law an appeal is mandatory in all capital cases. And there is no capital punishment except for Nazi war crimes.

The judge's reference to an "appeal" may also have been to an application for a ruling on a specific matter to the High Court of Justice. This is in fact what the defense has done on several occasions in the past.

As a reporter who has covered the trial from the beginning, I am often asked: "Nu, Ernie, what do you think, is it him or not?" The questioner, of course, does not wait for an answer but gives his own opinion.

Many people think that John Demanjuk's identity as Ivan the Terrible has been amply proven. Understandably, most Holocaust survivors are among them.

But there are also many thoughtful people who, while they believe in Demanjuk's guilt, are not satisfied that it has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

This group includes those who think that it is beyond any doubt that Demanjuk was part of "Operation Reinhard," the German campaign to exterminate all Jews. They think that Demanjuk certainly was enlisted as a guard by the SS, but that he may have served "only" at Sobibor and at ghetto exterminations, but that he was not Ivan the Terrible of Treblinka. The trial, of course deals only with the accused's alleged role at Treblinka and nothing else.

A final group believes in Demanjuk's total innocence, and takes his word for it that he sat out the war in German PoW camps. It is clearly impossible to assign statistical proportions to these groupings.

The game of "judge-watching" is fascinating. Observers evaluate the judges' pronouncements and decisions according to their own prejudices. Some, coming from cooler climes, find it hard to accept the "interventionist" attitude of Levin, who is active rather than maintaining a silent, stony-faced facade. He often refers to the fact that the bench acts according to the Talmudic principle of relaxing the letter of the law, and bends over backwards to be fair to the defense.

He complimented the new member of the defense team, former Toronto prosecutor Paul Chumak, on the "elegance" of his performance. It is on such occasions that the professionalism of judges and advocates becomes apparent.

Beyond all emotional and moral considerations, there is "the law" and the men and women who practice it.

Several of the defense witnesses have voiced criticism of the court. But their criticism must be assessed in light of the fact that they were prepared to give evidence in the first place.

Surprisingly, these witnesses, many of whom were savaged and even demolished by the prosecution, blamed the bench rather than the prosecution. There may even have been a grudging admiration for the thoroughness of their work.

Michael Shaked, especially, has emerged as a "witness-slayer," as one observer put it. His angelic appearance and his mild manner hide a brilliant mind and a formidable adversary.

Shaked, of course, is greatly helped by his team-mates. How often have I heard people close to the defense express jealousy about the large resources at the disposal of the prosecution. But that is the situation when a government agency — in this instance the Justice Ministry — prosecutes an individual.

What has constantly amazed me is the solidarity the world Ukrainian community displays with the accused through its financial contributions to the Demanjuk Defense Fund. After all, that Ukrainian ex-prisoners of war operated in the ranks of the SS is an historical fact.

Allan Ryan, the former director of the U.S. Office for Special Investigations, which handled the prosecution of Demanjuk in America, put it succinctly: "The fact that some Ukrainians helped the Germans persecute the Jews does not mean that all Ukrainians are guilty. The fact that most Ukrainians are innocent does not mean that some are not guilty."

Trial Statistics

Court secretary Nira Aslan has released these statistics:

★ About 800,000 people have attended the trial.

★ There have been 92 court sessions, during which the prosecution produced 273 exhibits as evidence, compared with the defense's 136. Four interrogatory sessions were conducted with witnesses in Germany. The prosecution has called 21 witnesses, the defense 11.

★ The prosecution team is made up of eight lawyers and one police investigator. The defense numbers three full-time advocates, who are assisted by some investigators abroad and by the accused's son, John Jr., who is present at most sessions.

★ The judges are assisted by five officials and the corps of translators, who handle testimony in English, Hebrew, German, Ukrainian and Yiddish. The trial record at present numbers 8,800 pages in the original Hebrew and 11,600 pages in the English translation.

No accurate figure for the cost of the trial so far was obtainable.

Israel's Territorial Predicament

Yael Yishai
Department to Political Science, Haifa University

In the midst of the perpetual storm of Middle-Eastern events a few conciliatory voices have unmistakably been heard. Jordan's King Hussein has signed an agreement with the PLO, which, ambigous as it may be, portends some moderation. Egypt's President Mubarak put forward some ideas to revive the dormant peace process and enlisted the support of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. Although the initiator sought the involvement of the U.S. in the peace process, the crucial question is Israel's attitude. The new Arab initiative leaves unresolved a number of critical issues. The Hussein-Arafat agreement suggests that a Jordanian-Palestinian team, to be selected by the two leaders, be empowered to negotiate with Israel and the U.S. in a U.N. conference. This provision implies PLO participation, to which Israel vehemently objects. Also the accord neither explicitly accepts Israel's right to exit, nor endorses U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for the exchange of Israeli occupied territory for peace. A greater U.S. involvement, or change of mood on Arafat's part, may bring forth these modifications, will Israel be ready to respond? Will it be able to deliver the goods, that is to return land in exchange for peace?

Probing these questions necessitates taking into consideration the domestic inputs that attempt to influence Israel's territorial policy. Two major such inputs can be identified: the *possessors* and the *traders*. The possessors believe either that the lands were endowed to Israel by a biblical promise or are essential to the state's security or both. The implication of the possessive orientation is the fullscale settlement of the territories until annexation is effected. The possessors' counterparts are the traders, who are willing to relinquish the territories, or substantial parts thereof, in return for peace. The traders oppose any activity, economic or political, which may put obstacles in the path of the future trading of land for peace.

Input is carried out on all political levels, namely in the governing arena (cabinet and Knesset), within the political parties and in extra-parliamentary groups. Since the Six-Day War the territorial issue has attracted public attention and engendered action on an unprecedented scale. The crucial problem however, concerns not the input but pertains rather to the manner in which the input is tranformed into an impact. Only an impact can induce the leadership to forge a decision, or alternatively, can impede action by constraining the authorities. Measuring this impact is a formidable task. There is hardly a method by which influence over decision-makers can be accurately gauged. Why a decision is adopted, rejected, or perhaps not even deliberated is within the *black box*, closed to any investigative eye. There are, nonetheless, several indications which at least point to the potential of the input to become an impact. By way of inference the extent of inducement/constraint on past or future decisions can be roughly assessed. Three types of resources turn the input into an impact: organizational resources, including the quality of leadership, the institutional set-up and the group's cohesion; political resources, accrued by the penetration of the input factor to the locus of decision-making; ideological resources, which enable expansion into the public at large. Taking stock of the input factors' various resources will enable evaluation of the leeway of the Israeli leaders, who, in addition to their own views on the issue, are bound to maneuver between the possessors and the traders.

The Possessors: Peace for Peace

Possessors do not reject peace, but assert that Israel should trade only peace for peace. Assuming that peace is a desirable objective to all parties concerned, they maintain that to end the state of war, no concessions are necessary, especially not in territories (i.e., Judea and Samaria), the historical cradle of the Jewish people and their current security. Israelis who claim a right to the territories abound on all political levels. Possessors are not of one shade. Some demand the extension of Israeli law, administration and jurisdiction over Judea and Samaria. Others suffice with maintaining the status quo, awaiting the day the Arabs become willing to comply with Israel's interpretation of the Camp David Accords. The latter, however, accept the status quo as an unavoidable reality rather than a desired ideal. The trademark of all possessors is their rejection of the compromising attitude. Under no circumstances are they willing to concede any portion of the lands located east of the June 4, 1967 border, hoping the day will arrive when Israel's sovereignty will be legally applied. For them land has become a focus recalling a heroic past and anticipating a worthy future. It is the incarnation of a national revival, enabling both the secular and the observant to share a new type of faith, embodied not in a spiritual entity but in tangible soil.

The possessive attitude is rife among decision-makers. Some half of the 26 cabinet members are not willing to trade land for peace. These include the Likud ministers, headed by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, the ministers from the religious parties, and a minister from a fringe party affiliated with Labor (Ometz). Two Labor ministers also lean heavily towards the possessive attaitude. The Knesset also reflects the dissemination of the pro-land position. The nationalistic parties, proponents of possession – the Likud, NRP, Tehiya, Morasha, Ometz and Kach – attained 55 mandates in the election to the 11th Knesset (July 1984). However, some 10 Labor MKs espouse clear hawkish attitudes, thus tipping the scale in the Knesset towards the possessive end.

Examination of the partisan arena also reveals discernible possessive tendencies. The hawkish parties, enumerated above, are almost homogeneous regarding the territorial issue, all objecting to any return of land. The Likud leader, Yitzhak Shamir, explicitly rejected any option of territorial concession, even in exchange for peace. His contender for the leadership, Ariel Sharon (Minister of Industry), is no less ardent with regard to the territories. The Labor Party, committed to territorial compromise, is numbered among the traders. Yet, not only was its leader, Shimon Peres, fettered by the need to secure the consent of the Likud in forming the national unity government, but within the Labor Party itself possessive attitudes are visible. to begin with, the party pledged in its electoral platform not to remove the settlements already existing in Judea and Samaria, and adopted the latter value-laden term instead of the West Bank. It went even further by incorporating in the coalition agreement a commitment to establish six additional settlements in the disputed territories. Possessive tendencies were also displayed by Peres' proclamation regarding the future of some territories. As Prime Minister he stated that parts of the Jordan Valley and Gush Etzion would remain indivisible parts of the State of Israel, thus demonstrating his acceptance of at least some of the drive for annexation.

Public groups and movements constitute another channel for transmitting possessive demands. It is here that the inputs become impact on decision-makers, confined to the partisan and the governmental levels. Space limitations preclude the delineation of the important input (and impact) of all the groups from 1967 to date. It suffices to note that both the Land of Israel Movement and Gush Emunim have left their imprint on Israel's territorial policies. Both movements challenged the legacy that the reality of the 1948 partition was a sufficient parameter for defining the boundaries of the state. The Land of Israel Movement remained, to a large extent, and ideological movement whose major success was in legitimizing the possessive idea of Greater Israel and having it accorded a prime position on the national agenda. Gush Emunim's activity was not confined to the ideological domain. Its hallmark was action in the form of settling the land whose possession it preached.

A review of the public opinion polls taken since 1968 reveals that many Israelis are firmly against returning territories. In 1968 the percentage of those demonstrating possessive attitudes ("unwilling to return any land on the West Bank or only a small portion of it") was more than 90. After the October War some moderation occurred, the average refusal to relinquish territories clustering around 60 percent, though the majority of the Israeli public (Jewish, urban) was still positioned on the hawkish side of the spectrum. This possessive attitude was also demonstrated in the opinions regarding the Jewish settlements on the West Bank, which were supported (between 1974–79) by some 60 percent of the respondents.

Expansion also found expression in activity. Gush Emunim, composed initially of a handful of religious youngsters, attracted the support of other groups, cutting across long consolidated religious and socio-economic barriers. Its settlement bids were participated in by thousands of Jews, mostly – but by all means not solely – observant. Among those aiding the squatters were members of Hakibbutz Hameuchad, the militant wing of the Labor movement, whose leaders were among the founders of the Land of Israel Movement. There were also members of moshavim and diehard urbanites, all advocators of a Greater Israel. The chief constituency mobilized to advance the case of possession remained, nonetheless, the orthodox community. Gush Emunim granted prestigious status to the religious youngsters, remote from the mainstream of Israeli society. The knitted skullcap became a symbol of 'beautiful Israel' and a source of pride to its wearers. Masses of observant youth flocked to the settlement sites, demonstrating the high expandibility of Gush Emunim.

In the final analysis, Gush Emunim's main weapon was its high "nuisance impact", generated by a combination of organizational resources, penetration capabilities and wide expansion. These features enabled the group to display perseverence in the face of repeated suppression which took the form of forcible eviction from the squatting areas. Such and impact being so difficult to overlook or ignore, it left the government little choice but to comply. Only a cohesive and powerful government could have resisted the challenge without veering from its course.

What remains today of Gush Emunim's nuisance impact? Is it still capable of inducing the government to change its course or constrain its action? A survey of the impact properties at the disposal of Gush Emunim in 1986 reveals that the group has lost much of its clout. Two events cut deep inroads in its resources: the peace with Egypt and the exposure of the Jewish terror organization. The peace process dealt Gush Emunim a serious blow: What had been a nightmare since 1967 became a reality: the Likud government relinquished territories and unhesitatingly uprooted settlements located on lands designed for evacuation. Gush Emunim made a pathetic last-minute effort to organize a Prevent the Withdrawal from Sinai Movement, whose activity proved to be futile. The withdrawal resisters were forcibly evicted by the security forces and official policy was implemented. Gush Emunim's error in challenging such a policy and hampering its execution were vividly exposed. The Gush's frustrated leaders, who were left in the lurch, dispersed in three directions: the first settled for the administrative technical aspect of possessing the territories and founded Amana, a settlement organization. A second group decided to cooperate, under the same institutional umbrella, with the secular zealots of Greater Israel, and formed Tehiya – the arch-nationalistic party. Another party, Morasha, which made its appearance towards the elections to the eleventh Knesset, attracted the Gush leadership and constituency and further shrunk its organizational resources. The third group became active in Yesha (the Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria and Gaza) – the Council of the Settlements on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Yesha may be perceived as the genuine successor of Gush Emunim. There are nonetheless, major differences between the two groups. First, Yesha is the more institutionalized and bureaucratized heir of the zealous and radical Gush Emunim, and thus is trammeled by organizational imperatives. As it is based on a consensus between more than 50 settlements, it is fettered by their diverging interests. Secondly, Yesha was set up initially to promote the interests of the settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. In doing so it turned into a sectional interest group, unlike its predecessor, Gush Emunim, which claimed to be a national promotional group.

The exposure of the Jewish terror organization also had a detrimental effect on Gush Emunim. The 27 people indicted on suspicion of assaulting Arabs living in the territories were all activists in Gush Emunim and respectable members of the settlers' community. While the Gush claimed Israel's right to withhold and annex the territories, it largely evaded the issue of their Arab inhabitants. There were some individuals who adopted Tehiya positions, namely distinguishing between local Arabs and alien Arabs. Others spoke of some sort of coexistence between Jews and Arabs under Israeli sovereignty. In its official publications the Gush never raised the idea of expelling the Arabs or of harming them in any way, and shied away from Rabbi Kahane's advocacies to that effect. The exposure of the terror organization spurred a deep rift within the settlers' movement. A minority of their membership justified the terror, attributing its eruption to the impotence of the Israeli authorities against Arab terror. They saw no wrong in killing or injuring Arabs whose declared intention was to destroy Israel. They questioned the wisdom of keeping the Jewish saboteurs behind bars when the "real culprits" – Israel's enemies – were walking free. A second view denounced the terrorists while at the same time displayed understanding of their motives – the government's ineffectiveness in providing security to the settlers. According to this view, the void which was thus created was filled by the terrorists, who should nonetheless have refrained from taking the law into their own hands. The majority of Gush Emunim censured the terror. Yesha adopted a resolution proclaiming that "the life of any individual, be he Jew or Arab, is sacred, and so are his honor, property and rights

"The resolution also states that maintaining security is the exclusive right and obligation of the government and not of individuals".

Within a few weeks of the terrorists' exposure, the intra-Gush dissension grew deeper and louder. An article published in the settlers' periodical, "To Emerge from the Underground" unequivocally justified terror against Arabs. At the same time others continued to castigate the acts of violence and questioned their religious justifications. Some went as far as declaring that Gush Emunim no longer existed for them if these were to be its repercussions. The exposure of terror signalled that the path of Gush Emunim may lead to intemperate violence and may, obliquely, wreak havoc to the final goal: the controversy over the terror further depleted Gush Emunim's resources. Paradoxically, however, the Gush arose from the ashes, attempting to undergo organizational revitalization. The organizational campaign was purported to resuscitate the dying Gush, which was deemed to be still essential to the struggle to possess Eretz Israel. The Arab peace campaign also contributed its share to the amassing of forces on the possessors' front.

The possessors also regained some of their penetrative assets. Obviously, the formation of a government headed by Shimon Peres blocked some of the channels that had been available to the proponents of Eretz Israel under the Likud-controlled cabinet. Yet access was still there. In April 1985, the formation of a Knesset lobby for the Jewish settlements in the territories was announced. The lobby was composed of 23 MKs from five parties (Likud, Tehiya, Morasha, the NRP and Shas), among them such high-ranking ministers as Yitzhak Shamir and David Levy. The lobby's coordinator, MK Landau (Likud), declared its intention to hold weekly meetings and to exert pressure to allocate more resources for settling Judea and Samaria. While Gush Emunim was not explicitly mentioned in the lobby's deliberations, its formation undeniably facilitated smoother access of the Gush to those who formulate territorial policy. The possessors, nonetheless, did not resume their previous scope of penetration, since the lobby was conspicaously confined to the nationalistic parties. No Labor MKs, some of whom are, as earlier noted, ardent hawks in their own right, participated in the lobby or publicly identified with its objectives. Despite these limitations, the possessors still had ears attuned to their demands in various Labor circles. As prime minister, Peres even paid an official visit to Ofra, one of Gush Emunim's core settlements, thus adding validity to his previous commitment not to dismantle any settlement. Penetration was thus secured, but not to the extent it was in the earlier days of Gush Emunim.

The decline in expansion was more evident in mobilization. Settlements of the West Bank seem to be frozen not only owing to budgetary constraints, which are undoubtedly severe, but also on account of a shortage of human resources. The number of those settling the territories because of ideological reasons has considerably diminished. The religious constituency within Israel no longer flocks to the sites designated for Jewish settlement, and the prospects for growth hinge largely on the high birth rate of the settlers themselves. The Gush's institutionalization and proliferation quenched some of the fire of the earlier possessors.

At present, the wind in the possessors' camp seems going to blow in the direction of everything possible in terms of influence within the accepted rules of the game but to accede to any resolution the government may deem proper to adopt.

The Traders: Land for Peace

For the traderrs, keeping the territories is both unfeasible and undesirable. The former because doing so requires Israel to live by the sword forever, something, bearing in mind its size, it cannot do. The latter because retaining the land implies domination of their population. The traders' concern over continued occupation derived not only from humanitarian consideration, although these are certainly evident, but mainly from itts detrimental effects on Israeli society. Occupation corrupts, claim the traders, who wish to see the state consolidated not through the tangible assets of land but via the spiritual force of morality. For them, the land simply has to be returned. The exposé of the traders' stock reveals a bleak picture. Admittedly, the Labor Party is committed to territorial concessions, and its leader, Shimon Peres, has reiterated Israel's adherence to the principle of peace in return for land. Furthermore, 12 Labor MKs signed a letter urging the premier to comply with Mubarak's attempt to assemble a joint convention with the Palestinians. Yet the traders' voice is not loudly heard in the corridors of power. Only two of the Labor Party's ministers are proclaimed doves (Haim Bar-Lev, Minister of Police, and Yitzhak Navon, Minister of Education). Neither minister is of prime importance. An additional trader (Amnon Rubinstein, Minister of Communications) belongs to a fringe party and bears limited influence on foreign policy decisions. In the Knesset, the Labor Party was deprived of most of its dovish input with the secession of Mapam and Yosi Sarid. The party's representation in the Knesset is still divided almost equally between possessors and traders; the voice of the latter is, however, not often heard. The small dovish opposition parties comprise 16 MKs, an impressive number in comparison to the six MKs of the hawkish opposition. However, the fragmentation of the traders in the Knesset, divided between the Arab-nationalist parties and the Zionist proponents of peace curtails any effective action.

Within Labor some dovish activity is taking an organizational form. A faction termed Mashov (feedback) composed of young academics and intellectuals in the Tel Aviv branch, espouses enequivocal dovish positions. However, the fledgling faction is reluctant to adamantly criticize a leadership the resumed control of government after seven years in opposition. An attempt to influence party policies was made through Massad (foundation) – an extra-partisan organization aiming at uniting all Zionist dovish forces, including Mapam, Ratz, Peace Now and others. The Labor Party was apprehensive lest Massad bite off a portion of its regained power. However the peace campaign was nipped in the bud and Massad's efforts aborted. In the process of drafting its platform, the initiators of Massad realized that the common denominator between its various components was not broad enough to enable joint action. Another attempt to block the ostensible "hawkization" of the Labor Party was made by the Forum for Political Deliberations, with prominent members such as Abba Eban, chairman of the Knesset Committee of Foreign and Security Affairs. The faction urged the party to accelerate Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon and advance negotiations with Jordan. This attempt also came to naught. The Labor Party, enjoying the benefits of government was not in a mood to sustain factional activity and internal dissent.

Dovish input was also evident on the interest group arena. Between 1967–73 futile attempt to veer Israel towards a more compromising stand was made by Peace and Security, a small peace movement that scored low in all three components of impact. The October War obliterated even the embers of extra-parliamentary dovish activity, which resurged only after Sadat's dramatic visit to Jerusalem. Peace Now emerged as the chief proponent of land-for-peace tradeoff. The movement was formed in March 1978, when the peace process, enthusiastically welcomed by many Israelis, stumbled over the Sinai setlements issue. Peace Now proved to be more successful than its predecessor (Peace and Security) in commanding support and expounding its ideas. While the movement had no visible organizational set-up, no fixed membership or structured institution, it did have a competent leadership, composed mainly of prestigious reserve officers in the IDF, and a large following. Peace Now staged mass demonstrations which attracted hundreds of thousands of Israelis displaying their desire for peace.

Penetration was not at hand. Peace Now emerged in a polity controlled by the Likud, an avowed possessor. The Alignment did endorse the traders' principle; however, in 1978 it was licking the wounds of its electoral defeat and attempting to woo a constituency that was itself largely possessive. Nevertheless, Peace Now's wide expansion opened a few doors to top decision-makers, including even Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Not surprisingly, these decision-makers did not recind their well-entrenched views, and the input was hardly transformed into an impact. Of the three indicators of impact, Peace Now scored the highest on expansion, which was evident in the mobilization of large crowds to demonstrate for the cause of peace, and in the legitimization of the tradeoff as a viable and realistic policy option.

Peace Now proved to be successful not only owing to its own capabilities, but also because the winds were blowing in its direction. The huge demonstration staged on the eve of Begin's departure for Camp David underscored the widespread desire for peace and assured the premier that there was a large constituency supporting territorial concessions. This support may have been reck oned by Begin, who confronted opposition to compromise within his own party. Lacking a nuisance impact, however, the chances of Peace Now's influence on policies disapproved by the authorities were dim. The group's main potential lay in accelerating a process that was already evolving. Since it could do little more than demonstrate, its activities could not have yielded a counter-effect to Gush Emunim.

After the signing of the peace treaty, in 1979, the already limited capabilities of Peace Now were further eroded owing to three factors: to begin with, the movement's objectives were fully endorsed by the government, which was willing to relinquish territory and dismantle settlements for the sake of peace. Peace Now thus had to readjust its objectives and focus on other goals. The process of readjustment was the second reason for the dwindling resources. Peace Now turned its attention to Israel's eastern front, demanding an end to the occupation and the return of territories in exchange for peace. However, the movement could not specify how much land should be returned, to whom and under what conditions. Should Israel negotiate with the Palestinians? Should it keep Jerusalem as its indivisible capital? Should it opt for the Jordanian solution – the Labor's version of a tradeoff? No clear-cut answer was ever provided to these controversial questions. Peace Now preferred to cloak its goals in ambiguity and presented only the vague formula of peace in return for land as the group's slogan claimed ("Better a piece of peace than a piece of land") hoping to achieve the widest possible consensus among the multiple strands of opinion. The movement's equivocation was an asset since it enabled a wide scope of mobilization. It was also a detriment since it blurred Peace Now's objectives and impeded their effectiveness.

The third hindrance to impact was grounded in the strategies adopted by Peace Now, mainly street demonstrations. This strategy had two basic limitations: firstly, it could be effective only with regard to targets that were articulated and obtainable and not as vague as those promoted by Peace Now. Secondly, demonstrations are characterized by a process of diminishing benefits. A strategy of street action soon exhausts itself unless it is nourished by critical events that spur the public to be continuously involved in the political process. None of these conditions existed after 1979. Peace was not imminent and the people had no good reason to gather in the streets to urge the government to make territorial concessions. In fact, people did turn to street action, not because of Israel's domination of the West Bank, but owing to the protracted war in Lebanon.

The protest against the Lebanon war glaringl exposed the vulnerability of Peace Now. Initially, the movement was reluctant to oppose a war that was supported by an overwhelming portion of the Israeli population. As the war progressed and support subsided, Peace Now became actively engaged in the acts of protest. In cooperation with the Alignment it staged a huge demonstration (attended by 400,000 people) urging the government to set up a commission of inquiry into the massacre in Sabra and Shatila. The government yielded to the pressure but the peace movement's difficulties were not over. It was caught on the horns of a dilemma: on the one hand it opposed the war, especially after the initial stages of the operation were over. At the same time it was reluctant to join forces with the groups that dominated the scene of protest, that were adopting means more radical than those acceptable to Peace Now. Chief among these groups was Yesh Gvul (There's a Limit/Border), a few dozen of whose members have been jailed for conscientious objection to military sevice in Lebanon. Peace Now took pride in its "legitimacy" and in its unabashed adherence to the democratic rules of the game. Peace Now thus shied away from acts that were incongruent with legal protest. Other groups, such as Parents Against Silence, took over and carried the banner of objection to the war.

Peace Now's stocks continued to diminish towards the elections to the 11th Knesset. The Labor Party declined to cooperate with the movement and refused to adopt parts of its platform. Some of the activists urged the movement to present an electoral list. The majority, however, preferred to operate outside the Knesset and feared that "partization" might further weaken the drive for peace. The 1985 Arab peace campaign was thus not supported by a viable domestic Israeli movement. There was hardly any input to susain a possible tradeoff; impact on the process of decision-making was conspicuously absent.

Conclusions

The discussion of Israel's territorial predicament in face of the Arabs' attempts at conciliation suggests a number of conclusions:

The Israeli leadership is not challenged by parties, groups or individuals which exert strong pressure to make territorial concessions in order to obtain peace. Israel of 1986 in no way resembles Israel of 1978–9 (or, for that matter, the United States of the early '70s), when peace input was easily discernible. Currently, in-ducement for return of lands is practically monopolized by small parties whose power is largely curtailed by their opposition status.

Similarly, there is hardly any inducement for an outright annexation of the West Bank. The parties involved realize that the international barriers to such an act are insurmountable. Current possessors thus prefer incremental encroachment that would enable Israel to dominate the territories and their resources, especially land and water, without extending Israel's sovereignty over the area.

Should an Israeli government decide to ignore international censure and resolve to apply the state's legal system over the disputed land, there is no current viable domestic force able to block its path. The constraints on possessive policies do not seem to be effective owing to the fragmentation of the traders, their shortage of organizational resources, their poor penetration and their dwindling expansion. A radical shift in the territorial policy in likely to ignite some protest action. The limitations of such a protest, however, are obvious.

Constraints on a shift towards the traders' option may be more viable. The possessors' point of view has been well taken care of since 1967. The pro-territories forces in the past manifested remarkable potency: mainly being that the parties promoting the idea of Greater Israel secured electoral victory and gained control of government. One may argue that it was not the possessive orientation alone which facilitated electoral attainments, but the linkage between the two facts remains unquestioned. The possessors groups (especially Gush Emunim) scored high on the scale of impact by amassing resources, securing penetration and attaining expansion. Israel gained the reputation of being an intransigent, a landgrabber, whose final goal is to incorporate all or a great portion of the territories.

Notwithstanding the high potential of the possessors' impact, the government enjoys a great measure of freedom in making its choices and can easily follow its own course. The reasons for this are grounded in historical experience and contemporary circumstances. Historically, the withdrawal from Sinai indicated that objection to government policy is fraught with danger. Opposition to retreat collapsed mainly because the anti-withdrawal movement failed to mobilize large crowds and encountered difficulties in delegitimizing the decisions of a legal government. This failure is also reflected in contemporary politics. Israel is a stable democracy in which the chances for large-scale disobedience or civil insurgence are extremely remote. Operating on the basis of the well known rule of the "anticipated reaction", the government thus could, if it so desired, trade land for peace.

Why then does not the Israeli government seek solutions to break the enduring deadlock? The answer lies both in the personalities involved in the process of decision-making and in the intricacies of the democratic process. As noted earlier the top decision-makers in the Israeli polity are not ardent traders themselves. Deep suspicions and entrenched animosities contribute their share to obstructing any compromising action. The Arabs' enduring refusal to recognize Israel's legitimate rights also hinders conciliation. The leaders are thus inclined to display a moderate mood more than they tend to return tangible assets such as land. Also, adhering to the status quo is perhaps not very fruitful in terms of international politics, but does bear domestic benefits. Why take risks and incite fierce objections? Why undermine the shaky consensus that unites the varying segments of Israeli society? Current decision-making thus reflects the distribution of political goods rather than providing a basis for future solutions. A policy of status quo may indeed be the optimal solution to the intractable problems of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but the manner in which it is formulated and maintained does not assure that the other options have been closely examined and rejected.

From the Jerusalem Quarterly, Number 40, 1986.

The Lavi Decision: A Self-Inflicted Wound

Moshe Arens

"Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potters vessel. Be wise now therefore, O ye kings; be instructed, ye judges of the earth." (*Psalms,* 2:9-10)

After a lengthy debate lasting months, the Israeli government at its meeting of August 30 decided to cancel the Lavi project by a vote of 12-11. By a show of 12 hands, some emphatic, others hesitant, the government "dashed to pieces" Israel's greatest technological achievement and shattered the dream of an Israeli fighter aircraft.

Some called it a courageous decision, and if shooting yourself in the leg requires courage, that quality might be discerned in this act. But usually self-inflicted wounds reflect poor judgement rather than courage.

Maybe experts in mass psychology can explain the causes of this unfortunate decision. Probably "group dynamics" managed to sway those ministers who started as enthusiastic supporters of the Lavi, and ended by voting for its cancellation.

The "collective rape" perpetrated by the Labor Party ministers of the minister of health may from now on appear as an additional chapter in the theory of group dynamics. But it is exceedingly difficult to present a convincing argument, based on a balance between expected ability and penalties, for cancelling a program that had already passed over two-thirds of the development cycle and whose successful conclusion was assured.

Many things were said in the heat of debate, some that were inaccurate, others that were incorrect. Possibly the fundamental considerations on which the final conclusion should have rested are not clear to the public to this day. It may be worthwhile, even after the fact, to point out those issues on which the decision to continue or cancel the program should have been based.

The Quality of the Aircraft

The supporters of the Lavi claimed that it is far superior to the F-16, currently considered the best fighter in the world. The opponents argued that it was only slightly better than the F-16, and was essentially in the same class.

On what qualities should a modern fighter be judged? Once, it was maximum speed that served as the outstanding mark of superiority. But not anymore. The Kfir's maximum speed exceeds Mach 2, while the F-16's is only Mach 1.6, and yet it is superior to the Kfir. The Lavi's maximum speed is also Mach 1.6. Aerial combat and ground attack missions are not carried out at such speeds and that performance parameter is therefore of secondary importance.

For many years the fighter aircraft's maneuvering capability was considered its outstanding quality, which permitted its pilot to out-maneuver the enemy and fire his cannon rounds or missiles from a position of advantage. Getting on the enemy's tail decided the outcome of aerial dog-fights.

The primary advantage of the F-16 is its maneuvering capability which is far superior to the previous generation of fighter aircraft. The Lavi's maneuvering capability is essentially equivalent to that of the F-16. But lately, the importance of maneuvering capability is receding. Aerial combat is now carried out at long range, frequently beyond the visual range of the pilots, using long-range missiles that can be fired head-on without the need to "sit on the enemy's tail."

Locating the aircraft, "locking" on it and "tracking" it with the firecontrol system, and missile launch, these are the key elements of aerial combat in the electronic battlefield of the future. Therefore, the most important quality demanded of the next generation aircraft is "survivability".

When it comes to "survivability," the Lavi, far from being in the same class as the F-16, is actually a generation ahead of it. It is an aircraft difficult to locate in the sky, hard to track, hard to "lock on," and therefore difficult to hit.

The Lavi is physically smaller than the F-16, its "radar cross-section" and infra-red signature are smaller by an order of magnitude than those of the F-16. Its electronic warfare systems are novel and technologically advanced.

In addition, the Lavi has a unique omni-directional warning system that alerts the pilot of approaching threats from any direction, while artificial intelligence is used to ease the pilot's work load in dealing with these threats.

The Lavi was designed at the Israel Aircraft Industries to meet the specifications drawn up by the Israel Air Force. These were the requirements of the IAF for its future fighter aircraft, and the IAI engineers were brilliantly successful in meeting them. No wonder then that the September 7th issue of Aviation Week writes, "If the Lavi, with its sophisticated avionics suite, lives up to its billing as a new-generation ground-attack aircraft, it should not be overlooked as a candidate for the U.S. Air Force's emerging Close Air Support aircraft requirement."

Economic Considerations

If even those who opposed completion of the Lavi development had no criticism of its performance, obviously the decision criterion should have been economic. Will there be a saving, and how much of a saving, if F-16 aircraft are required instead of Lavis?

As of now, $1.3 billion have been invested in the development of the Lavi and the initial preparations for its production. It should be noted that not a penny of this investment came from the Israeli Treasury. It was totally funded by the U.S. in accordance with legislation enacted by the Congress in November 1983, budgeting $550 million for the Lavi for the 1984 fiscal year and providing an unprecedented authorization to convert $250 million to Israeli currency to fund the Lavi development effort in Israel.

These allocations were again authorized in the following years. These funds were used not only for the current Lavi development, but also to "refund" all Lavi expenditures prior to 1984. In addition, the Treasury "deducted" about $50 million a year in value added taxes.

U.S. funding of the Lavi actually constituted an incremental increase in U.S. military assistance to Israel. In the fiscal year 1984, this assistance was composed of $850 million in grants and $850 million in loans at commercial interest rates. In the fiscal years 1985-8 military assistance was provided entirely as grants, and increased from $1.4 billion in 1985 to $1.8 billion in 1987. The anticipated annual expenditure of $550 billion on the Lavi project obviously influenced the large increase in the level of assistance to Israel.

If there was any logic at all in halting the Lavi development after half the investment had already been made, and much of the technology already proven, then it must be based on two assumptions.

1. Acquisition of F-16s instead of Lavis will result in significant savings.
2. The U.S. Congress will agree in future years to permit conversion of these savings to U.S. currency for funding of what is referred to as the IDF "alternatives".

The first assumption is connected with the following estimates:

1. The cost of completing the Lavi development and its production costs.
2. The cost of terminating the Lavi program.
3. The purchase price of F-16 aircraft in future years.

All of these estimates are clouded by uncertainties. It is actually the cost of completing the Lavi development and its production costs that can be predicted with greatest confidence, since the expenditure items are well defined and will be under local control.

On the other hand, the program termination costs, which are dependent on the demands to be made by the large number of Lavi program subcontractors in Israel and the U.S. whose contracts will have to be broken, are difficult to estimate at this time. However, it is already clear that they will run in the hundreds of millions of dollars and may even approach the billion-dollar mark.

The purchase price of F-16 aircraft in future years is not certain at this point. Past experience indicates that we should expect steep increases. The current batch of 75 F-16s acquired by the IAF cost exactly twice what was paid for the first batch of 75 F-16s purchased only a few years ago.

When taking account of the termination costs and the anticipated escalation in the price of F-16s, it is not at all clear that cancellation of the Lavi program will result in any significant savings. The September 7th issue of Aviation Week writes: "As for cost savings, the price tag for terminating outstanding Lavi contracts has yet to be totalled up and the economics that are to be achieved by pressuring the Israeli Defense Ministry to buy large quantities of the F-16 could well prove to be overstated. In the long run, neither Israel nor the U.S. may see any big cost savings."

As opposed to the cost uncertainties, one thing is already clear — the Lavi cancellation will deal a heavy blow to the credibility of Israel's defense establishment in the eyes of the U.S. and particularly in the Congress. The special aid for the Lavi was authorized by Congress under the impression that a fighter aircraft designed to Israel Air Force specifications was bound to be one of the best fighters of the world.

It was even said at the time that the Pentagon might learn from the Israeli Ministry of Defense the art of decision-making regarding weapons system development and procurement.

Regardless of whether these impressions were actually rooted in reality, they will obviously be "gone with the wind" after Israel announces that the Lavi had been a $2 billion mistake at the expense of the American taxpayer. Many of

Israel's friends in Congress who supported the Lavi over initial opposition from the Pentagon will doubtless be hurt and embarrassed.

With this in mind, it is not at all obvious that congressional authorization can be obtained in future years to convert whatever savings may result from the Lavi cancellation to Israeli currency for the use of the IDF "alternatives". Even the most outspoken opponents of the Lavi will have to admit that cancellation of the program might leave us without the Lavi as well as without the Lavi funding from the U.S.

The Human Element

In addition to technical and economic considerations, the human element of the Lavi issue should not be ignored. The origin of the Lavi was David Ben-Gurion's decision to establish a department of Aeronautical Engineering at the Technion in the early Fifties. At the time, many ridiculed B-G's "megalomania", but it was that department, founded by the great aeronautical scientist Dr. Sidney Goldstein, that served as the foundation stone for Israel's great aeronautical industry.

Over the years, thousands of engineers and tens of thousands of technicians and production workers reached a standard of professional excellence that allowed them to compete with the most advanced aircraft industries in the world. No doubt that cancellation of the Lavi will inevitably bring about the loss of this great investment in Israel's human resources during the past 30 years.

What led 12 of Israel's ministers to arrive at the unfortunate decision to cancel the Lavi? The inescapable conclusion is that when faced by conflicting data and opinions, their instincts took over. Some said that this was "too big for Israel"; that we could not possibly compete with the industries of the U.S. and Western Europe; that "we had not yet won a single war by the use of Israel's developed weapons." And there were others who believed in our ability to provide the IAF with the best fighter in the world.

There is general agreement that the government's decision was amongst the most important ever taken by an Israeli government. If the decision was mistaken, it will go down as the greatest error since the "fatal mistake" made on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. With one big difference — it can still be corrected.

Tourism — Israel's Leading Export

Abraham Sharir

Minister of Tourism and Justice

"And see the Land, what it is..." (*Numbers* 13:18)

Most Israeli advances in technology, science, industry and tourism are proof of Benjamin Franklin's often quoted hypothesis that "necessity is the mother of invention."

Israel lacks basic natural sources of raw materials to enable her to become an industrial country. On the other hand, we possess advantageous natural resources in the fields of agriculture, electronics, medicine, engineering and tourism, all of which aim to increase foreign currency income, so as to narrow the country's balance of payment gap and decrease its dependence on overseas aid. It was natural, therefore, that Israel would exploit one of its most obvious sources of foreign currency income — tourism.

Four Pillars

Israel's tourism industry rests upon four unique pillars:

(a) Being the Land of the Bible — the world's center of the three monotheistic religions.

(b) The rich historical and archaeological heritage which speaks volumes about the events which shaped civilizations and cultures.
(c) The geography and climatic conditions, which offer a year-round tourism destination for holidaymakers.
(d) The people of Israel – a melting pot of Jews who immigrated from 102 different countries, conquered the desert and established a democratic Jewish state.

These four factors dictated the marketing and promotion policy of Israel's tourism industry in an effort to make it the country's leading export.

The following data illustrate the results of this endeavor.

New Record

1.5 million tourists visited Israel in 1987, thus establishing a new all-year record. Total revenues will reach 1.25 billion US dollars, which once again ranks tourism as Israel's leading export commodity.

The role of tourism in Israel's economy can be best understood by making the following comparisons:
(a) Total income in 1986 from exports of agricultural products was 650 million dollars, 174 million dollars of which was from citrus. The added value of all agricultural products is 80 percent and of citrus 77 percent.
(b) Total income in 1986 from industrial exports was 6.535 billion dollars, of which diamonds comprised 1.897 billion dollars, electronic products 2.190 billion dollars, and chemicals 790 million dollars.

The added value of the exports was 45 percent; diamonds added value was 22 percent, metal and electronics added value 58 percent, chemicals added value 46 percent. There is, therefore, no doubt that tourism represents Israel's most profitable export commodity.

National Role

Israel's income from tourism in 1986 was 226 dollars per capita, higher than for Greece, Italy, or Spain. In fact, according to World Tourism Organization data, Israel ranked fifth amongst the top tourism destinations, with the highest tourism income per capita.

Currently, some 60,000 people are employed in tourism in Israel.

Israel nets 4,823 dollars per worker in agriculture, 634 dollars in industry and 19,000 dollars in tourism.

To better understand the important role of tourism in our national economy, the following figures illustrate the impressive rate of growth of tourism during the last 20 years.

In 1967, 300,000 visitors came to Israel, with a total income of 52 million dollars.

In 1977, 987,000 visitors came to Israel, with a total income of 570 million dollars.

In 1987, 1,500,000 visitors came to Israel, with a total income of 1,250 billion dollars.

Third Place

Investments: Between 1978 and 1986, total investments in tourism reached 874 million dollars, of which almost 217 million dollars were government loans (including grants).

These investments were in two major categories:

(a) Accommodation facilities — a total of 606 million dollars was invested, of which 192 million dollars were government loans. As a result of these investments, the number of hotel rooms increased from 23,100 to 32,000.

(b) Tourism projects — a total of 260 million dollars has been invested during the last decade. These investments enabled the development of tourism projects (water games, parks, etc.) in such areas as Eilat, the Dead Sea, Jerusalem, the Mediterranean coast, the Sea of Galilee and Beth She'an.

Master Plan

In accordance with the Master Plan for the development of tourism in Israel, our forecast calls for two million visitors by 1995.

In order to meet this target, we have to implement the following goals:

(a) Further invest in and develop tourism projects.

(b) Increase the standard of professional teaching of tourism.

(c) Improve and expand tourism services in the country (hotels, restaurants, entertainment, archaeological sites, etc.)

(d) Try to develop a more favorable image of Israel as a holiday destination.

The results achieved in tourism and particularly in view of its significant role have attracted renowned overseas investors who have constructed hotels and other tourism enterprises. Some of these include the new Hyatt Hotel in Jerusalem, the Sonesta Hotel, the Ramada Hotel, and, of course, the Hilton and Sheraton Hotels. Also, British and French enterprises, such as Club Inn-Ladbroke (UK), Isrotel (Louis UK), CP (Canada), Club-Med (France) and others. These tourism establishments are located mainly in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, Eilat, the Dead Sea region and Tiberias.

Harmonious Blend

Implementation of this Master Plan, it is hoped, will attract more foreign investors to Israel, and offer a unique experience for the many visitors who come for an exciting and unforgettable holiday.

Operation Independence Update

Operation independednce is a private organization of world business leaders dedicated to advancing Israel's economic growth and independence. Created in 1985 at the initiative of former Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Minister of Economy and Planning Gad Ya'acobi, this effort is encouraged by the Israel government.

During its first year, Operation Independence's project management team established the organization's structure, developed working groups, and tested the project's basic philosophical and operational precepts.

The Task Force's most outstanding activities and achievements are listed below:

Trade and Export Working Groups

The Task Force enabled Israeli food industry CEOs to see the American market firsthand by meeting US CEOs and other high-level representatives. These educational visits proved that Israelis can penetrate the US market only by joint efforts.

A Task Force study undertaken by an American-based consulting firm suggested setting up an independent North American/Israeli-owned commercial firm to market and sell only Israeli consumer and industrial products targeted for this market.

Mast industries has established Israeli manufacturing facilities that will export all production to the Limited fashion chain. The first shipment was sent in August 1986.

The Task Force has helped leading Israeli consumer goods companies like Teva, Gibor, Delta Textile, Beit Hashita, and Keter Plastics increase their export to the US.

Carmel Mizrahi concluded a distribution deal with Seagrams, which should increase the winery's exports to America substantially.

Investments

A year ago, investments took a backseat to exports, due partially to an unstable, unfavorable economic environment. Nevertheless, the Task Force and a major Israeli firm launched an international investment company.

Tourism

The Israeli and North American sections of the working group convened several separate and joint meetings in Israel and in the U.S. Accomplishments include:

★ Cooperating with the Israel Bonds organization to encourage tourism to Israel.
★ Promoting incentive travel to Israel.

★ Forming tourism councils in the US and Canada.

★ Promoting American tourism to Israel with the Israel Ministry of Tourism and El Al.

★ Developing special short-range programs to combat the recent tourism crisis, and encouraging Jewish organizations to hold their conferences in Israel.

★ Holding the Rabbinical conference in Jerusalem, and bringing the CRC directors' meeting to Israel.

The working group is also cooperating with a government committee to initate 1987–88 tourist events honoring Israel's 40th anniversary, and to encourage capital investment in convention-center and apartment-hotel construction in Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv.

During the past year, the North American tourism working groups have become the address for tourist matters concerning Israel. However, the working group primarily concerns itself with creating a favorable atmosphere and evaluating ideas, not with implementing policies.

Legislation

This Task Force working group, comprising distinguished American and Israeli attorneys and entrepreneurs, prepared a comprehensive report, "To improve the Economic Environment". The introduction states that "it is the shared view of members of the American and Israeli legislative working groups of Operation Independence that dramatic changes are necessary in Israel's administrative, legislative, and regulatory environment in order to increase the ability of Israel to compete in the world marketplace.

Three areas have been targeted for urgent reform.

1. Administration: A centralized one-stop agency is needed to apply "clear rules and procedures, promulgated in advance, in a timely manner.

2. Taxation Policy: "Israel's tax legislation is frequently amended and changes are often applied to companies retroactively." Such procedures, added to high corporate and personal taxes, are "disincentives to potential investors who are comparing Israel with other lower-tax jurisdictions."

3. Foreign-Currency Controls: "Government controls in the outflow of foreign currency from Israel are hindering the freedom of companies in Israel engaging in international trade to use capital raised outside Israel in all aspects of the business. These controls and similar regulations affecting other aspects of international trade deter local and foreign investors from participating in Israeli enterprises and should be changed.

The report emphasizes that effective economic reform must be comprehensive and identifies additional issues and problems. Operation Independence's Executive submitted the findings to the Prime Minister, other government leaders, and the Governor of the Bank of Israel, with the understanding that a mechanism will be implemented as soon as possible to follow through and monitor changes.

Sale of State-Owned Corporations

Operation independence has previously suggested selling state owned corporations both to reduce government business involvement and to promote state-owned corporations to potential investors.

Last year, the Sale of State-Owned Corporations working group recommended that: "The best way for the government to implement the declared policy of wanting to sell state-owned corporations might be through retaining the services of a professional advisor of recognized stature in the international business community." The government, however, did not adopt this recommendation.

Territorial Canada

Several Canadian working groups were established last year, parallel to and operating with the US working groups, as a result, Israel Aircraft industries has opened a Canadian office and a Canada Month in Israel will be held.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom group has been meeting regularly and is recruiting a chief coordinator for its operations.

Marks and Spencer has let Operation Independence display Israeli goods in its permanent showroom to encourage retail chain buyers.

Australia and France

Australian and French Task Force groups have been established, comprising influential businessmen who identify with Operation Independence goals and will provide local contacts to Israeli businessmen and will encourage investments in Israel.

International Corporate Finance Company

The Task Force is currently developing a business plan to establish an Israeli-focused international corporate finance company. The Israeli and non-Israeli owned company, to be incorporated and based in the US, will provide international corporate finance services in Israel, mainly to medium-sized companies and enterpreneurs and to Israeli and foreign investors.

Strategic Planning

Operation Independence, the Israel Manufactures Association, Hevrat Ha'ovdim, and the Jerusalem institute of Management are sponsoring a high-level study on Israel's industrial strategy for the coming decade. The interim report stresses the need for an Israeli growth strategy to maximize added-value export niches.

Currently, the researchers believe that Israeli economic independence within the next decade is ambitious but feasible.

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

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
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Pursuing Justice — A Tribute to Louis Dembitz Brandeis

Mr. Chaim Herzog

President of Israel

No more fitting name could have been given to an American university under Jewish auspices, than that of Louis Dembitz Brandeis. The special nature of this great university reflects the synthesis he reached in his thinking. For he who achieved unique distinction as America's great, progressive lawyer and Supreme Court Justice, rose — unexpectedly — to prominence in a world he hardly knew, that of Zionist political and economic activity. The two worlds co-existed for him without difficulty. He came to see the preservation of American Jewish group identity as a most valuable contribution to American life and culture. The Jewish National Homeland would guarantee the preservation of the values of the Jewish tradition. He could happily quote the agreement of his revered friend and ally, President Woodrow Wilson: "In the opinion of the President," he wrote, "there is no conflict between Zionism and loyalty to America."

If Zionism was for Theodor Herzl "the Sabbath of his life," for Brandeis it was surely a profound and crucial spiritual adventure, an extension and intensification of being. In his own words, it brought him back to his people. There is something of the Moses story here — the aristocratically reared outsider who finds his brothers and assumes the uneasy but great role of leader. The mysterious impulse towards his people has, in Brandeis' case, sometimes been attributed to his descent from one of Jewish history's dissident sects, the mystic and revolutionary Frankists.

In any event, involvement in Zionism made a national leader, a thinker in Jewish and large political terms, of the quiet, modest but tenacious lawyer. As chairman of the American Provisional Committee for General Zionist Affairs during World War I, he not only brought American Jewish intellectuals into what had been a limited though very ardent group, but played a decisive role in the world movement. It was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917 and the League of Nations Mandate to Britain, based on the Declaration, which opened the way to international acceptance of the Zionist development of Palestine. Despite all the shifts and reversals in later British policy, the Declaration was the rock on which the future of Jewish Palestine was built. And in the complex negotiations preceding the issuance of the Declaration, Brandeis was an actor of foremost importance. He was the link with President Wilson, and President Wilson's views on the desirability of a pro-Zionist declaration were a propelling factor in the final decision of the British War Cabinet to accept the Declaration.

Even after his appointment to the Supreme Court compelled Brandeis to give up his Zionist office and later when differences of opinion with the European Zionists led to secession of his closest co-workers, he never ceased to follow developments in Palestine with utmost concern, generous assistance, and total personal involvement. His relations with leading government figures in Washington opened possibilities for dialogue with them on Zionist matters — in the Roosevelt administration as in the Wilsonian.

Louis Dembitz Brandeis, that wise, good and extraordinary man, led in the advancement of economic and social democracy in the United States; broadened the base of the American Jewish community and deeply influenced its relationship to its own identity and to the national center being built by Zionism. It is for a shaper of history in the noblest sense that this university of yours is named.

Louis Brandeis would have been fascinated, I think, that the history of this university and the history of the State of Israel were destined to march side by side from their common year of foundation in 1948. For both complement each other as the twin pillars of this extraordinary man's universal vision — on the one hand, justice to the individual, whoever he or she may be, by offering them access to education and opportunity on a nonsectarian basis; on the other, justice to his beloved Jewish people, by restoring to them their national opportunity in their own homeland.

Brandeis believed that Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel was natural, desirable, and would benefit not only Jews who would settle there, but also those Jews who would choose to remain in the Diaspora. He believed, too, that the Jewish people, living in their homeland and speaking their own language, would generate a reinvigorated Jewish culture that would take its place in the contemporary marketplace of ideas, and give the Jewish nation new opportunities to contribute to the well-being of mankind.

Forty years on, the State of Israel, has revolutionized Jewish thought and Jewish society; has opened up new fields of Jewish philosophy and intellectual application; and has posed new cultural and political challenges and opportunities for a Jewish people that now finds itself on the stage of world culture and world affairs in a way that it has not been since Biblical times.

Its universalistic impact is already considerable; I believe it still has a great deal more to give. In particular, the people of Israel eagerly await the peace that will enable us to share learning, scholarship and culture in all areas of science and the arts with the Arab peoples among whom we live. It is no accident that the first official Israeli presence to be established in Egypt, apart from our Diplomatic Mission, was an Academic Liaison office.

The Jewish national awakening felt at a very early stage that an authentic national renaissance demanded a return to some conceptual base of Hebrew law. It had to be, however, Hebrew law in a modern, secular, legal system, deriving authority from a democratic legislature. That generated a series of fascinating discussions, many of them still at their height; but I have always felt that the grappling with the question of law in the State of Israel encapsulates all the paradoxes of the Zionist movement. We are an ancient, yet modern State; a spiritual, yet secular society; a particular, yet universalistic culture; a Western, yet Middle Eastern policy. These are the parameters within which a great deal of the cultural and philosophical argument of Israel is conducted. There are a series of further issues which, I think, can only be fully confronted, at least in their Jewish dimension, in Israel. Today, be they near to the phenomenon of Israel and its implications and imperatives, or be they far from it — there is no significant movement in the Jewish world that does not relate to it; that does not echo, in a modern form, the classic and still valid dialectic within Judaism between the Land of Israel and the existence of the Jewish Diaspora.

I was nurtured on the twin concepts of Judaism and law and justice. Perhaps the outstanding aspect of Jewish civilization is its inherent justice and the fact that the concept of justice occupies paramount place in its principles. After all, many of the principles of human justice which are accepted as a matter of course in civilized countries today —— an acceptance which is, historically speaking, of comparatively recent vintage —— are the principles expounded to mankind by our Jewish forebears over 3,000 years ago. These are principles which are nonexistent today in the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world. These are principles maintained today in the democracies of the world, the comparatively few that exist — approximately one-fifth of the members of the U.N. These are principles which are daily trampled underfoot in derision and disdain in the United Nations. These are the principles which will never be known to or experienced by the bulk of the human race living in some four-fifths of the countries in the world, in which the value of human freedom as we understand it does not exist.

Our system of law, based on the Mishna and the Talmud, has developed over the ages and is, therefore, applicable to this day. The great interpreters of the Talmud through the ages had the sense of reality which encouraged them to adapt the experience of the past, so that it may best serve the needs of the present. Over the centuries a narrow interpretation of the law was displaced by a more liberal doctrine, which brought the law into consonance with the principles of humanity.

As Benjamin Cardozo so aptly emphasized on one occasion when discussing the relation between justice and law, the legal process must be one of compromise and concordance. In his words ”The reconciliation of the irreconcilable, the merger of antitheses, the synthesis of opposites, these are the great problems of the law.”

It is, indeed, sobering to reflect on the profundity of these words on the one hand, and to contemplate the process in the world which is so diametrically opposed to them on the other. For precisely the reverse is occurring in the world, and as it occurs, man’s mind is becoming accustomed and innured to new standards, based on cynical expediency which negate both the principles that inspired Cardozo and the great legacy of Jewish tradition from which Western culture has drawn so much.

For we Jews have given to the world a legal system which recognizes the existence of a special reciprocal tie between law and morality, a tie that stems from the common origin of both concepts in Judaic sources. The common origin of the concepts of law and morality remained a guideline for Judaism in all periods and generations. ”Thou shall not kill” and ”Thou shalt not steal” are enjoined with the same finality as ”Thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself; I am the Lord”. Indeed, Jewish law, functioning as a legal system, itself impels recourse to a moral imperative, and in so doing prepares the way to conversion of the moral imperative into a fully sanctioned norm. Thus, a legally sanctioned norm is to be found in the direction to act ”leniently, beyond the requirements of the law”, a direction which became in the post-talmudic period a fully fledged norm enforced in certain instances by the courts.

A basic tenet of Judaism is that the source of Jewish law is divine revelation. Law is a manifestation of God, just as nature and man himself are, whether it is a law relating to man’s relation with the Almighty or laws pertaining to man’s relations with his fellows. I cannot avoid recalling some of the Jewish peoples’ immortal contributions to values and society as I contemplate daily the eclipse of these values in so many parts of the world. And it is precisely those who have totally abandoned the principles given by the Jewish people to the world in their national and international practice who now would sit in judgement on Israel. ”Damned is the generation that sits in judgement of its judges,” said our sages. Damned is a world that must sit in judgement of those who would seek to pass judgement.

It was God's foremost commandment to man that he should deal justly with his fellow men. Thus it is that according to the Talmud, the conscientious judge who does justice is God's partner in the creation of the world: justice is the foundation and bulwark of the Universe. And doing justice is tantamount to bringing truth, and love and peace into the world.

Indeed, it is in the context of judicial administration that we find in the Bible the most insistent exhortations to do and to pursue justice "Ye shall pursue justice." Thus our sages echoing the Bible, the prophets and the psalmists never tire of accentuating the paramount importance of the right administration of justice which they regard as one of the three pillars supporting the entire edifice of civilized society. On three things the world exists, on the law, on truth and on peace.

We have other horizons, too. That famous medieval map, the 'cloverleaf map', showing Jerusalem in the center of the world, at the intersection of Europe, Asia and Africa, was an early recognition of our position at a cultural crossroads. That takes me back coincidentally, to another ceremony where I was present at Brandeis — David Ben Gurion's appearance here in 1951; the appearance at a young university of the Prime Minister of a fledgling State. Ben-Gurion was the internationalist of classic Zionism. He was keenly aware that reborn Israel, an ancient people but infused with the application of a pioneering spirit, had the capacity — I should say the duty — to be a 'light unto the nations'; had the duty to stretch out the hand of friendship and aid the emerging countries of the Third World.

When, together, forty years ago we embarked on our parallel roads, I think it would have been difficult, probably impossible to foresee what the coming decades would have in store for Israel. At the very time that your university opened, the State of Israel, then all of a few months old, was involved in its War of Independence — in which we sacrificed one percent of our population who lost their lives.

But despite the physical frontiers on which we have had to fight then and since, there have been other frontiers, too, at which we have constantly and persistently pushed: the frontiers of knowledge and the frontiers of intellect, the frontier of ideas and the frontier of learning. And it is for those that I am honored to accept this Degree.

Speech by Mr. Chaim Herzog, the President of Israel, on acceptance of an honorary doctorate bestowed by Brandeis University, November 1987.

A Letter to Elie Wiesel

Jan Willem van der Hoeven

Dear Mr. Wiesel,

Once more I want to thank you for your wonderful words yesterday evening and also for the readiness with which you were willing to talk to me afterwards. I myself am a speaker and know how people can press in upon one after a meeting and I appreciated your non-professional, warm, personal approach.

I hesitate in a way to write to you the things I will, for the matters you touched upon in your speech are so deep and so holy that any reply to them seems to be cheap or out of place. Nevertheless because of my respect for you I venture to reply as to a friend wanting nothing but the very best for you. Probably it would be better to converse with you face to face to help one another further as we think aloud but I would hardly dare to make such a demand upon your precious time. Therefore a letter.

My wife and I live in Jerusalem, in Israel. I have two children and my son is serving in "your" Israeli Army, if I may put it like this. I am Spokesman for the International Christian Embassy, Jerusalem that wants to be a beacon of comfort and practical help to the people of Israel. This includes a branch for Soviet Jewry and our concern generally for the Jewish people. We opened the Embassy as a response to the exodus of thirteen embassies out of Jerusalem in 1980 after the Jerusalem Law was passed in Israel's Knesset.

We are trying to be a worldwide voice that speaks up for Israel and are thankful to be able to do this. What we really do is what Ruth the Moabite did when she said to Naomi, "Let your God be my God and your people be my people. Where you lie down, there will I lie down, where you go, I will go and where you die, I will die."

We love Israel and the people of Israel and believe that they are the great sign of God's goodness that He has not only not forgotten His people but through them not forgotten His word.

You spoke as a Jew carrying the concern for this bleeding world in a way that deeply spoke to me and convicted me. Of course with all my heart I wish you already lived with us and your people in Israel.

I remember how Mr. Begin spoke some years ago at the Western Wall, the same evening that you spoke for the 5,000 Holocaust survivors and asked them this question, "My people, where was our God when six million of our people were brutally murdered?" I still remember his answer. He said, "If it had not been for the mercy of the Lord that left us a remnant to see this day of our redemption, we would have all been like Sodom and Gomorrah and let us not forget that our generation that saw the darkest page in our history also saw the brightest page, the return to Eretz Israel and Jerusalem. It is this generation that saw a returned Jerusalem."

The Jewish faith is universal but not without a center. It has a geographical focus point and that is Jerusalem. When I see the Isaiah wall before the U.N. building on which is written the words, "Then shall the nations turn their swords into ploughshares and teach war no longer", I know that your prophet did not see this vision becoming true through the efforts of that organization of the nations called the U.N., but saw this come to pass as a result of the Jews returning to their land and city of Jerusalem. Not New York, New York, "If I forget thee let my right hand forget her cunning", but Jerusalem is the only city where this prophecy will one day be fulfilled and in that day all the nations including the leaders of the United Nations will go up to Jerusalem. I firmly believe this and in this spirit I pray fervently for the peace of Jerusalem, for in her destiny lies the destiny of the world.

Wherever your people, marked as chosen by God to be a light to the nations, have wanted to carry that burden to change this world or help it to become more humane, they have principally failed. This world is not going to be changed by your people living in Boston, Berkeley, Moscow or Bonn among the gentiles. That is the tragedy of Marx, Freud, Einstein and many others. A Jew has to pay a price to change this world, he has to make Aliyah, he has to go up to Jerusalem, to Israel. It is from there that he was meant to be a blessing and a light to all the peoples of the world.

It is amusing to me to see how Jerusalem has become the political focus of attention, not when it was in British hands nor when it was in Turkish hands or in Jordanian hands, but when it returned to Jewish hands.

Sometimes I have been asked over the many years that I have lived in Jerusalem, "Where was God when the Holocaust occurred?" It is a terrible question and may be as you said, more terrible to try to answer it. But then by not answering it the One who pays the bill is God. The very One I am meant to love with all my heart is left in the unholy position of being accused of failing to live up to the One He claimed to be, a merciful Father. So not to answer is making Him pay. He will be doubted. He will be accused. He who suffered more with and for His people during all these years, more than can even be imagined or expressed. Does He need to be punished? You expressed it so beautifully in your speech when you said that in the beginning it was not man questioning God but God putting His question to man, "Where are you?" I loved this point you made, I dislike man's arrogance always giving himself the right to question God without being willing to be exposed to God questioning Him.

The book of Job is one of the most poignant examples of this. First there are his friends' cheap religious, neatly cut answers which do not satisfy either Job nor God, so that in the end Job has to pray for his religious self-assured friends. Then comes Job's near rebellious questioning of God right through the book and finally God answers Job, as you said in your speech, by questioning Job. It is only then that the righteous Job, a "tsadik", says, "I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes."

It is a pity how we who claim to believe the Book of Books, often conveniently interpret that Book to fit our own outlook and philosophy. God saw the monstrous power of prejudice and anti-Semitism coming up like a cloud in the hearts and minds of many Europeans in the beginning of this century. And in His love and mercy for His people, began to work for His people preparing them a way of escape which was Israel. He touched the heart of Theodore Herzl, who wrote, "We Jews have not yet sufficiently been trampled upon to believe that our only hope is to return to Zion." Jabotinsky said to thousands upon thousands, "liquidate the Diaspora or the Diaspora will liquidate you." However His people, that God through all these men wanted to save did not want to leave the fleshpots of Europe in accord with God's own promise, "And I will gather you from the nations where you have scattered and bring you back to the land of your fathers." He had even made it politically possible not only by sending the Zionists but by putting it in the heart of Balfour to officially open up the land of Palestine for Jewish immigration.

However Jabotinsky died a pauper in New York. Theodore Herzl felt so rejected that he wrote in his diary, "I have the right to become the world's greatest anti-Semite" and he died an early death.

The people that had laughed about these messengers of God's love, pleading with them to go up to Zion, died in the Holocaust. Your God warned your people of the invasion of Nebuchadnezzar through Jeremiah; of the Roman Holocaust by Titus, through Jesus; and of the horrible, horrible liquidation by Hitler, through the fiery Zionists and opened the door of escape through Balfour, is nevertheless still questioned!

Dear Mr. Wiesel, I am a gentile who believes with all my heart in what you Jews have taught about your God. I believe it is you and your people that He wants to bring home to Israel, to bring then this world home to Himself, when He will be King over all the world in Jerusalem. I live and pray earnestly for this day. I believe that in the end the quickest way to be involved with the redemption of this world is not by trying to be wiser than God but by praying for the peace of Jerusalem. It is only from this city that one day all killing and injustice among the nations will stop.

You can try to save situations, individuals, even groups of people, from injustice, from oppression, from death; but when they have been saved, in what kind of nations will they grow up? What kind of people will they become? How will they live? Will they use their gained freedom from oppression to oppress others? Will they who suffered injustice, now become unjust, harmful and egocentric themselves?

This world is not helped just by fighting for all the rights of men. It will only become a peaceful paradise of justice under the rightful reign of the Lord and that through His people in Jerusalem. After all the suffering you have gone through, you still prefer Boston to Jerusalem. As a gentile that lives with burning faith in your city's and people's destiny in Jerusalem, I wonder why.

What will bring the Jews home to become then channels of blessing to the world? New outbursts of anti-Semitism? If you were in God's place — all loving and caring — wanting to bring the Jews of America and other nations home to heal this sad, torn world, how would you go about it?

You have a golden mouth, the hand of God is upon you. How would you go about convincing your Jewish people to come home? Will you be successful after all the sufferings they experienced in their history; after all the promises of God to bring them back to the land of their fathers; after all the centuries of praying at Seder night, "HaShana haba-a beYerushalayim"? With all these biblical incentives in your hand, with your enormous gifts, would you as God's instrument be successful in bringing them to understand that this world will never become again the place it was created for without the Jews coming up to Jerusalem to present themselves as a nation to God for Him to heal the world through?

Do we force anti-Semitism, as horrible as it is, upon us as the only way through which God is able to convince us? I hope not.

Please forgive me if in any way my writing has been too didactic. It is certainly not because I lack respect for you, rather the opposite, because I found in you a man to which I believe I could entrust these thoughts.

With much respect and friendship,

Yours,
Jan Willem van der Hoeven
Spokesman, I.C.E.J.